Court Filings

The defendant, Ethan Alexander Herrera, appealed a conviction for aggravated robbery. On April 13, 2026, Herrera filed a signed, voluntary motion to dismiss his appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.2(a). The Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. The opinion is a short memorandum explaining the dismissal was pursuant to the rule permitting voluntary dismissal when requested by an appellant and properly signed.

The First District of Texas dismissed Omarion Brown’s appeals from five felony convictions for lack of jurisdiction because Brown validly waived his right to appeal as part of plea agreements in each case. Brown pleaded guilty or stipulated to evidence in five trial causes, signed written waivers and advisals acknowledging he understood and waived appeal rights, and the trial court’s judgments reflected the waiver. Because the record affirmatively shows the waivers were knowing and voluntary and Brown admitted the waivers to this Court, the court concluded it had no jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals and pending motions.

The First District of Texas dismissed Omarion Brown’s appeals in five criminal cases for lack of jurisdiction. Brown had pleaded guilty to theft-from-person in three cases and aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon in two others, and in each case he agreed as part of plea arrangements to waive his right to appeal. The trial-court paperwork and appellant’s own filings show he knowingly and voluntarily waived appeal rights, and the judgments expressly note appeals were waived. Because the record contains valid appeal waivers and no trial-court permission to appeal, the court dismissed the appeals.

The First Court of Appeals dismissed Omarion Brown’s appeals in five consolidated criminal cases because the trial-court record shows he validly waived his right to appeal as part of plea agreements. Brown pleaded guilty or stipulated to violations in three theft-from-person cases and pleaded guilty to two aggravated robbery cases; in each cause he signed documents and the judgments reflected an appeal waiver. Because the written certifications and filings demonstrate a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver and the trial court did not grant permission to appeal, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals.

The First District of Texas dismissed Omarion Brown’s consolidated appeals from five felony convictions for lack of jurisdiction. Brown pleaded guilty to theft-from-person in three cases and to aggravated robbery in two others, and in each case he signed plea paperwork and certifications expressly waiving his right to appeal. The court found the trial-court certifications and the record show a knowing, voluntary waiver of appeal and that the trial court did not grant permission to appeal, so the appellate court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals and any pending motions.

The First District of Texas dismissed Omarion Brown’s appeals in five criminal cases because the trial-court record shows he validly waived his right to appeal as part of plea agreements. Brown pleaded guilty or stipulated to evidence in five felony cases, signed written waivers and advisals acknowledging he gave up his appeal rights, and the judgments expressly state appeal was waived. Because a valid, knowing, and voluntary waiver bars appeal absent trial-court permission, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals and any pending motions.

The First District of Texas dismissed Donald Wayne Herod’s pro se petition for writ of mandamus because it was a collateral attack on his final felony conviction and thus must be pursued through a post-conviction habeas application under Article 11.07 in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. The court explained that mandamus is not the proper vehicle for challenging a final felony conviction and that only the Court of Criminal Appeals has jurisdiction over such post-conviction felony relief. The petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and any pending motions were denied as moot.

The Second Court of Appeals at Fort Worth dismissed Sergio Guadal Maresmartinez’s appeal of his convictions for two counts of sexual assault of a child and two counts of indecency with a child because his notice of appeal was untimely. His sentence was imposed June 29, 2023, and without a motion for new trial his notice of appeal was due July 31, 2023. He filed his notice on February 27, 2026. The court concluded that timely filing of a notice of appeal is essential to its jurisdiction and that Maresmartinez’s response did not show any grounds for continuing the appeal or authorization for an out-of-time appeal.

