Bacchus v. 676 E. 179 LLC
Docket Index No. 35204/20|Appeal No. 6452|Case No. 2025-03503|
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- Filed
- Jurisdiction
- New York
- Court
- Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
- Type
- Opinion
- Case type
- Civil
- Disposition
- Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part
- Citation
- 2026 NY Slip Op 02442
- Docket numbers
- Index No35204/20Appeal No6452Case No2025-03503
Appeal from a Supreme Court, Bronx County order granting plaintiff partial summary judgment and denying defendant's motion to dismiss portions of a Labor Law § 241(6) claim
Summary
The Appellate Division, First Department modified a Bronx Supreme Court order on a Labor Law § 241(6) claim. The court affirmed that plaintiff was entitled to partial summary judgment and defendants were not entitled to dismissal as to Industrial Code §§ 23-1.5(c)(3) and 23-9.2(a) because the grinder lacked a visible guard, the employer had notice, and the unguarded tool was necessary for the work. The court reversed as to Industrial Code § 23-1.5(c)(1), holding that provision is too vague to support liability under Labor Law § 241(6). The remainder of the lower court's order was affirmed.
Issues Decided
- Whether plaintiff established a Labor Law § 241(6) violation based on Industrial Code §§ 23-1.5(c)(3) and 23-9.2(a) due to use of an unguarded grinder that kicked back and injured him.
- Whether defendant-owner could avoid liability by showing lack of notice of the missing guard.
- Whether Industrial Code § 23-1.5(c)(1) is a sufficiently specific regulation to serve as a predicate for Labor Law § 241(6) liability.
Court's Reasoning
The court held that the unguarded grinder and testimony that it was the only tool available supported an inference that the employer had notice of the missing guard, satisfying the notice element for the cited Industrial Code provisions and establishing liability under Labor Law § 241(6). As owner of the premises, East 179 could not avoid liability simply by claiming lack of notice because the employer in the construction chain was negligent in permitting use of the unguarded tool. The court reversed the grant as to Industrial Code § 23-1.5(c)(1) because that provision is not sufficiently specific to predicate liability under Labor Law § 241(6).
Authorities Cited
- Viruet v Purvis Holdings LLC198 AD3d 587 (1st Dept 2021)
- Nicholson v Sabey Data Ctr. Props., LLC205 AD3d 620 (1st Dept 2022)
- Gasques v State of New York15 NY3d 869 (2010)
Parties
- Plaintiff
- Azfal Bacchus
- Defendant
- 676 East 179 LLC
- Appellant
- 676 East 179 LLC
- Judge
- Myrna Socorro
- Judge
- Manzanet-Daniels
- Judge
- Kennedy
- Judge
- González
- Judge
- Pitt-Burke
- Judge
- Rosado
Key Dates
- Decision date
- 2026-04-23
- Lower court order entered
- 2025-05-19
What You Should Do Next
- 1
Assess remaining claims and defenses
Defense and plaintiff should evaluate the remaining Labor Law claims tied to §§ 23-1.5(c)(3) and 23-9.2(a) and prepare for further proceedings, including potential trial or settlement discussions.
- 2
Consider appeal to Court of Appeals
If a party wishes to challenge the First Department's rulings, they should consult counsel promptly about seeking leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals and note any filing deadlines.
- 3
Preserve evidence and witnesses
Both sides should preserve and organize evidence about the grinder, supervision, notice, and available tools, and prepare witness statements for forthcoming litigation stages.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What did the court decide overall?
- The court affirmed finding liability under Labor Law § 241(6) based on two specific Industrial Code rules but reversed the portion relying on a more general Industrial Code provision as too vague.
- Who is affected by this decision?
- The plaintiff (worker) benefits from a ruling that supports his safety claim; the employer and property owner face continued exposure to the Labor Law § 241(6) claim for the specific violated safety rules.
- What happens next in the case?
- The portions of the claim tied to the upheld Industrial Code provisions remain for further proceedings or remedy, while the claim based on § 23-1.5(c)(1) is dismissed.
