What did the court decide?

The appeals court reversed the part of the lower court's order that kept two internal incident reports secret, finding the hospital did not prove those reports were protected by the cited confidentiality laws.

Who is affected by this decision?

The plaintiff (the former employee) gains access to two RL6 incident reports; the hospital must turn them over unless another privilege applies or other lawful protection is shown.

What was the hospital's argument for keeping the reports private?

The hospital argued the reports were privileged quality‑assurance records under Education Law § 6527(3) and protected patient safety work product under the federal PSQIA, but it failed to show the reports were actually used in those protected processes.

Can this decision be appealed further?

Yes; the hospital could seek leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, but that would require following New York appellate procedures and any applicable deadlines.

Adams v. Bassett Healthcare Network

Docket CV-25-0867

Court of record · Indexed in NoticeRegistry archive · AI-enriched for research

CivilAffirmed in Part, Reversed in Part

Filed: Apr 30, 2026 · yesterday
Jurisdiction: New York
Court: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
Type: Opinion
Case type: Civil
Disposition: Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part
Citation: 2026 NY Slip Op 02706
Docket: CV-25-0867

Appeal from a Supreme Court order denying plaintiff's CPLR 3124 motion to compel reports and granting defendant's cross-motion for a protective order in a wrongful termination and retaliation action.

Summary

The Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed part of a Supreme Court order that had denied a nursing assistant's motion to compel two internal incident reports (RL6 forms) and granted the hospital a protective order. The plaintiff sued for wrongful termination and retaliation after reporting safety concerns. The court held the hospital failed to carry its burden to show the reports were privileged under New York Education Law § 6527(3) or the federal Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act, because there was no proof the reports were actually part of a medical peer‑review or submitted to a patient safety organization. The case was otherwise affirmed.

Issues Decided

Whether the hospital established that two RL6 incident reports were privileged from disclosure under Education Law § 6527(3).
Whether the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act (PSQIA) shields the RL6 reports as patient safety work product.

Court's Reasoning

The court required the hospital to prove the reports were created for and actually used in a qualified medical review or peer‑review process to invoke Education Law § 6527(3). The hospital's general descriptions and boilerplate confidentiality language were insufficient, especially where the hospital conceded the reports were not submitted to a quality assurance or peer‑review committee. Similarly, the hospital failed to show the reports were reported to a patient safety organization as required to qualify as PSQIA-protected patient safety work product.

Authorities Cited

Education Law § 6527(3)
Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (PSQIA)42 USC § 299b-21 et seq.
Estate of Savage v Kredentser150 AD3d 1452 (3d Dept 2017)

Parties

Appellant: Richard C. Adams
Respondent: Bassett Healthcare Network
Attorney: Gabriella K. Read (Hinman, Howard & Kattell, LLP) - counsel for appellant
Attorney: Andrew W. Bagley (Crowell & Moring LLP) - counsel for respondent
Judge: Corcoran, J.

Key Dates

Decision entered: 2026-04-30
Supreme Court order entered: 2025-04-29
Calendar date (argument): 2026-03-23

What You Should Do Next

1
Production of RL6 reports
Defendant should produce the two RL6 reports to plaintiff unless it identifies another applicable privilege or seeks further appellate review within the statutory deadlines.
2
Consider seeking leave to appeal
If the hospital wishes to contest the Appellate Division's ruling, it should consult counsel promptly about filing an application for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.
3
Review reports with counsel
Plaintiff and his attorney should review the produced reports to assess their relevance to the wrongful termination and retaliation claims and plan any further discovery or motions.

Frequently Asked Questions

What did the court decide?: The appeals court reversed the part of the lower court's order that kept two internal incident reports secret, finding the hospital did not prove those reports were protected by the cited confidentiality laws.
Who is affected by this decision?: The plaintiff (the former employee) gains access to two RL6 incident reports; the hospital must turn them over unless another privilege applies or other lawful protection is shown.
What was the hospital's argument for keeping the reports private?: The hospital argued the reports were privileged quality‑assurance records under Education Law § 6527(3) and protected patient safety work product under the federal PSQIA, but it failed to show the reports were actually used in those protected processes.
Can this decision be appealed further?: Yes; the hospital could seek leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, but that would require following New York appellate procedures and any applicable deadlines.

