Matter of Anthone v. Carlo
Docket 246 CA 25-01177
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- Filed
- Jurisdiction
- New York
- Court
- Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
- Type
- Opinion
- Case type
- Civil
- Disposition
- Affirmed
- Citation
- 2026 NY Slip Op 02559
- Docket
- 246 CA 25-01177
Appeal from denial of petitioner's motion for summary judgment in a special proceeding under CPLR 5236 to enforce a judgment lien by directing sale of real property.
Summary
The Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court's denial of petitioner Karen Anthone's motion for summary judgment in a proceeding to enforce a judgment lien against real property owned by George Carlo and the Carlo Family Trust. The court held that the trust is a self-settled trust and therefore its assets are available to satisfy the settlor's creditors, so petitioner did not need to prove a fraudulent conveyance. However, the court found a triable issue whether the homestead exemption applies to the property sale, so summary judgment was improper and the matter remains for further fact-finding on that exemption issue.
Issues Decided
- Whether assets held in a trust created and revocable by the judgment debtor (a self-settled trust) are reachable by the debtor's creditors without proof of fraudulent conveyance.
- Whether summary judgment was appropriate to order sale of the subject real property to satisfy a judgment lien.
- Whether the homestead exemption applies to prevent sale of the subject real property to satisfy the judgment lien.
Court's Reasoning
The court relied on statutory and precedent authority that self-settled trusts created for the settlor's benefit are void as to the settlor's creditors, so creditors may reach the settlor's beneficial interest without proving fraud. The Trust here was funded by the settlor or his agents, gives the settlor control over distributions and revocation, and thus is effectively owned by him and available to satisfy the judgment. However, the respondent's affidavit raised a factual dispute over whether the homestead exemption protects the property, so summary judgment was inappropriate on that ground.
Authorities Cited
- EPTL 7-3.1(a)
- State of New York v Hawes169 AD2d 919 (3d Dept 1991)
- Vanderbilt Credit Corp. v Chase Manhattan Bank100 AD2d 544 (2d Dept 1984)
- State of New York v Coyle171 AD2d 288 (3d Dept 1991)
- CPLR 5206(a)
Parties
- Petitioner
- Karen Anthone, formerly known as Karen Carlo
- Respondent
- George Carlo
- Respondent
- Gerald T. Carlo
- Respondent
- Laurie Lynn Carlo, Trustee of the Carlo Family Trust
- Attorney
- David L. Roach (for petitioner)
- Attorney
- Brian D. Gwitt (for respondents)
- Judge
- Grace Marie Hanlon (Supreme Court, Chautauqua County)
- Judge
- Ann Dillon Flynn (Clerk entry)
Key Dates
- Decision date
- 2026-04-24
- Supreme Court order entered
- 2025-01-31
What You Should Do Next
- 1
Develop evidence on homestead exemption
Petitioner should gather and submit evidence rebutting the respondent's affidavit and demonstrating the absence of a valid homestead exemption, or be prepared for a trial on that issue.
- 2
Prepare for further proceedings in Supreme Court
Both parties should expect additional fact-finding or a hearing in Supreme Court to resolve the homestead exemption and related factual disputes.
- 3
Consult appellate counsel if appropriate
If either party believes legal error remains, they should consult appellate counsel about seeking further review or clarifying orders to guide the lower court's proceedings.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What did the court decide overall?
- The appellate court affirmed denial of summary judgment; it held the trust is reachable by the judgment creditor but found a factual dispute about the homestead exemption that prevents immediate sale.
- Does this mean the trust's assets can be taken to satisfy the judgment?
- Yes, the court confirmed that a self-settled trust created and controlled by the debtor is generally available to creditors, so the debtor's beneficial interest in the trust can be reached.
- Why was summary judgment denied then?
- Because the respondent produced an affidavit creating a genuine factual issue about whether the homestead exemption protects the property, which must be resolved before ordering a sale.
- Who is affected by this decision?
