Court Filings

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order that dissolved prejudgment writs of garnishment obtained by Texas Global Equity Fund XII (TGE) against 22 entities believed to owe money to Breckenridge Development 2019 (BD19). TGE had sued BD19 for unpaid loan principal and interest after BD19 failed to provide required financial reports, repay a prior Frost Bank loan as required, and cure defaults. The appeals court held TGE proved the statutory grounds for garnishment (the debt was liquidated, due and unpaid; BD19 lacked sufficient property to satisfy it; and the garnishment was not sought to injure BD19), and BD19 failed to prove extrinsic grounds to dissolve the writs. The court reinstated the writs and remanded for further proceedings.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of a misdemeanor charge against Nathan Hake for illegally disposing of construction and demolition debris and remanded the case for further proceedings. The trial court had dismissed the charge as unconstitutionally vague, focusing on terms like “disposal,” “storage,” “temporary period,” and “substantially unchanged.” The appellate court held that the statutory and regulatory definitions give fair notice and are not impermissibly vague as applied to Hake’s alleged conduct (digging a pit, burying construction debris and household waste), so the dismissal was improper.

The State of Ohio appealed two Lucas County trial-court judgments that allowed cash seized in investigations to be applied toward fines imposed on defendant Shakur Ishmail Shabaa. The appellate court reversed and remanded. It held that (1) $122 forfeited through a civil forfeiture consent judgment could not be used to pay criminal fines because R.C. 2981.12(G) expressly forbids using forfeited property to pay fines; and (2) $4,460 that Shabaa forfeited by plea agreement could not be applied to his fines because the trial court lacked authority to alter the parties’ negotiated plea terms that specified disbursement to the State and Sylvania Township Police.

The Illinois Appellate Court reversed the circuit court’s denial of leave to file a successive postconviction petition by Angel Navarro and remanded for second-stage proceedings. Navarro had been convicted of first-degree murder in 2004 based primarily on three eyewitness identifications and police testimony; he later obtained Chicago Police Department records via FOIA that included officer Meer’s professional complaints. The court held Navarro’s petition raised newly discovered, noncumulative evidence that could materially affect officer credibility and thus created a colorable claim of actual innocence. The court declined to reassign the case sua sponte on remand.

The Texas Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and remanded, holding that the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) timely sought an Attorney General opinion under the Public Information Act. Sierra Club had requested a large set of records on July 1, 2019. TCEQ emailed July 2 seeking clarification whether Sierra Club wanted confidential material released or would accept a narrowed response; Sierra Club declined. The Court held the ten-business-day clock began on July 2, the interagency-mail “mailbox rule” made TCEQ’s July 17 submission timely, and therefore TCEQ did not miss the statutory deadline. The case returns to the trial court to decide the merits of TCEQ’s claimed deliberative-process withholding privilege.

The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case for further consideration. The dispute arose from Platinum Construction’s suit against Copper Creek and Jose Escoffie for theft of services and related claims after key emails and accounting records were missing. The court of appeals had found the trial court’s spoliation jury instruction reversible error and ordered a new trial without first addressing other appellate issues that might have led to rendition. The Supreme Court held that appellate courts must first decide rendition issues and that the court of appeals’ harm analysis was insufficient.

The District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's dismissal of a misdemeanor information charging Christine Heidi Scott with resisting or obstructing officers without violence. The trial court had required ever-more specific allegations about the exact legal duties the deputies were performing and dismissed the second amended information as vague. The appellate court held the original information was legally sufficient because it tracked the statute, gave date and place, and provided adequate notice; any further detail was a matter for proof or for a statement of particulars, not a required element of the charging document.

The Sixth District reversed and remanded a jury verdict in a car-accident negligence suit because the trial court wrongly excluded deposition testimony of the sheriff’s office organizational representative about the office’s internal investigation and finding that its deputy’s crash was “preventable” and therefore the deputy was at fault. The district court held the trial court’s stated legal bases for exclusion did not support it and concluded the appellate court cannot apply the evidentiary balancing rule (Section 90.403) in the first instance to affirm under the tipsy coachman doctrine. The case is remanded for a new trial and the court certified conflict with two First District decisions.

The Sixth District reversed a county court's orders that had set aside a default final judgment for possession and dismissed an eviction complaint. Landlord Wayne Rickert sued tenants Karen and Erin Valencia for nonpayment of rent under an oral month-to-month tenancy and obtained a default final judgment after the tenants failed to timely pay the rent allegedly due on September 1. The appellate court held the tenants waived defenses other than payment by not paying alleged rent when due or timely moving to have the rent determined, so the trial court erred in vacating the default and dismissing the complaint. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

The Sixth District reversed a trial-court judgment that had enforced a 1973 deed addendum requiring Riviera’s land to be used as a golf course. The trial court had concluded the restriction remained enforceable because it was preserved by a 1990 affidavit (the Gifford Affidavit). The appellate court held the affidavit was not a muniment of title and therefore could not preserve the pre-root restriction under Florida’s Marketable Record Title Act (MRTA). Because no muniment preserved the restriction, MRTA extinguished it; the case is remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for Riviera.