The above suggestions and answers are AI-generated for informational purposes only. They may contain errors. NoticeRegistry assumes no responsibility for their accuracy. Consult a qualified attorney before relying on them.

Full Filing Text

Adams v Bassett Healthcare Network - 2026 NY Slip Op 02706

Adams v Bassett Healthcare Network

2026 NY Slip Op 02706

April 30, 2026

Appellate Division, Third Department

Richard C. Adams, Appellant,

Bassett Healthcare Network, Respondent.

Decided and Entered:April 30, 2026

CV-25-0867

Calendar Date: March 23, 2026

Before: Clark, J.P., Ceresia, Fisher, Powers And Corcoran, JJ.

Hinman, Howard & Kattell, LLP, Binghamton (Gabriella K. Read of counsel), for appellant.

Crowell & Moring LLP, Washington, DC (Andrew W. Bagley of counsel), for respondent.

Corcoran, J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (John Lambert, J.), entered April 29, 2025 in Otsego County, which, among other things, denied plaintiff's motion to compel disclosure of certain documents.

Plaintiff was employed as a nursing assistant and technician within defendant's secure unit for patients with behavioral health and psychiatric conditions. He commenced this action for wrongful termination and retaliation under Labor Law §§ 740 and 741, claiming that defendant unlawfully fired him after he reported unsafe workplace practices and conditions. During discovery, plaintiff demanded copies of his statements to defendant, including his June 2022 report of safety concerns submitted to defendant's electronic reporting system. Plaintiff also requested the parties' communications about the secure unit and defendant's responses to prior related complaints or concerns. The parties agreed to terms of a confidentiality stipulation. Defendant objected, served a privilege log identifying two "RL6" reports, and asserted that both reports were immune from disclosure pursuant to statutory privileges under Education Law § 6527 (3) and the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (42 USC § 299b-21
et seq.
[hereinafter PSQIA]). One of the reports was authored by plaintiff in June 2022; the other was written by a hospital security staff member in July 2022 after the incident that led to plaintiff's termination. Plaintiff moved pursuant to CPLR 3124 to compel production of the reports and defendant cross-moved for a protective order. Supreme Court inspected the reports in camera, then denied plaintiff's motion to compel and granted defendant's cross-motion for a protective order. Plaintiff appeals.

Supreme Court erred in concluding that both RL6 reports were exempt from discovery pursuant to Education Law § 6527 (3). Under certain conditions, this statute exempts from disclosure records related to medical review and quality assurance functions, records of participation in a medical malpractice prevention program and certain reports required by the Department of Health (
see Katherine

F. v State of New York
, 94 NY2d 200, 204 [1999]). The statutory privilege is designed to "encourage a candid peer review of physicians, and thereby improve the quality of medical care and prevent malpractice, but such protections are not automatically available and do not prevent full disclosure where it should otherwise be provided" (
Estate of Savage v Kredentser
, 150 AD3d 1452, 1455 [3d Dept 2017] [internal citations omitted]). "The exemption from discovery conferred by that statute pertains only to medical review functions" (
Carter v County of Erie
, 255 AD2d 984, 985 [4th Dept 1998] [citation omitted]). As the party seeking to invoke the privilege, defendant bore the burden of establishing that a review procedure was in place and that the requested documents were prepared in accordance with the relevant statute (
see Bellamy v State of New York
, 154 AD3d 1239, 1240
[3d Dept 2017];
Estate of Savage v Kredentser
, 150 AD3d at 1454). Absent proof that a document was reviewed as contemplated by the statute, a conclusory statement that it was prepared for a protected purpose will not trigger the statutory privilege (
see

Estate of Savage v Kredentser
, 150 AD3d at 1455;
Matter of Coniber v United Mem. Med. Ctr.
, 81 AD3d 1329, 1330 [4th Dept 2011]).

