Court Filings

The Ohio appellate court reversed the trial court’s denial of the City of Euclid’s motion to dismiss a negligence complaint. Frederico sued the city after a tree fell from private property onto his car, alleging the city owned and failed to maintain the tree. The appellate panel held that under Ohio law the city is generally immune from tort liability unless an exception applies, and the complaint did not plead facts showing the tree was an “obstruction” on the roadway as required to overcome immunity. Because the complaint could not state a viable exception, dismissal was required.

The First Department reversed Supreme Court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss a fraudulent inducement complaint and granted the motion. Plaintiff claimed defendant lied about tenants and rents when selling Manhattan property, but documentary evidence in the closing binder (schedule 8.1(k)) and the purchase agreement terms (including a merger clause and an "as is" purchase) conclusively refuted reliance. The court also held that, even absent those documents, the complaint failed to plead all elements of fraudulent inducement with sufficient particularity, so dismissal was required.

The Appellate Division reversed a Supreme Court order that had awarded the mother $108,491.83 in counsel fees and expenses under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act after the court ordered the return of the parties' child to Italy. The panel held that Supreme Court made only conclusory findings and failed to apply the statutory and equitable factors required by ICARA and controlling federal caselaw (including the respondent's burden to show an award would be "clearly inappropriate" and use of the lodestar method to set fees). The matter is remitted for the lower court to consider the proper factors, decide whether an award would be clearly inappropriate, and, if not, calculate an appropriate fee amount.

The Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed Supreme Court's grant of summary judgment for Bassett Healthcare Network in a wrongful-death action by Harvey Brody, administrator of Barbara Brody's estate. The court held that issues of fact exist both on a common-law negligence claim that the facility failed to monitor its parking lot and on medical malpractice claims against the nurse practitioner who evaluated the decedent. The court found defendant met its initial burdens but that plaintiff submitted admissible evidence (job description, photos, and an expert affidavit) creating triable issues about assumed duty and whether the NP departed from the applicable standard of care.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of class certification in a putative class action against owners of a Red Roof Inn asserting violations of Civil Code § 1940.1. The trial court had denied certification because it believed each class member would need to prove the hotel was their personal “primary residence,” making individualized issues predominant. The appellate court held that the statute requires inquiry into whether the hotel is a “residential hotel” (a hotel-wide question), not individualized proof that each guest treated the hotel as their own primary residence. The case is remanded for reconsideration of class certification.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Victor Valley Community College District in Jessie Walton’s suit alleging sexual harassment, discrimination, retaliation, and related claims. The appellate court found the trial court abused its discretion by excluding counsel’s curable declaration defect, and erred in holding Walton lacked FEHA standing, failed Government Claims Act notice, and could not show the District acted with deliberate indifference under Education Code section 66270. The court ordered the trial court to vacate its summary judgment, grant summary adjudication only on Walton’s Civil Code claim she did not contest, and deny summary adjudication on the remaining claims for trial setting.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed the Court of Claims’ grant of summary judgment for the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (BWC). The dispute concerned whether a $120 fee for an independent medical reviewer that BWC included in its subrogation demand was released by a prior settlement. The appellate court held the settlement’s release of subrogation rights did not bar Thomas’s claim for reimbursement because the fee was not part of the statutory subrogation interest and BWC was statutorily required to pay costs of medical reviews itself. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the superior court's dismissal of a putative class complaint by absent class member Destiny Corbin against Life Care Centers. Corbin filed claims for unpaid meal periods five days after a separate, court-approved class settlement (Atkinson) resolved claims about unpaid COVID-19 testing and screening time. The court held that the scope of preclusion depends on the settling parties’ intent; because the Atkinson settlement and its notices released only claims related to COVID-19 testing and screening for absent class members, it did not bar Corbin’s distinct meal-period claims. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Court of Appeals reversed the superior court’s judgment that had affirmed the City of Atlanta Board of Zoning Adjustment’s denial of Beacon Media’s permit to erect a freestanding billboard. Beacon applied for a permit, the City initially denied it, then granted it, and an adjacent landowner, Jamestown, appealed to the BZA and succeeded. The appeals court held Jamestown lacked standing under Georgia’s substantial-interest-aggrieved-citizen test because it did not show any special harm unique from other similarly situated property owners. Because Jamestown lacked standing, the court reversed the superior court’s affirmance of the BZA decision.

The Second District Court of Appeals reversed the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court’s dismissal of Thomas Coddington’s complaint seeking return of equipment allegedly wrongfully withheld after his father’s death. The trial court had dismissed the case as time-barred by the probate creditor-claim statute, R.C. 2117.06. The appellate court held that Coddington’s allegation of ownership and wrongful withholding places his claim outside the probate presentment requirement, so the trial court erred to the extent it dismissed under R.C. 2117.06. The case is remanded for further proceedings, including consideration of other defenses the trial court did not address.

