State v. Faison

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official text of the opinion.




                                                     In the
                                Supreme Court of Georgia
                                                No. S26A0554
                                                 The State
                                                      v.
                                               Anthony Faison

                            On Appeal from the Superior Court of Henry County
                                         No. 2025SUCR0527HV

                                              Decided: May 5, 2026


                        ELLINGTON, Justice.
                     The State appeals the trial court’s order determining that
              Anthony Faison was immune from prosecution in connection with
              the shooting death of Curtis Johnson on April 16, 2025. The State
              indicted Faison in connection with Johnson’s death on May 29,
              2025, on three counts of felony murder – one based on criminal
              attempt to commit a felony (kidnapping), one based on burglary
              in the first degree, and one based on home invasion in the second
              degree – and one count each of criminal attempt to commit a fel-
              ony (kidnapping), burglary in the first degree, home invasion in
              the second degree, and simple assault. On October 5, 2025, the
              court held an evidentiary hearing on Faison’s motion asserting
              his immunity from prosecution, and on October 20, the court en-
              tered a written order declaring Faison immune from charges pur-
              suant to OCGA § 16-30-20.
                     On appeal, the State asserts that the trial court erred in
              determining that Faison was justified in entering a residence
              while acting as a bail recovery agent, by applying the wrong law
              in determining that Faison was immune from prosecution, and in
determining that the Sheriff of Henry County could not revoke
the authority of a bail recovery agent in his county. Because the
trial court failed to apply the proper analysis in deciding Faison’s
immunity motion, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand
the case for further proceedings.
       At the hearing on the immunity motion, Faison testified
that, in early 2025, he was working as a licensed bail recovery
agent 1 in Georgia, with registration in seven different Georgia
counties, including Henry County. Faison renewed his registra-
tion in Henry County on or about February 5, 2025, and in his
registration paperwork, Faison identified Jam Bonding as the
registered bonding company with which he was affiliated. One of
Jam Bonding’s co-owners confirmed at the immunity hearing that
Faison worked as a subcontractor for the company in early 2025.
        However, sometime around March 5, 2025, Faison was per-
sonally served with a letter from the Henry County Sheriff (the
“Sheriff”) notifying him that, pursuant to the Henry County Sher-
iff’s Office Bonding Company Rules and Regulations, his letter of
authorization to operate as a bail recovery agent in Henry County
was revoked (the “revocation letter”). According to Faison, the
Sheriff drafted the revocation letter based on what Faison de-
scribed as “unrelated felony charges within Henry County” that
were pending against him at the time. Faison signed the letter on
March 7, 2025, acknowledging its receipt. Jam Bonding also was

       1 Georgia law recognizes and regulates both “professional bondsmen”
and “bail recovery agents.” “Bondsmen or persons who hold themselves out as
signers or sureties of bonds for compensation are declared to be professional
bondsmen.” OCGA § 17-6-50(a). “[T]he term ‘bail recovery agent’ means any
person who performs services or takes action for the purpose of apprehending
the principal on a bail bond granted in this state or capturing a fugitive who
has escaped from bail in this state for gratuity, benefit, or compensation.”
OCGA § 17-6-56(a).




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sent a copy of the revocation letter, and sometime before April 16,
2025, the company informed Faison that until Faison got the
Henry County charges cleared, Jam Bonding could not use his
services.
        On or around April 15, 2025, the owner of a Florida bail
bond agency commissioned Faison to recover Edward Atkins, who
had absconded and was the subject of an outstanding bench war-
rant in Hillsborough County, Florida. The agency owner hired
Faison to recover Atkins based on her belief that Atkins was stay-
ing with his girlfriend in an apartment complex in Henry County.
Her suspicion was based on the following factors: Atkins’s girl-
friend had posted his bail; the Hillsborough County, Florida Sher-
iff’s detective looking for Atkins told her that “a vehicle” had been
discovered “close to Georgia in Jacksonville”; the girlfriend had a
Georgia address at the apartment complex, although the agency
owner did not have an apartment number; and Atkins was using
his Cash App in Georgia at the same locations that the girlfriend
was using her Cash App. Nevertheless, the agency owner ex-
pressly stated that she had no evidence that Atkins was staying
with his girlfriend or residing at any other address in Georgia.
       Faison agreed to work with the Florida agency owner, but
in light of the revocation letter, he commissioned Johnson, whom
he identified as another Georgia bail recovery agent, to act as a
“partner” and to take “the lead” in the recovery of Atkins. Alt-
hough Faison testified that he did not believe the revocation letter
was valid, he intended to act only as “an oversight overseer” to
make sure “what [Johnson] was doing was legit” and to offer ad-
vice in connection with Atkins’s recovery. Faison acknowledged
that he was not acting on behalf of Jam Bonding in connection
with the recovery of Atkins.
      Based on information provided by the Florida bond agency,




