Miller v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.




                                                  In the
                             Supreme Court of Georgia
                                           No. S26A0317
                                        Jonathan Allen Miller
                                                 v.
                                             The State

                        On Appeal from the Superior Court of Cherokee County
                                           No. 98CR0722

                                          Decided: April 21, 2026


                    MCMILLIAN, Justice.
                   Jonathan Miller appeals from a trial court order dismissing
            his motion to correct a void sentence on the grounds that the mo-
            tion presented no cognizable claim because Miller’s sentence fell
            within the statutory range of punishment. Miller argues that the
            trial court erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction to de-
            cide the motion because a claim that a sentence is grossly dispro-
            portionate under the Eighth Amendment of the United States
            Constitution is a cognizable void sentence claim and that the trial
            court should have considered the claim on its merits. For the rea-
            sons that follow, we vacate the dismissal order and remand for
            further proceedings.
                   In November 1998, then-fifteen-year-old Miller initiated an
            altercation with a thirteen-year-old student after they got off the
            school bus, hitting the victim with a fist to the back of the head
            and kicking him once. After the victim died from his injuries, Mil-
            ler was indicted and convicted in superior court for felony murder,
            aggravated assault, and aggravated battery and was sentenced to
            serve life in prison. See Miller v. State, 275 Ga. 730, 731 (2002).
After this Court affirmed his convictions, Miller filed a federal ha-
beas petition, which was denied and affirmed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 1 See id.; Miller
v. Martin, 2007 US Dist. LEXIS 13112 (Feb. 26, 2007); Miller v.
Martin, 276 FApp’x 927 (11th Cir. 2008).
        On July 10, 2023, Miller filed a motion to correct void sen-
tence, arguing that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment
of the United States Constitution because a “more than 20-year
prison sentence” is disproportionate to an act of unintentional
killing committed by a fifteen-year-old during a fistfight with an-
other student. See US Const. Amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unu-
sual punishments inflicted.”). Following a hearing and briefing,
the trial court dismissed the motion. In that order, the trial court
explained that “[s]uccessful challenges under the Eighth Amend-
ment to specific sentences based on gross disproportionality are
rare” and that Miller’s “case is not one of these rare cases in which
the threshold inference of gross disproportionality will be met and
then stand after further scrutiny.” The trial court then stated:
“Notwithstanding that, [Miller] was lawfully sentenced to life im-
prisonment with the possibility of parole following his conviction
for felony murder. [Miller’s] sentence fell within the range of pun-
ishment under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1.” Because Miller’s sentence fell
within the statutory range of punishment, the trial court ex-
plained that “the sentence is not void – it is legal – and is not
subject to post-appeal modification under Georgia law” and that
“[w]here such a motion presents no cognizable claim that the im-
posed sentence is void, the sentencing court should dismiss the


       1 Miller did not raise the proportionality claim on direct appeal and did
not file a state habeas petition. This claim was raised in his federal habeas
proceedings but was procedurally barred.




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motion for lack of jurisdiction.” The order then concluded:
“THEREFORE, THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION HAS PRE-
SENTED NO COGNIZABLE CLAIM AND IS HEREBY DIS-
MISSED.” 2
        1. Turning first to the jurisdictional issue, we begin by set-
ting out first principles. “When a sentencing court has imposed a
sentence of imprisonment, its jurisdiction to later modify or va-
cate that sentence is limited.” von Thomas v. State, 293 Ga. 569,
571 (2013). Generally, the sentencing court only retains the power
to modify the sentence “[w]ithin one year of the date upon which
the sentence was imposed, or within 120 days after receipt by the
sentencing court of the remittitur upon affirmance of the judg-
ment after direct appeal, whichever is later.” OCGA § 17-10-
1(f)(1). However, “a sentencing court has jurisdiction to vacate a
void sentence at any time”; “a sentence is void if the court imposes
punishment that the law does not allow.” Thomas, 293 Ga. at 571
(cleaned up; emphasis in original). Most typically, a valid void
sentence claim is based on a sentence that is void “because it ex-
ceeds the most severe punishment for which the applicable penal
statute provides,” id. at 572, but we have also recognized that a
claim that a sentence is disproportionate under the Eighth
Amendment is a void sentence claim that may be raised at any
time. See Rooney v. State, 287 Ga. 1, 1–3 (2010) (concluding that
the appellant’s constitutional challenges to a sentencing statute
were “properly the subject of a motion to vacate a void sentence”
and that “a sentencing court retains jurisdiction to correct a void
sentence at any time” (punctuation omitted)). Cf. Dennis v. State,
300 Ga. 457, 459 (2017) (“Dennis’[s] 1998 sentence of life without
the possibility of parole was void and subject to a challenge on



