Court Filings

The court dismissed relator Atravion Preston’s mandamus action seeking public records from the Lorain Correctional Institution and the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. The magistrate concluded, and the court adopted that recommendation, that Preston failed to file with his complaint the written affirmation required by amended R.C. 149.43(C)(2). Because the statute mandates dismissal if that affirmation is not filed, the court granted respondents’ motion to dismiss, denied as moot the motion to strike, and dismissed the action without reaching the merits or statutory-damages arguments.

The First Department dismissed an appeal by defendant-appellant Danielle Statuto from a Supreme Court order that denied her CPLR 2221(d) motion for leave to reargue. The appellate court held the order denying reargument is not appealable as of right and declined to treat her notice of appeal as a motion for leave to appeal. The court cited precedent and distinguished circumstances where a notice may be converted into a leave application, finding no extraordinary circumstances here, and therefore dismissed the appeal as taken from a nonappealable paper.

The Ninth District Court of Appeals dismissed Woodforest National Bank's appeal from a final judgment because the bank failed to pay required filing fees and failed to arrange or pay for the clerk's record. The court repeatedly notified the appellant, sent invoices and a certified bill of costs, and warned the appeal would be dismissed if fees were not paid or arrangements made. The appellant did not respond or show indigency, so the court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution under the applicable appellate rules.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Wayne Bridges’s application for discretionary review of a DeKalb County Magistrate Court dispossessory judgment because the court lacked jurisdiction. Georgia law requires that appeals from magistrate court dispossessory judgments be filed within seven days; Bridges filed his application 33 days after the magistrate court’s March 6, 2026 judgment. Because the statutory appeal period expired, the Court declined to transfer the matter to the state or superior court and dismissed the application as untimely.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Madelene Kinsler’s direct appeal from a superior court judgment favoring BW Links Owner, LLC in a dispossessory proceeding because Kinsler did not follow the mandatory discretionary-appeal procedure for superior-court reviews of magistrate-court orders. The court explained that under Georgia law an application for discretionary appeal is required and that compliance is jurisdictional, so the Court of Appeals lacked authority to consider the merits and dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Keola Pasteure’s appeal of a trial-court summary judgment in favor of State Farm Fire and Casualty Company because the notice of appeal was filed more than eight months after the July 2025 order. Under Georgia law, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order. Because Pasteure did not file within that statutory period, the Court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the defendants' direct appeal in a dispossessory (eviction) matter for lack of jurisdiction. Realistry Acquisitions obtained de novo judgment and a writ of possession in superior court after the magistrate court dismissed the case. The defendants filed post-judgment motions that were denied, then filed a notice of appeal 15 days after entry of the superior court judgment. The Court of Appeals found the appeal defective because the defendants should have used discretionary-appeal procedures for de novo superior-court review and because the notice of appeal was untimely under the seven-day deadline for dispossessory appeals.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Elizabeth Jordan’s pro se appeal from a September 11, 2025 trial-court order concerning contempt and attorney-fee rulings because Jordan was still represented by counsel when she filed her notice of appeal. The court explained that a litigant cannot both proceed pro se and be represented by an attorney, and that a counsel withdrawal must be ordered by the trial court before a pro se filing can be effective. Because Jordan’s pro se notice of appeal was therefore a nullity, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Sonya Chandler Anderson's appeal for failure to prosecute. The appellant did not comply with the Court's notice of docketing or Court of Appeals Rule 23(a) requiring an enumeration of errors and brief within twenty days of docketing, nor with a subsequent order to file those documents by April 27, 2026. Because the required filings were not received, the court deemed the appeal abandoned and ordered it dismissed under applicable Court of Appeals rules.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Sandra Capouch’s appeal from a trial court order that granted defendants’ motion to open default and motion to dismiss. The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction because Capouch filed her notice of appeal 34 days after the trial court’s October 29, 2025 order, but Georgia law requires a notice of appeal within 30 days. The court relied on the filing deadline statute and precedent holding timely filing is an absolute jurisdictional requirement, and it accepted the clerk’s endorsement as the operative filing date.