                                 3
Faison and Johnson identified the apartment complex in the city
of Stockbridge in Henry County where Atkins’s girlfriend lived.
On April 16, 2025, Johnson and Faison, along with Faison’s son
Romello, 2 met near the apartment complex to begin “surveillance”
to verify Atkins’s location. Faison did not, however, notify the
Sheriff or the Stockbridge Police Chief prior to taking any action
in that regard, although OCGA § 17-6-57(a) requires a bail recov-
ery agent to provide such notification “prior to taking any action
as a bail recovery agent” upon entering any local police jurisdic-
tion for the purpose of “apprehending the principal on a bond[,] …
capturing a fugitive, or engaging in surveillance of such principal
or fugitive.” 3
       When Johnson, Faison, and Romello subsequently arrived
at the apartment complex, they had no evidence linking Atkins to
the complex, nor did they know in which apartment his girlfriend
resided, so Johnson went into the apartment’s leasing office alone
to obtain information. Jada Bridges, an assistant manager at the
apartment complex, was working in the leasing office at the time.


       2 Romello was not a registered bail recovery agent, and, in fact, did not
meet the minimum age requirement for an agent under Georgia law, which is
“25 years of age.” OCGA § 17-6-56(b). The State indicted Romello on the same
charges as Faison in connection with this incident, as well as the additional
offense of impersonating an officer.
        3 OCGA § 17-6-57(a) provides in full:
        Any bail recovery agent who enters any local police jurisdiction
        in pursuit of and for the purpose of apprehending the principal
        on a bail bond or capturing a fugitive or engaging in surveil-
        lance of such principal or fugitive shall, prior to taking any ac-
        tion in his or her capacity as a bail recovery agent in that local
        police jurisdiction, notify by facsimile transmission or tele-
        phone the sheriff and police chief of the local police jurisdiction
        in which the surveillance, apprehension, or capture is to take
        place unless it is to take place in public.




                                      4
She testified at the hearing that she provided Johnson with the
apartment number, but she also testified that no one other than
the girlfriend was listed on the lease and no one else was listed in
the office records as residing in the apartment. Faison testified,
however, that Bridges told Johnson that she had seen Atkins
around the apartment the day before.4 After Johnson asked
Bridges to let him inside the girlfriend’s apartment, she called the
apartment complex’s maintenance technician, who accompanied
Johnson to the apartment. Before approaching the girlfriend’s
apartment, Johnson and the technician devised what the trial
court termed a “ruse” for entering the apartment to determine if
Atkins was there. 5 The technician testified that the plan was for
Johnson and the technician to confirm Atkins’s presence and then
leave the apartment so the technician would not be there when
Atkins was apprehended.
       When the technician and Johnson arrived at the apart-
ment, the technician knocked on the door and identified himself
as “maintenance.” The door was locked, and when there was no
answer, the technician opened the apartment door with his key.
Once the door was open, they encountered Atkins, and the tech-
nician told him that he and Johnson were there to check for a
leak, although there was no active work order for the apartment
or for a potential leak. The technician identified Johnson as a
“new guy” who was helping him out. Although Faison testified


       4 The State raised no hearsay objection to this testimony, and the trial
court relied on this evidence in granting Faison immunity. See OCGA § 24-8-
802 (“[I]f a party does not properly object to hearsay, the objection shall be
deemed waived, and the hearsay evidence shall be legal evidence and admissi-
ble.”).
        5 According to the technician, Faison participated in formulating this
plan, but Faison testified that although he was aware of the plan, he did not
help in its formulation.




