Court Filings

The Superior Court reversed a Philadelphia County trial court order that had denied Juliett Barzilayeva and Eugene Zwick’s petition to set aside a sheriff’s sale of real property. The panel held that the restitution order imposed in Montgomery County remained a criminal sentencing matter under the sentencing court’s continuing jurisdiction and that the procedures in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9728 vested the county clerk (not a private victim) with authority to transmit certified restitution judgments for docketing. Because the Philadelphia filing and resulting judgment were outside the authorized procedure and thus void ab initio, the court struck the Philadelphia judgment and reversed the denial of the petition to set aside the sale.

The Superior Court opinion (dissenting) addresses a dispute over a Philadelphia sheriff’s sale of property owned by Juliett Barzilayeva and Eugene Zwick after a transferred civil judgment for restitution in favor of victim Otar Kosashvili. The Majority vacated the sale for jurisdictional defects; Judge Kunselman dissents and would have affirmed. He reasons that once a criminal restitution order is reduced to a civil judgment and entered by a prothonotary, the victim is the real party in interest and may transfer and enforce that judgment in another county. He also finds the Owners waived most procedural objections (notice, postponement, price) and that the record does not support setting aside the sale.

The Superior Court affirmed the Orphans’ Court decree that denied Jacob Singer’s petition to compel burial arrangements for his father, Irvin Michael Singer. The Orphans’ Court had stayed burial pending a hearing after Jacob alleged his brother and executor, David Singer, planned a private burial and excluded siblings. The Superior Court held that a valid will appointed David as executor and expressly directed burial in the family plot, and that Section 305 of the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code is subject to a decedent’s valid will. Because the will gave the executor authority over burial, Jacob’s majority-next-of-kin argument failed.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that when a contract is governed by the Home Improvement Consumer Protection Act (HICPA), a consumer may rescind the home-improvement contract within three business days by giving actual notice of cancellation to the contractor even if that notice is not in writing. The Office of Attorney General sued Gillece for refusing to honor timely oral or other non-written cancellations; the trial court granted partial summary judgment and issued an injunction, and the Commonwealth Court affirmed. The Supreme Court concluded HICPA’s specific, later-enacted consumer-protection rescission rule controls over any general written-notice language in the older UTPCPL.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected Gillece’s argument that a consumer’s oral cancellation of a home-improvement contract is ineffective unless followed by written notice. The court concluded that the Home Improvement Consumer Protection Act and the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law are meant to protect consumers, and that requiring written follow-up would undermine that purpose when a seller knows a consumer asked to cancel. The court therefore held sellers must honor an oral cancellation for contracts covered by the home‑improvement law and emphasized best practices of documenting cancellations in writing.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court's order on April 30, 2026, resolving an appeal brought by Elliot-Todd Parker Koger and Todd Elliott Koger Sr. (the "Koger Family") against multiple state entities and officials including the Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency and county court officers. The Supreme Court issued a short per curiam order that simply states the Commonwealth Court's decision is affirmed, without extended opinion or additional reasoning in this document. The procedural posture shows this appeal follows the Commonwealth Court's September 5, 2025 order in a matter previously litigated and identified at this Court's earlier docket entries.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court and trial court orders dismissing Clearfield County’s lawsuit against construction professionals as time-barred by the 12-year construction statute of repose, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5536. The County argued the common-law doctrine nullum tempus (no time runs against the sovereign) should toll the repose period, but the Court held nullum tempus cannot be used to defeat a statute of repose. Because a statute of repose abolishes causes of action after a fixed period and is not subject to tolling, the County’s claims, filed decades after construction finished, were jurisdictionally barred.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s decision that the Borough of West Chester’s municipal “stream protection fee” is a local tax, not a fee for service. The Borough had enacted the charge to fund stormwater management and compliance with federal and state stormwater regulations; universities (PASSHE and West Chester University) challenged it as an unlawful tax on exempt entities or as an improper fee. The Court held the Borough acted in its public capacity, providing a general public benefit and lacking a voluntary contractual relationship with property owners, so the charge functions as a tax from which the universities are immune.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court justice concurred with the majority in holding that the Borough’s stormwater charge functions as a tax rather than a fee because the proceeds fund broad, community-wide projects (tree planting, street sweeping, regrading alleys, rain gardens, curb extensions) that benefit the public generally rather than providing specific, measurable services to West Chester University. The concurrence explains that when charges fund generalized environmental and beautification projects remote from the university, the nexus to runoff from university property is too thin to qualify as a fee. The justice reserved judgment on different fact patterns where proceeds are spent solely on direct stormwater remediation or where charges are closely tied to individual property runoff.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court justice in this concurring and dissenting opinion would reverse the Commonwealth Court’s ruling that West Chester Borough’s stormwater ‘‘stream protection fee’’ is a tax exempting the Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education (West Chester University). The justice reasons the University voluntarily uses the Borough stormwater system, receives a discrete benefit from that use, and therefore could be required to pay a fee rather than be immune as a sovereign entity. Because the Commonwealth Court did not analyze whether the charge is proportional to the benefit received, the justice would remand for further factual development on proportionality.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania justice concurs in part and dissents in part from the majority in an appeal by the Borough of West Chester concerning a municipal stormwater charge imposed on the Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education and West Chester University. The justice agrees that the lower court correctly assigned the burden of proof to the Borough on cross-motions for summary judgment, but disagrees with the majority’s conclusion that the charge is a tax. The justice would hold the charge is a fee because it funds a service that benefits the University, can reasonably be allocated by impervious surface area, and may cover costs reasonably related to operating and maintaining stormwater management.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated part of the Commonwealth Court's order that had sustained a preliminary objection to Christopher Rogalski's request for a writ of mandamus to remove disciplinary information from Department of Education websites. The Supreme Court directed the Commonwealth Court to reconsider that preliminary objection in light of its recent decision in T.G.A. v. Department of Education, 348 A.3d 1043 (Pa. 2025). All other parts of the Commonwealth Court's order were affirmed, and jurisdiction over the case was relinquished.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court and held that the judicially created "positive steps" test cannot disqualify an unemployment benefits claimant for self-employment when the claimant has not actually performed services for wages. The case involved a claimant who, after leaving employment, formed a business entity, created a website, and spent money advertising but had not yet performed services or received earnings. The Court ruled that Section 4(l)(2)(B) of the Unemployment Compensation Law requires proof that services were performed for wages before applying the control and independence inquiry, so aspirational or preparatory acts alone cannot bar benefits.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Middle District, issued an order on April 30, 2026, quashing Pedro Luis Gavilan-Cruz’s Notice of Appeal. The court relied on Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 910(a)(5), indicating that the appeal did not comply with the requirement that only the questions in the jurisdictional statement (or those fairly comprised therein) will ordinarily be considered. As a result, the court declined to consider the appeal and dismissed the appeal process by quashing the notice.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court and upheld the trial court’s denial of the Commonwealth’s motion to nolle prosequi charges of negligent simple assault against former officer Stuart Harrison. The Commonwealth argued its key eyewitness had died and, without that testimony, it could not prove criminal negligence beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court held the trial court applied the correct Reinhart standard — evaluating whether the Commonwealth’s stated reasons were valid and reasonable — and found other available witnesses provided sufficient evidence to allow trial, so the nolle prosequi was not justified.

