Greg Abbott, in His Official Capacity as Governor of the State of Texas; Stephanie Muth, in Her Official Capacity as Commissioner of the Department of Family and Protective Services; And the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services v. Jane Doe, Individually and as Parent and Next Friend of Mary Doe, a Minor; John Doe, Individually and as Parent and Next Friend of Mary Doe, a Minor; And Dr. Megan Mooney

Supreme Court of Texas
                         ══════════
                          No. 24-0384
                         ══════════

 Stephanie Muth, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the
  Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, and the
     Texas Department of Family and Protective Services,
                           Petitioners,

                                v.

   Mirabel Voe, individually and as parent and next friend of
Antonio Voe, a minor; Wanda Roe, individually and as parent and
  next friend of Tommy Roe, a minor; PFLAG, Inc.; and Adam
Briggle and Amber Briggle, individually and as parents and next
                    friends of M.B., a minor,
                          Respondents

                             ~ and ~

                         ══════════
                          No. 24-0385
                         ══════════

 Greg Abbott, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of
Texas; Stephanie Muth, in her official capacity as Commissioner
 of the Department of Family and Protective Services; and the
      Texas Department of Family and Protective Services,
                           Petitioners,

                                v.
  Jane Doe, individually and as parent and next friend of Mary
  Doe, a minor; John Doe, individually and as parent and next
     friend of Mary Doe, a minor; and Dr. Megan Mooney,
                             Respondents

   ═══════════════════════════════════════
              On Petitions for Review from the
       Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas
   ═══════════════════════════════════════

      CHIEF JUSTICE BLACKLOCK, concurring.

      I agree with the Court that the injunctions in these consolidated
cases, which this Court long ago stayed, must now be dissolved in their
entirety. I also agree with the Court that the families’ claims are moot
and that PFLAG lacks standing. In my view, however, Dr. Mooney
likely has standing sufficient for at least some of her case to proceed
against the Department of Family and Protective Services. I would
therefore reach the question of Mooney’s probable right to relief on the
merits and would vacate the injunctions because the merits point firmly
in the other direction.
      As a licensed psychologist, Mooney is subject to the mandatory
child-abuse reporting regime administered by DFPS.         See 40 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 707.451–.471. Her portion of the suit challenges, in part,
DFPS’s decision to make the administration of “gender-transition”
therapy to children reportable as child abuse.    Mooney—who has a
history of counseling people considering these treatments—takes the
position that DFPS’s changed view of the matter violates the law.
Although I do not think she is right about that, I am inclined to view




                                   2
imposition by the government of an increased reporting burden of this
nature as an injury sufficient to confer standing. It seems to be an injury
to which Mooney remains subject, despite intervening developments in
the case.
      I would nevertheless fully vacate the injunctions. Since these
cases were initiated, the conduct at issue—“gender-transition”
treatments for children—has been outlawed in Texas. Both this Court
and the U.S. Supreme Court have upheld such bans against
constitutional attack. State v. Loe, 692 S.W.3d 215, 239 (Tex. 2024);
United States v. Skrmetti, 605 U.S. 495, 525 (2025). Thus, since the time
of the injunctions, the law has developed in a way that forecloses the
legal theories animating this litigation, including Mooney’s portion of it.
In light of those developments, the sweeping temporary injunctions are
plainly improper on the merits.       I therefore concur in the Court’s
decision to vacate the injunctions.



                                          James D. Blacklock
                                          Chief Justice

OPINION FILED: April 24, 2026




                                      3