Court Filings

The Florida Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the circuit court's decision in a dispute involving members and the estate of Emma Jean Baldwin. The appeal was brought pro se by Chad R. Baldwin against the estate and several relatives. The appellate court issued a short per curiam opinion stating only 'Affirmed' without published reasoning, and the panel of three judges concurred. The decision leaves the lower court's judgment intact and ends this stage of appellate review.

The Sixth District reversed and remanded a jury verdict in a car-accident negligence suit because the trial court wrongly excluded deposition testimony of the sheriff’s office organizational representative about the office’s internal investigation and finding that its deputy’s crash was “preventable” and therefore the deputy was at fault. The district court held the trial court’s stated legal bases for exclusion did not support it and concluded the appellate court cannot apply the evidentiary balancing rule (Section 90.403) in the first instance to affirm under the tipsy coachman doctrine. The case is remanded for a new trial and the court certified conflict with two First District decisions.

The Sixth District reversed a county court's orders that had set aside a default final judgment for possession and dismissed an eviction complaint. Landlord Wayne Rickert sued tenants Karen and Erin Valencia for nonpayment of rent under an oral month-to-month tenancy and obtained a default final judgment after the tenants failed to timely pay the rent allegedly due on September 1. The appellate court held the tenants waived defenses other than payment by not paying alleged rent when due or timely moving to have the rent determined, so the trial court erred in vacating the default and dismissing the complaint. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

The Sixth District reversed a trial-court judgment that had enforced a 1973 deed addendum requiring Riviera’s land to be used as a golf course. The trial court had concluded the restriction remained enforceable because it was preserved by a 1990 affidavit (the Gifford Affidavit). The appellate court held the affidavit was not a muniment of title and therefore could not preserve the pre-root restriction under Florida’s Marketable Record Title Act (MRTA). Because no muniment preserved the restriction, MRTA extinguished it; the case is remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for Riviera.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment in a dispute between Dr. Gary Boraks, LLC (as assignee of Runnell D. Curry) and the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association (FIGA). The court held that FIGA is not generally liable for attorney’s fees under section 627.428 and may only be assessed fees under the limited exception in section 631.70 when FIGA affirmatively denies a covered claim other than by delay. The court relied on statutory text and precedent limiting FIGA’s obligations to policy limits (up to statutory caps), interest as provided, and attorney’s fees only in that narrow circumstance.

The Court of Appeal granted petitioner Michelle Paknad’s second writ of mandate ordering the Santa Clara Superior Court to vacate its prior order that accepted Intuitive Surgical’s redactions of investigator Andrea Smethurst’s reports and related investigative materials. The court held Intuitive had waived attorney-client privilege and work-product protection by placing the scope and adequacy of the investigations at issue in defending Paknad’s employment discrimination and retaliation claims. The court directed the trial court to conduct further in camera review and to disclose all factual findings and other information relevant to the investigations’ scope or adequacy, even if that material would otherwise qualify as core work product.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment rejecting challenges by Western Manufactured Housing Communities Association and Rincon Valley Mobilehome Park. Western argued (1) that during a declared state of emergency the statutory definition of “rental price” allows routine annual CPI rent increases despite Penal Code § 396’s 10% cap, and (2) that after the emergency owners may “recoup” denied CPI increases by resetting future baseline rents. The court held the statute must be read to fix the baseline rental amount as of the emergency declaration, so the 10% cap applies, and Santa Rosa’s rent ordinance does not compel the post-emergency recoupment Western sought.

The Court of Appeal granted a peremptory writ directing the Contra Costa County Superior Court to vacate its minute order that denied a petition for mandate brought by four teachers challenging West Contra Costa Unified School District’s staffing practices. The trial court had denied the writ based on the District’s claim it was impossible to fully staff classrooms with credentialed teachers. The appellate court held the District failed to prove it had exhausted statutory procedures (including seeking waivers from state entities) before asserting impossibility, so the defense was premature and the denial of the writ was reversed for entry of an order denying the petition.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered forfeiture of a 2007 Lincoln Navigator. The State sought forfeiture after R.C. Scott was arrested while driving the Navigator and later pled guilty to evading and third-or-more driving-while-intoxicated charges. The court held the State proved the vehicle was contraband under Chapter 59 because Scott had three prior DWI convictions and used the vehicle in a qualifying felony, and that Scott was an equitable owner despite the vehicle titled to his parents. Because Scott was an owner, the parents could not prevail on the innocent-owner defense.

