Montgomery County v. Barzilayeva, J.

J-A16033-25

                                   2026 PA Super 88

  MONTGOMERY COUNTY AND OTAR                   :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  KOSASHVILI                                   :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JULIETT BARZILAYEVA                          :
                                               :   No. 1592 EDA 2024
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: JULIETT BARZILAYEVA               :
  AND EUGENE ZWICK                             :

                 Appeal from the Order Entered May 3, 2024
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
                            No(s): 190800558


BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

OPINION BY KING, J.:                                     FILED APRIL 30, 2026

       Appellants, Juliett Barzilayeva and Eugene Zwick, appeal from the order

entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which denied their

petition to set aside a sheriff’s sale. Due to the unique circumstances of this

appeal, we reverse the order denying Appellants’ petition.

       The trial court opinion set forth the relevant facts and procedural history

of this case as follows:

          The action arises from a judgment that was transferred from
          Montgomery County to Philadelphia County in August 2019.
          In Montgomery County, Appellant Barzilayeva was
          convicted of felony theft in 2012,[1] and part of the sentence
          required payment of restitution to the victim, Otar
          Kosashvili (“Appellee”). Appellant Barzilayeva was ordered
          to pay Appellee [$154,876.03]. According to Appellee,
____________________________________________


1 Montgomery County docketed Appellant Barzilayeva’s criminal case at CP-

46-CR-0009160-2011.
J-A16033-25


       Appellant concealed that she had an ownership interest in
       the property at issue, 1804 Bainbridge Street [in
       Philadelphia], during the sentencing in 2012. Upon learning
       about the property, Appellee reduced the restitution
       order to a civil judgment, transferred the judgment to
       Philadelphia County, and sought to execute and
       collect on the judgment through Sheriff’s Sale of the
       property.     From the first entry of the judgment in
       Philadelphia courts, Montgomery County and Appellee have
       been listed as co-plaintiffs.

       Appellee filed three Praecipes to Issue Writ of Execution
       between July 2020 and August 2021. In September 2021,
       Appellee filed a Motion to Proceed with Sale, which was
       denied as moot due to the COVID-19 Moratorium on
       Sheriff’s Sales that was set to end in December 2021. After
       the moratorium was lifted, Appellee filed a new Praecipe for
       Writ of Execution in February 2022.

       After a Motion to Postpone Sheriff’s Sale was granted, the
       property was set for sale on July 12, 2022. On July 7, 2022,
       Appellant Zwick filed an Emergency Petition to Intervene
       claiming that he has a seventy-five percent (75%)
       ownership interest in the property, along with a Motion to
       Postpone. The following day, the Petition to Intervene was
       granted and the sale was postponed to August 2022.
       Appellant Zwick filed another Motion to Postpone Sheriff’s
       Sale regarding the August sale date and a Motion to Strike
       the Writ of Execution. The Motion to Postpone was granted
       on August 1, 2022, and set the next sale date to October 4,
       2022. On September 7, 2022, the Motion to Strike the Writ
       of Execution was dismissed as procedurally improper and
       moot.    The September 7 Order dismissing the Motion
       mentioned that the Writ of Execution expired before the
       Motion was submitted and was never executed.

       On July 28, 2023, Appellee filed a Praecipe to Reissue the
       Writ of Execution on the property. Appellants contend that
       the resulting writ contained an error by not including that
       only 25% of the property would be sold due to Appellant
       Zwick’s claimed 75% ownership. Appellants have since
       clarified that they (Ms. Barzilayeva and Mr. Zwick) are joint
       tenants with a right of survivorship. The Parties disagree as
       to whether notice of the new Writ of Execution was properly

                                   -2-
J-A16033-25


         effectuated at the time of issuance. The property was put
         up for bidding and sold on the scheduled October 3, 202[3],
         sale date for $290,000.

                                   *    *     *

         On October 23, 2023, Appellants filed a Motion to Set Aside
         Sheriff’s Sale and Stay All Proceedings. Appellants alleged
         that Appellee failed to comply with multiple rules about the
         notice required before the sale could proceed and that the
         proceeds from the sale were “grossly inadequate.” Hearings
         were held on February 29 and April 11, 2024. On May 3,
         2024, [the trial c]ourt denied the Motion.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/28/24, at 1-3) (emphasis added) (footnote

omitted).

      Appellants timely filed a notice of appeal on Monday, June 3, 2024. On

June 5, 2024, the court ordered Appellants to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal. Appellants timely filed their Rule

1925(b) statement on June 26, 2024.