                                      5
that Bridges also accompanied Johnson and the technician into
the apartment and that Atkins’s girlfriend was there as well,
Bridges testified that she stayed in the parking lot and never en-
tered the apartment while either Johnson or Faison was there,
and the technician testified that he never saw a female inside the
apartment.
        As Johnson and the technician were getting ready to leave
the apartment, Faison and Romello came running in. The techni-
cian said that the two Faisons entered the apartment while “hol-
lering ‘agent, agent,’” and once inside, Faison discharged his
taser. 6 After they entered, Atkins went into the apartment’s bed-
room, with Johnson following. Moments later, gunfire erupted.
There is no evidence that Faison or the technician witnessed the
shootings, as Faison said he exited the apartment before the gun-
fire started, and the technician said he left as it began. The State
alleged in the indictment that Atkins shot and killed Johnson
before taking his own life. 7
       Faison subsequently filed his “Motion to Declare Defend-
ant Immune from Prosecution under OCGA 16-3-24.2,” which
provides that “[a] person who uses threats or force in accordance
with Code Section 16-3-20, 16-3-21, 16-3-23, 16-3-23.1, 16-3-24, or
17-4-20 shall be immune from criminal prosecution therefor un-
less in the use of deadly force, such person utilizes a weapon the
carrying or possession of which is unlawful by such person.” Fai-
son’s motion asserted that as a bail recovery agent, he had the

       6 Faison testified that he discharged his taser into a wall but did not
make contact with anyone inside. Faison said he took that action as a “diver-
sion” to allow Bridges and the technician to run out of the apartment. Faison
said that he ran after them to make sure Bridges got away safely. However, as
discussed below, Faison raises no claim on appeal that he is entitled to immun-
ity because he was acting in defense of others.
        7 The appellate record contains no evidence concerning these events.




                                      6
lawful authority to enter Atkins’s girlfriend’s apartment and fur-
ther sought immunity on the charge of simple assault under
OCGA § 16-3-21(a) 8 asserting that he was justified in using rea-
sonable force in the protection of himself or others. Following the
evidentiary hearing, the trial court found Faison immune, not un-
der OCGA § 16-3-21(a) but pursuant to OCGA § 16-3-20. 9 In
granting immunity, the trial court found that the Sheriff did not
have the authority to revoke the ability of Faison to act as a bail


      8 Under § 16-3-21(a),
      A person is justified in threatening or using force against an-
      other when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes
      that such threat or force is necessary to defend himself or her-
      self or a third person against such other’s imminent use of un-
      lawful force; however, except as provided in Code Section 16-3-
      23, a person is justified in using force which is intended or
      likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if he or she rea-
      sonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death
      or great bodily injury to himself or herself or a third person or
      to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.
      9 OCGA § 16-3-20 provides:
      The fact that a person’s conduct is justified is a defense to pros-
      ecution for any crime based on that conduct. The defense of jus-
      tification can be claimed:
           (1) When the person’s conduct is justified under Code Sec-
      tion 16-3-21, 16-3-23, 16-3-24, 16-3-25, or 16-3-26;
           (2) When the person’s conduct is in reasonable fulfillment
      of his duties as a government officer or employee;
           (3) When the person’s conduct is the reasonable discipline
      of a minor by his parent or a person in loco parentis;
           (4) When the person’s conduct is reasonable and is per-
      formed in the course of making a lawful arrest;
           (5) When the person’s conduct is justified for any other rea-
      son under the laws of this state, including as provided in Code
      Section 51-1-29; or
           (6) In all other instances which stand upon the same foot-
      ing of reason and justice as those enumerated in this article.




