Court Filings

The Texas Third Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal filed by appellant Ricardo Turullols Bonilla after he moved to dismiss it. The dismissal was granted under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the court issued a short memorandum opinion stating the appeal is dismissed. The decision is procedural: the court did not reach the merits of the underlying dispute but terminated appellate review because the appellant withdrew the appeal by motion.

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Appellate District of Texas dismissed this appeal because the parties filed a joint notice that they resolved their disputes and moved to dismiss. The court granted the motion under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1) and entered dismissal. The decision is procedural: no merits ruling was made because the parties voluntarily ended the litigation by settlement and asked the court to close the appeal.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Trimen Enterprises, Inc.'s appeal seeking review of the trial court's refusal to allow an amended answer and the entry of default judgment against Trimen. The court held it lacked jurisdiction because the case remains pending below as other claims against a co-defendant were unresolved, and the trial court did not enter a certificate under OCGA § 9-11-54(b). Because Trimen did not follow the interlocutory-appeal procedures in OCGA § 5-6-34(b), including obtaining a certificate of immediate review, the appeal was premature and must be dismissed.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed a pro se appeal by Crandall Postell from a probate court order approving sale of estate real property because Postell remained represented by counsel when he filed the notice of appeal. The record contained no probate-court order allowing attorney Daniel Wilder to withdraw, and Georgia precedent bars a party from simultaneously being represented and proceeding pro se. Because a pro se notice filed while represented is a legal nullity, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal by homeowner Chinh Vo challenging the denial of his motion to set aside a May 2025 final judgment in favor of Bellmoore Park Homeowners Association. The court held it lacked jurisdiction because appeals from denials of motions to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60(d) must proceed by discretionary appeal application under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(8),(b). Because compliance with the discretionary-appeal procedure is jurisdictional, the court dismissed the direct appeal for failure to follow the required procedure.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Ed Hunter's appeal from the City of South Fulton because the appellant failed to comply with docketing notice and Court of Appeals Rule 23(a) by not filing an enumeration of errors and brief within the required time. The court had previously ordered those filings by April 6, 2026; they were still not filed as of the April 17, 2026 order. Relying on its procedural rules, the court deemed the appeal abandoned and entered dismissal.

The Texas appellate court reinstated an appeal previously suspended by the debtor’s bankruptcy filing, reviewed a motion showing the debtor received a Chapter 7 discharge, and concluded the discharge mooted the dispute between John Deere and Bradley Irwin. Because the bankruptcy discharge voided the underlying debt and barred collection, there was no live controversy for the court to resolve. The court therefore vacated the trial court’s judgment and its prior appellate opinion and judgment, and dismissed the case as moot.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth District of Texas dismissed Stacey Sprung’s pending appeal after Sprung filed a motion to dismiss under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The motion was filed before the court issued a decision, and the court granted it under the governing rule, resulting in dismissal of the appeal. The opinion is a short, per curiam memorandum noting submission and opinion dates and the panel that considered the matter.

The court dismissed a pending civil appeal after the parties jointly moved to dismiss under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The appeal arose from the County Court at Law No. 1 in Jefferson County (trial cause No. 25CCCV0301). Because the joint motion was filed before the court issued a decision, the Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. The opinion is a brief memorandum disposing of the case without further analysis.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth District of Texas dismissed Leo Roger Dugas’s appeal of a trial-court take-nothing judgment in a quiet-title suit against Ryan Edward Reuter. Dugas filed an initial brief that lacked legal authority and a corrected brief that failed to comply with numerous appellate rules. After warning and allowing an opportunity to amend, the court determined Dugas did not file a proper brief and proceeded on the clerk’s record, then dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. The court therefore did not reach the merits of the underlying title dispute.