      Appellants now present nine (9) issues for this Court’s review:

         [The trial court erred i]n not setting aside the sheriff’s sale
         because … Appellee needed to pursue modification of the
         ordered statutory relief with the [Montgomery County Court
         of Common Pleas] prior to seeking other remedies.

         The trial court abused its discretion and erred as a matter
         of law … [i]n that the sheriff’s sale on writ #2206-430 was
         postponed for more than 130 days, new notice and
         publication were required under the Pennsylvania Rules of
         Civil Procedure, and: (1) no notice of the date of continued
         sheriff’s sale was filed with the prothonotary at least fifteen
         days before the continued sale date pursuant to Pa.R.C.P.
         3129.3(b)(2)(i)(A) and (2) there is no evidence a certificate
         of filing with the sheriff confirming the filing of the notice of
         the date of continued sheriff’s sale with the prothonotary
         occurred pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 3129.3(b)(2)(i)(B) and

                                       -3-
J-A16033-25


         thereby the due process of those with a record interest and
         those with an unrecorded interest were violated along with
         the rights of the general public.

         Was the actual sale price of the subject property … grossly
         inadequate and as such should have been set aside?

         Did writ #2206-430 fail to comply with Pa.R.C.P. 3129.2?

         Did [Appellee] fail to comply with Pa.R.C.P. 3129.1(b)(4)?

         Were the due process rights of Appellants violated when the
         sheriff’s sale moved forward when the docket maintained by
         the Office of Judicial Records gave notice to Appellants and
         general public the October 3, 2023 sheriff’s sale had been
         postponed?

         Did the trial court abuse its discretion in allowing testimonial
         evidence into the record from a witness that is an attorney
         for the City of Philadelphia (not a party or representing any
         party hereto) concerning docket entries related to sheriff’s
         sales when this witness admittedly lacked knowledge of the
         docket entries in this case?

         The [trial] court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this
         case because naming Montgomery County, Pennsylvania a
         party hereto was fictitious where counsel for Appellee … had
         no authority nor was engaged by Montgomery County,
         Pennsylvania to proceed on their behalf and therefore based
         on this deception all writs, orders and/or actions hereto are
         void?

         In that service of the praecipe for writ of execution and writ
         of execution with accompanying affidavit was not perfected
         (see Pa.R.C.P. 3129.1) and thus a strict condition precedent
         prior to deprivation of one’s property rights did not occur
         whereby set aside was required.

(Appellants’ Brief at 4-7) (reordered for purposes of disposition).

      We first address Appellants’ claim regarding the underlying restitution

order from Montgomery County. Appellants acknowledge that Montgomery


                                      -4-
J-A16033-25


County issued the restitution order in a criminal case against Appellant

Barzilayeva, which named Appellee as the victim of a theft. Appellants insist,

however, that Appellee “had no authority to add his name … to the certified

judgment without seeking leave of court to amend the restitution order, which

he could have done.”          (Appellants’ Brief at 36-37).   Appellants cite 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9728, governing the collection of restitution, for the proposition

that Montgomery County was the only entity that could place a lien on the real

property.    Because Appellee did not file a motion to modify the restitution

order in Montgomery County, Appellants argue that Appellee violated the

statutes governing restitution.        On this basis, Appellants conclude that we

must reverse the order denying the motion to set aside the sheriff’s sale. 2

____________________________________________


2 In response, Appellee claims that Appellants are attempting to challenge
standing by arguing that Appellee’s name should not have appeared on the
judgment.      Appellee maintains that this argument is waived because
Appellants “failed to raise the same at the earliest opportunity[.]” (Appellee’s
Brief at 33). We disagree. “A party seeking judicial resolution of a controversy
in this Commonwealth must, as a prerequisite, establish that he has standing
to maintain the action.” Foxfield at Naaman’s Creek Homeowner’s
Association v. Eventoff, 329 A.3d 1271, 1275 (Pa.Super. 2024), appeal
denied, ___ Pa. ___, 343 A.3d 183 (2025). “A party has standing if he is
aggrieved, i.e., he can show a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in
the outcome of the litigation.” Id. “Unlike standing, which relates to a party’s
right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement, subject matter
jurisdiction concerns the court’s authority to consider cases of a given nature
and grant the type of relief requested.” In re Adoption of Z.S.H.G., 34 A.3d
1283, 1289 (Pa.Super. 2011). Here, rather than raising a challenge to
standing, Appellants have repeatedly questioned the propriety of the transfer
of the judgment for restitution to Philadelphia for the purpose of liquidating
Appellant Barzilayeva’s real property there. For example, at the first hearing
on the motion to set aside sheriff’s sale, Appellants’ counsel noted:
(Footnote Continued Next Page)


                                           -5-
J-A16033-25


Considering recent case law explaining a sentencing court’s continuing

jurisdiction over restitution orders, we agree.