      2 The font and emphasis are original to the order.




                                    3
Eighth Amendment grounds at any time.”).
       Here, Miller has raised a cognizable claim that his sen-
tence is disproportionate and, thus, void under the Eighth
Amendment. See Sillah v. State, 315 Ga. 741, 754 (2023) (“The
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution bans ‘cruel
and unusual punishments,’ including those that are grossly dis-
proportionate to the crime committed.”). Because Miller has as-
serted a cognizable void sentence claim, the trial court erred in
dismissing the motion for lack of jurisdiction. See Dennis, 300 Ga.
at 459; Rooney, 287 Ga. at 2.
        2. Having concluded that the trial court erred in dismissing
the motion, we turn to the question of the appropriate remedy.
Miller argues that a remand is required for the trial court to as-
sess whether the sentence is grossly disproportional under the
Eighth Amendment. In response, the State argues that the trial
court made the requisite findings when it determined that Mil-
ler’s “case is not one of these rare cases in which the threshold
inference of gross disproportionality will be met and then stand
after further scrutiny” and, alternatively, that Miller is precluded
from raising this void sentence claim because his trial counsel
made the same argument at sentencing.
       As to whether the trial court has already rejected Miller’s
Eighth Amendment claim on the merits, we note that although
the order ultimately concluded that the trial court was without
jurisdiction to review the void sentence claim, before reaching
that conclusion, the trial court referred to Miller’s Eighth Amend-
ment claims and cited to applicable cases, including Sillah, 315
Ga. at 741. Sillah explains the requirements for a court when
determining whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate under
the Eighth Amendment:
      [A] court first compares the gravity of the offense




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      and the severity of the sentence. When evaluating
      the gravity of the offense as part of the threshold
      comparison, courts look not only at the statutory el-
      ements of the offense, but also the particular circum-
      stances of the crime committed as shown by the rec-
      ord. Moreover, courts must defer to the legislature
      in determinations of sentencing parameters unless a
      sentence is so overly severe or excessive in propor-
      tion to the offense as to shock the conscience.

      In the rare case that this threshold comparison leads
      to an inference of gross disproportionality, a court
      next compares the defendant’s sentence with the
      sentences received by other offenders in the same ju-
      risdiction and with the sentences imposed for the
      same crime in other jurisdictions.

Sillah, 315 Ga. at 754–55 (cleaned up).
        After reviewing the trial court’s order as a whole, it is not
clear to us that the court ruled on the merits of the Eighth Amend-
ment claim. The sentence that the State points to says that this
is not one of the rare cases where the threshold inference “will be
met” and only “after further scrutiny.” This suggests that the
trial court is anticipating that the threshold inference of gross dis-
proportionality will not be met but only if the issue could be con-
sidered under its jurisdiction. And in the next paragraph, the trial
court states “[n]otwithstanding that, [Miller] was lawfully sen-
tenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole follow-
ing his conviction for felony murder” and then ultimately con-
cludes that the trial court is without jurisdiction to decide the mo-
tion.
      Given that it is not clear whether the trial court passed on




                                  5
the merits or was stating that the Eighth Amendment claim
would fail “after further scrutiny,” and because the trial court ex-
pressly declined to exercise jurisdiction over the motion, we can-
not discern whether the trial court decided the merits of the
claim. 3 Under similar circumstances, we have vacated the lower
court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. See Wil-
liams v. State, 301 Ga. 60, 62 (2017) (“Given the uncertainty in
the trial court’s order regarding the basis for its ruling, this Court
must vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals and remand for
the Court of Appeals to remand this case to the trial court for fur-
ther clarification on the specific findings that form the basis for
its legal conclusions with regard to [appellant’s] motion to sup-
press.”); Parker v. State, 255 Ga. 167, 168–69 (1985) (remanding
for further proceedings when it was not clear whether the trial
court determined the voluntariness of the confession or whether
it decided that it was a question for the jury).
       Alternatively, the State argues that the judgment should
be affirmed under the right-for-any-reason doctrine because the
issue was raised and ruled on at sentencing such that Miller “may
not raise the issue a second time absent a fundamental change in
the law that is subject to retroactive application.” However, the
right-for-any-reason doctrine does not apply when the alternative
basis for the judgment was not raised in the trial court. See Geor-
gia-Pacific, LLC v. Fields, 293 Ga. 499, 504 (2013) (concluding
that since the alternative basis for the judgment “was not raised
in the motion, the ‘right for any reason’ rule should not have been
invoked”). The State did not assert this alternative basis for re-
jecting the merits of Miller’s Eighth Amendment claim in re-
sponding to the motion to vacate void sentence or at the hearing
on the motion. Therefore, we decline to consider the State’s right-

      3 We express no opinion as to the merits of Miller’s claim.




                                     6
for-any-reason argument. 4
       For these reasons, we vacate the judgment of the trial court
and remand for further proceedings on the merits consistent with
this opinion.
       Judgment vacated and case remanded. All the Justices con-
cur, except Ellington, LaGrua, and Land, JJ., who dissent. War-
ren, P.J., and Pinson, J., not participating.




