Court Filings

The Court of Appeals dismissed Ricky R. Franklin’s direct appeal of a trial-court award of attorney fees to Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC and Wilmington Savings Fund Society because the appeal should have been pursued by filing an application for discretionary review under Georgia law. The trial court had awarded $14,354.50 in fees under OCGA § 9-15-14(b), and denied Franklin’s motions for a new trial and to set aside the fee award. The appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction because Franklin did not follow the mandatory discretionary appeals procedure required for appeals of attorney-fee awards.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Ergin Tek’s direct appeal of a trial court order that removed a mechanic’s lien and found slander of title because the case was not final. The trial court reserved damages and attorney-fee issues for a later hearing, so the case remained pending. The Court explained that Tek needed either a final judgment, an express determination that there is no just reason for delay, or compliance with interlocutory appeal procedures (including a certificate of immediate review) to obtain appellate jurisdiction. Because Tek did not follow those procedures, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Allied Property Group, LLC’s application for interlocutory review as untimely. Allied sought review after the trial court dismissed all its claims and granted a certificate of immediate review on March 17, 2026. Georgia law requires an application to this Court within ten days of that certificate, but Allied filed on March 31, 2026—four days late. Because compliance with OCGA § 5-6-34(b) is jurisdictional, the Court lacked authority to consider the late application and dismissed it, leaving Allied to await final judgment to pursue an appeal.

The Appellate Division, First Department dismissed Christina Ventura's appeal from a Bronx Supreme Court order that granted defendant Ahmed summary judgment dismissing her complaint for lack of a serious injury under Insurance Law § 5102(d). The appellate court held the order was entered against plaintiff for failure to timely respond (a default), so the order was not appealable as of right. The proper procedure was to move to vacate the default and then appeal any denial. Because of that procedural defect, the court did not reach Ventura's substantive arguments on the motion's merits.

The Appellate Division, First Department dismissed Jacob Adekola’s appeal from Supreme Court orders that granted Deutsche Bank’s motions for a default judgment, an order of reference, confirmation of a referee’s report, and a judgment of foreclosure and sale. The court held Adekola lacked standing to appeal because he failed to appear in the underlying action before filing his notice of appeal and therefore was not an aggrieved party. Because the appeal was dismissed for lack of standing, the panel did not reach the merits of Adekola’s arguments for relief.

The court dismissed pro se appellant Isabelle Edwards’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Edwards sought review of the trial court’s August 5, 2025 order granting KFS Lewisville LLC’s motion to dismiss under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a and awarding attorneys’ fees, but the trial court expressly stated the fee amount had not yet been determined and that its order was not final. The appellate court concluded the order neither finally disposed of every claim nor was an appealable interlocutory order, so the appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction after Edwards failed to respond to the court’s notice to show grounds to continue the appeal.

The First District of Texas dismissed Star Construction Services, Sandra Scherer (d/b/a Star Construction Services), and Robert Scherer’s appeal because the appellants neither established indigence nor paid required appellate fees and failed to respond to the court’s notice. The court cited Texas rules and statutes governing fee payment and its authority to dismiss for nonpayment and failure to prosecute. Because appellants did not timely explain why they should not pay or actually pay the fees, the court dismissed the appeal and denied as moot any pending motions.

The First District of Texas dismissed an appeal brought by Blackbuck Petroleum PropCo I LLC and AGP Energy Services LLC from a trial court order denying their motion to compel arbitration. The parties executed a mediated settlement and a signed settlement, release, and confidentiality agreement that expressly resolved all past and present claims, including the pending appeal, and required dismissals with prejudice. Appellees moved to dismiss the appeal under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure; appellants did not oppose. The court granted the unopposed motion and dismissed the appeal, taxing costs against the appellants.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal in a dispute between John Dickerson and Atlas Sand Company, LLC after the parties jointly moved to dismiss. The parties agreed each would bear their own appellate costs as permitted by the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court granted the joint motion and dismissed the appeals without reaching the merits of the underlying dispute.

The Court of Appeals dismissed EZ Automotive and Towing SVC LLC's appeal from the trial court's summary judgment because the judgment was not final or appealable. Recaman Auto Group obtained summary judgment on its declaratory-judgment claim about ownership of a Chevrolet Silverado, but the trial court expressly left Recaman's request for attorney’s fees undecided. Because the fee claim remained pending and the order lacked finality language, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas struck Kevin McBride’s appellate brief for failure to substantially comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure after multiple notices and an opportunity to cure. McBride’s March 30, 2026 brief was deficient—containing conclusory, bulleted statements without citation to the record or legal authority—so the court treated the filing as if no brief had been filed and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. The court explained that liberal construction of procedural rules does not require the court to perform a party’s legal research or factual hunting.

The court granted the parties' agreed motion to dismiss the appeal and the plaintiff's underlying claims with prejudice. The Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing Appellant Eric Erdeljac's claims against appellees Kalahari Development LLC, KR Acquisitions, LLC (d/b/a Kalahari Resorts & Conventions), and Gerson Velasquez with prejudice, dismissed the appeal with prejudice, and denied as moot any other pending motions. Court costs are taxed against the party incurring them. No opinion was issued.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Ram Country of Fort Stockton, LLC’s interlocutory appeal from a county court’s order appointing an arbitrator because the court lacks jurisdiction to review orders that merely appoint an arbitrator under the Federal Arbitration Act. Ram Country alternatively asked the court to treat the filing as a petition for a writ of mandamus; the court considered that request but denied mandamus because Ram Country failed to show it lacked an adequate appellate remedy and did not meet procedural certification requirements. The court relied on Texas precedent holding appointment orders are not appealable interlocutory orders.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Lawrence Jeanpierre's appeal against Discover Bank for want of prosecution. Jeanpierre repeatedly missed the briefing deadline, filed a late brief and an amended brief that violated the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and failed to file a compliant second amended brief or request further extensions after the court struck his filings and set deadlines. Because he did not file a timely, compliant brief or request an extension, the court dismissed the appeal under the appellate rules permitting dismissal for failure to prosecute.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Tamera Montgomery’s appeal of a trial court order granting summary judgment to Milton Ruben Toyota of Augusta because Montgomery failed to file her appellant brief by the April 13, 2026 deadline and did not request an extension. The appeal had been docketed March 23, 2026, and under Court of Appeals Rule 23(a) the court dismissed for failure to prosecute. The order is procedural — the appellate court did not address the merits of the summary judgment ruling.

The Appellate Division dismissed John Evelyn's appeals from two Supreme Court orders in a mortgage foreclosure action because the right to a direct appeal ended when the court entered the final order and judgment of foreclosure and sale. The court granted the plaintiff's motion to dismiss these appeals, noting the issues raised are properly considered on the existing appeal from the final foreclosure judgment. The panel therefore dismissed the appeals without costs and treated related issues as preserved for review on the appeal from the order and judgment of foreclosure and sale.

The Second District Court of Appeal denied a petition for writ of certiorari from plaintiffs Carolyn Hoskins and Lolita Johns challenging a trial court order that dismissed without prejudice their direct-liability medical-malpractice claim against Women's Care of Florida for failure to satisfy presuit notice under chapter 766. The appellate court concluded the petitioners failed to show the required irreparable harm from the without-prejudice dismissal. Because certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and jurisdictional prerequisites were not met, the court dismissed the petition without addressing the trial court's legal ruling on presuit notice.

The Second District Court of Appeal dismissed Neelam Uppal’s petition for a writ of certiorari challenging a Pinellas County circuit court decision. The petition named multiple respondents including a condominium association, management companies, mortgage entities, and individual defendants. The court issued a short per curiam order simply stating “Dismissed” without extended reasoning, and three judges concurred. The filing indicates counsel appearances for some respondents and no appearance for others; the opinion is subject to revision before official publication.

The First District of Texas Court of Appeals granted the appellant's unopposed motion to dismiss an appeal. The appellant had filed a notice of nonsuit and later a motion to dismiss the appeal; the court requested clarification and held the motion for the required period for a response, but none was filed. The court therefore granted the motion, dismissed the appeal under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and denied as moot any other pending motions. The decision disposed of the appeal without reaching the merits of the underlying judgment.