- The judgment creditor (petitioner) seeking to enforce the lien, the judgment debtor (respondent), the trustee, and any other parties with an ownership or exemption claim in the property are affected.
- Can the petitioner appeal this decision further?
- Yes, the petitioner could seek further appellate review, but this decision affirmed the denial of summary judgment; the next practical steps likely involve further proceedings below to resolve the homestead issue.
The above suggestions and answers are AI-generated for informational purposes only. They may contain errors. NoticeRegistry assumes no responsibility for their accuracy. Consult a qualified attorney before relying on them.
Full Filing Text
Matter of Anthone v Carlo - 2026 NY Slip Op 02559 Matter of Anthone v Carlo 2026 NY Slip Op 02559 April 24, 2026 Appellate Division, Fourth Department IN THE MATTER OF KAREN ANTHONE, FORMERLY KNOWN AS KAREN CARLO, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, v GEORGE CARLO, GERALD T. CARLO, AND LAURIE LYNN CARLO, TRUSTEE OF THE CARLO FAMILY TRUST, RESPONDENTS-RESPONDENTS. Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department Decided on April 24, 2026 246 CA 25-01177 Present: Whalen, P.J., Smith, Nowak, And Delconte, JJ. ROACH, LENNON & BROWN, PLLC, BUFFALO (DAVID L. ROACH OF COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER-APPELLANT. WOODS OVIATT GILMAN LLP, BUFFALO (BRIAN D. GWITT OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENTS-RESPONDENTS. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Chautauqua County (Grace Marie Hanlon, J.), entered January 31, 2025. The order denied petitioner's motion for summary judgment. It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: Petitioner commenced this special proceeding pursuant to CPLR 5236 seeking, inter alia, an order directing the sale of real property owned by respondent George Carlo (respondent) and the Carlo Family Trust (Trust), of which respondent is the grantor and lifetime beneficiary, in order to satisfy a judgment lien against respondent. Supreme Court denied petitioner's motion for summary judgment. We affirm. Initially, we agree with petitioner that the court erred in concluding that she had the burden to establish a fraudulent conveyance in order to seek enforcement of her judgment lien against any of the assets held by the Trust. "A disposition in trust for the use of the creator is void as against the existing or subsequent creditors of the creator" (EPTL 7-3.1 [a]). "The statutory language is abundantly clear and unequivocal that self-settled trusts are void as against creditors" ( State of New York v Hawes , 169 AD2d 919, 920 [3d Dept 1991]). Thus, the "settlor's creditors need not allege or prove [that a self-settled] trust is a fraudulent conveyance before they are permitted to reach the full amount of the beneficial interest retained by the settlor" ( Vanderbilt Credit Corp. v Chase Manhattan Bank , 100 AD2d 544, 546 [2d Dept 1984]; see State of New York v Coyle , 171 AD2d 288, 290 [3d Dept 1991], appeal dismissed 79 NY2d 805 [1991]). Here, the Trust was funded with assets transferred either by respondent or a "person or entity who is acting under the authority granted to that person or entity by [respondent]"; the purpose of the Trust is to, inter alia, "receive and manage assets for the benefit of [respondent]"; during respondent's lifetime, the Trustee "shall pay all of the income of th[e] Trust, and also such sums from principal as [respondent] may request . . . to or for the benefit of [respondent], or as [respondent] may designate"; and respondent may revoke the Trust at any time. We conclude that the "trust then is totally owned by [respondent]" ( Hawes , 169 AD2d at 921) and, therefore, "is available to satisfy [respondent's] obligation to [petitioner]" ( Coyle , 171 AD2d at 290). We further conclude, contrary to petitioner's contention, that although petitioner met her initial burden on the motion, respondent's affidavit in opposition raises a triable issue of fact whether the homestead exemption is applicable to the sale of the subject real property ( see generally CPLR 5206 [a]; Matter of Halpern v White , — AD3d —, —, 2026 NY Slip Op 01360, *2 [2d Dept 2026]). Entered: April 24, 2026 Ann Dillon Flynn