       To dispose of Appellants’ claim, we must interpret the statutory scheme

governing restitution.

          The objective of all interpretation and construction of
          statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent
          behind the statute. When the plain language of a statute is
          clear and free from all ambiguity, it is the best indication of
          legislative intent.

          When, however, the words of a statute are ambiguous, a
          number of factors are used in determining legislative intent,
          including the purpose of the statute and the consequences
          of a particular interpretation. Furthermore, it is axiomatic
          that in determining legislative intent, all sections of a statute
          must be read together and in conjunction with each other,
          and construed with reference to the entire statute. Lastly,
          we presume that the legislature did not intend an
          unreasonable or absurd result.


____________________________________________




          The [Clerk of Court] is allowed to collect the [restitution]
          money based upon the order of the judge. If the judge says:
          You have to pay X amount of dollars each month, I don’t
          know where they have the authority to go in and file a
          sheriff’s sale, and I don’t know that Montgomery County
          contacted [Appellee’s counsel] to go and seize a property
          that was also owned by another person.

(N.T. Hearing, 2/29/24, at 6). Appellants’ arguments on appeal continue to
question whether the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas possessed
authority to make the judgment for restitution “attach to property” owned by
Appellant Barzilayeva. (Appellants’ Brief at 37). Thus, we decline to
Appellee’s invitation to deem this claim waived. See Keller v. Bank of New
York Mellon, 212 A.3d 52, 57 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, 656 Pa. 86,
219 A.3d 1104 (2019) (stating: “After the delivery of the sheriff’s deed to the
purchaser, the only possible attacks are those based on fraud or lack of
authority to make the sale”).

                                           -6-
J-A16033-25


A.M.D. on Behalf of A.D. v. T.A.B., 178 A.3d 889, 892-93 (Pa.Super. 2018)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

         The Supreme Court has held restitution provisions to be
         penal in nature. Accordingly, we must construe restitution
         provisions strictly, interpreting any ambiguity in favor of the
         defendant. Additionally, when statutes or parts of statutes
         relate to the same persons or things or to the same class of
         persons or things, we must construe them together, if
         possible, as one statute.

Commonwealth v. Wright, 2025 PA Super 226, 2025 WL 2813496, at *3

(Pa.Super. October 3, 2025) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

      Section 1106 of the Crimes Code generally governs the imposition of

restitution for injuries to person or property.

         Section 1106(a) provides that a court shall include
         restitution as part of the sentence for cases where “property
         has been stolen, converted or otherwise unlawfully obtained
         … as a direct result of the crime.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(a).
         Alternatively, the court may impose restitution as a
         condition of probation under the Sentencing Code. See
         Clark v. Peugh, 257 A.3d 1260, 1268 (Pa.Super. 2021)
         (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9763(b)(10)). Moreover, … when a
         court orders restitution as part of the sentence, the court
         may require compliance with the restitution as “a condition
         of such probation[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(b).

         [I]n Section 1106(c)(3), the General Assembly established
         “an independent cause of action for a defendant to seek a
         modification of an existing restitution order” from the trial
         court even after the expiration of the time for modifying or
         appealing the original sentence.        Commonwealth v.
         Gentry, 101 A.3d 813, 816 (Pa.Super. 2014). Specifically,
         Section 1106(c)(3) provides as follows:

            The court may, at any time [or upon the
            recommendation of the district attorney that is
            based on information received from the victim
            and the probation section of the county or other

                                      -7-
J-A16033-25


            agent designated by the county commissioners
            of the county with the approval of the president
            judge to collect restitution,] alter or amend any
            order of restitution …, provided, however, that the
            court states its reasons and conclusions as a matter
            of record for any change or amendment to any
            previous order.

         18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(c)(3) (emphasis added).

Id. at *3-*4.

