Reynaldo Antonio Sanchez v. the State of Texas

Court of Appeals
                   Tenth Appellate District of Texas

                               10-25-00090-CR


                         Reynaldo Antonio Sanchez,
                                Appellant

                                       v.

                             The State of Texas,
                                  Appellee



                            On appeal from the
              19th District Court of McLennan County, Texas
                    Judge Thomas C. West, presiding
                   Trial Court Cause No. 2017-603-C1

JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the Court.

                       MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Following a jury trial, Reynaldo Antonio Sanchez was convicted of

continuous sexual abuse of a young child and sentenced to forty years in prison.

See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02. On appeal, he raises issues concerning his

constitutional right to a speedy trial and the admission of certain evidence over

his hearsay and confrontation objections. We affirm.
                                          Speedy Trial

       In his first issue, Sanchez claims that he was denied his constitutional

right to a speedy trial. 1 The State responds that Sanchez failed to preserve

this issue for appeal. We agree with the State.

       The Court of Criminal Appeals held in Henson v. State that speedy-trial

complaints are subject to error-preservation requirements. 407 S.W.3d 764,

768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 1141, 134 S. Ct. 934, 187 L.

Ed. 2nd 804 (2014). 2 To preserve a complaint for our review, a party must have

presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion stating the

specific grounds, if not apparent from the context, for the desired ruling. TEX.

R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1); Thomas v. State, 505 S.W.3d 916, 924 (Tex. Crim. App.

2016). Further, the party must obtain an express or implied adverse ruling

from the trial court or object to the trial court’s refusal to rule. TEX. R. APP. P.



1 Approximately eight years passed from the date prosecution commenced (January 13, 2017) to

Sanchez’s jury trial (March 3, 2025).

2 Sanchez invites this Court to ignore Henson, claiming that it conflicts with federal Sixth-Amendment

precedent and that it has been implicitly overruled by a subsequent Court of Criminal Appeals case,
Taylor v. State, 667 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). In Taylor, the intermediate appellate court,
notably, expressly declined to address whether Taylor preserved his speedy trial claim for appellate
review. 655 S.W.3d 478, 484 (Tex. App—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2022, rev’d, 667 S.W.3d 809 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2023). Instead, the appellate court declined to reverse the trial court’s implicit denial of
Taylor’s speedy trial motion because the trial court did not “conduct a meaningful hearing” on it. Id.
at 484-85. On Taylor’s petition for discretionary review, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed,
holding that the court of appeals erred in requiring a “specially-designated ‘Speedy Trial Hearing’”
before weighing the Barker factors. 667 S.W.3d at 810; see also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
The Court of Criminal Appeals did not address speedy-trial error preservation, let alone implicitly
overrule Henson.


Reynaldo Antonio Sanchez v. The State of Texas                                               Page 2
33.1(a)(2). Sanchez argues that his “request for a priority setting,” multiple

announcements of ready, presence in court on at least twenty-three occasions,

and rejection of a plea bargain evidence his assertion of his right to a speedy

trial.

         The “request for a priority setting” referenced by Sanchez was a joint

request from the State and defense counsel in 2019 indicating that plea

negotiations were unsuccessful and requesting “a date certain for trial so that

each side may properly present evidence necessary for a claim or defense.”

This is akin to a pro forma request for a trial date, which the Court of Criminal

Appeals has held does not constitute a request for a speedy trial. See State v.

Munoz, 991 S.W.2d 818, 825-26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

         Additionally, announcing ready is not a demand for a speedy trial, but

simply “asserts that [the defendant] could go to trial at that moment should

the State push for it.” Henson, 407 S.W.3d at 769. Further undermining

Sanchez’s argument that his “ready for trial” announcements evidence a

speedy-trial assertion are the various occasions that he requested or

acquiesced to a continuance despite previously announcing ready.

         In 2021, when Sanchez’s initial trial counsel informed the trial court that

the State had not yet complied with all of his discovery requests, the trial court

proposed “set[ting] it off for 90 days to make sure that we’re in good shape


Reynaldo Antonio Sanchez v. The State of Texas                              Page 3
when the time comes.” Sanchez’s trial counsel stated, “Yes sir.” A few months

later, Sanchez’s trial counsel moved to withdraw from representation and

attested in his motion that such withdrawal could “be accomplished without

material adverse effect on the interests of [Sanchez] and without unnecessarily

delaying the due administration of justice.” At the hearing on the motion,

Sanchez agreed to the requested withdrawal. The trial court appointed new

counsel.

       It appears that the case was reset multiple times, with no indication in

the record that Sanchez objected to the resets. In January of 2024, Sanchez’s

attorney filed a motion for continuance from his February trial date because

Sanchez suffered a stroke and needed additional time for rehabilitation. The

trial court granted the continuance.             At a hearing on November 4, 2024,

Sanchez declined the State’s plea offer for a lesser-included offense. His trial

counsel told the trial court, “I think we’re looking at December 12 - - December

2nd as a trial date.” Finally, the trial court held a status hearing on February

14, 2025. The State announced ready for the March trial setting, while defense

counsel stated, “[W]e anticipate being ready.” Sanchez’s attorney explained

that he still needed to acquire the services of a new translator for the forensic

interview, but noted that he did not expect further scheduling issues.




