Court Filings

The Court of Appeals (Eighth District, El Paso) dismissed Boss Lady Pub and Maria Elena Olvera’s appeal because they filed a notice of appeal but did not pay required appellate filing fees or show entitlement to proceed without payment. The clerk warned them that failure to pay by a specified deadline could result in dismissal; they did not respond or pay. The court therefore dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot on April 20, 2026.

The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas denied Beverly Brooks's emergency petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a trial-court order dated April 13, 2026. Brooks sought to prevent counsel Kirkendall Dwyer, LLP from withdrawing all funds held in the trial court's registry and to secure a portion of the registry funds representing accrued interest. The appeals court declined relief and left the trial court's order intact, which granted withdrawal of the full registry amount to Kirkendall Dwyer and denied Brooks's request for interest funds.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order that dissolved prejudgment writs of garnishment obtained by Texas Global Equity Fund XII (TGE) against 22 entities believed to owe money to Breckenridge Development 2019 (BD19). TGE had sued BD19 for unpaid loan principal and interest after BD19 failed to provide required financial reports, repay a prior Frost Bank loan as required, and cure defaults. The appeals court held TGE proved the statutory grounds for garnishment (the debt was liquidated, due and unpaid; BD19 lacked sufficient property to satisfy it; and the garnishment was not sought to injure BD19), and BD19 failed to prove extrinsic grounds to dissolve the writs. The court reinstated the writs and remanded for further proceedings.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal filed by appellant Ricardo Turullols Bonilla after he moved to dismiss it. The dismissal was granted under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the court issued a short memorandum opinion stating the appeal is dismissed. The decision is procedural: the court did not reach the merits of the underlying dispute but terminated appellate review because the appellant withdrew the appeal by motion.

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Appellate District of Texas dismissed this appeal because the parties filed a joint notice that they resolved their disputes and moved to dismiss. The court granted the motion under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1) and entered dismissal. The decision is procedural: no merits ruling was made because the parties voluntarily ended the litigation by settlement and asked the court to close the appeal.

The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case for further consideration. The dispute arose from Platinum Construction’s suit against Copper Creek and Jose Escoffie for theft of services and related claims after key emails and accounting records were missing. The court of appeals had found the trial court’s spoliation jury instruction reversible error and ordered a new trial without first addressing other appellate issues that might have led to rendition. The Supreme Court held that appellate courts must first decide rendition issues and that the court of appeals’ harm analysis was insufficient.

The Texas Supreme Court denied review of an appeal in an asbestos wrongful-death case involving Howmet Aerospace and the Burford family. Justice Young concurred in the denial while criticizing the court of appeals for rejecting a prior Texas Supreme Court statement that proof of dose is required even in single-source asbestos-exposure cases. He explained the factual posture (long-term household exposure from a worker’s contaminated clothes), summarized relevant precedent (Havner, Flores, Bostic), and said that although lower courts show confusion, this particular case cannot resolve the dose question because the court of appeals found the plaintiffs had produced sufficient proof of dose. He urged future review in an appropriate case.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered forfeiture of a 2007 Lincoln Navigator. The State sought forfeiture after R.C. Scott was arrested while driving the Navigator and later pled guilty to evading and third-or-more driving-while-intoxicated charges. The court held the State proved the vehicle was contraband under Chapter 59 because Scott had three prior DWI convictions and used the vehicle in a qualifying felony, and that Scott was an equitable owner despite the vehicle titled to his parents. Because Scott was an owner, the parents could not prevail on the innocent-owner defense.

The Texas Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s default judgment against appellant Nicholas Lind in a suit by investors M3 Fort Worth Developer, LLC and The YoungESTone, LLC. M3 and YO invested in residential development projects run by Serene and Windridge, paid management and construction fees, and sued after projects stalled. Lind was served with the original petition but not the first amended petition; the trial court entered default judgment and later a damages judgment. The appellate court held lack of re-service was not error because the amended petition did not seek more onerous relief, and any challenge to sufficiency of evidence failed because securities claims under the Texas Securities Act do not require proof of loss causation.

