Com. v. Zealor, E.

J-S44038-25

                                   2026 PA Super 81

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  EDWARD JOSEPH ZEALOR                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 825 EDA 2025

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 26, 2025
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division
                     at No(s): CP-46-CR-0000986-2024

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

OPINION BY SULLIVAN, J.:                                 FILED APRIL 22, 2026

       Edward Joseph Zealor (“Zealor”) appeals from the judgment of sentence

following his convictions for fifty counts of possessing child sexual abuse

material arising from his possession of thousands of photographs and videos

of child pornography.1 Because Zealor’s appellate issues hinge on the trial

court’s denial of his suppression motion, and none of his issues merit relief,

we affirm the judgment of sentence.

       The trial court set forth the factual and procedural history of this case,

which we set forth in relevant part, as follows:

             [I]n February [] 2024, [the] Pennsylvania State Police
       [(“PSP”)] filed a criminal complaint charging Zealor with[, inter
       alia, several counts of disseminating and possessing child
       pornography.] . . ..

             [I]n August [] 2024, Zealor filed a motion to suppress
       evidence, alleging that the Commonwealth unlawfully obtained
       information from Comcast Cable through the Commonwealth’s
____________________________________________


1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d).
J-S44038-25


       service of administrative subpoenas directed to Digital Media, LLC
       and Comcast Cable [pursuant to section 5743.1 of Pennsylvania’s
       Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional
       Records Access Act (“the Act”)2].             Zealor claimed the
       administrative subpoenas are not constitutionally valid. The
       administrative subpoenas formed the basis for a search warrant
       of Zealor’s apartment, which Zealor claimed did not contain
       sufficient probable cause to justify the searches and seizures.

             On September 20, 2024, the court held a hearing on
       Zealor’s motion to suppress evidence. Zealor waived his presence
       at the suppression hearing. At the suppression hearing, no
       testimony was presented.        The Commonwealth entered five
       exhibits into evidence: (1) [a] stipulation of facts; (2) designation
       of Deputy Attorney General [(“DAG”)] Kristen Kemp to issue
       administrative subpoenas; (3) administrati[ve] subpoena on
       Comcast; (4) administrative subpoena on Digital Media; and (5)
       search warrant for 1514 W Marshall Street, Norristown, PA (West
       Norriton Township, Montgomery County).

              At the suppression hearing, the parties stipulated to the
       following facts. In the [f]all of 2023, Corporal Anthony Reppert
       [(“Corporal Reppert”)] of the [PSP] worked as a member of the
       Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force. As a part of the task
       force, Corporal Reppert monitors BitTorrent [peer-to-peer
       (“P2P”)] file sharing networks for possible sharing and trading of
       child pornography . . .. The investigation in this case began when
       Corporal Reppert received a notification that IP address
       173.12.32.109 may be sharing child pornography. [I]n November
       [] 2023, Corporal Reppert successfully downloaded numerous files
       that were coming from a computer using th[is same] IP address
       of 173.12.32.109. Within the files downloaded was a video
       depicting a [two-to-four-]year-old child being sexually assaulted
       by an adult male. [I]n December [] 2023, [DAG] Kemp approved
       an administrative subpoena for the IP address of 173.12.32.109
       to be served on Comcast. Comcast responded with subscriber
       information relating back to a Digital Media, LLC [(“Digital
       Media”)] with a subscriber address [for Jefferson Apartments] in
       Norristown. [I]n January [] 2024, [DAG] Kemp approved another
       administrative subpoena for [the] IP address of 173.12.32.109 to
       be served on Digital Media[,] LLC. [I]n January [] 2024, Corporal
____________________________________________


2 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5741 et seq.