                                      7
recovery agent in Henry County. Therefore, on the day of this in-
cident the defendant was lawfully still designated as a bail recov-
ery agent and was able to enter the apartment to recover … At-
kins and use force reasonably necessary to accomplish that goal.
      1. On appeal, the State asserts that the trial court erred in
determining that Faison was acting as a registered bail recovery
agent, which justified his entry into Atkins’s girlfriend’s apart-
ment, and that the trial court applied the wrong legal analysis in
determining that Faison was immune from prosecution under
OCGA § 16-3-20 on that basis.
       When evaluating a trial court’s decision “granting or deny-
ing immunity, we review the evidence in the light most favorable
to the trial court’s ruling, and we accept the trial court’s findings
with regard to questions of fact and credibility if there is any evi-
dence to support them, whereas its legal conclusions are reviewed
de novo.” Davis v. State, 306 Ga. 430, 432 (2019) (quotation marks
omitted). See also State v. Hylton, 321 Ga. 292, 293 n.2 (2025).
Moreover, Faison bore the burden to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that his conduct was justified so as to entitle him to
immunity under OCGA § 16-3-24.2. See Cotton v. State, 297 Ga.
257, 258 (2015); Bunn v. State, 284 Ga. 410, 413 (2008).
        OCGA § 16-3-20 sets forth six bases for which the defense
of justification is available and thus upon which immunity may
be granted pursuant to OCGA § 16-3-24.2. But the trial court’s
order does not identify which of the enumerated statutory bases
it relied upon in granting Faison immunity, and Faison does not
identify the section of that statute under which he claims immun-
ity. It is apparent, however, that on appeal Faison does not claim
immunity under OCGA § 16-3-21(a), as he states in his appellate
brief that “there never was a self-defense claim” and he does not




                                 8
assert that he was acting in defense of others. Instead, he con-
tends that “[t]he justification of any force used would come from
being a licensed bail recovery agent.”
        Because Faison bases his claim of immunity solely on his
status as a bail recovery agent with the right to apprehend a fu-
gitive, certain sections of OCGA § 16-3-20 can be ruled out as in-
applicable on their face. Nevertheless, the trial court’s grant of
immunity plausibly could have been based on sections (4), (5), or
(6) of the statute. Section 4 of the statute, provides for the defense
of justification “[w]hen the person’s conduct is reasonable and is
performed in the course of making a lawful arrest.” Alternatively,
his claim could fall under section 5, providing a justification de-
fense “[w]hen the person’s conduct is justified for any other reason
under the laws of this state” or under section 6, providing that the
defense of justification is available “[i]n all other instances which
stand upon the same footing of reason and justice as those enu-
merated in this article.”
        However, the trial court did not analyze Faison’s motion
under the requirements of any particular provision of the stat-
ute. 10 Thus, it appears that the trial court did not consider, for
instance, whether Faison proved by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that his conduct “was reasonable” and “performed in the


        10 Although this Court acknowledged in Hylton that “OCGA § 16-3-
24.2 does not require a trial court’s order granting or denying immunity to in-
clude explicit factual findings or conclusions of law,” 321 Ga. at 297, here, the
trial court made a number of factual findings and conducted a legal analysis in
reaching its conclusion that Faison was entitled to immunity under OCGA §
16-3-20. However, that analysis is incomplete because the trial court failed to
consider the issue under any of the statutory grounds for finding a person’s
conduct to be justified. And because the statute lists six separate bases for jus-
tification, we cannot presume the basis of the trial court’s legal conclusion from
the record before us, as we did in Hylton.




                                        9
course of making a lawful arrest” as required under Section 4;
that his conduct was otherwise justified “under the laws of this
State” under section 5; or that it presented an instance that
stands “upon the same footing of reason and justice as those enu-
merated in [that] article” of the Georgia Code as required under
section 6.
       Instead, as the State notes, the trial court’s analysis fo-
cused almost entirely on the question of whether the Sheriff
lacked the authority to revoke Faison’s status as a bail recovery
agent in Henry County (a question we do not decide in this ap-
peal), and upon determining that the Sheriff lacked such author-
ity, the trial court concluded that this lack of authority was dis-
positive of the immunity issue. But even if Faison was still a reg-
istered bail recovery agent when he entered the Stockbridge
apartment, that determination does not end the immunity analy-
sis under OCGA § 16-3-20, which requires a trial court to deter-
mine whether Faison’s conduct was justified under the specific
standards set out in the statute.
       Because the trial court not only failed to identify which ba-
sis for justification it was applying to Faison but also conducted
an analysis that failed to track any of the potential statutory
grounds for immunity, we vacate the trial court’s order and re-
mand for further proceedings.
     2. Given this determination, we need not address Faison’s
remaining arguments.
       Judgment vacated and case remanded. All the Justices con-
cur, except Warren, P.J., not participating.




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