Court Filings

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Stephen Kay Thorp Jr.’s criminal appeal because the trial-court certification states this was a plea-bargain case and the defendant has no right to appeal. The clerk’s record confirms the sentence did not exceed the prosecutor’s recommendation and there is no written pretrial motion, trial-court permission to appeal, or statute authorizing the appeal. The court gave Thorp an opportunity to supply an amended certification but none was filed, so the court dismissed the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(d).

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Samantha Ann Marie Vargas's appeal challenging a December 8, 2025 order that modified her community supervision to include a 30-day jail sanction (with credit for time served). The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from an order that alters conditions of community supervision, relying on controlling precedent. The panel ordered dismissal after Vargas failed to show a basis for continuing the appeal when asked to show cause.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Ra Hermes Velthra’s appeal challenging a trial court’s finding that he could pay court costs. Velthra sought review under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145(g) after a February 26, 2026 hearing, but the appellate court concluded Rule 145(g) does not permit a standalone interlocutory appeal. The court ordered Velthra to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed; he submitted the indigency order but no final judgment in the underlying case. Lacking jurisdiction, the court dismissed the appeal on April 8, 2026.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Kenisha Sharron Simms's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Simms had been placed on deferred community supervision after a plea; the State later moved to adjudicate guilt, and the trial court modified the supervision conditions. The appellate court held that appeals from modifications to deferred adjudication supervision are not authorized by the legislature, cited controlling precedent, gave Simms an opportunity to show cause, received no response, and dismissed the appeal.

The court dismissed Gil Rojas III’s appeal because his conviction and thirty-year sentence resulted from a plea-bargain in which the trial court certified he had no right to appeal. The appellate clerk’s record contained the Rule 25.2(a)(2) certification and the written plea agreement showing the sentence did not exceed the agreed recommendation. Because the record contained no pretrial written motion preserved for appeal, no trial-court permission to appeal, and no amended certification granting appeal rights, the court concluded it must dismiss the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(d).

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed appellant Bryan Keith Gutierrez's filing for lack of jurisdiction. Gutierrez filed a "Motion for Bond Relief" that appeared to challenge bail and seek to quash multiple indictments. The appellate court treated the filing as a notice of appeal but found no final judgment of conviction in the record and noted that courts of appeals lack statutory authority to hear interlocutory appeals on excessive bail or motions to quash indictments. Because the appellant did not respond to an order to show cause, the appeal was dismissed.

The court dismissed Bianca Fox's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Fox, pro se, filed a notice of appeal purporting to challenge a January 30, 2026 turnover order, but the clerk’s record contains only two interlocutory orders from that date — denial of her motion for protection and an order to comply with a subpoena — neither of which is an appealable final judgment or an authorized interlocutory appeal. The court gave Fox an opportunity to show cause why the appeal should proceed; she did not respond, so the appeal was dismissed and pending motions were denied as moot.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Jacqueline Wilbourn’s appeal from a superior-court judgment in favor of Galadriel Enterprises because the court lacked jurisdiction. Wilbourn had appealed to the superior court from a magistrate-court judgment and then appealed the superior-court judgment to this Court, but she did not use the required discretionary-appeal procedures. The Court explained that de novo reviews of magistrate rulings and appeals in damage actions where the judgment is $10,000 or less must be initiated by discretionary application, and noncompliance is jurisdictional, so the appeal was dismissed.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted the appellant's motion to withdraw the appeal in the case Jonathan Blanton v. Eric Spinks et al. The court released jurisdiction back to the trial court upon issuance of the order. No substantive ruling on the merits was made; the action simply ends the appellate proceeding and restores control of the case to the lower court.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal in Aslam Gilani and Peak Amusement, LLC v. Epic Amusement, LLC for failure to file the required appellate brief and enumeration of errors. The appeal was docketed March 5, 2026; appellants requested and received an extension to April 7, 2026, with a warning that failure to file by 4:30 p.m. would result in dismissal. Because the appellants did not file the brief by the extended deadline, the court dismissed the appeal pursuant to its rules and controlling precedent.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Shawn Davart Lockhart Jr.'s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Lockhart had pled guilty in 2009 and in 2025 sought an out-of-time appeal under OCGA § 5-6-39.1; the trial court denied that motion on 2026-02-19. Lockhart filed a notice of appeal on 2026-03-24, but the Court of Appeals held the notice was untimely because it was filed 33 days after entry of the order and thus did not satisfy the 30-day filing requirement. Because timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional, the court dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Cedric Herbert’s original mandamus petition seeking an order requiring a trial judge to refer his recusal motion to another judge. The court explained that mandamus in the appellate courts is reserved for extremely rare cases because superior courts generally have authority to grant such extraordinary relief and the petitioner should first seek relief in the appropriate lower court. Because Herbert did not show he first petitioned the superior court and this case was not one of the rare exceptions, the Court of Appeals declined to exercise original jurisdiction and dismissed the petition.