The First District Court of Appeals dismissed Charles Greenlee’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Greenlee, a pro se incarcerated litigant, had sought relief under Civ.R. 60(B) from a March 3, 2025 trial-court dismissal of his claims against Walmart, arguing his amended complaint should have been deemed filed earlier under the prison-mailbox rule. The appeals court held the March 3 dismissal was not a final order because it left claims against municipal defendants pending and did not include a Civ.R. 54(B)/54(B)/no-just-reason-for-delay certification; therefore the trial court’s April 24 denial of his motion was not appealable.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals dismissed Zenayda Guadalupe Portillo-Rodriguez’s appeal from a Potter County district court judgment because she failed to pay the required appellate filing fee and did not seek to proceed without payment. The Clerk notified her of the overdue fee and gave a deadline of April 13, 2026, but she took no action. Relying on the court’s appellate rules and the Clerk’s notice requirement, the court concluded dismissal was appropriate for noncompliance and entered a per curiam dismissal on April 29, 2026.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Nichelle Taylor’s direct appeal from the trial court’s denial of her motion to set aside a final judgment under OCGA § 9-11-60(d). The court held it lacked jurisdiction because appeals from denials of such motions must be pursued by application for a discretionary appeal under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(8), (b), and Georgia precedent makes that process jurisdictional. Because Taylor filed a direct appeal instead of seeking discretionary review, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on April 28, 2026.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Ashlee Mock’s application for interlocutory review of the trial court’s order striking her answer in a civil forfeiture case because the application was filed late. The trial court struck Mock’s answer on January 7, 2026, and issued a certificate of immediate review on January 20, 2026. Mock filed her application in this Court 28 days after that certificate, but Georgia law requires an application be filed within ten days of the certificate. Because the timeliness requirement is jurisdictional, the court had to dismiss the untimely application.

The Court of Appeals dismissed a direct appeal by Robert Stafford and Icon Studios, LLC because the Court previously denied their application for discretionary appeal and that denial constituted an adjudication on the merits, barring a second direct appeal. The case arose after Heritage purchased property at foreclosure, obtained a writ of possession in magistrate court, and brought a dispossessory action; Icon and Stafford sought superior-court review but the superior court dismissed the petition and Stafford’s motion to join. The Court held that the prior denial precludes relitigation and thus the court lacks jurisdiction to hear this direct appeal.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Gary D. James's appeal for failure to file his brief and enumerations of error by the deadline set under Court of Appeals Rule 23(a) and a subsequent court order. The court had given James until 4:30 P.M. on April 27, 2026, to file the required materials and warned that failure to comply would result in dismissal. Because James did not comply, the court dismissed the appeal and cited Tolbert v. Tolbert as authority supporting dismissal for noncompliance with appellate deadlines.

The Texas Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal by William Martin, independent executor, from a trial-court order that required co-executor Steven Martin to resign or be removed. The appellate court found the appeal moot because Steven formally resigned after the order was entered, so reversing the order would have no practical effect on Steven’s status or estate administration. The court therefore declined to address the parties’ standing and procedural arguments and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals dismissed two consolidated direct appeals by Google, LLC and its employee Laura Revenko seeking review of a trial court order compelling them to comply with deposition notices and subpoenas in a divorce case. The court held it lacked jurisdiction because discovery orders in domestic relations cases listed in OCGA § 5-6-35 must be pursued by discretionary application, even if the order otherwise meets the collateral order criteria for immediacy. Because Google and Revenko did not file the required application for appeal, the appeals were dismissed.

The Court of Appeals dismissed an application for interlocutory appeal by guardians of a minor bitten by a dog because the trial court’s certificate of immediate review was untimely. After the trial court granted summary judgment for the homeowner (Jerry) on March 10, 2026, the court issued the required certificate only on April 2, 2026 — 23 days later. Because Georgia law requires the certificate be issued within ten days of the order and that requirement is jurisdictional, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the application. The plaintiffs must wait for a final judgment to pursue appeal rights.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Vernard K. Carter, Jr.'s appeal from a superior court writ of possession because the appeal was subject to discretionary-appeal procedures. The case began as a dispossessory action in magistrate court, was reviewed de novo by the superior court, and then appealed directly to this Court. The Court held it lacked jurisdiction because Carter did not follow the statutory discretionary-appeal process required for appeals from superior-court de novo reviews of magistrate-court rulings (OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(1) and controlling precedent). The appeal was therefore dismissed.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Thomas Crain’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Crain had appealed from post-trial documents related to a magistrate’s decision and a later trial-court entry adopting that decision. The appellate court found the filings attached to the notice of appeal were irregular: the magistrate’s paper was a dispositive magistrate’s decision, and the trial-court paper merely incorporated that decision but did not itself enter a separate, signed judgment specifying relief. Because the trial court failed to enter a final, independent judgment determining all claims, the appeal cannot proceed.