The Texas Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s default judgment against appellant Nicholas Lind in a suit by investors M3 Fort Worth Developer, LLC and The YoungESTone, LLC. M3 and YO invested in residential development projects run by Serene and Windridge, paid management and construction fees, and sued after projects stalled. Lind was served with the original petition but not the first amended petition; the trial court entered default judgment and later a damages judgment. The appellate court held lack of re-service was not error because the amended petition did not seek more onerous relief, and any challenge to sufficiency of evidence failed because securities claims under the Texas Securities Act do not require proof of loss causation.

The Texas appellate court reinstated an appeal previously suspended by the debtor’s bankruptcy filing, reviewed a motion showing the debtor received a Chapter 7 discharge, and concluded the discharge mooted the dispute between John Deere and Bradley Irwin. Because the bankruptcy discharge voided the underlying debt and barred collection, there was no live controversy for the court to resolve. The court therefore vacated the trial court’s judgment and its prior appellate opinion and judgment, and dismissed the case as moot.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth District of Texas dismissed Stacey Sprung’s pending appeal after Sprung filed a motion to dismiss under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The motion was filed before the court issued a decision, and the court granted it under the governing rule, resulting in dismissal of the appeal. The opinion is a short, per curiam memorandum noting submission and opinion dates and the panel that considered the matter.

The Court of Appeals affirmed a bench-trial judgment awarding Douglas Fuhrman $187,244 plus $30,782.58 in attorney’s fees after he sued his ex-wife, Nancy Fuhrman, for breach of the 2020 agreed divorce decree’s tax-allocation provisions. The trial court found the decree was a valid contract, Douglas performed (Deloitte prepared and filed the 2020 returns), Nancy breached by failing to pay her allocated share, and Douglas suffered damages. The appellate court held the record (tax returns, expert testimony, decree language) provided legally and factually sufficient support for the trial court’s findings and legal conclusions.

The court dismissed a pending civil appeal after the parties jointly moved to dismiss under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The appeal arose from the County Court at Law No. 1 in Jefferson County (trial cause No. 25CCCV0301). Because the joint motion was filed before the court issued a decision, the Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. The opinion is a brief memorandum disposing of the case without further analysis.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth District of Texas dismissed Leo Roger Dugas’s appeal of a trial-court take-nothing judgment in a quiet-title suit against Ryan Edward Reuter. Dugas filed an initial brief that lacked legal authority and a corrected brief that failed to comply with numerous appellate rules. After warning and allowing an opportunity to amend, the court determined Dugas did not file a proper brief and proceeded on the clerk’s record, then dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. The court therefore did not reach the merits of the underlying title dispute.

The Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s temporary injunction preventing four former CRNA employees from providing CRNA services within 20 miles of any location where they worked for their former employer, Anesthesia Associates, for three years. Anesthesia Associates sued after the CRNAs resigned and began working for a competitor at a local hospital, alleging breach of noncompetition and irreparable harm. The appellate court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion: the employer showed a legitimate protectable interest (goodwill, specialized training, credentialing), probable success on the claim at trial, and probable irreparable injury that could not be adequately remedied by money damages.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a default judgment entered for Deere Credit against Unger Texas Stone, LP and Shelia Unger. The court held this was a restricted appeal and reviewed only the clerk’s record, finding that Shelia — a non-lawyer — timely filed a letter that, in substance, amounted to an answer both for herself and for the limited partnership. Because that filing constituted an appearance, the defendants were entitled to notice of Deere Credit’s motion for default judgment and an opportunity to be heard; the trial court signed the default judgment without providing such notice, producing error apparent on the face of the record.

The First District of Texas dismissed Trina Jones's appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 2 for failure to prosecute. The appellant's brief was due January 5, 2026, and after no brief was filed the court notified her on January 22, 2026, that the appeal could be dismissed unless the brief or an extension motion was filed by February 2, 2026. The appellant did not respond, so the court dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

The First District of Texas dismissed Timothy Williams's appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 4 for failure to prosecute. Williams failed to file his appellant brief by the February 20, 2026 deadline, did not file the brief or a motion for extension after a March 6, 2026 notice, and did not respond by the March 16, 2026 date given. The court therefore dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot under applicable Texas appellate rules.

