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Goode v. Bespoke Motor Group, LLC

Docket 2024-04114

Court of record · Indexed in NoticeRegistry archive · AI-enriched for research

CivilReversed
Filed
Jurisdiction
New York
Court
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
Type
Opinion
Case type
Civil
Disposition
Reversed
Citation
2026 NY Slip Op 02395
Docket
2024-04114

Appeal from denial of plaintiff's CPLR 3215 motion for leave to enter a default judgment in a breach of contract action

Summary

The Appellate Division reversed a Nassau County Supreme Court order and granted plaintiff Kelvin Goode leave to enter a default judgment against Bespoke Motor Group, LLC and Bentley Long Island, LLC in a breach of contract action. The court found service on an employee identified as a "service consultant" was proper under the rules for serving limited liability companies, the defendants failed to timely answer, and the plaintiff provided proof of service and the defendants' default. Because the defendants did not show a reasonable excuse for the default, the court granted default judgment without reaching the merits of any asserted defenses.

Issues Decided

  • Whether service of process on the defendants was effectuated properly under CPLR 311-a when copies were delivered to an individual identified as a "service consultant" authorized to receive process.
  • Whether the plaintiff established entitlement to leave to enter a default judgment under CPLR 3215 by proving service, the facts of the claim, and the defendants' default.
  • Whether the defendants demonstrated a reasonable excuse for their failure to timely answer and a potentially meritorious defense to avoid default judgment.

Court's Reasoning

The court applied CPLR 311-a and related precedent holding that service on an agent or other person designated to receive process on behalf of an LLC is valid. The plaintiff proved proper service and the defendants' failure to answer the complaint, satisfying CPLR 3215's requirements for default judgment. Because the defendants did not show a reasonable excuse for their default (and their law-office-failure claim was raised too late), the court refused to excuse the default and therefore granted the motion without reaching the merits of any defense.

Authorities Cited

  • CPLR 3215
  • CPLR 311-a
  • Bachvarov v Khaimov224 AD3d 724
  • Rosenzweig v Gubner194 AD3d 1086
  • Nurse v Marion 502, LLC241 AD3d 1352

Parties

Appellant
Kelvin Goode
Respondent
Bespoke Motor Group, LLC
Respondent
Bentley Long Island, LLC
Attorney
LaBonte Law Group, PLLC (Charles E. Holster III)
Judge
Angela G. Iannacci, J.P.
Judge
Valerie Brathwaite Nelson
Judge
Deborah A. Dowling
Judge
Donna-Marie E. Golia

Key Dates

Summons with notice filed
2023-07-01
Defendants' notice of appearance and demand
2023-07-17
Complaint electronically filed
2023-08-07
Plaintiff's CPLR 3215 motion
2023-09-01
Supreme Court order (denying motion)
2024-04-16
Appellate Division decision
2026-04-22

What You Should Do Next

  1. 1

    Move to enter default judgment

    Plaintiff should proceed in Supreme Court to obtain an order entering the default judgment and seeking damages consistent with CPLR 3215 procedures.

  2. 2

    Defendants consider post-judgment relief

    If the defendants want to challenge the default, they should promptly consult counsel about a motion to vacate the default in the trial court, presenting a reasonable excuse and a potentially meritorious defense.

  3. 3

    Document and calculate damages

    Plaintiff should gather and submit evidence supporting the amount of damages and any other relief sought so the trial court can determine the judgment amount.

Frequently Asked Questions

What did the court decide?
The Appellate Division reversed the lower court and allowed the plaintiff to enter a default judgment against the two defendant companies because they were properly served and failed to timely answer.
Who is affected by this decision?
The decision affects the plaintiff, Kelvin Goode, and the defendant companies Bespoke Motor Group, LLC and Bentley Long Island, LLC, by permitting the plaintiff to obtain judgment for failure to answer.
Why couldn't the defendants avoid default judgment?
They failed to show a reasonable excuse for not answering in time, and their claim of law-office failure was raised too late on appeal.
What happens next procedurally?
With leave to enter a default judgment granted, the plaintiff may seek an actual default judgment and damages consistent with CPLR 3215 procedures.
Can the defendants challenge this decision?
They may have limited options; they could seek post-judgment relief in the trial court if they can show a valid excuse and a meritorious defense, but appellate opportunities after this decision will be narrowed.

The above suggestions and answers are AI-generated for informational purposes only. They may contain errors. NoticeRegistry assumes no responsibility for their accuracy. Consult a qualified attorney before relying on them.

