Court Filings

The Georgia Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court exceeded its authority by directing the Department of Corrections (DOC) to credit the defendant, Jonathan Lynn Stansell, with time served beginning January 26, 2022, for burglary and theft convictions where Stansell was not arrested on those charges until January 12, 2025. The court held the sentencing judge misdirected the correctional custodian because only the custodian/DOC computes credit for time served under state law. The panel vacated the portion of the sentencing orders that set the starting date for credit and remanded to remove that language.

The Illinois Appellate Court vacated the trial court's denial of plaintiff Mary Owens’ request to amend her timely post-judgment motion for a new trial after a jury verdict for a nursing home and an independent contractor nurse practitioner. The court held the trial court retained jurisdiction to consider amendments to a timely post-judgment motion until it actually denied that motion, and that the trial court erred by refusing to exercise discretion and instead concluding it lacked jurisdiction. Because that error prevented consideration of the amendment, the court vacated both the order denying leave to amend and the later denial of the new-trial motion, and remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion.

The Texas Supreme Court dismissed interlocutory appeals and vacated three trial-court temporary injunctions that had barred the Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) from investigating reports that minors received puberty blockers or hormone therapy for gender transition. The Court concluded the injunctions presented no live controversy because DFPS permanently closed most of the investigations and the remaining child reached majority, so there is no credible threat of future enforcement. A psychologist’s claim for injunctive relief likewise failed for lack of standing because her alleged injuries were speculative.

The Texas Supreme Court concurred that the preliminary injunctions entered in two consolidated suits should be dissolved. The Chief Justice agreed that the private families’ claims are moot and that PFLAG lacks standing, but concluded that Dr. Megan Mooney likely retains standing to pursue at least part of her challenge to the Department of Family and Protective Services’ reporting rule. Nevertheless, because Texas law now outlaws the challenged treatments and higher courts have upheld such bans, he would vacate the injunctions on the merits as the legal landscape forecloses the plaintiffs’ theories.

The Appellate Division, First Department reviewed a contempt finding against plaintiff-wife for allegedly failing to transfer funds under this Court's March 20, 2025 order. The court held that the contempt adjudication was an improvident exercise of discretion and vacated the contempt finding because the prior order lacked a clear deadline for transfer and the motion court did not make required findings that the wife's conduct impaired the husband's rights. The court otherwise affirmed the lower court's order as to issues not challenged on appeal.

The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded a trial-court award of $123,740.62 in attorney fees against plaintiff’s counsel in a medical-malpractice case. The trial court had found counsel abused discovery by failing to disclose a post-mortem pacemaker report and awarded fees under OCGA §§ 9-15-14(b) and 9-11-37(d). The appellate court held the report was discoverable and counsel had a duty to supplement, but concluded the § 9-11-37(d) award was invalid because the trial court lacked jurisdiction when it entered that portion of the sanction. The § 9-15-14(b) award was authorized but vacated because the court failed to explain how it calculated the exact fee amount, requiring remand for proper factfinding.

The Georgia Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s dismissal of Jonathan Miller’s motion to correct a void sentence and remanded for further proceedings. Miller, who was sentenced to life with parole after convictions including felony murder for a 1998 killing committed when he was 15, argued his life sentence is grossly disproportionate in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Court held that an Eighth Amendment disproportionality claim is a cognizable void-sentence claim that may be raised at any time, found the trial court erred by dismissing for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded because the record did not clearly show the trial court decided the constitutional claim on the merits.

The Fifth District Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the defendant Carl S. Williams Jr.’s aggregate eight-year prison sentence because the trial court imposed consecutive terms without making all statutory findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C). Williams had pled guilty to multiple theft-related felonies while on post-release control and received consecutive eight-month terms plus two years for post-release-control violation. The appellate court found the trial court failed on the record to state that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public or to punish the offender, so the sentence was contrary to law and must be vacated for resentencing. The court upheld the post-release-control prison term itself.

The Superior Court vacated a April 29, 2025 revocation-of-probation sentence imposed on Leroy Kenneth Thomas and remanded to re-impose his earlier October 25, 2021 revocation-of-probation sentence. The PCRA court had entertained an untimely collateral petition and resentenced Thomas without jurisdiction because the petition did not satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or an exception. Because the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction, its resentencing was void ab initio. The court therefore vacated the 2025 sentence and ordered reinstatement of the 2021 sentence, leaving any discretionary-sentencing challenges unreviewed.

The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s order that had granted Ricky Thompson an out-of-time appeal from his convictions for involuntary manslaughter and aggravated assault. The court found the trial court lacked authority under the statutory deadline in OCGA § 5-6-39.1 because Thompson filed his motion 114 days after the time to appeal expired, exceeding the statute’s 100-day window. The panel remanded with directions to dismiss the out-of-time appeal motion and noted that any remedy must be pursued by habeas corpus under existing precedent.

The Court of Appeal vacated and remanded a judgment confirming a large arbitration award because unresolved factual disputes remain about whether the individuals who filed and prosecuted the suit were authorized to represent the plaintiff limited liability company. The trial court had ordered arbitration and later confirmed the arbitrator’s award for respondent NNN Capital Fund I, LLC. Appellants argued the purported “liquidating trustees” (Tyrone Wynfield and later Mary Jo Saul) lacked standing under the company’s operating agreement, so neither the arbitrator nor the court had jurisdiction. The appellate court concluded the standing question was unresolved and directed the trial court to decide it and then either dismiss or reinstate the arbitration confirmation accordingly.

The First District of Texas granted Radial Power Asset, LLC’s unopposed motion to dismiss its appeal after the parties settled all disputes and the settlement was finalized. Because the appeal became moot and the appellee did not oppose dismissal, the court vacated the trial court’s judgment, dismissed the appeal, and denied as moot any other pending motions. The court relied on precedent and the appellate rules that require vacatur and dismissal when a case becomes moot.

The Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals vacated a domestic-violence civil protection order (DVCPO) that a Cuyahoga County domestic-relations magistrate had entered against G.S. following a full hearing. The court reviewed the record and concluded the petitioner, R.S., failed to present sufficient, credible evidence by a preponderance that she was in danger of domestic violence. Because the appellate court found the evidence inadequate—R.S.’s uncorroborated testimony, impeachment by exhibits, and competing testimony and exhibits from G.S.—the DVCPO was vacated and the case remanded for notification that the order is no longer in effect.

The Twelfth District Court of Appeals vacated a juvenile-court order that had granted visitation rights to the paternal grandfather because the juvenile court in Madison County lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to decide a grandparent-visitation claim under R.C. 3109.11. The appellate court reviewed statutory text and Ohio Supreme Court precedent establishing that only the common pleas general division has jurisdiction under R.C. 3109.11 and that juvenile courts have only the powers expressly granted by statute. Because Madison County's juvenile division has not been granted the common-pleas division's powers, the visitation judgment was void and therefore vacated.

The Ohio Court of Appeals vacated a trial-court default judgment and receivership appointment entered against Janiene Johnson in a public-nuisance action brought by Community Gain. The court found that the affidavit supporting Community Gain’s request for service by publication did not identify the efforts taken to locate Johnson or show her address could not be ascertained with reasonable diligence, as required by Civ.R. 4.4 and R.C. 2703.14. Because service by publication was therefore improper, the trial court lacked jurisdiction and the default judgment is void; the matter is remanded for further proceedings.