      As previously mentioned, Appellee’s conduct implicated the procedures

for the collection of restitution, “including 42 Pa.C.S. § 9728, which provides

for restitution to be treated as a ‘judgment.’” Id. at *4. Initially, Section

9728 indicates that restitution is part of the criminal action and shall not be

deemed a debt:

         § 9728. Collection of restitution, reparation, fees,
         costs, fines and penalties

         (a)      General rule.—

            (1) Except as provided in subsection (b)(5), all
         restitution, reparation, fees, costs, fines and penalties shall
         be collected by the county probation department or
         other agent designated by the county commissioners of the
         county with the approval of the president judge of the
         county for that purpose in any manner provided by law.
         However, such restitution, reparation, fees, costs, fines and
         penalties are part of a criminal action or proceeding and
         shall not be deemed debts. A sentence, pretrial disposition
         order or order entered under section 6352 (relating to
         disposition of delinquent child) for restitution, reparation,
         fees, costs, fines or penalties shall, together with interest
         and any additional costs that may accrue, be a judgment
         in favor of the probation department upon the person
         or the property of the person sentenced or subject to
         the order.


                                      -8-
J-A16033-25


42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9728(a)(1) (emphasis added).

      Section 9728(b) explains the procedure for docketing these judgments

for restitution:

         (b)       Procedure.—

             (1) The county clerk of courts shall, upon sentencing,
         pretrial disposition or other order, transmit to the
         prothonotary certified copies of all judgments for restitution,
         reparation, fees, costs, fines and penalties which, in the
         aggregate, exceed $1,000, and it shall be the duty of each
         prothonotary to enter and docket the same of record in his
         office and to index the same as judgments are indexed,
         without requiring the payment of costs as a condition
         precedent to the entry thereof.

             (2) The clerk of courts, in consultation with other
         appropriate governmental agencies, may transmit to the
         prothonotary of the respective county certified copies of all
         judgments for restitution, reparation, fees, costs, fines and
         penalties which, in the aggregate, do not exceed $1,000,
         and, if so transmitted, it shall be the duty of each
         prothonotary to enter and docket the same of record in his
         office and to index the same as judgments are indexed,
         without requiring the payment of costs as a condition
         precedent to the entry thereof.

            (3) The county clerk of courts shall, upon sentencing,
         pretrial disposition or other order, transmit to the
         Department of Probation of the respective county or other
         agent designated by the county commissioners of the
         county with the approval of the president judge of the
         county and to the county correctional facility to which the
         offender has been sentenced or to the Department of
         Corrections, whichever is appropriate, copies of all orders
         for restitution and amendments or alterations thereto,
         reparation, fees, costs, fines and penalties. This paragraph
         also applies in the case of costs imposed under section
         9721(c.1) (relating to sentencing generally).




                                      -9-
J-A16033-25


42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9728(b)(1)-(3). “The total amount for which the person is

liable pursuant to this section may be entered as a judgment upon the person

or the property of the person sentenced or ordered[.]”         42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9728(b)(4).

         Notably, in providing that restitution shall be a judgment,
         the General Assembly did not revoke its prior express
         statement that restitution was part of a criminal action or
         state that the judgment undermined the sentencing court’s
         continued jurisdiction over the restitution portion of the
         sentence.

Wright, supra at *4.

      We also observe that Appellee wanted to use Appellant Barzilayeva’s

real property to satisfy the restitution obligation. “Where the defendant owns

assets in an amount sufficient to make restitution, he or she may be called

upon to sell or borrow on the security of those assets and use the proceeds to

make restitution.”     Commonwealth v. Madron, 488 A.2d 331, 332

(Pa.Super. 1985). “The rights of a victim to be made whole will not be made

subservient to the criminal’s desire to retain an unencumbered title to capital

assets.” Id. Nevertheless, the statutory scheme governing restitution does

not expressly permit the type of self-help Appellee undertook in this case.

Rather, Section 9728(e), which contemplates the need to preserve a

defendant’s assets for payment of restitution, authorizes the Commonwealth

to act on a victim’s behalf:

         Upon application of the Commonwealth, the court may
         enter a restraining order or injunction, require the execution
         of a satisfactory performance bond or take any other action

                                     - 10 -
J-A16033-25


        to preserve the availability of property which may be
        necessary to satisfy an anticipated restitution order under
        this section:

            (1) upon the filing of a criminal complaint, information
        or indictment charging a criminal violation or a petition
        alleging delinquency for which restitution may be ordered
        and alleging that the property with respect to which the
        order is sought appears to be necessary to satisfy such
        restitution order and judgment; and

           (2) if, after notice to persons appearing to have an
        interest in the property and an opportunity for a hearing,
        the court determines that:

           (i)   there is a substantial probability that:

                (A) the Commonwealth will prevail on the
           underlying criminal charges or allegation of delinquency;

                 (B)   restitution will be ordered exceeding $10,000
           in value;

                  (C) the property appears to be necessary to
           satisfy such restitution order; and

                 (D) failure to enter the order will result in the
           property being destroyed, removed from the jurisdiction
           of the court or otherwise made unavailable for payment
           of the anticipated restitution order; and

           (ii)  the need to preserve the availability of the property
        through the entry of the requested order outweighs the
        hardship on any party against whom the order is to be
        entered.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9728(e) (emphasis added).