The court dismissed an appeal from a final judgment entered September 30, 2024 because the appellant filed his notice of appeal on July 1, 2025 — more than nine months after the judgment and well beyond the applicable deadlines. The court explained the general 30-day filing deadline, the circumstances that can extend it to 90 days, and the limited procedure for seeking an extension. The appellant was given notice that the appeal appeared untimely and did not respond, so the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

Appellants Mark Goloby and Richard Vega sued Harris County commissioners, contending Commissioner Adrian Garcia resigned his county office when the Commissioners Court appointed him to the Gulf Coast Protection District (GCPD) board. The trial court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the Commissioners Court’s appointment of one of its own members to the GCPD was void under the common-law self-appointment branch of the incompatibility doctrine, so Garcia never lawfully became a GCPD director and therefore did not resign his commissioner seat. Because Garcia remained an official-capacity county officer, governmental immunity barred the claims and the dismissal with prejudice was proper.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Maria Nava Hernandez's appeal from a final judgment entered October 20, 2025, for lack of jurisdiction because her notice of appeal was filed December 12, 2025 — more than the required 30 days and not saved by any timely post-judgment motion or Rule 26.3 extension. The court explained the 30-day deadline, the 90-day extension available only if a timely post-judgment motion is filed, and that the 15-day window to seek an extension under Rule 26.3 had passed. Because the notice was untimely and no jurisdictional basis existed, the appeal was dismissed and pending motions were denied as moot.

The Texas First District Court of Appeals dismissed Kevin Williams's appeal from a December 8, 2025 judgment because he neither paid required appellate fees nor proved indigence for those costs, and he failed to adequately respond after being notified that the appeal was subject to dismissal. The court cited the applicable Texas rules and statutes governing appellate fees and procedure and dismissed any pending motions as moot. The decision is a procedural dismissal for failure to comply with fee and response requirements, not a ruling on the merits of the underlying judgment.

The First District of Texas dismissed Jim Bob's appeal for failure to pay required appellate fees or to establish indigence. The court previously notified appellant that the appeal would be dismissed unless he either paid the fees or explained in writing why he should not be required to pay them. Because Jim Bob did not respond or pay, the court dismissed the appeal and denied as moot any pending motions. The dismissal rested on the applicable Texas rules and statutes governing payment of appellate fees and the court’s authority to involuntarily dismiss for noncompliance.

The Court of Appeals considered two appeals by John Lewis Jr. challenging a January 5, 2026 commitment to Kingwood Pines and an order authorizing medication. Appellant's counsel filed a notice of dismissal and the court treated it as a motion to dismiss. After abating the appeals for a hearing, the trial court docket showed appellant testified he no longer wished to pursue the appeals because he was no longer committed. The court lifted the abatement and granted the motion, dismissing both appeals and any pending motions as moot.

The First District of Texas dismissed two appeals brought by John Lewis Jr. challenging (1) a January 5, 2026 writ committing him to Kingwood Pines for up to 45 days and (2) a January 5, 2026 order authorizing medication. Counsel had filed a notice of dismissal, which the court treated as a motion to dismiss. After the court ordered a hearing to confirm whether appellant abandoned the appeals, appellant testified he no longer wished to pursue them because he was no longer committed. The court lifted the abatement, granted the dismissal motion, and dismissed the appeals as moot.

The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the City of Houston’s summary-judgment motion asserting governmental immunity after a parking-garage collision between a City-owned truck and the plaintiff’s car. The City argued its employee was off-duty and not acting in the course of employment, but the court held the undisputed fact that a City employee was driving a City-owned vehicle gave rise to a rebuttable presumption she was acting within the scope of employment. The City’s affidavit and records were conclusory and failed to conclusively rebut that presumption, so a fact issue remained.

The First District of Texas dismissed Ashlee Walker's appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 4 for failure to prosecute after she did not file an appellate brief or respond to the court's notice and directive to file a brief and motion for extension. The court cited Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring briefs and authorizing dismissal for failure to comply, and it also dismissed any pending motions as moot. The dismissal was issued as a memorandum opinion by a three-justice panel on April 16, 2026.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Angel Fuentes's appeal from a County Civil Court at Law in Harris County because the appellant failed to file a brief by the deadline, did not seek an extension, and did not respond to the court's notice that the brief was overdue. The court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and treated any outstanding motions as moot. The decision is a procedural dismissal rather than a ruling on the merits of the underlying case.

The First District of Texas dismissed an appeal by Affordable Ready Mix.com and Grace Raven because they failed to establish indigence or pay the required appellate filing fee, and they did not respond to the Court's notice directing them to either pay or explain why they should not. The court cited Texas appellate rules and statutory fee provisions, concluded appellants did not comply with the Court's directive, and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. The court also dismissed any pending motions as moot.