The Court of Appeal reversed a trial court order that had authorized involuntary antipsychotic medication for defendant C.F., who had been found not guilty by reason of insanity. At the renewal hearing the trial court proceeded without a court reporter because defense counsel failed to request the no-cost reporter available under local rules; the hearing lasted about 13 minutes and the transcript of testimony is therefore missing. The appellate court found defense counsel’s failure to secure a reporter was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial because it eliminated any meaningful appellate review, and because the medication order will expire before a settled statement could be produced, the case is remanded for a new hearing.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered forfeiture of a 2007 Lincoln Navigator. The State sought forfeiture after R.C. Scott was arrested while driving the Navigator and later pled guilty to evading and third-or-more driving-while-intoxicated charges. The court held the State proved the vehicle was contraband under Chapter 59 because Scott had three prior DWI convictions and used the vehicle in a qualifying felony, and that Scott was an equitable owner despite the vehicle titled to his parents. Because Scott was an owner, the parents could not prevail on the innocent-owner defense.

The Court of Appeals reviewed James Chadleigh Schrotel’s conviction for misdemeanor assault causing bodily injury against a family member. The court upheld the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction but found reversible error in jury selection: a prospective juror (venireperson six) admitted a bias favoring victims of family violence and could not guarantee that bias would not affect his decision. The trial court denied the defendant’s challenge for cause and also denied an additional peremptory strike, resulting in an objectionable juror sitting. Because that denial was erroneous and harmful, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a default judgment entered for Deere Credit against Unger Texas Stone, LP and Shelia Unger. The court held this was a restricted appeal and reviewed only the clerk’s record, finding that Shelia — a non-lawyer — timely filed a letter that, in substance, amounted to an answer both for herself and for the limited partnership. Because that filing constituted an appearance, the defendants were entitled to notice of Deere Credit’s motion for default judgment and an opportunity to be heard; the trial court signed the default judgment without providing such notice, producing error apparent on the face of the record.

The court reversed a trial-court order that denied the employer’s motion to compel arbitration and remanded with instructions to compel arbitration and stay the case. Josh Adams sued his former employer, The Bridge Strategy & Technology Consulting, LLC, for unpaid cash and phantom-stock commissions. Bridge moved to compel arbitration under an employment agreement clause that referenced wage-related statutes and the Federal Arbitration Act. The Court of Appeals held the arbitration clause was governed by the federal act, that the phrase “wages” reasonably includes commissions, and that the clause’s broad “arising from/relating to” language covers Adams’s claims.

The Court of Appeals reversed a trial-court order that granted a plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Cornelius Hudson’s survival-action suit filed on behalf of his deceased mother’s estate. Hudson had sued multiple transportation-related defendants for injuries his mother allegedly sustained before her death. The appellate court held Hudson’s petition sufficiently alleged that the decedent’s estate had standing to pursue the survival claim, and it explained that a plea to the jurisdiction is not the correct procedural vehicle to challenge a plaintiff’s capacity to sue. The case is remanded for further proceedings in the trial court.

The court denied the appellee’s motion for rehearing, withdrew its prior opinion, and issued a replacement opinion that reaches the same result: the Texas Department of Public Safety’s plea to the jurisdiction was sustained and the employee’s disability-discrimination and retaliation claims against DPS under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act were dismissed with prejudice. The court found Sanders failed to plead facts establishing a prima facie discrimination or retaliation claim (and thus failed to invoke the TCHRA’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity). Because Sanders had multiple opportunities to amend and the defects were incurable, dismissal was proper.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that Robert Sydow acquired title to a disputed strip of land by adverse possession as a matter of law. Sydow had fenced, used, and maintained the land continuously from 2008 to 2020, and successive purchasers and owners had actual or constructive notice of his possession. The court rejected the defendant Douglass Properties’ defenses based on the common grantor doctrine and equitable estoppel because the deed line was not a visible boundary on the ground and Douglass had actual knowledge of the encroachment. The case is remanded for entry of partial summary judgment for Sydow and determination of attorney fees under RCW 7.28.083.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded Kenneth Humphries Jr.’s 2025 misdemeanor domestic-violence conviction. Humphries had been indicted in 2025 for offenses arising from an August 2020 incident; his trial counsel moved to dismiss for preindictment delay but did not argue the two-year statute of limitations for misdemeanors. The State conceded counsel’s failure to raise the statute-of-limitations defense was ineffective assistance. The appellate court agreed with the concession, found the conviction must be reversed, and remanded for further proceedings, rendering the weight-of-evidence claim moot.

The Ohio appellate court reversed the trial court’s denial of the City of Euclid’s motion to dismiss a negligence complaint. Frederico sued the city after a tree fell from private property onto his car, alleging the city owned and failed to maintain the tree. The appellate panel held that under Ohio law the city is generally immune from tort liability unless an exception applies, and the complaint did not plead facts showing the tree was an “obstruction” on the roadway as required to overcome immunity. Because the complaint could not state a viable exception, dismissal was required.