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J-S44038-25


     Reppert received the results from Digital Media[; and Corporal
     Reppert learned that the IP address was a public facing IP address
     shared by all internet connections at Jefferson Apartments, with
     each subscriber possessing a network gateway, such as a router,
     with a unique port number, through which the subscriber could
     use the shared IP address to access the internet and make
     connections with other IP addresses. Corporal Reppert learned
     from the subpoena that Zealor’s port number used the shared IP
     address to communicate via a P2P program with other IP
     addresses associated with child pornography, and Zealor’s
     combined IP address and port number was associated with a
     unique torrent identifier—called an “infohash,” discussed further
     infra—for child pornography].       Based on that information,
     Corporal Reppert applied for a search warrant for [Zealor’s] home
     in West Norriton, Montgomery County, PA. The search warrant
     was signed and authorized by [Magisterial District Judge] Edward
     Kropp.    The attorneys presented argument.         Following the
     suppression hearing, the court took the motion under advisement.

             [I]n October [] 2024, the court issued findings of fact and
     conclusions of law and denied Zealor’s suppression motion. The
     court scheduled this matter for a bench trial [i]n November []
     2024. [I]n November [] 2024, Zealor signed a waiver of jury trial
     and a stipulated bench trial colloquy and proceeded with a
     stipulated bench trial. The Commonwealth filed [a]mended [b]ills
     of [i]nformation in open court charging Zealor with[, inter alia,]
     fifty [] counts of [possessing child pornography] . . ..

            Following the stipulated bench trial, the court found Zealor
     guilty of [the fifty] counts of [possessing child pornography]. The
     court determined that Zealor possessed a total of 41,663
     photographs and 9,571 videos. The court deferred sentencing to
     obtain a presentence investigation report, a sexual violent
     predator assessment and a psychosexual evaluation, and released
     Zealor on . . . bail.

           [I]n February [] 2025, the court held a sentencing hearing.
     For counts [one] through [forty-nine], the court imposed
     concurrent sentences of two-and-a-half to seven years in a state
     correctional institution. That sentence is in the standard range of
     the guidelines. On [c]ount [fifty], the court imposed seven years
     of probation consecutive to the expiration of parole.




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J-S44038-25


               On March 25, 2025, Zealor filed a timely [n]otice of [a]ppeal
      . . ..

Trial Court Opinion, 5/29/25, at 1-4 (some citations to the record omitted).

Both Zealor and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Zealor raises the following issues for our review:

     I.    Did the lower court err in denying [Zealor’s] motion to
           suppress[,] pursuant to the 4th Amendment of the United
           States Constitution and Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania
           Constitution[,] in that the administrative subpoenas issued to
           Comcast and Digital Media pursuant to [section] 5743.1
           allowed the Commonwealth to obtain constitutionally
           protected information and data without a warrant supported
           by probable cause and issued by a neutral and detached
           magistrate or other judicial authority?

    II.    Did the lower court err in denying [Zealor’s] motion to
           suppress pursuant to the 4th Amendment of the United States
           Constitution and Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania
           Constitution[,] in that the administrative subpoenas issued to
           Comcast and Digital Media pursuant to [section] 5743.1
           allowed the Commonwealth to obtain constitutionally
           protected information and data that were beyond the scope of
           the items listed in [section] 5743.1 without a warrant
           supported by probable cause and issued by a neutral and
           detached magistrate or other judicial authority?

   III.    Did the lower court err in denying [Zealor’s] motion to
           suppress pursuant to the 4th Amendment of the United States
           Constitution and Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania
           Constitution[,] in that the administrative subpoenas issued to
           Comcast and Digital Media pursuant to [section] 5743.1 were
           served on foreign corporations outside the boundaries of
           Pennsylvania, over which the Commonwealth had no
           jurisdiction, in violation of the Uniform Act to Secure
           Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State in Criminal
           Cases, 42 Pa.C.S.A.] § 5964?

Zealor’s Brief at 3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).




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J-S44038-25


      Our standard of review for an order denying a suppression motion is as

follows:

      [We are] limited to determining whether the suppression court’s
      factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal
      conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the
      Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may
      consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of
      the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read
      in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression
      court’s factual findings are supported by the record, we are bound
      by these findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal
      conclusions are erroneous. Where, as here, the appeal of the
      determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of
      legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are not
      binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the
      suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the
      conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to our plenary
      review.