Justice Dougherty concurred in part and dissented in part from the Court’s decision affirming the Superior Court’s judgment in Commonwealth v. Harrison. He would have reversed the Superior Court’s published opinion and remanded for application of this Court’s binding precedent (particularly Commonwealth v. Reinhart and Commonwealth v. DiPasquale) governing judicial review of a prosecutor’s motion to nolle prosequi. He criticizes the Superior Court for adopting a de novo standard for review and the majority for affirming on an alternate ground and addressing issues the Commonwealth did not raise, while warning about separation-of-powers concerns and unresolved practical consequences of the decision.

The Superior Court affirmed the denial of Tyrell Giles’s PCRA petition challenging his convictions for aggravated assault and related offenses. Giles filed a late (nunc pro tunc) post-conviction petition claiming trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting when witnesses testified that he was on state parole. The court held the petition was untimely and Giles failed to plead or prove any statutory exception to the PCRA time bar, so the court lacked jurisdiction to review the claim. The Superior Court therefore affirmed denial of relief, noting the lower court’s merits ruling was unnecessary.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that cast vote records (CVRs) are not the "contents of ballot boxes and voting machines" under Section 308 (25 P.S. § 2648) of the Election Code, and therefore are not exempt from public disclosure. The court rejected the Commonwealth Court’s view that CVRs are the digital equivalent of machine contents and found the statute’s plain language dispositive. The Court noted that if policy concerns exist about disclosure, the proper remedy is legislative change rather than judicial construction of a statute enacted in 1937.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that cast vote records (CVRs) — digital spreadsheet reports of votes generated by a county’s tabulating equipment — are not the "contents" of ballot boxes or voting machines under Section 308 of the Election Code and therefore are subject to public disclosure. The dispute arose from a Right-to-Know request to Lycoming County for CVRs from the 2020 general election, which had been denied as exempt. The Court concluded CVRs are documents/reports generated by tabulators (automatic tabulating equipment), not the physical ballots in ballot boxes or the voting machines that let voters mark and verify votes.