The court dismissed Ross Thomas Brantley’s pro se appeal for lack of jurisdiction because there was no signed trial-court order denying his statutory request for postconviction DNA testing (Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 64.01). The appellate court gave Brantley ten days to show grounds to continue the appeal but received no response. Citing its rules and prior precedent, the court concluded there was no appealable order and therefore dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals dismissed a duplicative cross-appeal filed by defendant Austin Luke Bradley. The State had appealed a trial court order granting Bradley's motion in limine; Bradley filed a timely cross-appeal challenging an earlier denial of his motion to suppress. Bradley later refiled the same notice of cross-appeal after the trial court re-entered its denial nunc pro tunc. Because that second filing duplicated an already pending cross-appeal in a separate docket number, the Court dismissed the later appeal as superfluous.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Dwayne Eugene Jackson’s direct appeal of his March 2026 guilty plea and 20-year sentence because the appeal was not filed under the state’s newly amended discretionary review procedure required for guilty pleas entered on or after May 14, 2025. The court explained that OCGA § 5-6-35 now requires such appeals to begin by application for discretionary review and that failure to follow that procedure is jurisdictional. Because Jackson did not comply, the court concluded it lacks jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed appellant Giovani Aveleno Kitts’s criminal appeal after he filed a motion to dismiss that complied with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.2(a). The motion was signed by Kitts and his counsel, and the court granted it, ending appellate review. The opinion is a short per curiam dismissal with no discussion of the merits and is not for publication.

The Texas Court of Appeals, Third District, granted appellant Chadwick Edward Lambert’s joint motion to dismiss his criminal appeal. The motion was signed by Lambert and his appellate counsel and cited Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.2(a). Because the motion complied with the rule, the court dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits. The decision is a brief memorandum opinion filed April 14, 2026, and the dismissal was entered on appellant’s motion.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Roy Boone Bright's appeal from the trial court's denial of a December 2025 motion that sought to vacate his 2019 convictions and recidivist sentence. The court held Bright had no right to appeal because his filing improperly attempted to collaterally attack the validity of his convictions through a post-conviction motion that is not a permitted procedure in a criminal case. The court relied on Georgia Supreme Court precedent establishing that such efforts to set aside convictions by post-conviction motion are not appealable and therefore must be dismissed.

The Eleventh District Court of Appeals dismissed Albert DiTomaso’s appeal because the trial court’s judgment was not a final, appealable order. DiTomaso was tried and convicted on six of eight indictment counts, but two counts (one OVI count and an assured-clear-distance minor misdemeanor) were not resolved in the record and were not presented to the jury. Because unresolved "hanging" charges remain, the appellate court concluded it lacks jurisdiction to review the convictions and therefore dismissed the appeal.

The First District of Texas dismissed appellant Dayanara Danae Baker’s attempted appeal of a 2010 prostitution conviction because the notice of appeal was filed fifteen years after judgment and the trial-court certification from 2010 stated she had no right to appeal. Baker, pro se, also sought appointment of counsel and asked the court to consider waiving fees to aid access to employment, housing, and records, but the court explained an untimely appeal is not a proper vehicle for fee relief. Because the court lacked jurisdiction over the belated appeal, the appeal and pending motions were dismissed as moot.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals dismissed Scott Crow’s appeal from his 2015 guilty plea and twenty-year sentence for third-degree felony driving while intoxicated. Crow filed a second pro se notice of appeal nearly ten years after sentencing, which the court found untimely under the appellate rules. The court also relied on the trial-court certification showing this was a plea-bargain case in which Crow waived any right of appeal. Because the notice was untimely and the certification precludes an appeal, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Court dismissed Bobbie Hall Wooldridge’s appeal of a guilty plea conviction for possession of methamphetamine because the trial court certified this was a plea-bargain case in which Wooldridge had no right to appeal. Wooldridge pleaded guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement and received the agreed three-year sentence. The appellate court found no statutory or procedural basis to continue the appeal, noting the certification was signed by the defendant, defense counsel, and the judge, and that the record supported the certification.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Jose Martin Islas's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Islas had previously been convicted and had his convictions affirmed. He filed a motion to correct a void sentence that the trial court denied on October 16, 2025, and a later motion for reconsideration denied December 5, 2025. Islas filed a notice of appeal on December 22, 2025, which the Court found untimely because Georgia law requires a notice of appeal within 30 days of the challenged order and a reconsideration motion does not extend that deadline or create a separate appealable order.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Stephen Kay Thorp Jr.’s criminal appeal because the trial-court certification states this was a plea-bargain case and the defendant has no right to appeal. The clerk’s record confirms the sentence did not exceed the prosecutor’s recommendation and there is no written pretrial motion, trial-court permission to appeal, or statute authorizing the appeal. The court gave Thorp an opportunity to supply an amended certification but none was filed, so the court dismissed the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(d).