Commonwealth v. Ross, 330 A.3d 1262, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2025) (internal

citation and quotations omitted).

      Because all of Zealor’s issues relate to his challenge to the issuance of

administrative subpoenas pursuant to section 5743.1, we begin by setting

forth the relevant portions of section 5743.1, which provide:

            (a) Authorization.—

                (1) In an ongoing investigation that monitors or utilizes
                    online services or other means of electronic
                    communication to identify individuals engaged in an
                    offense involving the sexual exploitation or abuse of
                    children, the following shall apply:

                        (i) The following may issue in writing and cause
                            to be served a subpoena requiring the
                            production     and     testimony       under
                            subparagraph (ii):


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J-S44038-25


                                   ****

                           (B) A deputy attorney general designated in
                               writing by the Attorney General.

                                   ****

                        (ii) A subpoena issued under subparagraph (i)
                             may be issued to a provider of electronic
                             communication      service or     remote
                             computing service:

                           (A)   requiring disclosure under section
                                 5743(c)(2) (relating to requirements
                                 for governmental access) of a
                                 subscriber   or   customer’s   name,
                                 address, telephone or instrument
                                 number or other subscriber number or
                                 identity, including any temporarily
                                 assigned network address, which may
                                 be relevant to an authorized law
                                 enforcement inquiry;

                                   ****

              (2) A subpoena under this section shall describe the
                  information required to be produced and prescribe
                  a return date within a reasonable period of time
                  within which the information can be assembled and
                  made available.

                                   ****

          (b) Service.--The following shall apply:

                                   ****

              (3) Service may be made upon a domestic or foreign
                  corporation or upon a partnership or other
                  unincorporated association which is subject to suit
                  under a common name by delivering the subpoena
                  to any of the following:

                  (i)   An officer of the entity.

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J-S44038-25



                   (ii) A managing or general agent of the entity.

                   (iii) An agent authorized by appointment or by law
                         to receive service of process in this
                         Commonwealth.

                (4) The affidavit of the person serving the subpoena
                    entered on a true copy of the subpoena by the
                    person serving it shall be proof of service.

           (c) Enforcement.--The following shall apply:

                (1) The Attorney General or a district attorney, or a
                    designee may invoke the aid of a court of common
                    pleas within the following jurisdictions to compel
                    compliance with the subpoena:

                    (i)   The jurisdiction in which the investigation is
                          being conducted.

                     (ii) The jurisdiction in which the subpoenaed
                          person resides, conducts business or may be
                          found.

            (2) The court may issue an order requiring the subpoenaed
     person to appear before the Attorney General or a district
     attorney, or a designee to produce records or to give testimony
     concerning the production and authentication of the records. A
     failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the court
     as contempt of court. All process may be served in a judicial
     district of the Commonwealth in which the person may be found.

                                  ****
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5743.1.

     In his first issue, Zealor asserts the information the Commonwealth

sought in its administrative subpoenas was constitutionally protected and




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J-S44038-25


obtained without a warrant.3 Initially, we note that under both the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the

Pennsylvania Constitution, searches conducted without a warrant are per se

unreasonable unless a recognized exception applies. See, e.g., Hunte, 337

A.3d at 498.       Once a defendant files a motion to suppress, “it is the

Commonwealth’s burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the challenged evidence was not obtained in violation of the defendant’s

rights.” Commonwealth v. Wallace, 42 A.3d 1040, 1047-48 (Pa. 2012).

