Court Filings

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the denial of defendant 494 Eighth Avenue LLC’s summary judgment motion in a personal-injury sidewalk-trip case. Plaintiff said she tripped on an uneven sidewalk near a disassembled police barricade and testified the height differential was about one to one-and-a-half inches. The court held the defendant failed to show the alleged defect was trivial as a matter of law because the submitted photos and affidavit were inconclusive and the superintendent’s estimate was not a measured fact. Plaintiff’s testimony and possible violation of the NYC Administrative Code created questions of fact for trial.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court's May 21, 2025 order and granted Mary Trump's motion to compel discovery from Donald Trump in a breach-of-settlement-agreement case. Mary Trump asserted an affirmative defense of fraudulent inducement based on alleged false asset valuations in a 2001 settlement agreement. The court held that because the requested materials relate to that affirmative defense they are discoverable under CPLR 3101(a), which requires liberal disclosure of matter material and necessary to prepare for trial. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the decision.

The Appellate Division, First Department modified a lower court order in a malpractice/insurance dispute. It dismissed the third cause of action against Medical Liability Mutual Insurance Company (MLMIC) but otherwise affirmed denial of motions to dismiss. The court held that plaintiff's complaint sufficiently alleged facts supporting a punitive-damages demand against MLMIC and that the legal-malpractice claim against defense counsel Marshall Dennehey and Kevin Ryan should proceed because the complaint plausibly alleges breach of care and causation tied to a failure to inform the insured of settlement offers and a conflict of interest.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's judgment after a nonjury trial in a lease dispute between Rose Group Park Avenue LLC (tenant) and Third Church Christ, Scientist of New York City (landlord). The court held that the lease's audit provisions limit the landlord to auditing only the prior lease year and bar audits seeking information from earlier years; directed certain payroll records be included in future audits; required return of the landlord's protested payment except for amounts the court found due from the tenant's affiliate; and upheld various declaratory and injunctive rulings concerning weekday use, occupancy rights, equipment use, alterations, signage, and auditorium setup. The court grounded its decision in the express lease language and prior appellate rulings interpreting those provisions.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment holding the plaintiff liable on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim. The plaintiff testified he slipped on gravel and fell into an unguarded trench up to 10–12 feet deep alongside a building foundation; the trench had a makeshift pathway but no guardrail. The court found this testimony uncontradicted and held defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact or justify the absence of a guardrail as necessary to the work. The judgment for plaintiff on liability was therefore upheld.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed defendant Mauro Vivar's conviction for attempted assault in the second degree, vacated his guilty plea, and remitted the case for further proceedings. The court found Vivar's appellate-waiver invalid because the trial court failed to explain appellate rights separately from rights lost by pleading guilty and relied only on defense counsel to confirm the written waiver. The court also held the suppression court should have granted Vivar's motion to suppress custodial statements to the arresting officer, and that that error was not harmless because the statements could have affected his decision to plead.

The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the conviction and sentence of Stephanie Rodriguez. Rodriguez appealed a June 22, 2022 judgment of the Supreme Court, Bronx County. After oral argument and consideration, the appellate court found the sentence was not excessive and therefore upheld the trial court's judgment. The opinion is a brief affirmance without extended written opinion and refers defense counsel to the court's procedural rule § 606.5.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed defendant Luis Mendez’s convictions for attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and third-degree burglary and his concurrent sentences. The court held Mendez validly waived his right to appeal, which bars review of his suppression challenge, and alternatively found the trial court correctly denied suppression. The court accepted credibility findings and concluded police lawfully approached based on an intelligence report about a trend of firearms in fanny packs, observed a street-crossing violation, and legitimately pursued Mendez when he fled, making the abandonment of the fanny pack and the discovery of the gun lawful.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed defendant Michael T. Jackson's conviction and sentence after a guilty plea for criminal possession of a firearm, rejecting his challenges. The court held Jackson validly waived his right to appeal, which bars review of his excessive-sentence and most probation-condition claims. A facial challenge to the statute's "good moral character" licensing provision survives waiver and Jackson has standing, but the claim was unpreserved and not reviewed in the interest of justice; alternatively the court found it meritless. Ineffective-assistance claims based on counsel's failure to raise that argument must be pursued in a CPL 440.10 motion and were otherwise rejected on the record.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the Bronx County Supreme Court judgment entered December 17, 2024, in the criminal case against Joshua Brooks. The appeal challenged the sentence, but the appellate court, after argument and deliberation, found the sentence not excessive and affirmed. The decision is brief and focuses solely on the review of the sentence; no change to the conviction or sentence was ordered. Counsel for the appellant was referred to the court's Rule 606.5.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a lower court order requiring petitioner Harold Peerenboom to reimburse Marvel Entertainment, LLC for reasonable production expenses incurred in responding to a subpoena. The court held that under New York's CPLR the party seeking discovery must pay a nonparty's reasonable production costs, and that such costs can include third-party vendor charges and attorneys' fees. The court also upheld the trial court's reductions to requested attorney rates and rejected petitioner's reliance on federal balancing tests and arguments that certain withholding-related costs were categorically unrecoverable.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed Family Court orders that found respondent mother neglected her eldest child and derivatively neglected two other children. The court concluded, based on a preponderance of the evidence, that the mother choked the eldest child, pulled and ripped the child's shirt, and caused scratches; the child’s out-of-court statement was corroborated by a caseworker’s observation and photographs. The court also found the mother committed acts of domestic violence during the same incident and that the other children were present, supporting derivative neglect because the mother’s conduct created a substantial risk of harm.