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Samantha Ann Marie Vargas's appeal challenging a December 8, 2025 order that modified her community supervision to include a 30-day jail sanction (with credit for time served). The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from an order that alters conditions of community supervision, relying on controlling precedent. The panel ordered dismissal after Vargas failed to show a basis for continuing the appeal when asked to show cause.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Kenisha Sharron Simms's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Simms had been placed on deferred community supervision after a plea; the State later moved to adjudicate guilt, and the trial court modified the supervision conditions. The appellate court held that appeals from modifications to deferred adjudication supervision are not authorized by the legislature, cited controlling precedent, gave Simms an opportunity to show cause, received no response, and dismissed the appeal.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed appellant Bryan Keith Gutierrez's filing for lack of jurisdiction. Gutierrez filed a "Motion for Bond Relief" that appeared to challenge bail and seek to quash multiple indictments. The appellate court treated the filing as a notice of appeal but found no final judgment of conviction in the record and noted that courts of appeals lack statutory authority to hear interlocutory appeals on excessive bail or motions to quash indictments. Because the appellant did not respond to an order to show cause, the appeal was dismissed.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Shawn Davart Lockhart Jr.'s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Lockhart had pled guilty in 2009 and in 2025 sought an out-of-time appeal under OCGA § 5-6-39.1; the trial court denied that motion on 2026-02-19. Lockhart filed a notice of appeal on 2026-03-24, but the Court of Appeals held the notice was untimely because it was filed 33 days after entry of the order and thus did not satisfy the 30-day filing requirement. Because timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional, the court dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas considered a criminal appeal by Kevin Villatoro. The court previously paused the appeal so the trial court could hold a hearing about a missing exhibit. Villatoro then moved to reinstate and dismiss his appeal. The appellate court granted his motion, dismissed the appeal, and denied as moot any other pending motions. The opinion was issued April 7, 2026, and is unpublished.

The First District of Texas court grants the appellant's motion to reinstate and dismiss his criminal appeal. The court had previously paused the appeal for the trial court to hold a hearing about a missing exhibit. Because no opinion had issued and the appellant moved to dismiss, the court dismissed the appeal and any other pending motions as moot, citing the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Marvin Hillman III’s discretionary application challenging the denial of his 2025 extraordinary motion for a new trial because the application was untimely. Hillman sought review of the trial court’s December 17, 2025 order but filed his discretionary application to this Court on March 20, 2026, which was 93 days after the order. The Court held it lacks jurisdiction where a discretionary application is not filed within the 30-day period required by OCGA § 5-6-35(d), and therefore dismissed the application for failure to comply with the statute's jurisdictional deadline.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed an interlocutory application by defendant Calvin Lewis Neal challenging a trial court’s December 22, 2025 order that vacated a prior suppression ruling and denied his motion to suppress. The Court held it lacked jurisdiction because the trial court’s certificate of immediate review was not entered within ten days of the December 22 order as required by OCGA § 5-6-34(b). The Court explained the ten-day certificate requirement is jurisdictional and instructed the trial court on how to allow interlocutory review (vacate and re-enter the order and then promptly issue a certificate).

The Court of Appeals dismissed Victor Oswald Robinson Jr.'s original mandamus petition because the court lacks jurisdiction. Robinson filed in the Supreme Court of Georgia seeking an order requiring the trial court to rule on pretrial pro se motions; the Supreme Court transferred the matter to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held that a party seeking mandamus against a superior court judge must first pursue relief in the superior court itself and that this case does not present the extremely rare circumstances that would justify invoking the Court of Appeals' original jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals reviewed an appeal by Shiviez Montrel Howard from his conviction in Butler County Common Pleas. Counsel filed an Anders brief concluding no nonfrivolous issues exist but identified two potential arguable errors and sought permission to withdraw. The appellate court independently reviewed the record, found no prejudicial error or infringement of appellant's rights, granted counsel's motion to withdraw, and dismissed the appeal as wholly frivolous. The court ordered the trial-court mandate issued and costs taxed to appellant.