The First Department reversed Supreme Court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss a fraudulent inducement complaint and granted the motion. Plaintiff claimed defendant lied about tenants and rents when selling Manhattan property, but documentary evidence in the closing binder (schedule 8.1(k)) and the purchase agreement terms (including a merger clause and an "as is" purchase) conclusively refuted reliance. The court also held that, even absent those documents, the complaint failed to plead all elements of fraudulent inducement with sufficient particularity, so dismissal was required.

The Appellate Division reversed a Supreme Court order that had awarded the mother $108,491.83 in counsel fees and expenses under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act after the court ordered the return of the parties' child to Italy. The panel held that Supreme Court made only conclusory findings and failed to apply the statutory and equitable factors required by ICARA and controlling federal caselaw (including the respondent's burden to show an award would be "clearly inappropriate" and use of the lodestar method to set fees). The matter is remitted for the lower court to consider the proper factors, decide whether an award would be clearly inappropriate, and, if not, calculate an appropriate fee amount.

The Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed Supreme Court's grant of summary judgment for Bassett Healthcare Network in a wrongful-death action by Harvey Brody, administrator of Barbara Brody's estate. The court held that issues of fact exist both on a common-law negligence claim that the facility failed to monitor its parking lot and on medical malpractice claims against the nurse practitioner who evaluated the decedent. The court found defendant met its initial burdens but that plaintiff submitted admissible evidence (job description, photos, and an expert affidavit) creating triable issues about assumed duty and whether the NP departed from the applicable standard of care.

The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and granted the defendant's motion to suppress a statement obtained after his arrest. The People relied on an NYPD "probable cause I-card" and the fellow officer rule to justify the arrest, but presented no testimony from the arresting officers and did not show the I-card's contents or that the arresting officers actually received or relied on it. Because the prosecution failed to prove that the officers who arrested the defendant had been communicated probable cause, the court held the arrest unlawful and suppressed the statement as its fruit, remitting the case for further proceedings.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of class certification in a putative class action against owners of a Red Roof Inn asserting violations of Civil Code § 1940.1. The trial court had denied certification because it believed each class member would need to prove the hotel was their personal “primary residence,” making individualized issues predominant. The appellate court held that the statute requires inquiry into whether the hotel is a “residential hotel” (a hotel-wide question), not individualized proof that each guest treated the hotel as their own primary residence. The case is remanded for reconsideration of class certification.

A jury convicted Jan Curtis Harzan of communicating with and arranging to meet a minor for sexual purposes after he messaged and agreed to meet an undercover officer posing as a 13-year-old. Before trial the court ruled evidence of alleged sexual misconduct by Harzan from the 1970s would be excluded in the prosecution’s case-in-chief but could be admitted if Harzan asserted an entrapment defense. To avoid that prejudicial evidence, Harzan declined the entrapment defense and was convicted. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding the court’s conditioning of exclusion violated Harzan’s constitutional right to present a defense, though the evidence supporting guilt was otherwise substantial.

The Ninth District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded Kaelyn Smith’s felony-murder judgment because the trial court failed to complete statutorily required notice and form under Ohio’s violent-offender law (Sierah’s Law, R.C. 2903.41 et seq.) before sentencing. Smith had pleaded guilty to felony murder with a firearm specification; the parties and judge discussed the violent-offender form and defense counsel waived reading the paperwork, but the record does not contain an executed form or an affirmative on-the-record advisement. Because the trial court did not provide the required pre-sentencing notice, the appellate court found plain error and ordered further proceedings for proper notice and signature.

The First District Court of Appeals reversed the municipal court's denial of a victim's request for restitution and remanded for a restitution hearing. Defendant Adam Winkle had pleaded guilty/no contest to several driving-related offenses after side‑swiping multiple cars while intoxicated. Victim M.L. submitted a victim impact statement with documentation that she paid a $500 insurance deductible for damage to her vehicle. The appellate court held the trial court erred in refusing restitution based on the existence of insurance and directed a hearing to determine restitution for the deductible.

The First District Court of Appeals reversed Patricia Hauser’s municipal-court conviction for theft and discharged her. Hauser pleaded no contest after the State recited facts that she left a bar without paying a $69.33 tab when her credit card was declined. The appellate court held the State’s explanation of circumstances affirmatively showed the bar owner consented to her possession of the drinks when he served them, which negated an essential element of the charged theft offense. Because the explanation could not support the conviction under R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), the court reversed and discharged Hauser.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Victor Valley Community College District in Jessie Walton’s suit alleging sexual harassment, discrimination, retaliation, and related claims. The appellate court found the trial court abused its discretion by excluding counsel’s curable declaration defect, and erred in holding Walton lacked FEHA standing, failed Government Claims Act notice, and could not show the District acted with deliberate indifference under Education Code section 66270. The court ordered the trial court to vacate its summary judgment, grant summary adjudication only on Walton’s Civil Code claim she did not contest, and deny summary adjudication on the remaining claims for trial setting.