Reynaldo Antonio Sanchez v. The State of Texas                             Page 4
       “A speedy-trial demand should be, at the very least, unambiguous.” Id.

Sanchez did not file a motion for speedy trial, and we find nowhere in the record

where he alerted the trial court that he intended to assert his speedy-trial

right. We also find nothing in the record that could be construed as an express

or implied denial of a request for a speedy trial. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).

Because Sanchez failed to preserve his speedy-trial claim for appellate review,

we overrule his first issue.

                Examining Physician’s Testimony and Report

       In Sanchez’s second and third issues, he contends that the trial court

erred in admitting over his hearsay and confrontation objections the testimony

and medical report of Dr. Soo Battle, which included the complainant’s

statements translated from Spanish to English by an Advocacy Center

employee. We disagree.

RELEVANT FACTS

       The complainant’s statements to Dr. Battle during her forensic medical

examination were translated from Spanish to English by Laura Downing, an

employee of the Advocacy Center. Before Dr. Battle testified, Sanchez objected

to her testimony and to her medical report on hearsay and confrontation

grounds. He explained that his primary concern was Downing’s qualification,

training, and experience in interpreting the language.


Reynaldo Antonio Sanchez v. The State of Texas                           Page 5
       In response to Sanchez’s objections, and outside of the jury’s presence,

the State called Downing as a witness via Zoom. Both parties were permitted

to question her. At the conclusion of Downing’s testimony, the trial court

overruled Sanchez’s hearsay objection, stating:

       I find that the interpreter had no motive to mislead or distort, was
       supplied by the Advocacy Center which is not under the purview
       or the supervision of the medical examiner. Although they share
       the same building, they are separate entities within the umbrella
       of the Advocacy [Center] for Crime Victims and Children. I find
       that the - - based on the - - Ms. Downing’s lifelong ability to learn
       and speak Spanish, her ability to CLEP out of four classes, which
       means she took a test for each course and did not have to take it
       because she made a sufficient score, and the actions taken
       subsequent to the translated statements were consistent with the
       statements as translator [sic], therefore I find it is a single hearsay
       and the medical examination exception applies.

The trial court also overruled Sanchez’s confrontation objection, with the

qualification that the ruling would be revisited if the complainant did not

testify during trial.

       Downing did not testify in front of the jury. Dr. Battle, however, testified

regarding the complainant’s translated statements, and her report containing

the translated statements was admitted into evidence. The complainant also

testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination.




Reynaldo Antonio Sanchez v. The State of Texas                              Page 6
ANALYSIS

       We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence over a hearsay

objection for an abuse of discretion. Saavedra v. State, 297 S.W.3d 342, 349

(Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

       We review de novo a trial court’s ruling admitting evidence over a

confrontation objection. Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 742 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006).

       Hearsay

       A hearsay statement is an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of

the matter asserted.          See TEX. R. EVID. 801(d).             Hearsay statements are

inadmissible unless they fall under a recognized exception to the hearsay rule.

Id. R. 802, 803, 804. If a statement has multiple layers of hearsay, each layer

of hearsay must fall under an exception. Id. R. 805.

       Sanchez’s hearsay complaint centers on the second layer of hearsay –

Downing’s translated statements to Dr. Battle. 3                      Sanchez suggests that

“Downing did not pass the four-factor test” articulated in Saavedra v. State,

therefore her translated statements did not meet an exception to the hearsay

rule and should not have been admitted into evidence. 297 S.W.3d at 348.


3 Sanchez does not appear to contend that the complainant’s statements to Downing – the first layer

of hearsay – were inadmissible. The complainant’s statements were not excluded by the rule against
hearsay pursuant to Rule 803(4) of the Rules of Evidence, permitting out-of-court statements made for
the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment. See TEX. R. EVID. 803(4).

Reynaldo Antonio Sanchez v. The State of Texas                                             Page 7
       Regarding translated statements, the Court of Criminal Appeals has

held that an interpreter’s translation does not add a layer of hearsay if the

proponent can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the trial court that the

declarant authorized the interpreter to speak for him or otherwise adopted the

interpreter as his agent, acting as a “language conduit.” Id. at 349. In making

this determination, courts consider the following factors: (1) who supplied the

interpreter; (2) whether the interpreter had any motive to mislead or distort;

(3) the interpreter’s qualifications and language skills; and (4) whether actions

taken subsequent to the translated statement were consistent with the

statement as translated. Id. at 348. In addition to demonstrating whether the

interpreter was acting as a person’s agent, these factors also relate to the

“ultimate reliability of the proffered evidence.” Id. at 349.

       Here, neither party supplied the interpreter. Downing was an employee

of the Advocacy Center, a nonprofit organization that assists crime victims.