      4 We express no opinion on the merits of the State’s argument.




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       LAGRUA, Justice, dissenting.
       I respectfully dissent because I believe the trial court’s or-
der is sufficiently clear, does not require remand, and properly
determined that Miller’s void-sentence claim fails. 5
       In its order, the trial court cited the United States Supreme
Court’s and this Court’s precedent governing Eighth Amendment
void-sentence claims. The court’s order reflects that it applied
that law, stating specifically that this case is not one of “these rare
instances in which the threshold inference of gross disproportion-
ality will be met and then stand after further scrutiny.” See Sillah
v. State, 315 Ga. 741, 754–55 (2023) (holding that, “to determine
whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate, a court first com-
pares the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence,”
and that, “[i]n the rare case that this threshold comparison leads
to an inference of gross disproportionality,” the court further com-
pares the sentence with sentences received by other defendants
for the same crime (quotation marks omitted)). I presume the trial
court properly followed the law that it cited, see Moore v. State,
303 Ga. 743, 746 (2018), and I fail to see any ambiguity just be-
cause the trial court’s order did not contain detailed factual find-
ings or legal conclusions on the constitutional issue.
        Rather, I believe that the trial court’s order is clear that it
first concluded that Miller’s argument did not meet the threshold
inquiry for his constitutional claim, and second, that Miller was
given the statutorily required sentence for felony murder. Com-
pare Moore v. State, 293 Ga. 705, 707–08 (2022) (affirming trial
court’s conclusion that constitutional void sentence claim failed
but vacating sentence because sentence was not legal sentence


       5 I assume, without deciding, that the appeal is properly before this
Court, contrary to the argument presented in the Attorney General’s brief.




                                     8
under statutory law applicable at the time), disapproved on other
grounds, Kimbrough v. State, 300 Ga. 516, 519–20 (2017). Thus,
the trial court determined that Miller’s void-sentence claim failed
and appropriately dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction.
See von Thomas v. State, 293 Ga. 569, 571 (2013) (holding that
where a defendant does not raise a cognizable void sentence
claim, the sentencing court should dismiss the motion for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction). Accordingly, I see no basis for re-
manding to the trial court to clarify its order.
       Furthermore, the record is sufficient to show that the trial
court correctly rejected Miller’s claim. As part of the threshold
consideration of the gravity of the offense, the court looks to the
statutory elements of the offense and the particular circum-
stances of the crime as shown by the record. See Sillah, 315 Ga.
at 754. As the majority recognizes, Miller’s argument is that his
sentence is void under the Eighth Amendment because his sen-
tence “is disproportionate to an act of unintentional killing.” Maj.
Op. at 2-3. However, Miller was not convicted of a crime involving
the intent to kill. Instead, he was convicted of felony murder,
which does not require proof of an intent to kill, only the intent to
commit the underlying felony. See OCGA § 16-5-1(c); Burley v.
State, 316 Ga. 796, 803 (2023). 6 Thus, Miller’s argument that he
did not intend to kill the victim ignores the statutory elements of
his crime and relies on a false premise.
       Moreover, the trial court correctly determined that an in-



       6 If Miller had been convicted of involuntary manslaughter, which re-
quires proof of “the death of another human being without any intention to do
so by the commission of an unlawful act other than a felony,” OCGA § 16-5-
3(a), he would have a valid void sentence claim, given that the maximum sen-
tence for involuntary manslaughter is 10 years imprisonment. See id.




                                     9
ference of gross disproportionality has not been raised, either gen-
erally or under the facts of this case. Miller made no argument
below that a sentence of life imprisonment is an unduly severe
punishment for the taking of a life during the commission of a
felony. Nor do the particular facts of this case suggest that the
sentence is grossly disproportionate to Miller’s crime. As reflected
in our opinion affirming the conviction, see Miller v. State, 275
Ga. 730, 730 (2002), and in the trial transcript, which is included
in the record on appeal, the evidence showed that the victim was
two years younger than Miller and that, before the day of the fatal
assault, Miller “taunted” the victim and told others that he
planned to “beat the hell out of” the victim, derisively referring to
the victim as his “gay neighbor.” On the day of the incident, while
Miller and the victim were on the bus, Miller bullied the victim,
calling him names such as “bitch” and asking “anyone in general
whether he should hit [the victim] in the back of the head or run
around and hit him in the face.” At the bus stop, the victim exited
the bus, walking “at a fast pace … a little more than normal,” and
Miller came up behind him, punched him in the back of the head,
hit him in the face as the victim began to fall, and then kicked
him as he lay on the ground. Miller laughed and then fled. Under
these circumstances, I cannot say that the trial court erred in de-
termining that Miller failed to establish that his life sentence was
grossly disproportionate to the particular circumstances of the
crime. 7


       7 Yes, Miller was 15 years old at the time and, according to his testi-
mony at the hearing below, had disciplinary infractions prior to his first be-
coming eligible for parole in 2013 but has not had any since that time. How-
ever, because the trial court did not err in dismissing his void-sentence claim,
the question of whether he should be released from the terms of his sentence
is reserved to the discretion of the Board of Pardons and Paroles. See Ga.




                                      10
       I am authorized to state that Justices Ellington and Land
join in this dissent.




Const. of 1983, Art. IV, Sec. II, Par. II; Manley v. State, 287 Ga. 338, 341 (2010).




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