However, “a defendant must show that he had a privacy interest in the place

invaded or thing seized that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”

Commonwealth v. Enimpah, 106 A.3d 695, 698-99 (Pa. 2014) (explaining



____________________________________________


3 We note Zealor’s brief is not a paragon of clarity.     His argument at times
implies a constitutional challenge to section 5743.1. See Zealor’s Brief at 10-
11, 15 (stating that a “statute cannot authorize what the Fourth Amendment
or Article I, Section 8 would prohibit,” and citing, inter alia, Commonwealth
v. Hunte, 337 A.3d 483, 497–98 (Pa. 2025) wherein our Supreme Court
struck down an implied consent statute following a challenge to the statute as
facially unconstitutional).      However, section 5743.1 is presumed
constitutional, and Zealor does not develop an argument that all of its
applications are unconstitutional. See Zealor’s Brief at 10-15; cf. Hunte, 337
A.3d at 497-98. Additionally, it is unclear whether Zealor is asserting an as-
applied constitutional challenge to the statute.                 See generally
Commonwealth v. Hairston, 249 A.3d 1046, 1054 n.5 (Pa. 2021) (stating
that an as-applied challenge to a statute’s constitutionality “is one asserting
that the statute, even though it may generally operate constitutionally, is
unconstitutional in a defendant's particular circumstances”). However, to the
extent Zealor brings an as-applied challenge, it would hinge on the
constitutionality of the information sought by the Commonwealth, and, as
such, our analysis infra addresses the same issue.


                                           -8-
J-S44038-25


the important distinction between standing and privacy interest).              A

reasonable expectation of privacy will be found to exist when the defendant

“exhibits an actual or subjective expectation of privacy and that expectation

is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” Commonwealth

v. Kurtz, 294 A.3d 509, 520 (Pa. Super. 2023), aff’d, 348 A.3d 133 (Pa.

2025).

      In determining whether an individual’s expectation of privacy is

legitimate or reasonable, we must consider the totality of the circumstances

and the determination “ultimately rests upon a balancing of the societal

interests involved.” Commonwealth v. Peterson, 636 A.2d 615, 619 (Pa.

1993).   “The constitutional legitimacy of an expectation of privacy is not

dependent on the subjective intent of the individual asserting the right but on

whether the expectation is reasonable in light of all the surrounding

circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 A.2d 428, 435 (Pa. Super.

2009) (en banc) (citation omitted). “The expectation of privacy is an inquiry

into the validity of the search or seizure itself; if the defendant has no

protected privacy interest, neither the Fourth Amendment nor Article

I, § 8 is implicated.” Enimpah, 106 A.3d at 699 (emphasis added).

      Relevant to digital information, this Court has recently articulated the

law regarding the “third-party doctrine,” i.e., when a defendant voluntarily

turns over information to third parties, as follows:

             It is well-established that, under the third-party doctrine, an
      individual may forfeit his or her legitimate privacy interest in

                                      -9-
J-S44038-25


     property that is voluntarily provided to others as he has taken the
     risk that that information would be conveyed by the third party to
     the government. See Commonwealth v. Pacheco, [] 263 A.3d
     626, 636 & n.10 ([Pa.] 2021). In United States v. Miller, 425
     U.S. 435 [] (1976), the United States Supreme Court held that a
     bank customer holds no protected privacy interest under the
     Fourth Amendment in his account records, including copies of
     checks and deposit slips. [See i]d. at 440-43 . . .. Following
     Miller, our Supreme Court has ruled that Article I, Section 8 of
     the Pennsylvania Constitution provides broader protection to
     substantive bank records than the Fourth Amendment but that
     a bank customer has no legitimate expectation of privacy over
     basic account information, such as the name and address
     associated with an account. [See] Commonwealth v. Duncan,
     [] 817 A.2d 455, 462-63 ([Pa.] 2003); Commonwealth v.
     DeJohn, [] 403 A.2d 1283, 1290-91 ([Pa.] 1979).

