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Henriquez v. New York City Hous. Auth.

Docket Index No. 21718/18|Appeal No. 6527|Case No. 2025-00167|

Court of record · Indexed in NoticeRegistry archive · AI-enriched for research

Civil
Filed
Jurisdiction
New York
Court
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
Type
Opinion
Case type
Civil
Citation
2026 NY Slip Op 02782
Docket numbers
Index No21718/18Appeal No6527Case No2025-00167

Appeal from Supreme Court, Bronx County order denying defendant NYCHA's motion to strike supplemental bills of particulars and denying plaintiff's motion to amend the notice of claim and complaint.

Summary

The Appellate Division modified a Bronx Supreme Court order to grant the New York City Housing Authority's motion to strike new claims in plaintiff Henriquez's supplemental bills of particulars and otherwise affirmed the lower court's denial of plaintiff's request to amend her notice of claim and complaint. Henriquez, injured by smoke from an alleged apartment fire, had timely filed a notice of claim alleging negligence for permitting an illegal generator. After the statute of limitations, she added distinct theories alleging violations of multiple fire, administrative, and penal code provisions. The court held those new theories were not fairly implied by the original notice and therefore were barred.

Issues Decided

  • Whether allegations in supplemental bills of particulars that add new statutory and code violations are fairly implied by the original notice of claim.
  • Whether the court should treat NYCHA's motion as one to strike claims under the correct CPLR provision despite a technical misstatement in the notice of motion.
  • Whether plaintiff should be permitted to amend the complaint to add theories not alleged in the timely notice of claim.
  • Whether plaintiff can rely on testimony from a General Municipal Law § 50-h hearing to cure defects in the notice of claim.

Court's Reasoning

The court concluded the supplemental allegations went beyond mere amplification of the original boilerplate notice and constituted new, distinct theories of liability that were not fairly implied from the initial notice. A technical error in NYCHA's motion caption did not prejudice plaintiff and the court properly treated the motion under the correct procedural provision. Because the proposed amendments would assert theories not contained in the timely notice of claim, amendment is barred by the municipal notice statutes, and prejudice to the defendant is irrelevant under controlling precedent.

Authorities Cited

  • CPLR 2214(a)
  • General Municipal Law § 50-e(6)
  • Public Housing Law § 157(2); General Municipal Law §§ 50-e(1); 50-i(1)(c)
  • Ricciardi v State of New York201 AD3d 577 (1st Dept 2022), lv denied 38 NY3d 914 (2022)
  • Lopez v New York City Hous. Auth.16 AD3d 164 (1st Dept 2005)

Parties

Plaintiff
Antoinette Henriquez
Defendant
New York City Housing Authority
Third-Party Defendant
Lorenzo Simmons
Judge
Paul L. Alpert

Key Dates

Incident date
2017-08-05
Index filing year
2018-01-01
Supplemental bill of particulars (first)
2020-09-16
Supplemental bill of particulars (second)
2023-10-17
Supreme Court order entered
2024-12-24
Appellate Division decision
2026-05-05

What You Should Do Next

  1. 1

    Consider appeal to highest state court

    If the plaintiff wishes to challenge the Appellate Division's ruling, she should consult counsel promptly about seeking leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals and confirm any filing deadlines.

  2. 2

    Evaluate remaining claims and defenses

    NYCHA and plaintiff should review the surviving allegations (if any) and prepare for continued litigation or settlement discussions limited to claims that were properly pleaded.

  3. 3

    Preserve record of § 50-h and other proceedings

    Both sides should ensure all hearing transcripts and exhibits are preserved in case of further appellate review or to support settlement negotiations.

Frequently Asked Questions

What did the court decide in plain terms?
The court rejected plaintiff's attempt to add new legal theories and code-violation claims after the statute of limitations expired, finding those claims were not included or fairly implied in her original timely notice of claim.
Who is affected by this decision?
Plaintiff Henriquez cannot pursue the new theories of liability against NYCHA that were added after the limitations period; NYCHA succeeded in having those late claims struck.
Can the plaintiff still amend the complaint or add the late claims?
No — the court denied leave to amend because municipal notice statutes prohibit adding causes of action not alleged in the timely notice of claim, and the applicable one-year-and-90-day limitation period has passed.
Could NYCHA's procedural mistake in its motion have voided the result?
No — the appellate court treated NYCHA's motion under the correct CPLR provision because plaintiff suffered no prejudice and the relief sought was clear from the motion papers.
Is further appeal possible?
Yes; the Appellate Division issued a decision, which could be appealed to the Court of Appeals if a party timely seeks leave to appeal under New York appellate rules.

The above suggestions and answers are AI-generated for informational purposes only. They may contain errors. NoticeRegistry assumes no responsibility for their accuracy. Consult a qualified attorney before relying on them.

