Court Filings

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed defendant Mauro Vivar's conviction for attempted assault in the second degree, vacated his guilty plea, and remitted the case for further proceedings. The court found Vivar's appellate-waiver invalid because the trial court failed to explain appellate rights separately from rights lost by pleading guilty and relied only on defense counsel to confirm the written waiver. The court also held the suppression court should have granted Vivar's motion to suppress custodial statements to the arresting officer, and that that error was not harmless because the statements could have affected his decision to plead.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a conviction entered after defendant pleaded guilty to weapons and drug possession because the court improperly required defendant to waive his right to appeal as a condition of a court-initiated plea and because the trial court erred in denying suppression of physical evidence. The panel found the waiver invalid and concluded that the prosecution failed to prove defendant voluntarily consented to the frisk and search; body-worn camera footage contradicted the officer's testimony. The plea was vacated, the suppression motion granted, the indictment dismissed, and the case remitted for CPL 470.45 proceedings.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a resentencing of Phillip Owens, who had been resentenced after his conviction for criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. The court unanimously concluded the resentence was incorrect as a matter of law and sent the case back to Monroe County Supreme Court for a new resentencing. The opinion is brief and references an identical memorandum issued in a companion appeal, indicating the appellate court found legal error in the prior resentencing proceeding warranting reversal and remand.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed a Bronx County Supreme Court order that had found defendant J.P. to presently suffer from a dangerous mental disorder and committed him to a secure psychiatric facility for six months. The court held that although the initial hearing met statutory and due process requirements despite the examining witnesses not testifying, defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to meaningfully challenge the People's examiner reports, secure the examiners' testimony, obtain a defense expert, or present any defense evidence. The matter is remitted for a new CPL 330.20(6) hearing.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court's order that had dismissed the indictment against defendant Diamond Haggan under CPL 30.30. The People had filed a certificate of compliance for discovery and the court held that the prosecution was not required to obtain third-party employment and medical records as part of initial automatic discovery, so withholding them did not invalidate the certificate. Although the People improperly withheld a victim entity report as duplicative, there was no bad faith and the People had otherwise met their discovery obligations, so the dismissal was improper and the indictment was reinstated for further proceedings.

The Court of Appeals held that a defendant may not be required, as a condition of a negotiated guilty plea, to waive a Penal Law § 60.12 hearing under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA). N.H. accepted a plea conditioned on waiving a § 60.12 hearing; the Court concluded such a waiver is not enforceable and reversed the Appellate Division, remitting the case to Supreme Court for further proceedings. The majority emphasized the DVSJA’s remedial purpose to afford survivor-defendants a judicial opportunity to establish eligibility for alternative, less severe sentences and treated the hearing right as unwaivable in plea bargaining.

The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term, vacated Warren Burgess's guilty plea to misdemeanor criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, and remitted the case to Criminal Court for further proceedings. Burgess had pleaded to a misdemeanor after felony counts were crossed out at arraignment, but the accusatory instrument lacked any factual allegation that the recovered firearm was operable — an element required to sustain the weapon possession charge. Because a facially sufficient accusatory instrument is a jurisdictional prerequisite that survives a guilty plea, the Court concluded the misdemeanor information was jurisdictionally defective and could not support the plea.

The Court of Appeals held that defendant's written speedy-trial motion under CPL 30.30(1)(b), filed on the day trial was to begin, was timely and provided reasonable notice to the People. The Appellate Division erred in affirming the trial court's summary refusal to consider the motion as untimely and for lack of notice. Because the motion complied with the specific statutory deadline in CPL 170.30(2) and included detailed calculations of chargeable days, the Court reversed and remitted the case for further proceedings on the motion so the People may be given a fair opportunity to respond and the trial court may exercise its discretion how to proceed.

The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and granted the defendant's motion to suppress a statement obtained after his arrest. The People relied on an NYPD "probable cause I-card" and the fellow officer rule to justify the arrest, but presented no testimony from the arresting officers and did not show the I-card's contents or that the arresting officers actually received or relied on it. Because the prosecution failed to prove that the officers who arrested the defendant had been communicated probable cause, the court held the arrest unlawful and suppressed the statement as its fruit, remitting the case for further proceedings.