Court Filings

The Court of Appeals affirmed Michelle Saunders’s convictions and sentence for two second-degree felony drug charges. Saunders argued her guilty pleas were invalid because the trial court did not inform her, during the plea-change hearing, that any sentence in this Guernsey County case could be ordered consecutive to separate prison terms she was already serving in Union County. The appellate court held the trial judge had adequately complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) by advising Saunders of the maximum sentences for each offense and that the court could order consecutive terms between the counts in this case; the judge had no obligation to explain consecutive exposure to sentences from a different county where the defendant was already incarcerated.

The Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Delaware Municipal Court's conviction of Samuel Baffoe for one count of menacing by stalking after a bench trial. Baffoe argued the trial court erred by not ordering a competency evaluation before trial because he told the court he did not feel competent and made various courtroom protests. The appeals court reviewed for abuse of discretion and concluded the record did not show reasonable cause to doubt competency: Baffoe made limited medical complaints, displayed understanding of the proceedings, and standby counsel (appointed by the trial court) never raised competency concerns.

The Ohio Supreme Court held that a capital defendant cannot use Civ.R. 60(B) to reopen a prior state postconviction judgment; instead, R.C. 2953.21 and R.C. 2953.23 provide the exclusive statutory mechanism for collateral attacks on criminal convictions or sentences. The court reversed the appellate court’s decision that permitted Hill to proceed under Civ.R. 60(B) and remanded for consideration of Hill’s remaining assignment of error. The court reasoned that postconviction relief is a special statutory proceeding and the Civil Rules are clearly inapplicable where the legislature has prescribed an exclusive remedy.

The Superior Court vacated and remanded the defendant Dwayne Eric Lee’s sentence because the trial court imposed no jail time for a conviction under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(i). The Commonwealth appealed the sentence as illegal; the court interpreted the statutory phrase “shall be sentenced . . . to undergo imprisonment for a period of not less than 60 days nor more than 90 days” to require an indeterminate sentence with a mandatory 60-day minimum and a 90-day maximum. Because the trial court imposed zero days, the sentence was illegal and must be vacated for resentencing consistent with the statutory range.

This is a dissenting opinion in a Pennsylvania Superior Court criminal appeal. The dissent argues the majority misapplied precedent and statutory rules in interpreting 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(i). Relying on Commonwealth v. Glover (1959) and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9756, the dissent contends the statute prescribes a maximum sentence range of 60 to 90 days and that any minimum cannot exceed half the chosen maximum. The dissenter would vacate the majority’s sentencing interpretation and remand for resentencing consistent with Glover and section 9756 (maximum 60–90 days; minimum no more than half the maximum).

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed two judgments against Brandon Monegro. The court affirmed a January 18, 2024 conviction (amended April 10, 2024) for second-degree assault and a May 7, 2024 guilty plea conviction for third-degree assault, including the sentences. The court held that disorderly conduct was properly included in the Superior Court Information as a joinable lesser non-inclusory offense related to the same act charged in the felony complaint. Because the earlier conviction was affirmed, the defendant's argument that his later plea should be vacated as dependent on a reversal is moot.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a resentencing judgment that sentenced defendant Marques McGeachy to an aggregate term of 16 years. The court reviewed the trial court's denial of youthful offender treatment and found that, although McGeachy was technically eligible, the sentencing court properly considered the relevant factors and reasonably exercised its discretion to deny youthful offender status. The panel noted McGeachy’s participation with a violent gang, multiple shootings, and violent conduct over months involving multiple victims as reasons supporting the denial and the sentence.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a 2019 Bronx County conviction and sentence of Michael Mable, who pleaded guilty to third-degree criminal possession of a weapon and was sentenced as a second felony offender to 2½ to 5 years. The court declined to review Mable’s claim that his plea was involuntary because he failed to preserve the issue at the plea colloquy and the narrow exception allowing late review did not apply. The court also alternatively held that the record contains no evidence casting doubt on the voluntariness of the plea.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed defendant Keyshawn Kitchens' convictions for first- and second-degree assault and the concurrent seven-year sentences. The court found Kitchens failed to preserve statutory speedy trial and prosecutorial-misconduct claims and declined to review them in the interest of justice, but alternatively rejected those claims on the merits. The court also held the evidence was legally sufficient to convict, finding Kitchens the initial aggressor and that the victim was unarmed, with testimony corroborated by surveillance and other witnesses; jury credibility determinations were upheld.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed a Bronx County Supreme Court order that had found defendant J.P. to presently suffer from a dangerous mental disorder and committed him to a secure psychiatric facility for six months. The court held that although the initial hearing met statutory and due process requirements despite the examining witnesses not testifying, defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to meaningfully challenge the People's examiner reports, secure the examiners' testimony, obtain a defense expert, or present any defense evidence. The matter is remitted for a new CPL 330.20(6) hearing.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed defendant Diondre Holman’s conviction following a guilty plea to fourth-degree criminal possession of a weapon and his three-year probation sentence, but modified the judgment by striking the probation condition requiring payment of the mandatory surcharge and related fees. The court concluded Holman validly waived his right to appeal, which foreclosed review of his excessiveness challenge, but allowed review of his challenge to the legality of the probation condition and found that requirement unrelated to rehabilitation or public safety. Holman’s facial challenge to the "good moral character" licensing provision was unpreserved and declined in the interest of justice.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court's order that had dismissed the indictment against defendant Diamond Haggan under CPL 30.30. The People had filed a certificate of compliance for discovery and the court held that the prosecution was not required to obtain third-party employment and medical records as part of initial automatic discovery, so withholding them did not invalidate the certificate. Although the People improperly withheld a victim entity report as duplicative, there was no bad faith and the People had otherwise met their discovery obligations, so the dismissal was improper and the indictment was reinstated for further proceedings.

