Court Filings

The Texas Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s temporary injunction that had blocked the Texas Department of State Health Services from treating manufactured delta-8 THC products as Schedule I controlled substances. The Department and its commissioner had amended Schedule I definitions after objecting to a federal rule; the Court held those amendments were within the commissioner’s broad, statutorily granted discretion and did not conflict unambiguously with the 2019 Texas Farm Bill. The Court also held the Administrative Procedure Act did not govern publication of schedule changes, and that sovereign immunity bars the vendors’ claims.

Justice Sullivan dissents from the Court’s interpretation of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 18.001. He would hold that when a defendant serves a controverting affidavit the statute’s hearsay exception for medical-expense affidavits is defeated as to the entire affidavit, not just the particular line items the counteraffidavit disputes. Because the defendant served a controverting affidavit here, Ortiz could not rely on her medical-affidavits alone and the trial court properly denied a new trial on damages. Sullivan argues the statute’s plain text refers to "affidavits," so its all-or-nothing approach must be applied even if it creates odd or inefficient results.

The Texas Supreme Court held that when a party uses the pretrial affidavit process in Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 18.001 to prove medical expenses, only those specific items or charges that are actually controverted by a compliant counteraffidavit lose the statute’s evidentiary effect. Unchallenged portions of an initial affidavit remain competent evidence and may be submitted to the factfinder. The court reversed the court of appeals and remanded because the trial court erred by excluding entire medical-cost affidavits and counteraffidavits even though only portions were controverted, which deprived the claimant of admissible evidence of certain medical expenses.

The Court of Appeals affirmed Reynaldo Antonio Sanchez’s conviction and 40-year sentence for continuous sexual abuse of a young child. Sanchez argued he was denied a speedy trial and that the trial court erred by admitting portions of a medical examiner’s report and testimony that relied on a Spanish-to-English translation. The court held Sanchez failed to preserve the speedy-trial claim because he never made an unambiguous, timely demand in the trial court. The court also upheld admission of the translated statements, finding the translator acted as a reliable language conduit and that the statements were non-testimonial for confrontation-clause purposes.

The Tenth Court of Appeals reviewed Father's appeal of a trial court order terminating his parental rights to four children. Counsel filed an Anders brief concluding the appeal is frivolous, and Father submitted a pro se response. The appellate court conducted a full review of the record, found sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings that Father violated Family Code §161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and that termination was in the children’s best interest, and affirmed the termination order. The court denied counsel’s motions to withdraw because they did not show independent good cause under Texas law.

The Tenth Appellate District of Texas affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s bill of review challenging a July 26, 2022 order that terminated his parental rights to A.A.C.C. The Department moved for traditional summary judgment, arguing a six-month statutory bar under Texas Family Code §161.211(a) prevents collateral or direct attacks on such termination orders. Appellant did not file any response to the summary judgment motion. The court held the Department met its burden by showing the termination was under §161.002(b) and the bill of review was filed well after the six-month deadline, so the petition was time-barred.

The Texas Tenth Court of Appeals denied Bryan Stallworth's original petition for a writ of mandamus. The court issued a brief memorandum opinion stating only that the petition is denied and citing the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. No published reasoning or extended analysis accompanies the denial. The decision was delivered and filed on April 30, 2026, by Chief Justice Matt Johnson for a three-judge panel.

The Ninth District Court of Appeals dismissed Woodforest National Bank's appeal from a final judgment because the bank failed to pay required filing fees and failed to arrange or pay for the clerk's record. The court repeatedly notified the appellant, sent invoices and a certified bill of costs, and warned the appeal would be dismissed if fees were not paid or arrangements made. The appellant did not respond or show indigency, so the court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution under the applicable appellate rules.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of a plea to the jurisdiction and rendered judgment for county officials. Plaintiff Nelson sought mandamus and declaratory relief to force Polk County officials to assign 911 addresses and a street name for lots in his subdivision, claiming a statutory exemption from platting and that officials acted unlawfully. The appellate court held Nelson failed to plead or prove he submitted the required plat, exemption request, or addressing application (or that officials denied one), so he did not show officials failed to perform any ministerial duty. Because governmental immunity was not waived, the court dismissed his claims.

The Texas Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court order terminating both parents’ rights to infant Ivy after a jury found, by clear and convincing evidence, statutory grounds D, E, and N and that termination was in the child’s best interest. The Department of Family and Protective Services removed Ivy after she arrived at the hospital with a fractured femur, liver laceration, and bruising; testimony and medical opinions raised serious abuse concerns and showed parental instability and untreated mental-health issues. The court also upheld appointment of the Department as managing conservator and denied Mother’s mistrial claim about an improper juror communication.

The Court of Appeals reversed a default judgment against CE Acquisition, LLC (CEA) in a construction payment dispute and remanded for a new trial. On-Site Construction obtained a default judgment after CEA and a co-defendant failed to answer suit seeking payment and lien foreclosure. CEA moved for a new trial, supported by affidavits saying it never received the petition and asserting meritorious defenses and an offer to pay plaintiff’s fees. The court found CEA met the three Craddock factors (mistake, meritorious defense, no undue prejudice) and held the trial court abused its discretion in denying the new-trial motion.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals dismissed Zenayda Guadalupe Portillo-Rodriguez’s appeal from a Potter County district court judgment because she failed to pay the required appellate filing fee and did not seek to proceed without payment. The Clerk notified her of the overdue fee and gave a deadline of April 13, 2026, but she took no action. Relying on the court’s appellate rules and the Clerk’s notice requirement, the court concluded dismissal was appropriate for noncompliance and entered a per curiam dismissal on April 29, 2026.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas granted the appellant's unopposed motion to voluntarily dismiss his appeal of a trial court order adjudicating him guilty of theft of a firearm and sentencing him to seven months confinement. The motion complied with the appellate rule requiring signature by both the appellant and his attorney. Because no opinion had been issued in the case, the court dismissed the appeal, denied any rehearing motions, and directed that the court's mandate issue immediately.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas dismissed an unopposed voluntary motion by appellant D.E.P. to dismiss an appeal from a final order in a Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (child referred to by initials). The court found the motion complied with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1), that granting dismissal would not prejudice any party, and no appellate decision had been issued. The court granted the motion, dismissed the appeal, declined to entertain a rehearing motion, and ordered issuance of its mandate immediately.

The Seventh Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed Curtis Johnson’s jury conviction for continuous sexual abuse of his six-year-old granddaughter and his 40-year prison sentence. Johnson argued the trial court erred by admitting evidence of prior sexual abuse against another victim (A.J.) because the State’s notice was insufficient. The court held Johnson waived complaint by not requesting a continuance or other relief to address alleged surprise, and even assuming error, any notice defect was harmless because the State had informed him of the victim, offenses, and date range well before trial and A.J. testified at a pretrial hearing.

The Texas Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal by William Martin, independent executor, from a trial-court order that required co-executor Steven Martin to resign or be removed. The appellate court found the appeal moot because Steven formally resigned after the order was entered, so reversing the order would have no practical effect on Steven’s status or estate administration. The court therefore declined to address the parties’ standing and procedural arguments and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The State of Texas, as appellant, moved to dismiss its own appeal in a criminal case from the County Court at Law No. 9 of Travis County. The motion to dismiss was signed by the Travis County Attorney and filed under the applicable Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure. The Court of Appeals granted the State’s motion and dismissed the appeal. The opinion is a short memorandum decision, noting the procedural compliance with the rule and disposing of the appeal accordingly.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals dismissed Efrain Rodulfo Jr.'s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Rodulfo, who pleaded guilty under a plea bargain and was sentenced to 25 years on November 18, 2025, filed a pro se motion construed as a notice of appeal on April 14, 2026. The appellate court found the notice untimely because it was filed well after the 30-day deadline (or 90 days only if a timely motion for new trial is filed), and no extension was sought. The trial court also certified that Rodulfo waived and did not have a right to appeal, which required dismissal as well.

The court received a motion from appointed appellate counsel in Brandon Dmichael Lively’s appeal in which counsel stated continued representation was not in the appellant’s best interest and requested substitution. Because the trial court, not the appellate court, has authority to appoint or replace counsel for an indigent defendant on appeal, the court dismissed the motion, abated the appeal, and remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether good cause exists to replace counsel and to appoint substitute counsel if appropriate. The trial court must file records of its hearing and any appointment/removal orders by May 22, 2026.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Dana Meador’s pretrial habeas petition seeking a reduction of a $750,000 bond in a first-degree murder prosecution. The court reviewed the statutory and common-law factors for bail, including the violent nature of the offense, potential punishment, community safety, flight risk, and financial ability to post bond. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court, the appeals court found Meador failed to prove the bond was excessive or used as an instrument of oppression and concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

The Court of Appeals (Seventh District) ordered the appeal of Cody Lee Cochran abated and the case remanded because the reporter's record lacks three State exhibits (22, 23, 24) that are encrypted by the FBI and unreadable without special software. The court directed the trial court to obtain accessible, reviewable copies of those exhibits and to have the court reporter file them with the appellate clerk by May 28, 2026. If the State cannot provide usable copies, the trial court must hold a hearing under the appellate rule to determine whether the exhibits are functionally lost or destroyed and make written findings for the supplemental record.