The First District of Texas dismissed an appeal by WC 4th and Colorado, LP and WC 4th and Rio Grande, LP for want of prosecution after the appellants failed to file their brief by the extended deadline and did not respond to the court's notice. The court explained the brief was originally due October 27, 2025, an extension to December 1, 2025 was granted, and the appellants failed to file a brief or request a further extension. Because of that failure and no response to a December 11, 2025 dismissal notice, the court dismissed the appeal and denied as moot any pending motions.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Terrell Samuels’ appeal from a judgment of the County Civil Court at Law No. 3, Harris County, because Samuels failed to timely file an appellant’s brief and did not provide a reasonable explanation after being warned. The court cited Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure governing briefing deadlines and the court’s authority to dismiss appeals for failure to prosecute. Any pending motions were dismissed as moot.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Ray Jackson's appeal for want of prosecution because Jackson did not establish indigence, did not pay for or arrange payment for the clerk's record, and failed to respond to the court's notice that dismissal was possible. The court invoked the appellate rules permitting dismissal when the clerk's record is not filed due to the appellant's fault and when an appellant fails to prosecute the appeal. All pending motions were dismissed as moot.

The court dismissed an appeal by Delanie Perkins from a County Civil Court at Law judgment because Perkins failed to file an appellant’s brief by the deadline and did not respond to the court’s notice to file the brief or request an extension. The First District applied Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure that permit dismissal for want of prosecution and dismissed any pending motions as moot. The decision is a procedural dismissal rather than a decision on the merits of the underlying dispute between Perkins and West Lake Park Apartments.

The First District of Texas consolidated two duplicate appeals filed after the trial court granted partial summary judgment and later severed the case, making that interlocutory order final and appealable. The court found the notices of appeal filed in two appellate dockets were identical and stemmed from the same October 2, 2025 severance order, so it granted the unopposed motion to consolidate and ordered the consolidated appeal to proceed under cause number 01-26-00052-CV. Because the appellate record is incomplete, the court declined to set a briefing schedule and dismissed the duplicate appellate docket 01-25-01093-CV.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Reginald Charles Harvey’s appeal from various trial-court orders in a dispute with U.S. Nature-Invest Holdings, LLC because the notice of appeal was filed late. The underlying dispute began with the plaintiff’s declaratory judgment in January 2025 and multiple post-judgment motions by Harvey, the last of which the trial court denied on February 6, 2026. Harvey filed his notice of appeal on March 16, 2026 — 38 days after the February 6 order — and the Court of Appeals held it lacked jurisdiction because timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory under state law.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal in Phan v. Lee because appellants failed to file their enumerations of error and brief by the court-imposed deadline and did not request an extension. The appeal had been docketed March 6, 2026, and appellants were required to file within 20 days (by March 26, 2026). Citing Court of Appeals Rules 7 and 23(a) and precedent (Britton v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n), the court ordered dismissal on April 21, 2026 for noncompliance with filing requirements.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a per curiam order dated April 21, 2026, quashed a notice of appeal in a dispute between Paula Grapes (as executrix of an estate) and Linda J. Grapes. The Court concluded that the appealed order was not one of the types of final orders that may be appealed directly to the Supreme Court under 42 Pa.C.S. § 722 and the state appellate rules defining final orders. Because the appeal did not meet the statutory and rule-based criteria for direct review, the notice of appeal was dismissed.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a per curiam order on April 21, 2026 quashing a Notice of Appeal in a dispute involving Paula Grapes (as executrix of an estate) and Linda J. Grapes. The Court concluded the appeal could not proceed because the challenged order was not one of the types of final orders that may be appealed directly to the Supreme Court under state statute and appellate rules. The Court relied on 42 Pa.C.S. § 722 and Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 341(b) in finding the appeal improper and therefore quashed the filing.

The Court of Appeals (Eighth District, El Paso) dismissed Boss Lady Pub and Maria Elena Olvera’s appeal because they filed a notice of appeal but did not pay required appellate filing fees or show entitlement to proceed without payment. The clerk warned them that failure to pay by a specified deadline could result in dismissal; they did not respond or pay. The court therefore dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot on April 20, 2026.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal in Pimentel v. Morquecho because the appellant failed to file a required brief and enumerations of error by the court's deadline of April 13, 2026. The court issued a formal order on April 20, 2026, noting the missed filing and entered dismissal as the disposition. No opinion on the merits was reached because the procedural default (failure to file required appellate documents) warranted dismissal.