            The third-party doctrine has also been extended to
     computer files, electronic messages, and other digital records. In
     Commonwealth v. Dunkins, [] 263 A.3d 247 ([Pa.] 2021)
     (“Dunkins II”), our Supreme Court concluded that a student’s
     assent to his college’s computing resources policy resulted in a
     voluntary relinquishment of any expectation of privacy concerning
     the records of his connection to the campus wireless internet
     network. [See i]d. at 255-56. This Court has held that an
     individual lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy over emails
     and chat room messages once those communications are received
     by the intended recipients because “once the [message] is
     received and opened, the destiny of the [message] then lies in the
     control of the recipient [ ], not the sender, absent some legal
     privilege.” Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823, 83[1]
     (Pa. Super. 2001) (citation omitted), aff[’d], [] 837 A.2d 1163
     ([Pa.] 2003). We have likewise held that, when an individual turns
     his computer in to a repair shop and the repair necessarily entail
     access to the video files stored on the computer, the individual
     “has knowingly exposed the contents of his computer to the public
     and has lost any reasonable expectation of privacy in those
     contents.” Commonwealth v. Sodomsky, 939 A.2d 363, 369
     (Pa. Super. 2007).

            Regarding IP addresses, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
     has stated that “[f]ederal courts have uniformly held that”
     individuals do not have a cognizable privacy interest in their IP
     addresses. United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 573 (3d

                                   - 10 -
J-S44038-25


       Cir. 2010)[. S]ee also, e.g., United States v. Trader, 981 F.3d
       961, 967-68 (11th Cir. 2020); United States v. Morel, 922 F.3d
       1, 9 (1st Cir. 2019); United States v. Contreras, 905 F.3d 853,
       857 (5th Cir. 2018). As that court explained, “no reasonable
       expectation of privacy exists in an IP address, because that
       information is . . . not merely passively conveyed through third
       party equipment, but rather [ ] voluntarily turned over [to internet
       service providers] in order to direct the third party’s servers.”
       Christie, 624 F.3d at 574 (citation omitted).

Kurtz, 294 A.3d at 520–21 (footnote omitted).4

       Turning to the matter before us, Zealor argues the administrative

subpoenas, issued pursuant to section 5743.1, are constitutionally infirm

because they were not “limited to subscriber information.” Zealor’s Brief at

13. Specifically, Zealor argues that the collection of “payment information

and internet connection logs requested by both administrative subpoenas as

well as the search of the internet connection logs for each port associated with

[his] IP address” should be deemed constitutionally protected as was the

information in, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018).5

____________________________________________


4 Our Supreme Court later affirmed this Court’s decision in Kurtz. A plurality
of the Supreme Court affirmed this Court’s conclusion that Kurtz lacked a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his IP address; however, three justices
in a concurrence opined that they would have affirmed on other grounds and
not reached this issue. See Kurtz, 348 A.3d 133, 156 (Pa. 2025) (OAJC
stating that Kurtz had no enforceable expectation of privacy in his internet
searches); id. at 156-57 (Todd, C.J., concurring). Justice Donohue dissented.
See id. at 163-64.

5 In Carpenter, the United States Supreme Court limited the application of

the third-party doctrine in the context of a search of cell-site location
information (“CSLI”), which is information that is collected and stored by
wireless carriers when a user's cell phone connects to a specific radio antenna,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)


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J-S44038-25


       Following our review, we conclude Zealor’s argument merits no relief.

Here, Zealor develops no argument that his payment information extended to

anything other than his name and address associated with the account number

used to pay for service.        To the extent Zealor suggests that his payment

information is constitutionally protected, this Court has rejected this

argument.      See Kurtz, 294 A.3d at 520 (noting that the Constitutional

protections afforded to “substantive” bank records do not extend to basic

account information).