Full Filing Text
Goode v Bespoke Motor Group, LLC - 2026 NY Slip Op 02395

Goode v Bespoke Motor Group, LLC

2026 NY Slip Op 02395

April 22, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Kelvin Goode, appellant,

v

Bespoke Motor Group, LLC, et al., respondents, et al., defendants.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on April 22, 2026

2024-04114, (Index No. 611081/23)

Angela G. Iannacci, J.P.

Valerie Brathwaite Nelson

Deborah A. Dowling

Donna-Marie E. Golia, JJ.

Kelvin Goode, Miami Beach, Florida, appellant pro se.

LaBonte Law Group, PLLC (Charles E. Holster III, Garden City, NY), for respondents.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Philippe Solages, Jr., J.), entered April 16, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied the plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 3215 for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendants Bespoke Motor Group, LLC, and Bentley Long Island, LLC.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and the plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 3215 for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendants Bespoke Motor Group, LLC, and Bentley Long Island, LLC, is granted.

In July 2023, the plaintiff commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract by filing a summons with notice against the defendants Bespoke Motor Group, LLC, and Bentley Long Island, LLC (hereinafter together the defendants), among others. According to the affidavits of service, the defendants were served by delivery of copies of the summons with notice to an individual who was identified as a "service consultant," who was authorized to receive service on behalf of the defendants. The defendants filed a notice of appearance and demand for a copy of the complaint on July 17, 2023. The plaintiff electronically filed the complaint on August 7, 2023. The defendants failed to timely answer the complaint. In September 2023, the plaintiff moved pursuant to CPLR 3215 for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendants. The defendants opposed the motion.

In an order entered April 16, 2024, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied the plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 3215 for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendants. The plaintiff appeals.

"'On a motion for leave to enter judgment against a defendant for the failure to answer or appear, a plaintiff must submit proof of service of the summons and complaint, proof of the facts constituting its claim, and proof of the defendant's default'" (
Gray v Doyle
, 170 AD3d 969, 970, quoting
Triangle Props. #2, LLC v Narang
, 73 AD3d 1030, 1032;
see
CPLR 3215;
Bachvarov v Khaimov
, 224 AD3d 724, 725). "Service of process on a limited liability company may be made on, among others, 'any . . . agent authorized by appointment to receive process, or . . . any other person designated by the limited liability company to receive process'" (
Nurse v Marion 502, LLC
, 241 AD3d 1352, 1353, quoting CPLR 311-a[a][iii], [iv]). "In order to successfully oppose a motion for leave to enter a default judgment, a defendant who ha[d] failed to timely appear or answer the
complaint must provide a reasonable excuse for the default and demonstrate the existence of a potentially meritorious defense to the action" (
Bachvarov v Khaimov
, 224 AD3d at 725 [internal quotation marks omitted];
see

Rosenzweig v Gubner
, 194 AD3d 1086, 1089;
L & Z Masonry Corp. v Mose
, 167 AD3d 728, 729).

Here, the plaintiff established his entitlement to a default judgment against the defendants (
see

Bachvarov v Khaimov
, 224 AD3d at 725;
Rosenzweig v Gubner
, 194 AD3d at 1089). The plaintiff submitted proof of service of the summons and complaint (
see
CPLR 311-a;
Nurse v Marion 502, LLC
, 241 AD3d at 1353), as well as proof of the defendants' default in answering. Moreover, the defendants correctly concede that the verified complaint contained a potentially meritorious claim (
see

Rosenzweig v Gubner
, 194 AD3d at 1088-1089;
Triangle Props. #2, LLC v Narang
, 73 AD3d at 1032). In opposition, the defendants failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for their default in answering the complaint (
see

Pantanilla v Yuson
, 237 AD3d 1213, 1215;
Rosenzweig v Gubner
, 194 AD3d at 1089). The defendants' contention that their default should be excused due to law office failure is improperly raised for the first time on appeal (
see

Pantanilla v Yuson
, 237 AD3d at 1215). In light of the defendants' failure to establish a reasonable excuse for their default, it is unnecessary to determine whether they demonstrated a potentially meritorious defense (
see

Rivas v Palacios
, 238 AD3d 1186, 1187;
Pantanilla v Yuson
, 237 AD3d at 1215).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 3215 for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendants.

The defendants' remaining contentions are improperly raised for the first time on appeal.

IANNACCI, J.P., BRATHWAITE NELSON, DOWLING and GOLIA, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph