Court Filings

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas granted the appellant's unopposed motion to voluntarily dismiss his appeal of a trial court order adjudicating him guilty of theft of a firearm and sentencing him to seven months confinement. The motion complied with the appellate rule requiring signature by both the appellant and his attorney. Because no opinion had been issued in the case, the court dismissed the appeal, denied any rehearing motions, and directed that the court's mandate issue immediately.

The State of Texas, as appellant, moved to dismiss its own appeal in a criminal case from the County Court at Law No. 9 of Travis County. The motion to dismiss was signed by the Travis County Attorney and filed under the applicable Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure. The Court of Appeals granted the State’s motion and dismissed the appeal. The opinion is a short memorandum decision, noting the procedural compliance with the rule and disposing of the appeal accordingly.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals dismissed Efrain Rodulfo Jr.'s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Rodulfo, who pleaded guilty under a plea bargain and was sentenced to 25 years on November 18, 2025, filed a pro se motion construed as a notice of appeal on April 14, 2026. The appellate court found the notice untimely because it was filed well after the 30-day deadline (or 90 days only if a timely motion for new trial is filed), and no extension was sought. The trial court also certified that Rodulfo waived and did not have a right to appeal, which required dismissal as well.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Walter Green Jr.’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Green had previously been convicted of continuous family violence and later filed an Article 11.07 habeas application challenging his conviction and sentence. The trial court recommended dismissal as a subsequent application and forwarded its findings to the Court of Criminal Appeals, which dismissed the application. Green attempted to appeal the trial court’s findings that were sent to the Court of Criminal Appeals, but the appellate court concluded it lacks jurisdiction over postconviction matters and dismissed the appeal after Green failed to show grounds to proceed.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Michael Dean Samuelson’s pro se appeal from his convictions for theft and possession with intent to deliver because the trial-court certifications, which Samuelson signed, state his case was a plea bargain and that he has no right of appeal. The court gave Samuelson until March 27, 2026 to show grounds to continue the appeal and received no response. Relying on the trial-court certifications and applicable Texas appellate rules and precedent, the panel dismissed the appeal without addressing the merits.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Sean Harper’s appeal from his conviction for failing to comply with sex-offender registration requirements because the trial-court certification in the record indicated Harper waived his right to appeal. The clerk’s record showed a not-guilty plea and a jury verdict of guilty, while a separate punishment plea agreement limited appeals and contained Harper’s written waiver. The court reviewed both clerk’s and reporter’s records, concluded the certification did not show a right to appeal, gave Harper an opportunity to supply an amended certification, and dismissed the appeal after no amended certification or response was filed.

The First Court of Appeals dismissed two criminal appeals by Brelin Keithian Coleman for lack of jurisdiction because his notices of appeal were untimely. Coleman was convicted and sentenced on September 25, 2025 to concurrent 10-year prison terms for sexual assault (cause no. 1824733) and burglary with intent to commit another felony (cause no. 1824734). Texas rules require a notice of appeal within 30 days of sentencing unless a timely motion for new trial is filed; no such motions were in the clerk’s records and Coleman did not file notices until February 11, 2026. The court therefore dismissed the appeals and denied pending motions as moot.

The First District of Texas dismissed two criminal appeals by Brelin Keithian Coleman for lack of jurisdiction because his notices of appeal were filed late. Coleman was sentenced on September 25, 2025 to concurrent 10-year terms following convictions for sexual assault (case no. 1824733) and burglary with intent to commit another felony (case no. 1824734). Because no motion for new trial was filed and the standard 30-day deadline to appeal expired on October 26, 2025, Coleman's notices filed February 11, 2026 were untimely. The court therefore dismissed the appeals and any pending motions as moot.

The Texas Court of Appeals dismissed Lewis Carl Hunt’s appeal of his conviction for murder because the trial court certified that the case was resolved by a plea bargain and that Hunt waived his right to appeal. Under Texas appellate rules, when a defendant pleads guilty or no contest pursuant to a plea agreement and the trial court certifies no right to appeal (or the defendant waives appeal), the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The court therefore dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits.

The Court of Appeals dismissed William Antoine Thomas’s appeal from a conviction entered pursuant to a plea bargain because the trial-court certification, signed by the judge, Thomas, and his trial counsel, states the case is a plea-bargain case, that the defendant has no right of appeal, and that Thomas waived his right to appeal. The State moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and the court granted the motion, holding the certification deprived it of jurisdiction to hear the appeal under applicable Texas appellate rules and precedent.

The defendant, Ethan Alexander Herrera, appealed a conviction for aggravated robbery. On April 13, 2026, Herrera filed a signed, voluntary motion to dismiss his appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.2(a). The Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. The opinion is a short memorandum explaining the dismissal was pursuant to the rule permitting voluntary dismissal when requested by an appellant and properly signed.

The First District of Texas dismissed Omarion Brown’s appeals from five felony convictions for lack of jurisdiction because Brown validly waived his right to appeal as part of plea agreements in each case. Brown pleaded guilty or stipulated to evidence in five trial causes, signed written waivers and advisals acknowledging he understood and waived appeal rights, and the trial court’s judgments reflected the waiver. Because the record affirmatively shows the waivers were knowing and voluntary and Brown admitted the waivers to this Court, the court concluded it had no jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals and pending motions.

The First District of Texas dismissed Omarion Brown’s appeals in five criminal cases for lack of jurisdiction. Brown had pleaded guilty to theft-from-person in three cases and aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon in two others, and in each case he agreed as part of plea arrangements to waive his right to appeal. The trial-court paperwork and appellant’s own filings show he knowingly and voluntarily waived appeal rights, and the judgments expressly note appeals were waived. Because the record contains valid appeal waivers and no trial-court permission to appeal, the court dismissed the appeals.

The First Court of Appeals dismissed Omarion Brown’s appeals in five consolidated criminal cases because the trial-court record shows he validly waived his right to appeal as part of plea agreements. Brown pleaded guilty or stipulated to violations in three theft-from-person cases and pleaded guilty to two aggravated robbery cases; in each cause he signed documents and the judgments reflected an appeal waiver. Because the written certifications and filings demonstrate a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver and the trial court did not grant permission to appeal, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals.

The First District of Texas dismissed Omarion Brown’s consolidated appeals from five felony convictions for lack of jurisdiction. Brown pleaded guilty to theft-from-person in three cases and to aggravated robbery in two others, and in each case he signed plea paperwork and certifications expressly waiving his right to appeal. The court found the trial-court certifications and the record show a knowing, voluntary waiver of appeal and that the trial court did not grant permission to appeal, so the appellate court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals and any pending motions.

The First District of Texas dismissed Omarion Brown’s appeals in five criminal cases because the trial-court record shows he validly waived his right to appeal as part of plea agreements. Brown pleaded guilty or stipulated to evidence in five felony cases, signed written waivers and advisals acknowledging he gave up his appeal rights, and the judgments expressly state appeal was waived. Because a valid, knowing, and voluntary waiver bars appeal absent trial-court permission, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals and any pending motions.

The First District of Texas dismissed Donald Wayne Herod’s pro se petition for writ of mandamus because it was a collateral attack on his final felony conviction and thus must be pursued through a post-conviction habeas application under Article 11.07 in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. The court explained that mandamus is not the proper vehicle for challenging a final felony conviction and that only the Court of Criminal Appeals has jurisdiction over such post-conviction felony relief. The petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and any pending motions were denied as moot.

The Second Court of Appeals at Fort Worth dismissed Sergio Guadal Maresmartinez’s appeal of his convictions for two counts of sexual assault of a child and two counts of indecency with a child because his notice of appeal was untimely. His sentence was imposed June 29, 2023, and without a motion for new trial his notice of appeal was due July 31, 2023. He filed his notice on February 27, 2026. The court concluded that timely filing of a notice of appeal is essential to its jurisdiction and that Maresmartinez’s response did not show any grounds for continuing the appeal or authorization for an out-of-time appeal.