The Texas appellate court reinstated an appeal previously suspended by the debtor’s bankruptcy filing, reviewed a motion showing the debtor received a Chapter 7 discharge, and concluded the discharge mooted the dispute between John Deere and Bradley Irwin. Because the bankruptcy discharge voided the underlying debt and barred collection, there was no live controversy for the court to resolve. The court therefore vacated the trial court’s judgment and its prior appellate opinion and judgment, and dismissed the case as moot.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth District of Texas dismissed Stacey Sprung’s pending appeal after Sprung filed a motion to dismiss under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The motion was filed before the court issued a decision, and the court granted it under the governing rule, resulting in dismissal of the appeal. The opinion is a short, per curiam memorandum noting submission and opinion dates and the panel that considered the matter.

The Court of Appeals affirmed a bench-trial judgment awarding Douglas Fuhrman $187,244 plus $30,782.58 in attorney’s fees after he sued his ex-wife, Nancy Fuhrman, for breach of the 2020 agreed divorce decree’s tax-allocation provisions. The trial court found the decree was a valid contract, Douglas performed (Deloitte prepared and filed the 2020 returns), Nancy breached by failing to pay her allocated share, and Douglas suffered damages. The appellate court held the record (tax returns, expert testimony, decree language) provided legally and factually sufficient support for the trial court’s findings and legal conclusions.

The court dismissed a pending civil appeal after the parties jointly moved to dismiss under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The appeal arose from the County Court at Law No. 1 in Jefferson County (trial cause No. 25CCCV0301). Because the joint motion was filed before the court issued a decision, the Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. The opinion is a brief memorandum disposing of the case without further analysis.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth District of Texas dismissed Leo Roger Dugas’s appeal of a trial-court take-nothing judgment in a quiet-title suit against Ryan Edward Reuter. Dugas filed an initial brief that lacked legal authority and a corrected brief that failed to comply with numerous appellate rules. After warning and allowing an opportunity to amend, the court determined Dugas did not file a proper brief and proceeded on the clerk’s record, then dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. The court therefore did not reach the merits of the underlying title dispute.

The Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s temporary injunction preventing four former CRNA employees from providing CRNA services within 20 miles of any location where they worked for their former employer, Anesthesia Associates, for three years. Anesthesia Associates sued after the CRNAs resigned and began working for a competitor at a local hospital, alleging breach of noncompetition and irreparable harm. The appellate court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion: the employer showed a legitimate protectable interest (goodwill, specialized training, credentialing), probable success on the claim at trial, and probable irreparable injury that could not be adequately remedied by money damages.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a default judgment entered for Deere Credit against Unger Texas Stone, LP and Shelia Unger. The court held this was a restricted appeal and reviewed only the clerk’s record, finding that Shelia — a non-lawyer — timely filed a letter that, in substance, amounted to an answer both for herself and for the limited partnership. Because that filing constituted an appearance, the defendants were entitled to notice of Deere Credit’s motion for default judgment and an opportunity to be heard; the trial court signed the default judgment without providing such notice, producing error apparent on the face of the record.

The First District of Texas dismissed Trina Jones's appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 2 for failure to prosecute. The appellant's brief was due January 5, 2026, and after no brief was filed the court notified her on January 22, 2026, that the appeal could be dismissed unless the brief or an extension motion was filed by February 2, 2026. The appellant did not respond, so the court dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

The First District of Texas dismissed Timothy Williams's appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 4 for failure to prosecute. Williams failed to file his appellant brief by the February 20, 2026 deadline, did not file the brief or a motion for extension after a March 6, 2026 notice, and did not respond by the March 16, 2026 date given. The court therefore dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot under applicable Texas appellate rules.

The court dismissed an appeal from a final judgment entered September 30, 2024 because the appellant filed his notice of appeal on July 1, 2025 — more than nine months after the judgment and well beyond the applicable deadlines. The court explained the general 30-day filing deadline, the circumstances that can extend it to 90 days, and the limited procedure for seeking an extension. The appellant was given notice that the appeal appeared untimely and did not respond, so the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

Appellants Mark Goloby and Richard Vega sued Harris County commissioners, contending Commissioner Adrian Garcia resigned his county office when the Commissioners Court appointed him to the Gulf Coast Protection District (GCPD) board. The trial court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the Commissioners Court’s appointment of one of its own members to the GCPD was void under the common-law self-appointment branch of the incompatibility doctrine, so Garcia never lawfully became a GCPD director and therefore did not resign his commissioner seat. Because Garcia remained an official-capacity county officer, governmental immunity barred the claims and the dismissal with prejudice was proper.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Maria Nava Hernandez's appeal from a final judgment entered October 20, 2025, for lack of jurisdiction because her notice of appeal was filed December 12, 2025 — more than the required 30 days and not saved by any timely post-judgment motion or Rule 26.3 extension. The court explained the 30-day deadline, the 90-day extension available only if a timely post-judgment motion is filed, and that the 15-day window to seek an extension under Rule 26.3 had passed. Because the notice was untimely and no jurisdictional basis existed, the appeal was dismissed and pending motions were denied as moot.