     Appellee’s actions highlight the tension between the criminal and civil

elements involved in the imposition and payment of restitution. Regardless

of the entry of a judgment, however, other statutes evince the continuing


                                    - 11 -
J-A16033-25


criminal nature of restitution proceedings.

         For example, Section 9730(b), addressing the payment of
         court costs, restitution, and fines, directs that when a
         defendant defaults on payment of these amounts, the
         issuing authority, ... may conduct a hearing to determine
         whether the defendant is financially able to pay and to
         determine the appropriate next steps. Similarly, a judge of
         the court of common pleas having jurisdiction over the
         defendant has the authority to order private collection
         agencies to cease collection efforts. Moreover, the statutes
         task each county’s probation department, rather than a civil
         entity, with tracking the restitution payments.

         Thus, while the statutes do not expressly address
         whether a criminal or civil court has jurisdiction over
         “a judgment” of restitution, we glean from the
         detailed statutory procedure that the General
         Assembly intended for the sentencing court to
         maintain jurisdiction over the restitution to perform
         the statutorily mandated oversight of the collection
         process.     Indeed, this court previously explained the
         benefit of providing the original sentencing court with
         modification authority as a proceeding in the sentencing
         court allows the defendant to appear before the court that
         originally imposed the restitution and is familiar with the
         facts of the case and the relevant statutory framework.

Wright, supra at *5 (emphasis added) (internal citations, footnote, and

quotation marks omitted).

      Additional case law emphasizes the criminal nature of restitution. “The

primary purpose of restitution is not to compensate the victim but to

rehabilitate the offender.” Commonwealth v. Corbin, 317 A.3d 648, 653

(Pa.Super. 2024).

         [T]he primary purpose of restitution is to rehabilitate the
         offender by impressing on [her] the fact that [her] actions
         damaged the victim. In the end, restitution is not simply an
         award of damages, but, rather, a sentence. The amount of

                                    - 12 -
J-A16033-25


          restitution set by the court is related to the amount of
          damage sustained by the victim, but restitution is not itself
          a civil damage award. It is true that restitution helps the
          victim, but this fact is secondary to the reality that
          restitution is an aspect of sentencing imposed by the court
          on an offender in order to facilitate the administration of
          criminal justice.

Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 956 A.2d 992, 996 (Pa.Super.

2008)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

          Various characteristics of restitution further illustrate that
          its true nature is that of a criminal sanction. For example,
          while a crime victim certainly may ask the district attorney
          to seek restitution, it is the district attorney who has the
          authority to present that request to the court.[3] Moreover,
          an order of restitution does not create a creditor-debtor
          relationship between the victim and the offender.           …
          [R]estitution can only be enforced by the criminal court, just
          as penalties of incarceration or probation are within the
          court’s exclusive purview.

Commonwealth v. Pleger, 934 A.2d 715, 720 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal

citations omitted).


____________________________________________


3 We acknowledge the panoply of rights that our legislature has bestowed
upon victims of crime through the Crime Victims Act, 18 P.S. §§ 11.101-
11.5102. Relevant to restitution, however, the Act merely provides that
victims have the right

          [t]o be restored, to the extent possible, to the precrime
          economic status through the provision of restitution,
          compensation and the expeditious return of property which
          is seized as evidence in the case when in the judgment of
          the prosecutor the evidence is no longer needed for
          prosecution of the case.

18 P.S. §§ 11.201(6). As we will discuss infra, we do not read this provision
so broadly as to allow victims to engage in the type of self-help at issue in this
case.

                                          - 13 -
J-A16033-25


       Instantly, Appellant Barzilayeva entered a guilty plea to theft by

unlawful taking in Montgomery County. A Montgomery County jurist imposed

a judgment of sentence in 2012. As a condition of her sentence, the court

ordered Appellant Barzilayeva to pay restitution.            The restitution order

specifically identified Appellee as the victim, and it provided a restitution

amount of $154,876.03.