       Next, we address Zealor’s argument as it pertains to his IP address

connection logs. This Court has held that an individual lacks a reasonable

expectation of privacy over emails and chat room messages because once the

information is sent to the intended recipients, they are free to do what they

like with the information, unless a legal privilege applies. See id. at 521. This

Court has likewise found persuasive authority from the Third Circuit Court of

Appeals holding that individuals do not have a privacy interest in their IP

addresses and internet searches, because the information is not passively


____________________________________________


or cell site. See 585 U.S. at 300-01. However, the Carpenter decision rested
on the fact that CSLI is “not truly ‘shared’ [with a third party] as one normally
understands the term” because “a cell phone logs a cell-site record by dint of
its operation, without any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond
powering up.” Id. at 2220. In addition, the Court noted that through the
collection of CSLI, the government was able to build “a detailed chronicle of
[the defendant’s] physical presence compiled every day, every moment, over
several years,” that the defendant could “in no meaningful sense [have]
voluntarily assume[d] the risk of turning over.” Id. (internal citation and
quotations omitted).

                                          - 12 -
J-S44038-25


conveyed but voluntarily turned over to the internet service providers in order

to access the third party’s servers. See id. (discussing Christie, 624 F.3d at

574). In Kurtz, we distinguished the instant scenario from Carpenter, which

involved the collection of CSLI, because CSLI is passively conveyed by the

mere powering on of a cell phone whereas each time an individual chooses to

access another’s server, the individual provides their IP address voluntarily;

additionally, we note the period for which information was sought in Kurtz

was for a discrete seven-day period and it was limited to searches involving

the victim of Kurtz’s crime. See 294 A.3d at 522-23.6

       Here, the PSP downloaded child pornography, in this case video of the

molestation of a two-to-four-year-old girl, from the IP address at issue herein.

See N.T., 9/20/24, Ex. C-5 (Search Warrant), at 15.             Based on this

information, the Commonwealth issued an administrative subpoena on

Comcast for this IP address and determined the subscriber information and



____________________________________________


6 Zealor argues our holding in Kurtz was dictum because there was a search

warrant in that case. See Zealor’s Brief at 15. However, Zealor is incorrect.
The first rationale for our affirmance of the denial of suppression was that
Kurtz did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his IP address. Only
after that conclusion did we hold in the alternative that the warrant was
supported by probable cause.         See 294 A.3d at 522-23.         See also
Commonwealth v. Derby, 678 A.2d 784, 788 (Pa. Super. 1996) (stating
that “where a decision rests on two or more grounds, none can be relegated
to the category of obiter dictum. . . . The fact that the same result may be
reached by either of two rulings of a court does not make either dictum”)
(internal citation, brackets, and quotations omitted).



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J-S44038-25


service address was for Digital Media, LLC, 1514 W. Marshall Street, with a

billing address for Jefferson Apartments. See id. at 16. Corporal Reppert

spoke to a general manager at Digital Media, who informed him that Digital

Media managed all of the internet connections at Jefferson Apartments, and

that “customers share a singular public facing IP address and that

connections are established through Network Address Translation,” in this

case, a “network gateway such as a router,” with an “assigned port number”

that each device can use to send and receive communications. Id. (emphasis

added). Thus, with a combination of the shared public facing IP address and

a port number, a particular subscriber can be identified. See id.

       The Commonwealth subsequently issued an administrative subpoena to

Digital Media LLC for, inter alia, router log information for users who made

connections between the shared IP address at issue herein and forty-eight

specific IP addresses associated with an “infohash”—i.e., a unique identifier

for a torrent file (i.e., a file used to convey a file or group of files via torrent

software)7—linked to torrents for the distribution of child pornography. See

N.T., 9/20/24, Ex. C-5 (Search Warrant), at 17; see also id., C-4

(Administrative Subpoena on Digital Media LLC). Digital Media turned over to

the Commonwealth router log information showing that the device utilizing

the shared IP address and port number 58018 was associated with the child



____________________________________________


7 See N.T., 9/20/24, Ex. C-5 (Search Warrant), at 10.


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J-S44038-25


pornography infohash discussed above. See id. The router log information

showed that Zealor was the subscriber using this port number. See id.