The Texas First District Court of Appeals dismissed Kevin Williams's appeal from a December 8, 2025 judgment because he neither paid required appellate fees nor proved indigence for those costs, and he failed to adequately respond after being notified that the appeal was subject to dismissal. The court cited the applicable Texas rules and statutes governing appellate fees and procedure and dismissed any pending motions as moot. The decision is a procedural dismissal for failure to comply with fee and response requirements, not a ruling on the merits of the underlying judgment.

The First District of Texas dismissed Jim Bob's appeal for failure to pay required appellate fees or to establish indigence. The court previously notified appellant that the appeal would be dismissed unless he either paid the fees or explained in writing why he should not be required to pay them. Because Jim Bob did not respond or pay, the court dismissed the appeal and denied as moot any pending motions. The dismissal rested on the applicable Texas rules and statutes governing payment of appellate fees and the court’s authority to involuntarily dismiss for noncompliance.

The Court of Appeals considered two appeals by John Lewis Jr. challenging a January 5, 2026 commitment to Kingwood Pines and an order authorizing medication. Appellant's counsel filed a notice of dismissal and the court treated it as a motion to dismiss. After abating the appeals for a hearing, the trial court docket showed appellant testified he no longer wished to pursue the appeals because he was no longer committed. The court lifted the abatement and granted the motion, dismissing both appeals and any pending motions as moot.

The First District of Texas dismissed two appeals brought by John Lewis Jr. challenging (1) a January 5, 2026 writ committing him to Kingwood Pines for up to 45 days and (2) a January 5, 2026 order authorizing medication. Counsel had filed a notice of dismissal, which the court treated as a motion to dismiss. After the court ordered a hearing to confirm whether appellant abandoned the appeals, appellant testified he no longer wished to pursue them because he was no longer committed. The court lifted the abatement, granted the dismissal motion, and dismissed the appeals as moot.

The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the City of Houston’s summary-judgment motion asserting governmental immunity after a parking-garage collision between a City-owned truck and the plaintiff’s car. The City argued its employee was off-duty and not acting in the course of employment, but the court held the undisputed fact that a City employee was driving a City-owned vehicle gave rise to a rebuttable presumption she was acting within the scope of employment. The City’s affidavit and records were conclusory and failed to conclusively rebut that presumption, so a fact issue remained.

The First District of Texas dismissed Ashlee Walker's appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 4 for failure to prosecute after she did not file an appellate brief or respond to the court's notice and directive to file a brief and motion for extension. The court cited Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring briefs and authorizing dismissal for failure to comply, and it also dismissed any pending motions as moot. The dismissal was issued as a memorandum opinion by a three-justice panel on April 16, 2026.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Angel Fuentes's appeal from a County Civil Court at Law in Harris County because the appellant failed to file a brief by the deadline, did not seek an extension, and did not respond to the court's notice that the brief was overdue. The court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and treated any outstanding motions as moot. The decision is a procedural dismissal rather than a ruling on the merits of the underlying case.

The First District of Texas dismissed an appeal by Affordable Ready Mix.com and Grace Raven because they failed to establish indigence or pay the required appellate filing fee, and they did not respond to the Court's notice directing them to either pay or explain why they should not. The court cited Texas appellate rules and statutory fee provisions, concluded appellants did not comply with the Court's directive, and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. The court also dismissed any pending motions as moot.

The Fifteenth Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal filed by With Strength We Lead 2018, LLC for want of prosecution because the appellant failed to file or pay for the clerk's record. The court notified appellant of intent to dismiss and granted a 30-day extension to arrange payment and file the record, warning that failure to do so by April 2, 2026 would result in dismissal. Because no clerk's record was filed and no proof of payment was shown, the court dismissed the appeal.