The First District Court of Appeals granted appellant Todd Colter’s motion for voluntary dismissal of his appeal against Ubican Global, Inc., because the parties settled. The court dismissed the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1) and ordered that any other pending motions be dismissed as moot. No written opinion was issued; the panel issued a short per curiam memorandum disposing of the appeal on the agreed dismissal.

The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas considered a criminal appeal by Kevin Villatoro. The court previously paused the appeal so the trial court could hold a hearing about a missing exhibit. Villatoro then moved to reinstate and dismiss his appeal. The appellate court granted his motion, dismissed the appeal, and denied as moot any other pending motions. The opinion was issued April 7, 2026, and is unpublished.

The First District of Texas court grants the appellant's motion to reinstate and dismiss his criminal appeal. The court had previously paused the appeal for the trial court to hold a hearing about a missing exhibit. Because no opinion had issued and the appellant moved to dismiss, the court dismissed the appeal and any other pending motions as moot, citing the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The First District of Texas dismissed Kenneth Steven Isbell’s appeal from a Harris County district court because he failed to pay or arrange payment for the clerk’s record fee and did not respond to the court’s notice that the appeal was subject to dismissal. The court cited Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring payment or arrangement and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution, also denying as moot any pending motions. The decision was issued as a brief memorandum opinion by a three-justice panel.

The First Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal filed by Grant Allen Nelson from a final divorce decree entered July 7, 2025, after Nelson filed an unopposed motion stating he no longer wished to prosecute the appeal. Because no other party appealed and the motion complied with Texas appellate procedure, the court granted the motion, dismissed the appeal, and denied as moot any other pending motions. The decision is procedural and does not address the merits of the underlying divorce decree.

The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas granted the appellant Erica Arnez Jackson's motion for voluntary dismissal of her appeal from a judgment of the County Court at Law No. 2, Galveston County (trial court case no. 25-FD-0597). Because no opinion had issued, the court dismissed the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1) and dismissed any other pending motions as moot. The decision is a procedural dismissal rather than a merits determination.

The First District of Texas dismissed Dominique Cunningham’s appeal of the trial court’s dismissal of her suit against Justice of the Peace Steve Duble because Cunningham repeatedly failed to file an appellate brief that complied with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court struck her noncompliant briefs, gave her opportunities and extensions to file a corrected brief, and found her March 16, 2026 submission still deficient in essential content and formatting. Because she failed to cure the briefing defects, the court struck the corrected brief and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution.