      Contrary to Zealor’s suggestion that the subpoenas would allow the

Commonwealth to create a “detailed picture” of his “personal affairs, opinions,

habits,”   and   “familial,   political,     professional,   religious,   and   sexual

associations,” in contravention of Carpenter, the subpoenas were limited to

information about Zealor’s connections, via his port and a shared public facing

IP address, to other IP addresses associated with an infohash for a torrent

containing, inter alia, a thirty-six second long video depicting a prepubescent

girl (of approximately eight to ten years of age) receiving oral sex. See id.,

Ex. C-5, at 17.       Thus, as in Kurtz, the information sought via the

administrative subpoenas was not of the sort passively collected through the

mere powering on or operation of Zealor’s computer; rather, he took several

affirmative steps, including using his router and port number and IP address

to download a P2P sharing program, after which he chose to use his router

and IP address to, using the P2P software, connect with other users via their

IP addresses to share child pornography which contained identifiers (i.e., the

infohash) indicating it was child pornography.               Zealor could have no

reasonable expectation of privacy in the fact that he shared child pornography,

indicated with a particular infohash, on a P2P program with third parties. See

Kurtz, 294 A.3d at 520–21. Notably, torrent files “are typically found as a

[mere] result of keyword searches in internet sites that host or link them.”


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J-S44038-25


See N.T., 9/20/24, Ex. C-5 (Search Warrant), at 10.8 Based on the foregoing,

Zealor has failed to show the trial court erred in concluding he had not

demonstrated a reasonable expectation of privacy, and, as such, neither the

Fourth Amendment, nor Article I, Section 8, are implicated, see Enimpah,

106 A.3d at 699, and Zealor’s constitutional challenge fails.

         In his second issue, Zealor argues the trial court erred in denying

suppression because the subpoenas allowed the Commonwealth to obtain

information beyond the scope permitted by section 5743.1. He maintains his

“method of payment” and the IP address connection information are not listed

in section 5743.1(a)(1)(ii) and, adds without development, that these are not

the type of information the statute contemplates. Zealor’s Brief at 17. Zealor

suggests that this information goes beyond the “limited subscriber data” the

statute addresses and instead shows the subpoenas were used “as an

investigatory tool to review sensitive data without obtaining a warrant.” Id.

at 18.

         The trial court considered Zealor’s argument and concluded it merits no

relief, as “the information requested was either specifically authorized by the

statute or encompassed in the provision permitting the Attorney General to

obtain ‘other subscriber number or identity, including any temporarily

assigned network address, which may be relevant to an authorized law


____________________________________________


8 Additionally, we observe that Zealor does not assert that he took any steps

to protect his privacy.

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enforcement inquiry[.]’”       Trial Court Opinion, 5/29/25, at 11 (quoting 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 5743.1(a)(1)(ii)(A)).

       Assuming, arguendo, that the administrative subpoena in which the

Commonwealth sought Zealor’s method of payment and IP address connection

log records were outside of the scope of section 5743.1(a)(1)(ii)(A), we

conclude that Zealor is due no relief, as this violation of the statute would be

non-constitutional, as discussed above, and, as such, suppression is an

inappropriate remedy.9 In Commonwealth v. Dougalewicz, 113 A.3d 817,

826 (Pa. Super. 2015), this Court held that in the Act—which includes section

5743.1—“the Pennsylvania legislature excluded suppression as a remedy for

non-constitutional violations . . ..”          Dougalewicz, 113 A.3d at 826.

Accordingly, Zealor’s issue merits no relief.

       In his third issue, Zealor argues the Commonwealth had no jurisdiction

to serve administrative subpoenas to businesses outside of Pennsylvania, and,

accordingly, suppression is warranted. See Zealor’s Brief at 20. Zealor points

to authority including, inter alia, Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 200

for the principle that, with respect to search warrants, an issuing authority

may only issue search warrants for the judicial district in which the authority



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9 While the trial court concluded the information sought did not exceed the

scope of the statute, see Trial Court Opinion, 5/29/25, at 9, 11, 12, it is well
settled that we may affirm the court’s ruling on any legal basis. See
Commonwealth v. Clouser, 998 A.2d 656, 661 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2010).