Full Filing Text
Henriquez v New York City Hous. Auth. - 2026 NY Slip Op 02782

Henriquez v New York City Hous. Auth.

2026 NY Slip Op 02782

May 5, 2026

Appellate Division, First Department

Antoinette Henriquez, Plaintiff-Respondent-Appellant,

v

New York City Housing Authority, Defendant-Appellant-Respondent. [And a Third-Party Action]

Decided and Entered: May 05, 2026

Index No. 21718/18|Appeal No. 6527|Case No. 2025-00167|

Before: Webber, J.P., Moulton, Mendez, Higgitt, Michael, JJ.

Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP, New York (Patrick J. Lawless of counsel), for appellant-respondent.

DeColator, Cohen & DiPrisco, LLP, Garden City (Carolyn M. Canzoneri of counsel), for respondent-appellant.

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Paul L. Alpert, J.), entered December 24, 2024, which denied defendant New York City Housing Authority's (NYCHA) motion to strike the additional claims in the verified supplemental bills of particulars dated September 16, 2020 and October 17, 2023, and denied plaintiff's motion to amend the notice of claim and complaint, unanimously modified, on the law, to grant NYCHA's motion, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff alleges that, on August 5, 2017, while working as an on-duty sergeant employed by nonparty NYPD, she was seriously injured from the inhalation of heavy smoke at a NYCHA-owned building when third-party defendant Lorenzo Simmons allegedly started a fire inside an apartment. Plaintiff timely filed a notice of claim primarily alleging that NYCHA was negligent in permitting an illegal generator in the subject apartment. After the statute of limitations expired, plaintiff served supplemental bills of particulars, alleging that NYCHA was negligent and violated certain provisions of the New York City Fire Code, the Fire Prevention Code, the Administrative Code, and the Penal Law by failing to provide a fire alarm or fire sprinkler system for the premises.

Supreme Court should not have denied NYCHA's motion to strike claims in the supplemental bills of particulars for failing to specify the relief demanded (
see
CPLR 2214[a]). Although NYCHA erroneously asserted in its notice of motion that it was seeking relief pursuant to CPLR 3211, the court should have disregarded this technical deficiency because the notice of motion and affirmation made clear that it sought to strike claims in the bills of particulars that were not alleged in the notice of claim (
see
CPLR 2001;
Ricciardi v State of New York
, 201 AD3d 577, 578 [1st Dept 2022],
lv denied
38 NY3d 914 [2022]). The court should have treated the motion as one made pursuant to CPLR 3043(b), as there was no prejudice to plaintiff, who was adequately apprised of the relief sought and the grounds therefor (
see Matter of Blauman-Spindler v Blauman
, 68 AD3d 1105, 1106 [2d Dept 2009]). Further, this appeal may be reviewed under the proper standard based on the record (
see

Blainey v Metro N. Commuter R.R.
, 99 AD3d 588, 590 n 2 [1st Dept 2012],
lv denied
21 NY3d 859 [2013]).

On the merits, NYCHA's motion to strike should be granted. The new allegations cannot be fairly implied from the boilerplate statements contained in the notice of claim, including the "failure to warn" allegations (
see Chan v City of New York
, 238 AD3d 446, 446 [1st Dept 2025];
Lewis v New York City Hous. Auth.
, 135 AD3d 444, 444-445 [1st Dept 2016]). Rather, the new allegations go beyond mere amplification and are new, distinct and independent theories of liability (
see Lopez v New York City Hous. Auth.
, 16 AD3d 164, 165 [1st Dept 2005]). Plaintiff may not rely on her testimony at her General Municipal Law § 50-h hearing to rectify any deficiencies in the notice of claim (
see

Scott v City of New York
, 40 AD3d 408, 410 [1st Dept 2007]).

Supreme Court providently denied plaintiff leave to amend the complaint. Since NYCHA's moving papers established that plaintiff's proposed amendments constituted new theories of liability, amendment is not permitted pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e(6) (
see Ebron v New York City Hous. Auth.
, 177 AD3d 530, 530 [1st Dept 2019]). The issue of whether NYCHA would be prejudiced by the amendment is irrelevant (
see Wilson v City of New York
, 195 AD3d 534, 534 [1st Dept 2021]). Although leave to amend a pleading under CPLR 3025(b) shall be freely given, a complaint may not allege causes of action not alleged in the notice of claim (
see Cruz v City of New York
, 135 AD3d 644, 644-645 [1st Dept 2016]). Plaintiff may not seek leave to file a late notice of claim because the applicable one-year-and-90-day limitation period has expired (
see
Public Housing Law § 157[2]; General Municipal Law §§ 50-e[1]; 50-i[1][c]).

We have considered the remaining arguments and find them unavailing.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: May 5, 2026