The Superior Court affirmed most of the Berks County custody decision awarding Mother sole legal custody and primary physical custody of the parties’ five-year-old daughter, and awarding Father professionally supervised physical visitation. The court found credible evidence of Father’s history of violence, a validated child-protective-services report, criminal convictions, and allegations of drug-dealing that supported a present risk finding under the custody statute and justified safety restrictions. However, the court reversed a supplemental order (a gag order) that broadly prohibited public discussion about the case because the trial court did not make specific factual findings that Father’s posts had harmed or would imminently harm the child, so the speech restriction failed constitutional scrutiny.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed a Delaware County contempt order that jailed Dominic Anusionwu for seven days with a $1,200 purge for failing to pay child support. The court held that because imprisonment was a likely outcome, the trial court was required to ensure Anusionwu either had appointed counsel or knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to counsel via a formal colloquy. The Superior Court found the trial court erred by not conducting that waiver inquiry or determining indigency at the March 12, 2025 hearing and remanded the matter for compliance with the applicable procedures.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed a juvenile court order changing 13-year-old C.B.’s permanency goal from reunification to subsidized permanent legal custodianship (SPLC). The stepfather, I.Q., appealed and appointed counsel filed an Anders brief concluding the appeal was frivolous. The appellate court found counsel complied with Anders procedural requirements, reviewed the record, and held that the juvenile court’s factual findings and legal conclusions — including that placement remained necessary, reunification efforts were thwarted by the parent’s noncooperation, and C.B. had a strong bond with her foster custodian — were supported by the record. The court granted counsel’s withdrawal and affirmed the goal change order.

The Superior Court vacated and remanded the defendant Dwayne Eric Lee’s sentence because the trial court imposed no jail time for a conviction under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(i). The Commonwealth appealed the sentence as illegal; the court interpreted the statutory phrase “shall be sentenced . . . to undergo imprisonment for a period of not less than 60 days nor more than 90 days” to require an indeterminate sentence with a mandatory 60-day minimum and a 90-day maximum. Because the trial court imposed zero days, the sentence was illegal and must be vacated for resentencing consistent with the statutory range.

This is a dissenting opinion in a Pennsylvania Superior Court criminal appeal. The dissent argues the majority misapplied precedent and statutory rules in interpreting 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(i). Relying on Commonwealth v. Glover (1959) and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9756, the dissent contends the statute prescribes a maximum sentence range of 60 to 90 days and that any minimum cannot exceed half the chosen maximum. The dissenter would vacate the majority’s sentencing interpretation and remand for resentencing consistent with Glover and section 9756 (maximum 60–90 days; minimum no more than half the maximum).

The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed Edward Zealor’s convictions for fifty counts of possessing child sexual abuse material. Zealor had moved to suppress evidence obtained after the Commonwealth used administrative subpoenas under 18 Pa.C.S. § 5743.1 to obtain subscriber and router log information tying his shared IP/port to torrent files containing child pornography. The court held Zealor lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the subscriber, payment, and IP/port/torrent connection data, and even if some non‑constitutional statutory overreach occurred, suppression is not an available remedy under the Act. The convictions and sentence were therefore affirmed.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the dismissal of Jason Harding’s first PCRA petition without an evidentiary hearing. Harding sought post-conviction relief asserting layered ineffective-assistance claims (trial, direct-appeal, and PCRA counsel) and other errors stemming from trial events (jury delay/mistrial, admission of a statement to police, counsel’s witness choices, and his decision to testify). The court found the claims either procedurally waived, meritless, or unprejudicial: the delay did not prejudice Harding, his custodial statement was a spontaneous utterance not requiring Miranda warnings, failure to call a particular witness would not have helped his self-defense case, and his decision to testify was knowing and voluntary.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed Hakime Cooper’s conviction and sentence after a bench trial. Cooper was convicted of retaliation against a witness/victim and harassment for threatening the victim in a courthouse hallway after the victim testified against her. The court held the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence because Cooper and two companions together made multiple threats, satisfying the statute’s requirement of a course of conduct or repeated threatening acts. The court therefore upheld Cooper’s six- to twelve-month sentence for retaliation; no additional penalty was imposed for harassment.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the jury verdict for Thomas Chevrolet in Scott Martin’s wrongful-termination suit. Martin alleged he was fired for refusing his supervisor’s instructions to commit insurance fraud. The jury found for the employer, and the trial court denied post-trial relief. On appeal Martin argued the court erred by (1) refusing a jury instruction on the “cat’s paw” theory, (2) denying a juror challenge for cause, and (3) excluding evidence and an email about other employees’ post-termination allegations against the supervisor. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the court’s jury instructions, juror inquiry, or relevancy and prejudice rulings on evidence, and affirmed judgment.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed (quashed) Ajani Posey’s appeal because the Commonwealth Court’s order was not final or immediately appealable. The court relied on Pennsylvania appellate procedure rules defining final orders and explaining limits on appeals from certain interlocutory orders, including transfer orders under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103. Because the challenged order did not meet the rules for an appeal as of right, the Supreme Court ended the case without addressing the underlying merits.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court quashed Ajani Posey’s notice of appeal on April 21, 2026, because the Commonwealth Court’s order was not final or immediately appealable. The court concluded the appealed order did not meet the state rules' definition of a final order and noted that certain interlocutory transfer orders are not appealable as of right. Consequently, the appeal cannot proceed in the Supreme Court at this time.