Defendant's vice president, Paula Moshier, averred that hospital staff use RL6 reports to register a variety of incidents, such as accounts about medical procedures, "all near miss events," falls, medication reactions, employee injuries and certain other events not normally subject to the privilege. Moshier's description of the breadth of incidents reported through this electronic system demonstrated that it constitutes a tool to document an assortment of issues or events in the hospital, some of which relate to the medical review process. Contrary to defendant's argument, the mere fact that a report was created through the hospital's reporting system does not establish that it was made to promote quality assurance or for another purpose specified by Education Law § 6527 (3). Moshier described the policies and forms used to implement defendant's "Patient Safety Evaluation System" in general terms but she did not aver that the reports at issue were created for or submitted to any medical review process; her affidavit failed to even mention the specific reports at issue (
compare Bamberg-Taylor v Strauch
, 181 AD3d 432, 433 [1st Dept 2020];
Drum v Collure
, 161 AD3d 1509, 1510 [4th Dept 2018];
Bellamy v State of New York
, 154 AD3d at 1241). Nor do the generic statements on the RL6 forms establish that they were composed for a protected purpose. Although Moshier explained that all RL6 forms contain boilerplate language indicating that they are "[c]onfidential quality assurance material pursuant to Education Law § 6527, Public Health Law § 2805, and Mental Hygiene Law § 29.29," nothing in the record suggests that these particular reports were ever reviewed for any privileged purpose. "[A] party does not obtain the protection of Education Law § 6527 (3) merely because the information sought
could
have been obtained during the course of a hospital review proceeding[.] . . . The exemption applies only where the information was in fact so obtained" (
DiPasquale v Lim
, 218 AD3d 1182, 1183-1184 [4th Dept 2023] [internal quotation marks, brackets, ellipsis and citation omitted]). In short, the administrator's conclusory affidavit is insufficient to satisfy defendant's burden under Education Law § 6527 (3) (
see

Estate of Savage v Kredentser
, 150 AD3d at 1454;
Slayton v Kolli
, 111 AD3d 1314, 1315 [4th Dept 2013];
Matter of Coniber v United Mem. Med. Ctr.
, 81 AD3d at 1330). Moreover, defendant conceded, both in its brief and at oral argument, that the RL6 reports were
not
submitted to a quality assurance or peer review committee.

Next, we address defendant's claim that the reports at issue
are protected from disclosure by PSQIA. While defendant submits that the reports constitute privileged "patient safety work product," that term of art applies, as relevant here, to statements that are (1) assembled or developed by a provider for the purpose of reporting to a patient safety organization (hereinafter PSO)
and
(2) reported to a PSO (42 USC § 299b-21 [7] [A] [i] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Assuming, without deciding, the doubtful proposition that PSQIA applies to this state law claim, defendant failed to demonstrate that the RL6 reports at issue constitute privileged patient safety work product. Neither Moshier's affidavit, nor anything else in the record, establishes that these particular reports were actually provided to and reviewed by a PSO (
see Brown v St. Mary's Hosp.
, 2015 US Dist LEXIS 179597, *11-12 [D Conn, Aug. 26, 2015, No. 3:14CV228 (DJS)];
Francis v United States
, 2011 WL 2224509, *6, 2011 US Dist LEXIS 59762, *21 [SD NY, May 31, 2011, No. 09 Civ. 4004 (GBD) (KNF)];
Pal v New York Univ.
, 2007 WL 4358463, *7, 2007 US Dist LEXIS 91051, *21-22 [SD NY, Dec. 10, 2007, No. 06 Civ. 5892 (PAC) (FM)]). Accordingly, defendant failed to show in the first instance that the reports were privileged under the cited state or federal statutes.

In light of this determination, we need not consider plaintiff's alternative arguments that the reports fell within the narrow party-statement exception to the Education Law privilege (
see Siegel v Snyder
, 202 AD3d 125, 127 [2d Dept 2021];
Nowelle B. v Hamilton Med., Inc.
, 174 AD3d 1345, 1347 [4th Dept 2019]), and that public policy disfavors applying PSQIA and/or Education Law § 6527 (3) to healthcare whistleblower actions.

Clark, J.P., Ceresia, Fisher and Powers, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as denied plaintiff's motion to compel production of the RL6 reports and granted defendant's cross-motion for a protective order; motion granted to that extent and cross-motion denied to that extent; and, as so modified, affirmed.