The court dismissed Ross Thomas Brantley’s pro se appeal for lack of jurisdiction because there was no signed trial-court order denying his statutory request for postconviction DNA testing (Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 64.01). The appellate court gave Brantley ten days to show grounds to continue the appeal but received no response. Citing its rules and prior precedent, the court concluded there was no appealable order and therefore dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed appellant Giovani Aveleno Kitts’s criminal appeal after he filed a motion to dismiss that complied with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.2(a). The motion was signed by Kitts and his counsel, and the court granted it, ending appellate review. The opinion is a short per curiam dismissal with no discussion of the merits and is not for publication.

The Texas Court of Appeals, Third District, granted appellant Chadwick Edward Lambert’s joint motion to dismiss his criminal appeal. The motion was signed by Lambert and his appellate counsel and cited Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.2(a). Because the motion complied with the rule, the court dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits. The decision is a brief memorandum opinion filed April 14, 2026, and the dismissal was entered on appellant’s motion.

The First District of Texas dismissed appellant Dayanara Danae Baker’s attempted appeal of a 2010 prostitution conviction because the notice of appeal was filed fifteen years after judgment and the trial-court certification from 2010 stated she had no right to appeal. Baker, pro se, also sought appointment of counsel and asked the court to consider waiving fees to aid access to employment, housing, and records, but the court explained an untimely appeal is not a proper vehicle for fee relief. Because the court lacked jurisdiction over the belated appeal, the appeal and pending motions were dismissed as moot.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals dismissed Scott Crow’s appeal from his 2015 guilty plea and twenty-year sentence for third-degree felony driving while intoxicated. Crow filed a second pro se notice of appeal nearly ten years after sentencing, which the court found untimely under the appellate rules. The court also relied on the trial-court certification showing this was a plea-bargain case in which Crow waived any right of appeal. Because the notice was untimely and the certification precludes an appeal, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Court dismissed Bobbie Hall Wooldridge’s appeal of a guilty plea conviction for possession of methamphetamine because the trial court certified this was a plea-bargain case in which Wooldridge had no right to appeal. Wooldridge pleaded guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement and received the agreed three-year sentence. The appellate court found no statutory or procedural basis to continue the appeal, noting the certification was signed by the defendant, defense counsel, and the judge, and that the record supported the certification.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Stephen Kay Thorp Jr.’s criminal appeal because the trial-court certification states this was a plea-bargain case and the defendant has no right to appeal. The clerk’s record confirms the sentence did not exceed the prosecutor’s recommendation and there is no written pretrial motion, trial-court permission to appeal, or statute authorizing the appeal. The court gave Thorp an opportunity to supply an amended certification but none was filed, so the court dismissed the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(d).

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Samantha Ann Marie Vargas's appeal challenging a December 8, 2025 order that modified her community supervision to include a 30-day jail sanction (with credit for time served). The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from an order that alters conditions of community supervision, relying on controlling precedent. The panel ordered dismissal after Vargas failed to show a basis for continuing the appeal when asked to show cause.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Kenisha Sharron Simms's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Simms had been placed on deferred community supervision after a plea; the State later moved to adjudicate guilt, and the trial court modified the supervision conditions. The appellate court held that appeals from modifications to deferred adjudication supervision are not authorized by the legislature, cited controlling precedent, gave Simms an opportunity to show cause, received no response, and dismissed the appeal.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed appellant Bryan Keith Gutierrez's filing for lack of jurisdiction. Gutierrez filed a "Motion for Bond Relief" that appeared to challenge bail and seek to quash multiple indictments. The appellate court treated the filing as a notice of appeal but found no final judgment of conviction in the record and noted that courts of appeals lack statutory authority to hear interlocutory appeals on excessive bail or motions to quash indictments. Because the appellant did not respond to an order to show cause, the appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas considered a criminal appeal by Kevin Villatoro. The court previously paused the appeal so the trial court could hold a hearing about a missing exhibit. Villatoro then moved to reinstate and dismiss his appeal. The appellate court granted his motion, dismissed the appeal, and denied as moot any other pending motions. The opinion was issued April 7, 2026, and is unpublished.

The First District of Texas court grants the appellant's motion to reinstate and dismiss his criminal appeal. The court had previously paused the appeal for the trial court to hold a hearing about a missing exhibit. Because no opinion had issued and the appellant moved to dismiss, the court dismissed the appeal and any other pending motions as moot, citing the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.