- Why was one Industrial Code provision dismissed?
- The court found § 23-1.5(c)(1) was not specific enough to create liability under the statute, so it cannot serve as the legal basis for that part of the claim.
- Can the decision be appealed further?
- Yes, the losing party may seek leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, subject to appellate rules and time limits.
The above suggestions and answers are AI-generated for informational purposes only. They may contain errors. NoticeRegistry assumes no responsibility for their accuracy. Consult a qualified attorney before relying on them.
Full Filing Text
Bacchus v 676 E. 179 LLC - 2026 NY Slip Op 02442 Bacchus v 676 E. 179 LLC 2026 NY Slip Op 02442 April 23, 2026 Appellate Division, First Department Azfal Bacchus, Plaintiff-Respondent, v 676 East 179 LLC et al., Defendants-Appellants. 676 East 179 LLC et al., Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellants, Decided and Entered: April 23, 2026 Index No. 35204/20|Appeal No. 6452|Case No. 2025-03503| Before: Manzanet-Daniels, J.P., Kennedy, González, Pitt-Burke, Rosado, JJ. Leon I. Behar, P.C., New York (Kyle Egan Djurovic of counsel), for 676 East 179 LLC, appellant. Chirico Law PLLC, Brooklyn (Vincent Chirico of counsel), for respondent. Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Myrna Socorro, J.), entered on or about May 19, 2025, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the Labor Law § 241(6) claim insofar as predicated on Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) §§ 23-1.5(c)(1) and (3) and 23-9.2(a) as against defendant 676 East 179 LLC (East 179), and denied East 179's motion for summary judgment dismissing the same portions of that claim, unanimously modified, on the law, to deny plaintiff's motion insofar as predicated on Industrial Code § 23-1.5(c)(1), grant East 179's motion as to that portion of the claim, and otherwise affirmed, without costs. Supreme Court properly granted plaintiff partial summary judgment on the Labor Law § 241(6) claim insofar as predicated on Industrial Code §§ 23-1.5(c)(3) and 23-9.2(a). It is undisputed that plaintiff was using a grinder that noticeably lacked a safeguard when it suddenly kicked back and injured him. Plaintiff submitted evidence supporting the inference that his employer had notice of the grinder's visibly missing safeguard ( see Viruet v Purvis Holdings LLC , 198 AD3d 587, 588 [1st Dept 2021]), thereby satisfying the notice element of both Industrial Code provisions ( see Nicholson v Sabey Data Ctr. Props., LLC , 205 AD3d 620, 621 [1st Dept 2022]; see also Cabral v Rockefeller Univ. , 222 AD3d 474, 475 [1st Dept 2023]; Becerra v Promenade Apts. Inc. , 126 AD3d 557, 558-559 [1st Dept 2015]). The record demonstrates that plaintiff's supervisor and owner of third-party defendant, Rudy Peters, was present and supervising plaintiff's work which required the use of the unguarded grinder to cut parts of the commercial boiler. Plaintiff testified that the unguarded grinder was the only tool available capable of performing this task. East 179, as the undisputed owner of the premises, was not entitled to dismissal by showing that it lacked notice of the missing safeguard. Rather, plaintiff's evidence established that his employer, a party within the construction chain, was negligent in permitting plaintiff to use the unguarded grinder in violation of the relevant Industrial Code provisions, thus establishing liability under Labor Law § 241(6) ( see Rizzuto v L.A. Wenger Contr. Co. , 91 NY2d 343, 351 [1998]). The court should have dismissed the Labor Law § 241(6) claim insofar as predicated on Industrial Code § 23-1.5(c)(1). This provision is not sufficiently specific to serve as a predicate for Labor Law § 241(6) liability ( see Gasques v State of New York , 15 NY3d 869, 870 [2010]). Although East 179 raises this argument for the first time on appeal, we may consider it because it presents a purely legal question that is determinative without raising new facts ( see Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Arthur , 125 AD3d 492, 492 [1st Dept 2015]). THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT. ENTERED: April 23, 2026