The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment adjudicating Pierre Damond Hall guilty and sentencing him to nine years’ imprisonment after revoking deferred adjudication for methamphetamine possession, but it modified the judgment to delete a $1,550 fine that was included in the written judgment without being orally pronounced at the adjudication hearing. Appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief finding no arguable grounds for appeal but asked the court to remove the unpronounced fine. The Court of Appeals conducted an independent review, found no reversible error affecting liberty, and deleted the unsupported fine while granting counsel’s motion to withdraw.

A Rusk County jury convicted Justin Tremane Simon of aggravated robbery and sentenced him to seventy years’ imprisonment. On appeal Simon argued the evidence was insufficient to prove he was the robber and that the trial court erred by instructing jurors they could consider good-conduct time when assessing punishment. The Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, finding the circumstantial evidence (possession of pharmacy stock bottles, a damp hoodie, a pill on his person, his presence at his mother’s home tied to the victim’s phone pings, and false statements to police) supported a rational verdict. The court also found the jury-charge error regarding good-conduct time did not cause egregious harm given the overall charge, the evidence, counsel’s arguments, and no jury inquiries.

The Court of Appeals of Texas, Sixth District, affirmed appellant Joseph Bebout West Jr.'s conviction for family-violence assault and one-year sentence. West challenged the denial of his motion for new trial, claiming a juror (the Longview mayor) created bias, and argued the jury charge omitted a consent instruction. The court found West forfeited the juror complaint because defense counsel failed to ask voir dire questions that would have revealed the mayoralty and that no evidence supported a consent instruction. Because the record supports the trial court's rulings, the conviction was affirmed.

The Court of Appeals of the Sixth Appellate District (Texarkana) denied John Henry Garber’s petition for a writ of mandamus seeking an order forcing the Delta County court to rule on multiple pro se pretrial motions in three misdemeanor cases. The court found the record Garber supplied inadequate to show he had a clear, ministerial right to the relief because the registers show he failed to appear at a December 16, 2024 hearing and a warrant issued; there is no record he was re-arrested or returned to custody. The court emphasized mandamus requires a complete record and that a relator must show a clear right to relief, which Garber did not do.

The Court of Appeals (Sixth District) denied Jeffrey Don Brock's petition for a writ of mandamus asking the county court judge to rule on his motion to compel an executor's accounting. Brock had demanded an accounting by March 16, 2026, but filed for mandamus on March 10, before that deadline expired. The executor filed a verified accounting on March 13 (with clerk acceptance disputed by Brock). The court held Brock was not entitled to extraordinary relief because he sought mandamus before the accounting deadline and did not show the trial court refused to rule on his later complaints about the accounting.

The Texas Tenth Court of Appeals denied Gregory G. Idom’s original petition for a writ of mandamus and his emergency motion for a stay. The filing, received April 23, 2026, sought extraordinary relief from the appellate court, but the court declined to grant the requested mandamus or stay. The brief opinion contains the court's disposition without published reasoning and was issued April 24, 2026.

The Texas Court of Appeals dismissed a mandamus petition by Zachary Brice Knox challenging a temporary restraining order that denied him possession and access to a child. After the petition was filed, the trial court modified and partially vacated the TRO and set a hearing for temporary orders. Because the complained-of provisions were vacated, the appellate court found Knox’s complaints moot and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction under the appellate rules.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals denied Jeffrey Lee Gaston’s pro se petition requesting habeas and mandamus relief to compel speedy trial on pending Hays County charges. The court found jurisdictional and procedural defects: Gaston filed in the wrong court, failed to supply the certified record or supporting documents required for mandamus or habeas review, and cited authorities showing his usual remedy is direct appeal rather than pretrial habeas. Because he did not meet his burden to show entitlement to extraordinary relief, the court denied the petition without prejudice.

A jury convicted Eric Lon Jones of delivery of methamphetamine (4–200 grams) in Williamson County and assessed 45 years and a $10,000 fine. On appeal Jones argued the jury charge erred by (1) failing to include a venue instruction under former article 13.04 (venue for offenses committed on or within 400 yards of county boundaries) and (2) failing to define “preponderance of the evidence.” The Court of Appeals held there was no error: article 13.04 was not applicable where the offense and prosecution occurred in the same county and the evidence locating the buy in Williamson County was undisputed, and the court was not required to define “preponderance of the evidence.” The conviction was affirmed.