       Years later, Appellee learned about Appellant Barzilayeva’s ownership

interest in the Philadelphia property.         Believing this property could satisfy

Appellant Barzilayeva’s restitution obligation, Appellee took steps to attach

the property to the restitution judgment.            Initially, a praecipe to enter

judgment was filed in Montgomery County on April 30, 2019. 4 The praecipe

requested that the Prothonotary “[e]nter judgment in favor of Plaintiff, Clerk

of Court, against Defendant Juliett Barzilayeva” in the amount of $153,926.03.

(Praecipe, filed 4/30/19). The praecipe also included a notation, signed by

the Prothonotary, indicating the entry of judgment against Appellant

Barzilayeva on May 6, 2019. On August 7, 2019, Appellee filed the certified

judgment, as well as a praecipe to enter judgment, in Philadelphia County.5



____________________________________________


4 Although the   praecipe listed the docket number associated with Appellant
Barzilayeva’s criminal case, the praecipe modified the caption to “Clerk of
Court v. Juliett Barzilayeva.” (Praecipe, dated 4/30/19).

5 The certified judgment listed Montgomery County as the plaintiff with no
reference to Appellee. Nevertheless, the civil cover sheet filed with the
certified judgment listed both Montgomery County and Appellee as plaintiffs.

                                          - 14 -
J-A16033-25


Thereafter, Appellee engaged in his repeated attempts to collect on the

judgment through the forced sale of Appellant Barzilayeva’s real property.

       Here, Appellee acted sua sponte where the 2012 restitution order

remained unsatisfied.        Rather than taking matters into his own hands,

however, Appellee needed to recognize that the sentencing court for Appellant

Barzilayeva’s criminal case retained the express authority to alter or amend

the restitution order.       See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(c)(3).    We believe that

Appellee’s actions—formalizing entry of the civil judgment, transferring the

civil judgment to another county, adding his name to the judgment, and

targeting Appellant Barzilayeva’s real property—amounted to a request to

alter or amend the restitution order. We now hold that Appellee could not

request such an amendment. Instead, Appellee should have asked the district

attorney to take any necessary actions on his behalf. 6       See 18 Pa.C.S. §

1106(c)(3); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9728(e).

       Regarding Appellee’s August 7, 2019 filing of the praecipe to enter

judgment in Philadelphia County, Section 9728(b)(1) makes clear that the

clerk of courts is the only entity permitted to transmit certified copies of all



____________________________________________


6 Although we characterize Appellee’s actions as an attempt at an amendment

of the restitution order, we acknowledge that Section 1106(g) preserves a
victim’s right to pursue private remedies. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(g)
(stating: “No judgment or order of restitution shall debar the victim, by
appropriate action, to recover from the offender as otherwise provided by law,
provided that any civil award shall be reduced by the amount paid under the
criminal judgment”).

                                          - 15 -
J-A16033-25


judgments for restitution exceeding $1,000 to the prothonotary. Because the

clerk of courts already filed a praecipe to enter judgment in Montgomery

County, we believe that Appellee lacked authority to repeat this process in

Philadelphia. Therefore, the judgment entered in Philadelphia was void ab

initio, and we must strike it. See Oswald v. WB Public Square Associates,

LLC, 80 A.3d 790, 797 (Pa.Super. 2013) (stating: “judgments which are void

ab initio are those which the prothonotary was without authority to enter in

the first place,” and judgment that is void ab initio must be stricken without

regard to passage of time).

       We reiterate that the General Assembly intended for the sentencing

court to maintain jurisdiction over the restitution order to perform the

statutorily mandated oversight of the collection process. See Wright, supra.

As such, we refuse to endorse the procedure Appellee employed here, which

attempted to end-run the statutes governing the imposition and collection of

restitution.    Because the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas

maintained jurisdiction over the restitution matter, we must grant relief by

reversing the Philadelphia County order denying Appellants’ petition to set

aside the sheriff’s sale.7 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(c)(3); Wright, supra. We

also strike the judgment entered in Philadelphia County as void ab initio. See

Oswald, supra.



____________________________________________


7 Based on our disposition, we decline to address Appellants’ remaining issues.


                                          - 16 -
J-A16033-25


     Order reversed. Judgment stricken. Jurisdiction is relinquished.

     President Judge Lazarus joins this Opinion.

     Judge Kunselman files a Dissenting Opinion.




Date: 4/30/2026




                                  - 17 -