The Texas Supreme Court ruled that the Texas Department of Public Safety lawfully terminated Texas Ranger Robert Christopher Callaway after an incident at his daughter’s high school in which he threatened counselors and other officers while carrying his badge, handcuffs, and a firearm. Callaway claimed his conduct was caused by PTSD and sued for disability discrimination under the Texas Labor Code. The Court held that Section 21.105 excludes from Chapter 21 protection disabilities that impair an individual’s ability to reasonably perform the job, and concluded Callaway’s PTSD objectively impaired his ability to perform DPS duties, so his discrimination claim fails as a matter of law.

The Texas Supreme Court decided that a 1984 pole-attachment contract between Spectrum (successor) and CPS Energy incorporates later-enacted statutory limits on pole-attachment rates. The Court held the agreement’s clear promise to “at all times observe and comply with . . . all laws” and that the contract is “subject to” such laws means legislative changes affecting the parties’ rights and obligations become enforceable under the contract. Because CPS charged and collected higher rates from Spectrum while collecting less from AT&T, Spectrum may pursue its breach-of-contract claim alleging violations of the Public Utility Regulatory Act. The court reversed the court of appeals and remanded to the trial court.

The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated summary judgment for H-E-B in a slip-and-fall premises-liability case. The plaintiff slipped on a clear liquid puddle in a grocery aisle and sued H-E-B, alleging the store knew or should have known of the hazard. The Court held that to raise a fact issue on constructive notice a plaintiff must present some evidence about how long the dangerous condition existed at the time and place of injury. Because the record lacked any evidence on the puddle’s duration, H-E-B could not be charged with constructive knowledge and summary judgment was proper.

The Texas Supreme Court resolved a dispute over how to value a nonparticipating royalty reserved in a 1960 deed. The court held the deed’s phrase “produced from the above described acreage” fixes the valuation point at the wellhead, and the phrase “free of cost forever” refers only to exemption from exploration and production costs. Because the deed lacks language shifting valuation to processed, downstream sales or expressly adding postproduction costs to the royalty base, postproduction costs may be deducted from downstream proceeds to determine the value of the raw minerals at the well. The court reversed the court of appeals and rendered partial summary judgment for the operator, remanding for further proceedings consistent with that interpretation.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for ISI Contracting, Inc. in Robert Huber’s trespass suit arising from a TxDOT highway project adjacent to Huber’s restaurant. ISI had claimed immunity under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 97.002, arguing it complied with contract documents. The appellate court held ISI failed to conclusively prove every statutory element: Huber sought loss-of-use and lost-profit damages not barred by the statute, some alleged harms arose from ISI’s activities rather than a contract-related condition or defect, and ISI did not conclusively show compliance with contract documents material to any alleged condition or defect. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

The Court of Appeals reversed and rendered judgment for AZZ, Inc. in a breach-of-contract case. Southeast Texas Industries (STI) sued multiple AZZ entities for defective galvanizing and obtained a jury verdict and judgment against AZZ, Inc. for $4,539,468.25 plus fees and interest. On appeal AZZ, Inc. argued there was no evidence it was the entity that contracted with STI. The court held the evidence was legally insufficient to show AZZ, Inc. (rather than the Beaumont galvanizing entity) agreed to galvanize the pipe, so the verdict against AZZ, Inc. could not stand and STI takes nothing from AZZ, Inc.

The Court of Appeals reversed a post-answer default judgment awarding over $27 million to William Carrell and remanded for further proceedings. The judgment was entered after appellants’ counsel withdrew days before trial and appellants did not appear. The court held appellants’ failure to appear was due to mistake or accident (not conscious indifference) because there was no reliable evidence appellants received actual notice of the trial setting after counsel’s withdrawal and substitute counsel lacked authority/adequate time to prepare. Because the lack of notice defeated the default, a new trial was required.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Esdras Pineda’s suit against his workers’ compensation carrier, National Specialty Insurance Company, and remanded for further proceedings. The trial court had granted the insurer’s plea to the jurisdiction, finding Pineda’s pro se petition did not show he exhausted administrative remedies or identify the appeals-panel decisions that aggrieved him. The appeals court held the defects in Pineda’s petition were curable because the insurer’s plea and attached evidence showed Pineda had appealed the administrative law judge’s decisions to the appeals panel and that the appeals panel allowed those decisions to become final, so Pineda should be allowed to amend his pleadings.

The Court of Appeals (Eighth District, Texas) reviewed sanctions entered against Genevieve Glasgow in a post-divorce civil case brought against her former husband. The court held the trial court abused its discretion in awarding monetary attorney’s fees because the evidence did not meet the required showing of reasonable and necessary fees, reversed the portion awarding fees, affirmed the remaining sanctions (including dismissal with prejudice of remaining claims), and remanded solely for redetermination of attorney’s fees. The court found the declarations and spreadsheets submitted did not detail particular services, who performed them, when, or the time reasonably required.