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and party are located. He also notes that 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5964(a) provides

that where a witness in another state is required for a criminal prosecution or

grand jury investigations, the process required is that a judge of the court

may issue a certificate stating the basis for requiring the witness’s presence

and the certificate shall be presented to a judge of a court in the jurisdiction

where the witness is located. Because, Zealor maintains, section 5743.1(b)(3)

contemplates service in this Commonwealth of an agent of the corporation,

and service was not made in Pennsylvania, section 5964(a) applies, and the

Commonwealth was required to issue the subpoenas in accordance with

section 5964(a).

          The trial court considered this argument and determined it merits no

relief.     The court noted that the Act specifically permits service of an

administrative subpoena on a domestic or foreign corporation via an officer of

the entity or a managing or general agent of the entity.       See Trial Court

Opinion, 5/29/25, at 13 (discussing section 5743.1(b)(3)).           The court

additionally observed that to compel compliance with the subpoena, the

Commonwealth may invoke the aid of, inter alia, a court of common pleas in

the “jurisdiction in which the subpoenaed person resides, or conducts business

or may be found.” Id. at 13-14 (discussing section 5743.1(c)(1)). The court

reasoned that that the statute thus authorizes administrative subpoenas on

foreign companies, and, “[f]or each of the administrative subpoenas at issue

in this case, both Comcast and Digital Media turned the requested information


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over to Pennsylvania State Police. There was no need to take additional steps

to enforce them.” See id. at 14.

       Following our review, we likewise conclude Zealor is due no relief.

Initially, we find Zealor’s reliance on Pa.R.Crim.P. 200 and section 5964(a) to

be misplaced, as the former pertains to search warrants, and the latter to

compelling a witness for criminal proceedings. Neither speaks to the issue of

administrative subpoenas, while section 5743.1 expressly addresses service

of process on domestic and foreign entities; accordingly, there is no need for

us to look to Rule 200 or section 5964(a).

       Next, we observe that section 5743.1(b)(3)(i), (ii) permits service upon

a foreign corporation by delivery of a subpoena to, inter alia, an officer of the

entity or a managing or general agent of the entity.          See 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 5743.1(b)(3)(i), (ii).10      Nothing in these service provisions requires the

person served to be in this Commonwealth. As is undisputed in this case, the

DAG served the administrative subpoena on Comcast and Digital Media, after

which Comcast and Digital Media complied with the subpoenas. Had the DAG


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10 We note that section 5743.1(b)(3)(iii) also permits service upon a foreign

corporation by delivering a subpoena to an “agent authorized by appointment
or by law to receive service of process in this Commonwealth.” Subsection
(iii) is the only one that mentions service of process on an authorized agent
in Pennsylvania; therefore, had the legislature intended for service to be only
on agents in Pennsylvania, it could have so specified for each of the
subsections instead of just subsection (iii). The canon of statutory instruction,
expressio unius ist exclusio alterius, supports this interpretation.         See
Thompson v. Thompson, 223 A.3d 1272, 1277 (Pa. 2020).


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needed judicial involvement in enforcing the subpoenas, it could have sought

the assistance of a trial court in the jurisdictions where Comcast and Digital

Media conduct business.          See id. at 5743.1(c)(1)(ii).   However, it was

unnecessary for the DAG to do so. Because the statute authorized service on

Comcast and Digital Media, as foreign corporations, after which Comcast and

Digital Media complied with the subpoenas without judicial intervention,

Zealor’s challenge is meritless.11

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.




Date: 4/22/2026




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11 We also reiterate that suppression is not a remedy for non-constitutional

violations of the Act, and, so, even if Zealor’s argument were correct, it would
not merit suppression. See Dougalewicz, 113 A.3d at 826.

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