The First Department unanimously affirmed a Bronx County Supreme Court order that required the Archdiocese of New York to produce certain documents (with specified redactions) and denied the Archdiocese's request to vacate that order or to obtain a protective order. The court held that evidence about the Archdiocese's patterns or practices in responding to allegations of clergy sexual abuse is discoverable because it could show a deliberate, repetitive practice of silencing accusations and therefore bear on the Archdiocese's negligence in the plaintiff's specific abuse claim. The appellate court rejected the Archdiocese's other arguments without discussion.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing plaintiff Gordon Grubb's slip-and-fall complaint against the City of New York. The City showed it lacked prior written notice of the specific dangerous condition at the Madison Avenue and East 52nd Street crosswalk as required by the New York City Administrative Code. The court held that the records plaintiff cited did not amount to a written acknowledgment of the particular defect and that plaintiff's allegations did not raise triable issues or satisfy exceptions to the written-notice rule, so dismissal was appropriate.

The First Department affirmed the trial court's posttrial dismissal of Forrest Equities' complaint seeking coverage under a title insurance policy issued by Old Republic. Plaintiffs bought a Bronx building after an explosion and alleged the insurer should cover losses from vacate orders, relocation and emergency repair liens, and related litigation. The court held the policy did not provide coverage because the alleged enforcement actions and liens were not recorded in the public recording system required by the policy, and a lis pendens or vacate order alone did not make title unmarketable. Contract terms and exclusions controlled.

The Appellate Division, First Department modified a New York County Supreme Court order in a dispute over a loan agreement. The court held that plaintiff Arena Vantage stated breach of contract claims against guarantors but not against the Deal Agent (CoVenture — Vantage Credit Opportunities GP, LLC). The panel found the loan agreement expressly made the Deal Agent's enforcement duties discretionary and contingent on directions from the Required Lenders, so no mandatory contractual breach was alleged. By contrast, guarantors made unconditional payment promises, so the breach claim against them may proceed. The court otherwise affirmed the lower court's rulings.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the trial court's dismissal under CPLR 3211 of all claims in plaintiff Belina Anderson's complaint against multiple defendants. The court held Anderson's derivative claims failed because she did not plead a required pre-suit demand or futility, her individual fiduciary-duty and nuisance claims did not allege fraud, self-dealing, or unconscionability and were barred by the business judgment rule or arose from contract duties, and her declaratory-judgment and direct claims were speculative or lacked factual support. The court rejected Anderson's procedural challenge under CPLR 2219(a).

The First Department dismissed an appeal by defendant-appellant Danielle Statuto from a Supreme Court order that denied her CPLR 2221(d) motion for leave to reargue. The appellate court held the order denying reargument is not appealable as of right and declined to treat her notice of appeal as a motion for leave to appeal. The court cited precedent and distinguished circumstances where a notice may be converted into a leave application, finding no extraordinary circumstances here, and therefore dismissed the appeal as taken from a nonappealable paper.

The Appellate Division reversed part of Supreme Court's order and granted the plaintiff leave to amend her complaint to add a negligence claim against the school district. The plaintiff, a former student who was struck on the head in class in 2019, had sought to add negligence after depositions showed the teacher testified the contact was accidental. The trial court had denied the amendment as unexplained delay and prejudicial; the appellate court found no undue delay or surprise, held the proposed negligence claim was not plainly meritless, and concluded the district would not suffer the type of prejudice that justifies denial.

The Appellate Division, Third Department reversed County Court's denial of defendant Cendno Rahaman's CPL 440.10 motion and granted relief in the interest of justice. Rahaman argued his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing to object to empaneling an anonymous jury. The court found the sworn allegations and counsel's affidavit showed a legal basis that could not be summarily rejected as successive, and that empaneling an anonymous jury without a factual predicate can deny a fair trial. The matter is remitted to County Court for a new trial.