The Washington Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and held that a creditor seeking recognition of a foreign-country money judgment under the state’s Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act (ch. 6.40A RCW) must, absent general or specific personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor in Washington, show that the debtor has property in Washington. The case arose after an English court entered judgment for Alterna against SpiceJet and Alterna sought recognition in King County. The Court reasoned recognition is not purely ministerial and that constitutional due process requires a jurisdictional nexus for recognition actions when personal jurisdiction is lacking.

The Texas Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Progressive Direct Insurance Company’s special appearance and dismissed the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. The suit arose after a Washington resident insured by an Ohio-based, non-Texas-licensed insurer was injured in San Antonio and sued in Texas over denial of underinsured motorist benefits. The court held Progressive Direct lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Texas for either specific or general jurisdiction and that exercising jurisdiction would violate fair play and substantial justice, so Texas courts cannot constitutionally adjudicate the contract dispute.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that GEICO was entitled to judgment on the pleadings for breach of a settlement agreement. The case arose after Abdel-Rahman made a pre-suit motor vehicle tort settlement offer that included the five statutory material terms required by OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (2021) plus additional nonstatutory terms. GEICO sent a written acceptance agreeing to the material terms while rejecting the offeror’s attempt to make the statute inapplicable. The court followed prior appellate decisions holding that acceptance of the statutory material terms alone forms an enforceable settlement under OCGA § 9-11-67.1, so GEICO proved a breach and entitlement to specific performance.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Eighth District Court of Appeals and held that the City of Cleveland retained political-subdivision immunity for the drowning death of William Johnson at a city pool. The executor sued claiming the use of a low folding chair instead of an elevated lifeguard chair amounted to a “physical defect” on pool grounds under R.C. 2744.02(B)(4), which would remove immunity. The high court concluded that choosing one chair over another is not a tangible imperfection that impairs the function of pool grounds or equipment, so the statutory exception did not apply and summary judgment for the city must be entered.

The Court of Appeals held that Washington public policy bars an insured from assigning legal malpractice claims against defense counsel to its liability insurer when a conflict of interest exists between insurer and insured. The dispute arose after Great American (primary insurer) paid a $5 million settlement for its insured C3 and obtained an assignment of C3’s malpractice claims against defense counsel. Because the insurer had defended under a reservation of rights and thus had potential conflict with the insured, the court reversed the superior court’s denial of judgment on the pleadings and ordered dismissal of the assigned claims.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for defendant-appellant J.P.S. Properties Diversified, Inc. The dispute involved whether a deed use restriction barred an Amazon fulfillment center and whether that restriction was enforceable. A prior appellate decision (Jay Realty I) had already concluded the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Jay Realty and that the restriction was enforceable and ran with the land. The trial court improperly reinstated its prior summary-judgment entry contrary to the appellate mandate; the appeals court ordered entry of judgment for JPS because no claims remained pending after the earlier opinion.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s post-trial rulings in a fraudulent-transfer suit brought by Raida Allan against her ex-husband Tareq, his brother Qais, and two corporate gas-station entities. A jury found the transfers occurred, were not in good faith, and awarded Raida damages, but the trial court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) for Qais and the Gas Stations on statute-of-limitations grounds and denied JNOV as to Tareq. The appellate court held the trial court improperly weighed evidence when granting JNOV, found the jury’s verdict legally supported, reversed those rulings, and remanded for the trial court to enter judgment consistent with the jury and determine damages against Tareq.

The Court of Appeal reversed a trial-court judgment that sustained defendants’ demurrer and dismissed a qui tam claim under the California False Claims Act (CFCA). Relator Jamal Albarghouti filed a sealed complaint alleging false claims involving Los Angeles public entities, served the Attorney General by certified mail, and waited more than 60 days before serving defendants. The trial court held the complaint was improperly unsealed and dismissed it. The appellate court held the CFCA creates a 60-day default seal period that lifts automatically absent a government motion to extend the seal, that failure to allege compliance with the seal rules is not grounds for demurrer, and directed the trial court to overrule the demurrer and proceed.

The Ohio Supreme Court held that the State and its municipalities may immediately appeal a trial court order that preliminarily enjoins enforcement of a duly enacted law. The City of Columbus passed two firearm ordinances; plaintiffs obtained a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of several provisions. The Fifth District dismissed the city’s interlocutory appeal for lack of a final appealable order. The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that an injunction preventing enforcement of a law inflicts irreparable sovereign injury and therefore qualifies as a final, immediately appealable order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4). The case was remanded for consideration of the appeal on the merits.