The First District of Texas dismissed Trina Jones's appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 2 for failure to prosecute. The appellant's brief was due January 5, 2026, and after no brief was filed the court notified her on January 22, 2026, that the appeal could be dismissed unless the brief or an extension motion was filed by February 2, 2026. The appellant did not respond, so the court dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

The First District of Texas dismissed Timothy Williams's appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 4 for failure to prosecute. Williams failed to file his appellant brief by the February 20, 2026 deadline, did not file the brief or a motion for extension after a March 6, 2026 notice, and did not respond by the March 16, 2026 date given. The court therefore dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot under applicable Texas appellate rules.

The court dismissed an appeal from a final judgment entered September 30, 2024 because the appellant filed his notice of appeal on July 1, 2025 — more than nine months after the judgment and well beyond the applicable deadlines. The court explained the general 30-day filing deadline, the circumstances that can extend it to 90 days, and the limited procedure for seeking an extension. The appellant was given notice that the appeal appeared untimely and did not respond, so the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Maria Nava Hernandez's appeal from a final judgment entered October 20, 2025, for lack of jurisdiction because her notice of appeal was filed December 12, 2025 — more than the required 30 days and not saved by any timely post-judgment motion or Rule 26.3 extension. The court explained the 30-day deadline, the 90-day extension available only if a timely post-judgment motion is filed, and that the 15-day window to seek an extension under Rule 26.3 had passed. Because the notice was untimely and no jurisdictional basis existed, the appeal was dismissed and pending motions were denied as moot.

The Texas First District Court of Appeals dismissed Kevin Williams's appeal from a December 8, 2025 judgment because he neither paid required appellate fees nor proved indigence for those costs, and he failed to adequately respond after being notified that the appeal was subject to dismissal. The court cited the applicable Texas rules and statutes governing appellate fees and procedure and dismissed any pending motions as moot. The decision is a procedural dismissal for failure to comply with fee and response requirements, not a ruling on the merits of the underlying judgment.

The First District of Texas dismissed Jim Bob's appeal for failure to pay required appellate fees or to establish indigence. The court previously notified appellant that the appeal would be dismissed unless he either paid the fees or explained in writing why he should not be required to pay them. Because Jim Bob did not respond or pay, the court dismissed the appeal and denied as moot any pending motions. The dismissal rested on the applicable Texas rules and statutes governing payment of appellate fees and the court’s authority to involuntarily dismiss for noncompliance.

The Court of Appeals considered two appeals by John Lewis Jr. challenging a January 5, 2026 commitment to Kingwood Pines and an order authorizing medication. Appellant's counsel filed a notice of dismissal and the court treated it as a motion to dismiss. After abating the appeals for a hearing, the trial court docket showed appellant testified he no longer wished to pursue the appeals because he was no longer committed. The court lifted the abatement and granted the motion, dismissing both appeals and any pending motions as moot.

The First District of Texas dismissed two appeals brought by John Lewis Jr. challenging (1) a January 5, 2026 writ committing him to Kingwood Pines for up to 45 days and (2) a January 5, 2026 order authorizing medication. Counsel had filed a notice of dismissal, which the court treated as a motion to dismiss. After the court ordered a hearing to confirm whether appellant abandoned the appeals, appellant testified he no longer wished to pursue them because he was no longer committed. The court lifted the abatement, granted the dismissal motion, and dismissed the appeals as moot.

The First District of Texas dismissed Ashlee Walker's appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 4 for failure to prosecute after she did not file an appellate brief or respond to the court's notice and directive to file a brief and motion for extension. The court cited Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring briefs and authorizing dismissal for failure to comply, and it also dismissed any pending motions as moot. The dismissal was issued as a memorandum opinion by a three-justice panel on April 16, 2026.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Angel Fuentes's appeal from a County Civil Court at Law in Harris County because the appellant failed to file a brief by the deadline, did not seek an extension, and did not respond to the court's notice that the brief was overdue. The court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and treated any outstanding motions as moot. The decision is a procedural dismissal rather than a ruling on the merits of the underlying case.