The Texas Court of Appeals dismissed Nikki Arnold’s appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 of Travis County because she failed to file her appellate brief. The brief was due February 11, 2026; the court notified Arnold on February 18 that she had until March 2 to respond or face dismissal for want of prosecution. No brief or extension motion was filed, so the appellate court dismissed the appeal under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals dismissed Jillian Warren’s appeal for want of prosecution because she failed to file her appellant brief, which was originally due March 2, 2026, and did not respond to the court’s notice requiring a satisfactory response by March 23, 2026. The court invoked Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(b) and entered dismissal on April 7, 2026. No substantive merits decision was reached because the appeal was dismissed for procedural noncompliance.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed a direct appeal filed by Chuka Anene from a trial court’s final judgment and decree of divorce because appeals in divorce and other domestic relations matters require a discretionary-appeal application under OCGA § 5-6-35. The court explained that compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional and cited precedent holding the same. Because the appellant did not follow that mandatory procedure, the Court of Appeals concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal on April 7, 2026.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Tiffany Roseman's appeal from the superior court's dismissal of her petition for review because the court lacked jurisdiction. The case began in magistrate court, Roseman sought de novo review in superior court, and after the superior court dismissed her petition she appealed directly to this Court of Appeals. The Court held that appeals from superior-court de novo reviews of magistrate-court rulings require using the discretionary appeal procedures under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(1), which Roseman did not follow, so the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Joseph Michael Hirsch's appeal for failure to comply with the Court's docketing and briefing rules. The appellant did not file the required enumeration of errors and brief within the time ordered by the Court, despite a specific March 17, 2026 order giving a March 27, 2026 deadline. Because the filings were not received by the court, the appeal was deemed abandoned and dismissed under the Court of Appeals rules cited in the order.

The court dismissed a mandamus complaint filed by Davontez Otis seeking an order compelling a judge to calculate jail-time credit in his underlying criminal case. Otis argued the calculation was ministerial and that appeal would be inadequate because his 90-day jail term would expire before appellate review. The court held that the statute governing jail-time credit grants the sentencing court discretion to grant or deny credit, so mandamus is not available to control that discretion; furthermore, an appeal (with a stay request) is an adequate remedy. The writ was dismissed and costs were assessed to Otis.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Marvin Hillman III’s discretionary application challenging the denial of his 2025 extraordinary motion for a new trial because the application was untimely. Hillman sought review of the trial court’s December 17, 2025 order but filed his discretionary application to this Court on March 20, 2026, which was 93 days after the order. The Court held it lacks jurisdiction where a discretionary application is not filed within the 30-day period required by OCGA § 5-6-35(d), and therefore dismissed the application for failure to comply with the statute's jurisdictional deadline.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed an interlocutory application by defendant Calvin Lewis Neal challenging a trial court’s December 22, 2025 order that vacated a prior suppression ruling and denied his motion to suppress. The Court held it lacked jurisdiction because the trial court’s certificate of immediate review was not entered within ten days of the December 22 order as required by OCGA § 5-6-34(b). The Court explained the ten-day certificate requirement is jurisdictional and instructed the trial court on how to allow interlocutory review (vacate and re-enter the order and then promptly issue a certificate).

The Court of Appeals dismissed April Campbell’s application for discretionary review of a magistrate court dispossessory judgment because the court lacks jurisdiction. Columbia Park Citi obtained a magistrate judgment on February 25, 2026 awarding possession and $11,773.69 in past-due rent. Campbell filed for discretionary review on March 10, 2026, which was 13 days after the judgment. The court held that appeals in dispossessory actions must be filed within seven days, so Campbell’s filing was untimely and the Court declined to transfer the matter to the state or superior court.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Victor Oswald Robinson Jr.'s original mandamus petition because the court lacks jurisdiction. Robinson filed in the Supreme Court of Georgia seeking an order requiring the trial court to rule on pretrial pro se motions; the Supreme Court transferred the matter to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held that a party seeking mandamus against a superior court judge must first pursue relief in the superior court itself and that this case does not present the extremely rare circumstances that would justify invoking the Court of Appeals' original jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Tony L. Ware’s direct appeal of a January 23, 2026 trial-court order that corrected a clerical error under OCGA § 9-11-60(g). The court found it lacked jurisdiction because the corrected order left issues pending in the trial court and was therefore not a final judgment subject to direct appeal. The court also rejected Ware’s arguments that the order dissolved an injunction or could be treated as a collateral attack under the collateral-order doctrine, explaining those paths required interlocutory application or were inapplicable here.