The Appellate Division reversed a County Court order that denied defendant Shannon Dickinson's CPL 440.10 motion to vacate his conviction, and remitted the matter to a different County Court judge for further proceedings. The court concluded that the judge who decided the 440 motion had a law clerk who previously worked as an assistant prosecutor on the underlying case and that the clerk's potential prior involvement — combined with the failure to disclose or insulate the clerk — created an appearance of impropriety. Because the record does not show the clerk's role on the motion, the court found reversal and reassignment appropriate in the interest of justice.

The Appellate Division affirmed defendant Eugene Cobbins' November 30, 2023 conviction following a guilty plea to multiple charges, holding that his custodial statements were knowingly and voluntarily made and not subject to suppression. The court rejected his challenge that delayed filing of charges created a right-to-counsel issue because that right had not yet attached and any statutory-arraignment delay claim was unpreserved. However, the court reversed the February 9, 2024 resentencing on two grand larceny convictions because Cobbins was not produced and there is no indication he knew of or waived his right to be present, and remitted the matter for resentencing on those counts.

The Appellate Division, Third Department reversed a Supreme Court order and granted petitioner Junarian Walker's motion for counsel fees under CPLR 8601. Walker, an incarcerated person in a residential mental health unit, had a 120-day special housing sanction imposed after threats; Supreme Court annulled the sanction as violating the HALT Act and SHU Exclusion Law but denied fees, finding the state's position substantially justified and citing special circumstances. The appellate court held the state's position was not substantially justified and no special circumstances made a fee award unjust, so the case is remitted to determine the fee amount.

The Appellate Division reviewed Family Court's partial denial of a mother's petition to remove a prohibition on her partner's contact with her child. The court found the mother's sobriety constituted a sufficient change in circumstances to permit a full best-interests review, but concluded Family Court reasonably kept the no-contact provision in place because the child remained affected by the mother's past alcohol-related incidents and expressed reluctance to see the partner. The Appellate Division modified the order to allow the mother to seek removal of the prohibition after six months without proving a new change, and otherwise affirmed.

The Appellate Division, Third Department reviewed a combined CPLR article 78 petition and plenary action challenging a school board's termination of a bus driver, James Shara, and related claims of retaliatory discharge and constitutional violations. The court upheld Supreme Court's denial of defendants' motion to dismiss the retaliation claim under Civil Service Law § 75-b and the § 1983 due-process/freedom-of-association claim as sufficiently pleaded, and rejected the defendants' collateral estoppel argument because they did not provide the PERB record. But the court reversed as to claims brought against individual school officials, concluding plaintiff failed to plead their personal involvement. The order was otherwise affirmed.

The Appellate Division, Third Department denied Mary Elizabeth Rain's motion for reinstatement to the New York bar following a two-year suspension imposed in 2018 for multiple professional misconduct violations committed while she served as a district attorney. The court applied the three-part reinstatement test requiring compliance with suspension terms, proof of character and fitness by clear and convincing evidence, and demonstration that reinstatement would serve the public interest. The court found Rain failed to show she had meaningfully addressed the misconduct that led to suspension and provided no concrete plans or assurances that reinstatement would not harm the public, so her motion was denied.

The Appellate Division, Third Department granted Michael R. Pichowicz's application to resign from the New York bar for nondisciplinary reasons. The court reviewed Pichowicz's sworn affidavit and the Attorney Grievance Committee's response, found him eligible under the court's rules, accepted his nondisciplinary resignation, struck his name from the roll of attorneys, and ordered that he cease practicing law in New York and surrender any Attorney Secure Pass within 30 days. The decision is administrative, not punitive, and effective immediately.

The Appellate Division, Third Department granted Daniel Isaac Papermaster's application to resign from the New York bar for nondisciplinary reasons and accepted his resignation. The court reviewed Papermaster's sworn affidavit and the Attorney Grievance Committee's non-opposition, determined he was eligible under the court rules, struck his name from the roll of attorneys, and ordered that he cease practicing law in New York and surrender any Attorney Secure Pass within 30 days. The resignation is effective immediately and remains until further court order.

The Appellate Division reviewed a combined CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action by Nicholas Nunez seeking vacatur of a default revoking his license and relief under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL). The court agreed that Nunez was entitled to vacatur of the administrative default and remanded for a new hearing. It found Nunez substantially prevailed on his FOIL claims because the agency ultimately provided the requested records and metadata, but remanded to Supreme Court to determine whether the agency had a reasonable basis for its initial denial and thus whether Nunez is entitled to statutory counsel fees and costs.

The Appellate Division, Third Department granted Jeremy David Mishkin's request to resign from the New York bar for nondisciplinary reasons. The court reviewed Mishkin's sworn affidavit and the Attorney Grievance Committee's letter, found him eligible under the rules governing attorney disciplinary matters, and accepted his resignation. The court struck his name from the roll of attorneys, prohibited him from practicing or holding himself out as an attorney in New York, and ordered him to surrender any Attorney Secure Pass within 30 days. The resignation is effective immediately.