The First District of Texas dismissed an appeal by Affordable Ready Mix.com and Grace Raven because they failed to establish indigence or pay the required appellate filing fee, and they did not respond to the Court's notice directing them to either pay or explain why they should not. The court cited Texas appellate rules and statutory fee provisions, concluded appellants did not comply with the Court's directive, and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. The court also dismissed any pending motions as moot.

The Fifteenth Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal filed by With Strength We Lead 2018, LLC for want of prosecution because the appellant failed to file or pay for the clerk's record. The court notified appellant of intent to dismiss and granted a 30-day extension to arrange payment and file the record, warning that failure to do so by April 2, 2026 would result in dismissal. Because no clerk's record was filed and no proof of payment was shown, the court dismissed the appeal.

The Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) dismissed Tonia Lynn Edwards’s appeal for failure to pay the required $205 filing fee after giving notice under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court cited its prior notices (March 3 and March 18, 2026), the appellant’s noncompliance with procedural rules and a Texas Supreme Court fee order, and dismissed the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(c) and 43.2(f). The opinion also orders the appellant to pay all appellate costs.

The court dismissed an eviction appeal as moot after the appellee (the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs) executed a writ of possession and obtained physical possession of the premises. The trial court had entered judgment for the appellee and set the statutorily required supersedeas bond amount under Texas law, but there is no indication the appellants posted a bond to stay possession. Because the appellee already recovered possession and the appellants did not respond to the appellee’s motion to dismiss, the appellate court concluded there was no live controversy and dismissed the appeal.

The Texas Court of Appeals (Third District) dismissed an appeal brought by Dale Cole against Discover Bank after Cole filed an unopposed motion to dismiss. The court granted the motion under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and entered an order dismissing the appeal. No substantive ruling on the underlying merits was made; the dismissal was procedural and based solely on the appellant's request.

The Second Court of Appeals, Fort Worth, dismissed Wes and Tina Dobransky's appeal from the County Court at Law, Cooke County, because the appellants repeatedly failed to pay the required filing fee despite two warnings and deadlines. The court gave notice on February 19 and March 11, 2026, allowed at least ten days to cure, and concluded the deadlines passed with no payment. The court therefore dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellants to pay all costs of the appeal.

The Second Court of Appeals, Fort Worth, dismissed Tumininu Banwo's appeal from the 325th District Court for want of prosecution because the appellant failed to file the required appellate brief. The court had notified appellant after the March 16, 2026 brief deadline and gave a grace period until March 30, 2026 to file the brief and explain the delay, but received no response. Because the appellant did not comply with Texas appellate rules or offer an explanation, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered appellant to pay all appellate costs.

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas dismissed James Kristopher Limon's appeal for want of prosecution. Limon failed to file his brief by the March 21, 2026 deadline, did not request an extension, and did not comply with the clerk's ten-day notice. Applying Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 38.8(a)(1) and 42.3(b), the court dismissed the appeal. The opinion is a short memorandum concluding dismissal is warranted where a party fails to prosecute and does not seek an extension after notice.

The Court of Appeals (Seventh District) granted the appellants' unopposed motion for voluntary dismissal of their appeal from an Agreed Final Judgment in the probate matter Estate of Eliot Carmi. The court found the motion complied with the appellate rule, that dismissal would not prejudice any party, and no decision had been issued, so the appeal was dismissed. Because the motion did not allocate costs, the court taxed appellate costs against the appellants and declined to entertain a motion for rehearing, issuing its mandate immediately.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Scott Bolles’s appeal of a trial court award of attorney fees to GEICO Indemnity Company because the appellant failed to pursue the required discretionary-review procedure. Under Georgia law, orders granting fees under OCGA § 9-15-14 must be appealed by application for discretionary review; ordinary appeals are not permitted. Because Bolles did not follow that jurisdictional procedure, the Court concluded it lacked authority to hear the case and dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits of the fee award.