The defendant appealed from a Supreme Court (Onondaga County) order denying his motion to vacate a default judgment in a mortgage foreclosure action. While the appeal was pending, the defendant and plaintiff’s attorney signed a stipulation of discontinuance in February 2026. The Appellate Division consequently dismissed the appeal without costs on April 24, 2026. The court did not reach the merits of the underlying motion to vacate because the parties stipulated to discontinue the action.

The Appellate Division dismissed an appeal and cross-appeal in an Erie County civil action between Sycamore Maple Family Ltd. Partnership and James F. Jerge. The parties filed a stipulation of discontinuance on April 2, 2026, and the court ordered the appeals dismissed without costs on April 24, 2026. No opinion on the merits was issued because the case was discontinued by the parties.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal dismissed Johnny Antonio Thomas’s appeal from a county-court order that struck his six counterclaims and setoff defenses in a small-claims action by Chaney’s Used Cars to recover a loan deficiency after repossession and sale. The panel concluded it lacked jurisdiction because the dismissed counterclaims arose from the same transaction as the plaintiff’s claim and therefore were compulsory; orders dismissing compulsory counterclaims are not immediately appealable while the original claim remains pending. The court also rejected alternative bases for interlocutory review and ordered the appeal dismissed.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Elisha Holloway’s appeal from a county court judgment awarding possession and damages to The Julian at South Pointe because Holloway failed to file the required docketing statement and did not respond to the Court’s notices. The Clerk had set deadlines and warned that failure to comply could result in dismissal. Because no docketing statement or extension request was received, the court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution and for failure to follow a clerk’s directive, and it dismissed an emergency motion as moot.

The Court of Appeals dismissed an eviction appeal as moot after the appellants informed the court they no longer occupy the disputed property and do not oppose dismissal. The court noted that eviction proceedings in justice and county courts focus solely on the right to actual possession under Texas law and the civil rules. Because the appellants vacated the premises, the court vacated the county court judgment, dismissed the appeal and all pending motions, and provided no further relief on possession or related claims.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth District of Texas dismissed an appeal brought by Mitternight Boiler Works, Inc. after Mitternight filed a motion to dismiss under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The appellate court granted the motion prior to issuing any decision on the merits and dismissed the appeal, denying as moot all other pending motions. The dismissal was entered by per curiam opinion and the court noted the procedural rule authorizing dismissal on the appellant's motion.

The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District granted the parties' joint motion to reinstate and dismiss an appeal brought by Rene Martinez from an order enforcing a Rule 11 settlement. After the case was abated for mediation, the parties executed a mediated settlement agreement and asked the court to dismiss the appeal. The court reinstated the appeal and dismissed it by joint motion, ordering costs taxed against the party that incurred them and noting that no motion for rehearing will be entertained.

The Second District Court of Appeals at Fort Worth dismissed Reginald Munoz’s appeal for failure to pay the required $205 filing fee after being warned twice under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court cited the appellant’s noncompliance with Rule 42.3(c) and related rules, and referenced the Texas Supreme Court’s 2015 fee order. The court ordered Munoz to pay all costs of the appeal and issued a per curiam memorandum opinion dismissing the case on April 23, 2026.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Saadi Orabi's appeal for failure to comply with docketing and briefing rules. The appellant did not respond to the notice of docketing or file the required enumeration of errors and brief within the time prescribed by Court of Appeals Rule 23(a) and Rule 13. The court had previously ordered those filings by February 20, 2026, but they were never filed, so the appeal was deemed abandoned and dismissed pursuant to Court of Appeals Rules 7 and 23(a).