Court Filings

The Illinois Appellate Court vacated the trial court's denial of plaintiff Mary Owens’ request to amend her timely post-judgment motion for a new trial after a jury verdict for a nursing home and an independent contractor nurse practitioner. The court held the trial court retained jurisdiction to consider amendments to a timely post-judgment motion until it actually denied that motion, and that the trial court erred by refusing to exercise discretion and instead concluding it lacked jurisdiction. Because that error prevented consideration of the amendment, the court vacated both the order denying leave to amend and the later denial of the new-trial motion, and remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion.

The Appellate Division, First Department reviewed a contempt finding against plaintiff-wife for allegedly failing to transfer funds under this Court's March 20, 2025 order. The court held that the contempt adjudication was an improvident exercise of discretion and vacated the contempt finding because the prior order lacked a clear deadline for transfer and the motion court did not make required findings that the wife's conduct impaired the husband's rights. The court otherwise affirmed the lower court's order as to issues not challenged on appeal.

The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded a trial-court award of $123,740.62 in attorney fees against plaintiff’s counsel in a medical-malpractice case. The trial court had found counsel abused discovery by failing to disclose a post-mortem pacemaker report and awarded fees under OCGA §§ 9-15-14(b) and 9-11-37(d). The appellate court held the report was discoverable and counsel had a duty to supplement, but concluded the § 9-11-37(d) award was invalid because the trial court lacked jurisdiction when it entered that portion of the sanction. The § 9-15-14(b) award was authorized but vacated because the court failed to explain how it calculated the exact fee amount, requiring remand for proper factfinding.

The Court of Appeal vacated and remanded a judgment confirming a large arbitration award because unresolved factual disputes remain about whether the individuals who filed and prosecuted the suit were authorized to represent the plaintiff limited liability company. The trial court had ordered arbitration and later confirmed the arbitrator’s award for respondent NNN Capital Fund I, LLC. Appellants argued the purported “liquidating trustees” (Tyrone Wynfield and later Mary Jo Saul) lacked standing under the company’s operating agreement, so neither the arbitrator nor the court had jurisdiction. The appellate court concluded the standing question was unresolved and directed the trial court to decide it and then either dismiss or reinstate the arbitration confirmation accordingly.

The First District of Texas granted Radial Power Asset, LLC’s unopposed motion to dismiss its appeal after the parties settled all disputes and the settlement was finalized. Because the appeal became moot and the appellee did not oppose dismissal, the court vacated the trial court’s judgment, dismissed the appeal, and denied as moot any other pending motions. The court relied on precedent and the appellate rules that require vacatur and dismissal when a case becomes moot.

The Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals vacated a domestic-violence civil protection order (DVCPO) that a Cuyahoga County domestic-relations magistrate had entered against G.S. following a full hearing. The court reviewed the record and concluded the petitioner, R.S., failed to present sufficient, credible evidence by a preponderance that she was in danger of domestic violence. Because the appellate court found the evidence inadequate—R.S.’s uncorroborated testimony, impeachment by exhibits, and competing testimony and exhibits from G.S.—the DVCPO was vacated and the case remanded for notification that the order is no longer in effect.

The Ohio Court of Appeals vacated a trial-court default judgment and receivership appointment entered against Janiene Johnson in a public-nuisance action brought by Community Gain. The court found that the affidavit supporting Community Gain’s request for service by publication did not identify the efforts taken to locate Johnson or show her address could not be ascertained with reasonable diligence, as required by Civ.R. 4.4 and R.C. 2703.14. Because service by publication was therefore improper, the trial court lacked jurisdiction and the default judgment is void; the matter is remanded for further proceedings.