The Appellate Division, First Department reviewed defendant Yanil Heredia Gomez’s guilty plea and probation sentence for attempted second-degree assault. The court found Gomez validly waived his right to appeal, barring review of his excessive-sentence and certain as-applied constitutional challenges, but it reviewed nonconstitutional challenges to probation conditions. The court modified the sentence by striking several specific probation conditions (including warrantless drug searches, support of dependents, gang-association limits, electronic monitoring, ignition interlock, MTA ban, and cannabis prohibition) as unsupported by the record, and otherwise affirmed the conviction and probation sentence.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed defendant Jesse Faulkner's conviction for second-degree criminal possession of a weapon and his sentence of 3½ years plus five years of postrelease supervision. The court rejected Faulkner's unpreserved Second Amendment challenge and declined to review it in the interest of justice. Alternatively, the court held he had standing to bring a facial challenge but failed to show New York's "good moral character" licensing requirement was invalid under Bruen. His ineffective-assistance claim was held unreviewable on direct appeal and, in any event, meritless because the claim had little chance of success.

The First Department affirmed defendant Jamar Carr’s conviction following a guilty plea to fourth-degree criminal possession of a weapon and three years of probation, but modified the sentence by striking several probation conditions. The court found Carr validly waived most appellate rights, which barred review of his excessive-sentence and many constitutional claims, but allowed review of a Second Amendment challenge and several statutory challenges to probation conditions. The court rejected the Second Amendment claim and upheld certain conditions as reasonably related to rehabilitation, while striking fees, drug testing/treatment conditions, and a gang-association restriction as unsupported by the record.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the judgment of conviction entered by Supreme Court, Bronx County (Marsha D. Michael, J.) on May 31, 2022. Derwin Blanks appealed his conviction and sentence. After briefing and argument, the appellate court found the sentence imposed was not excessive and therefore affirmed the lower court's judgment in full. The decision is a short, unanimous order without extended opinion, primarily addressing the proportionality of the sentence.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed defendant Shawn Batista’s conviction and sentence for attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, but exercised its interest-of-justice power to vacate the mandatory surcharge and fees imposed at sentencing. The court held Batista validly waived his right to appeal, which barred his as-applied constitutional and excessive-sentence claims, and found his preserved facial challenge to New York's age-based restriction on gun licensing failed on the merits under Bruen and controlling state precedent. The People did not oppose vacatur of the fees, so those monetary assessments were removed.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed defendant Durell Anderson’s conviction and sentence from Supreme Court, New York County. Anderson appealed a June 29, 2023 judgment; after argument, the appellate court reviewed the record, found the sentence not excessive, and denied relief. The opinion is brief: the court entered a unanimous order affirming the lower court’s judgment and referred defense counsel to the court’s Rule 606.5. No extended opinion or new legal holdings were published.

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed defendant Robert W. Randolph’s conviction following his guilty plea to third-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance. Randolph pleaded guilty pursuant to an agreement that included a five-year prison term and a waiver of appellate rights; County Court imposed the agreed sentence. The appellate court found the written and colloquy-based appeal waiver valid, declined to disturb the plea (finding the voluntariness claim unpreserved), and rejected challenges to the People’s certificate of compliance and statutory speedy-trial claims as forfeited or foreclosed by the waiver. A constitutional speedy-trial claim was unpreserved and, on the merits, would not warrant relief.

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed defendant Anthony Nesbitt’s convictions and sentences following his guilty plea to first-degree criminal contempt, attempted second-degree assault, and second-degree menacing. The court held that Nesbitt’s written appeal waiver was invalid because it failed to clearly explain what collateral challenges survived, so his challenge to sentence was not precluded. On the merits, however, the court found the agreed-upon consecutive sentences lawful and not unduly harsh, declined to modify the sentence in the interest of justice, and noted that any request about a missing letter of support should be made to County Court.