When neither party supplied the interpreter, the first factor is neutral. See

Guillen-Hernandez v. State, Nos. 01-18-00461-CR, 01-18-00462-CR, 2019 WL

2750597, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 2, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem.

op., not designated for publication).




Reynaldo Antonio Sanchez v. The State of Texas                           Page 8
       As to the second factor, nothing in the record suggests Downing had a

motive to mislead or distort the complainant’s statements. Sanchez does not

appear to challenge this finding. This factor weighs in favor of admission.

       Third, Downing grew up in a bilingual family.                         She testified that

although she was not a certified translator, she spoke Spanish with such

proficiency that she “CLEPed out” of all four of her required Spanish college

classes. She clarified that “CLEPed out” meant that she passed a test to

demonstrate her fluency in the language. Downing also verified that in the

event that she was unsure of the appropriate translation, she would utilize a

Spanish dictionary and clarify her translation with the patient. This factor

weighs in favor of admission.

       Finally, as to the fourth factor, the actions taken subsequent to the

translated statements were consistent with the statements as translated. The

complainant underwent a medical examination consistent with the translated

statements and also testified at trial to much of the same detail provided in

the translated medical report. 4

       Considering the foregoing factors, we find that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in overruling Sanchez’s hearsay objection to Downing’s


4 The complainant testified in English at trial, explaining that she had sufficiently learned the
language over the past several years. Though her testimony at trial, as noted by Sanchez, did not
match exactly every description of sexual abuse in the medical report, her testimony was substantially
similar.

Reynaldo Antonio Sanchez v. The State of Texas                                              Page 9
translations of the complainant’s statements. We overrule Sanchez’s second

issue.

         Confrontation

         Sanchez’s confrontation complaint is based on Downing not testifying in

front of the jury. As such, he claims that Dr. Battle should not have been

permitted to testify to Downing’s interpretations of what the complainant told

her.

         The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States

Constitution provides that the accused in all criminal prosecutions “shall enjoy

the right … to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST.

amend. VI. A defendant’s right to confrontation is violated “when a witness is

permitted to relate out-of-court ‘testimonial’ hearsay statements unless the

declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-

examine the declarant.” Ricks v. State, No. AP-77,040, 2017 WL 4401589, at

*15 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 4, 2017) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).         In determining

whether a statement is testimonial or non-testimonial, we “objectively

evaluate the circumstances in which the statement is provided” and focus on

the primary purpose of the statement. See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344,

358-59 (2011). When the primary purpose is something other than criminal


Reynaldo Antonio Sanchez v. The State of Texas                           Page 10
investigation, “the Confrontation Clause does not require such statements to

be subject to the crucible of cross-examination.” Id. at 361.

       Medical reports created for treatment purposes are generally non-

testimonial within the meaning of Crawford. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,

557 U.S. 305, 312 n. 2 (2009). Many courts of appeals, including this Court,

have concluded that a patient’s verbal history to a medical professional during

a sexual assault exam for purposes of receiving medical treatment is not

testimonial, and thus does not run afoul of the Confrontation Clause. Williams

v. State, No. 10-13-00149-CR, 2014 WL 895506, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Waco Mar.

6, 2014, pet. ref’d.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). This is so

because a person undergoing a forensic medical exam “provides a verbal

history to a medical professional for the primary purpose of obtaining

medical treatment, whether or not the person intends to report the sexual

assault to the police and even though the exam creates evidence that might be

used in a prosecution.” Odeku v. State, 722 S.W.3d 76, 85 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2025, pet. ref’d).

       The primary purpose of Downing’s out-of-court statements was

something      other     than     criminal       investigation,   namely,   to   facilitate

communication between the complainant and Dr. Battle for the non-

testimonial purposes of obtaining and providing medical treatment. Because


Reynaldo Antonio Sanchez v. The State of Texas                                     Page 11
Downing’s out-of-court statements to Dr. Battle were non-testimonial, they

were not admitted in violation of Sanchez’s right to confrontation. 5

       Accordingly, we overrule Sanchez’s third issue.

                                           Conclusion

       Having overruled all of Sanchez’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial

court’s judgment.




                                                         STEVE SMITH
                                                         Justice

OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: April 30, 2026
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
       Justice Smith, and
       Justice Harris
Affirmed
Do not publish
CRPM




5 We note that both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have addressed similar complaints by applying the

“language conduit” principle and concluding that a defendant has no constitutional right to confront
an interpreter when that test is satisfied. See United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th
Circ. 2012); United States v. Budha, 495 F. App’x 452, 454 (5th Circ. 2012). The Ninth Circuit
explained that “whether the interpreter must be considered a declarant, rather than a language
conduit, is a threshold inquiry, and … confrontation concerns do not even arise if the statement may
be fairly attributed to the speaker.” Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1140; see also Blackwell v. State, No. 02-
24-00040-CR, 2025 WL 52115, at *3 n. 7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 9, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op, not
designated for publication) (addressing this issue in dicta).


Reynaldo Antonio Sanchez v. The State of Texas                                               Page 12