Court Filings

The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the county court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant Eric Babcock in a defamation suit brought by neighbor and HOA board member Gregory Lattimer. The appellate court held that disputed factual issues remain about whether Babcock reasonably relied on unnamed government sources when he told HOA members that Lattimer threatened to shoot him and was under investigation for a hate crime. Because credibility and verification issues create jury questions under the current summary-judgment standard, the court remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Sixth District reversed and remanded a trial-court final judgment awarding attorneys’ fees and costs to DidierGroup, LLC because that fee judgment was based on an underlying final judgment that this Court had already reversed in a prior opinion. The panel held that when the foundation judgment is reversed or vacated, any dependent award of fees and costs must likewise be reversed. The court remanded without prejudice to allow either party to seek attorneys’ fees after the trial proceedings conclude consistent with the mandate.

The Third District reversed a final summary judgment of foreclosure entered for Miami Beach Townhomes because the trial court never adjudicated the homeowner-appellant Steven Kwartin’s pending affirmative defenses and counterclaims. The Association proved overdue assessments and obtained a judgment liquidating the amount due, but the judgment did not rule on Kwartin’s claims that he had tendered payment, that the Association rejected payments, and that it breached duties. The appellate court followed precedent holding a foreclosure judgment is premature and reversible when interrelated defenses and counterclaims remain unresolved.

The Third District Court of Appeal reversed a trial-court order that denied Hartford’s motion to dismiss MSP Recovery’s second amended complaint. MSP had sued for a pure bill of discovery and declaratory relief under Florida’s motor-vehicle no-fault statute, alleging the trial court had specific personal jurisdiction over Hartford. The trial court found Hartford had abandoned its jurisdictional defense, but the appellate court held Hartford did not abandon that defense and, applying a recent controlling precedent (USAA Casualty Ins. Co. v. MSP Recovery Claims), concluded the long-arm jurisdictional allegations were insufficient. The case is dismissed and remanded with directions to dismiss the action.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a three-year injunction for protection against stalking that the trial court had entered for the Wife against the Girlfriend. The appellate court held the evidence did not show the two separate, legally distinct instances of harassment required by Florida law: the October 23 barrage of messages constituted a single episode, and the other alleged acts (two social-media posts and one child-support text) were either isolated or served legitimate purposes. The court also found the communications did not objectively cause the high level of emotional distress the statute requires.

The Fourth District reversed a trial court order denying dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. Ruth sued nonresident trustee Dunham Trust Company (DTC) in Florida for breach of fiduciary duties related to a trust created by a Florida resident. The court held DTC’s acceptance of a successor co-trusteeship and routine communications to a beneficiary who later moved to Florida were insufficient to show that DTC purposefully availed itself of conducting business in Florida. Because DTC’s administration occurred in Nevada and contacts with Florida were tied to unilateral acts of the settlor/beneficiary, due process was not satisfied.

The appellate court reversed a county court order denying the landlord’s motion to dismiss or transfer a security-deposit suit for improper venue. The complaint showed the leased property, tenancy, and a prior eviction action were all in Hillsborough County and did not allege any office or agent of the landlord in Palm Beach County. Because the plaintiff did not plead a sufficient basis for selecting Palm Beach County, the Fourth District held venue is proper in Hillsborough County and remanded with directions to grant the motion and transfer the case there.

The Fourth District reversed a trial court judgment that pierced the corporate veil to hold South Dade Dealership liable for a default judgment against CarX Depot. Line 5 had obtained a default judgment against CarX for unpaid finance-and-insurance (F&I) funds and sought to collect from South Dade as an alleged alter ego or mere continuation. The appellate court found the evidence insufficient to show South Dade dominated CarX or that CarX’s separate corporate existence ceased, and it concluded there was no relay-style continuation into SDT Cars. The case is remanded with instructions to enter judgment for South Dade.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a default final judgment entered in a small claims case because the defendant, a self-represented litigant, had notified the trial court before a pretrial conference that she could not attend due to a death in her family. The trial court entered default when she did not appear and later denied her motion to continue. The appellate court found that the denial was an abuse of discretion because the reason was unforeseeable, not suggestive of delay, and the default deprived the defendant of an opportunity to be heard. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Third District reversed a trial-court judgment awarding a referring attorney a full contractual referral fee after the client discharged her. The court held that a client may discharge a referring attorney just as any attorney may be discharged, and that the referring attorney is not automatically entitled to the contractual percentage after discharge. Because the referring attorney was discharged, she is limited to a modified quantum meruit recovery for services actually performed prior to discharge and within the scope of the agreement. The case is remanded for the trial court to determine reasonable recovery under those principles.

The Third District reversed a trial-court judgment awarding a referring attorney a full contractual referral fee after the client discharged her before final settlement. The court held a client may discharge a referring attorney just as any other lawyer, and that the referring attorney is not automatically entitled to the agreed contractual percentage once discharged. Instead, where a client discharges counsel without cause the attorney may recover only the reasonable value of services performed before discharge, capped by the contract (modified quantum meruit). The case is remanded for the trial court to calculate an appropriate quantum meruit award limited to pre-discharge, in-scope work.

The Third District reversed a trial court judgment awarding a referring attorney a full contractual referral fee after the client discharged her. The dispute arose from a wrongful-death case where the client had signed an agreement dividing fees between lead counsel (Podhurst) and referring counsel (Frexes). The appellate court held that a client may discharge a referring attorney and that discharge limits the referring attorney to recovery under a modified quantum meruit for work performed before discharge. The case is remanded for the trial court to calculate reasonable compensation limited to services rendered before the January 28, 2019 discharge and within the contract’s scope.

The Sixth District reversed and remanded a jury verdict in a car-accident negligence suit because the trial court wrongly excluded deposition testimony of the sheriff’s office organizational representative about the office’s internal investigation and finding that its deputy’s crash was “preventable” and therefore the deputy was at fault. The district court held the trial court’s stated legal bases for exclusion did not support it and concluded the appellate court cannot apply the evidentiary balancing rule (Section 90.403) in the first instance to affirm under the tipsy coachman doctrine. The case is remanded for a new trial and the court certified conflict with two First District decisions.

The Sixth District reversed a county court's orders that had set aside a default final judgment for possession and dismissed an eviction complaint. Landlord Wayne Rickert sued tenants Karen and Erin Valencia for nonpayment of rent under an oral month-to-month tenancy and obtained a default final judgment after the tenants failed to timely pay the rent allegedly due on September 1. The appellate court held the tenants waived defenses other than payment by not paying alleged rent when due or timely moving to have the rent determined, so the trial court erred in vacating the default and dismissing the complaint. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

The Sixth District reversed a trial-court judgment that had enforced a 1973 deed addendum requiring Riviera’s land to be used as a golf course. The trial court had concluded the restriction remained enforceable because it was preserved by a 1990 affidavit (the Gifford Affidavit). The appellate court held the affidavit was not a muniment of title and therefore could not preserve the pre-root restriction under Florida’s Marketable Record Title Act (MRTA). Because no muniment preserved the restriction, MRTA extinguished it; the case is remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for Riviera.