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed Jose Martinez's conviction and sentence for third-degree robbery after he pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement that included an appeal waiver. The court found the oral plea colloquy adequately explained the appeal waiver, separate from rights lost by pleading guilty, and that Martinez acknowledged discussing the waiver with counsel and understood its consequences. Because the waiver was knowing and voluntary and Martinez had been informed of the possible prison exposure if he failed interim probation, his challenge to the severity of the sentence was barred.

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed defendant Jerry Ellington's conviction and agreed-upon sentence after a guilty plea to attempted promoting prison contraband in the first degree. Ellington had pleaded guilty in satisfaction of an indictment charging multiple contraband-related offenses and admitted his involvement; County Court imposed a 1½ to 3-year term to run consecutive to his existing sentence. The appellate court found his challenges to plea voluntariness and counsel performance unpreserved and, on the merits, concluded the plea colloquy and record showed the plea was knowing and voluntary. The court also held the agreed sentence was the minimum authorized by law and not excessive.

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed County Court's denial of defendant Duane MM.'s 2022 application for resentencing under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA). Defendant, convicted in 1996 of two counts of second-degree murder and other property offenses for killings committed when he was 16, argued his history of sexual abuse by his father significantly contributed to the crimes and that his original sentence was unduly harsh. The court found the expert testimony lacked sufficient contact with or records about defendant and offered no nexus to one murder, and defendant's own statement did not tie the abuse to his actions. Because defendant did not prove the required DVSJA factors by a preponderance of the evidence, resentencing was properly denied.

The Court of Appeals held that a defendant may not be required, as a condition of a negotiated guilty plea, to waive a Penal Law § 60.12 hearing under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA). N.H. accepted a plea conditioned on waiving a § 60.12 hearing; the Court concluded such a waiver is not enforceable and reversed the Appellate Division, remitting the case to Supreme Court for further proceedings. The majority emphasized the DVSJA’s remedial purpose to afford survivor-defendants a judicial opportunity to establish eligibility for alternative, less severe sentences and treated the hearing right as unwaivable in plea bargaining.

The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term, vacated Warren Burgess's guilty plea to misdemeanor criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, and remitted the case to Criminal Court for further proceedings. Burgess had pleaded to a misdemeanor after felony counts were crossed out at arraignment, but the accusatory instrument lacked any factual allegation that the recovered firearm was operable — an element required to sustain the weapon possession charge. Because a facially sufficient accusatory instrument is a jurisdictional prerequisite that survives a guilty plea, the Court concluded the misdemeanor information was jurisdictionally defective and could not support the plea.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Michael Dean Samuelson’s pro se appeal from his convictions for theft and possession with intent to deliver because the trial-court certifications, which Samuelson signed, state his case was a plea bargain and that he has no right of appeal. The court gave Samuelson until March 27, 2026 to show grounds to continue the appeal and received no response. Relying on the trial-court certifications and applicable Texas appellate rules and precedent, the panel dismissed the appeal without addressing the merits.

The Second Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed Gene Anthony Tutt’s convictions and 38-year sentences for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and occlusion assault. Tutt complained on appeal that (1) the trial court erred by admitting the victim’s out-of-court statements to an officer as hearsay and (2) the State failed to prove he was the same person convicted of two prior felonies used to enhance punishment. The court held the victim’s statements were admissible as excited utterances and that documentary evidence (judgments, identification numbers, social security number, booking/ten-print records) and fingerprint comparison sufficiently linked Tutt to the prior Missouri convictions.

The Second Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed Carolyn Rodriguez’s conviction for hindering an official proceeding by disorderly conduct (Tex. Penal Code § 38.13). Rodriguez argued the statute was unconstitutional, the court erred in quashing a subpoena for County Judge Tim O’Hare, the jury charge was defective, and the evidence was insufficient. The court rejected her facial and applied First Amendment challenges, found no abuse of discretion in quashing O’Hare’s subpoena, determined the jury charge contained one harmless omission in mental-state wording but no reversible error, and held the evidence (including an audiovisual recording and deputy testimony) was sufficient to support the conviction.

The Texas Sixth Court of Appeals affirmed a jury conviction of Ronald Wayne Stivers, Jr. for failing to register as a sex offender. Stivers argued the trial court erred by admitting a prior Illinois conviction as extraneous-offense evidence and that its prejudicial effect outweighed probative value. The court held the prior conviction was admissible to prove Stivers knew of his duty to register — a required mental-state element — and that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The opinion also sua sponte corrected the judgment to cite Article 62.102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal reviewed Joseph Traeger's criminal case from the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County, and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The appeal was brief and the opinion per curiam simply states the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. The panel (Kuntz, C.J., May and Forst, JJ.) concurred. The opinion is not final until any timely motion for rehearing is resolved.