MIC Gen. Ins. Corp. v. Eckart
Docket Index No. 651028/22|Appeal No. 6541-6542|Case No. 2024-05767 2025-02802|
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- Filed
- Jurisdiction
- New York
- Court
- Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
- Type
- Opinion
- Case type
- Civil
- Disposition
- Affirmed
- Citation
- 2026 NY Slip Op 02785
- Docket numbers
- Index No651028/22Appeal No6541-6542Case No2024-05767 2025-02802
Appeal from two Supreme Court orders: (1) grant of a CPLR 5015(a)(1) motion vacating a January 9, 2024 order granting plaintiff summary judgment and, upon vacatur, denying plaintiff summary judgment; and (2) denial of plaintiff's motion for leave to renew and reargue the motion to vacate.
Summary
The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a trial court order vacating a prior summary-judgment ruling in favor of MIC General Insurance Corporation and, upon vacatur, denying the insurer summary judgment. The court held the trial judge correctly found a reasonable excuse for the default and that questions of fact exist about whether the insured property and relationships fit the policy terms “residence” and “household.” Because the policy terms are not defined and ambiguities are construed against the insurer, the court concluded summary judgment was improper and also affirmed denial of the insurer’s motion to renew.
Issues Decided
- Whether the trial court properly vacated its prior order under CPLR 5015(a)(1) based on a reasonable excuse and a potentially meritorious defense.
- Whether terms of the insurance policy—specifically “residence,” “reside,” and “household”—are unambiguous and, if ambiguous, whether they preclude summary judgment for the insurer.
- Whether the insurer should be granted leave to renew and reargue its motion for summary judgment in light of affidavits submitted after the original ruling.
Court's Reasoning
The court found the movant showed a reasonable excuse for the default and presented a potentially meritorious defense, satisfying CPLR 5015(a)(1) standards. The policy did not define key terms ("residence," "reside," "household"), creating factual disputes about whether the injured-party location and relationships fell within coverage; ambiguities in insurance contracts are construed against the insurer. The renewal motion was properly denied because the later affidavit did not resolve the policy ambiguities that made summary judgment inappropriate.
Authorities Cited
- CPLR 5015(a)(1)
- Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Allstate Ins. Co.98 NY2d 208 (2002)
- Westview Assoc. v Guaranty Natl. Ins. Co.95 NY2d 334 (2000)
- Dean v Tower Ins. Co. of N.Y.19 NY3d 704 (2012)
- Toos v Leggiadro Intl., Inc.114 AD3d 559 (1st Dept 2014)
- Alliance for Progress, Inc. v Blondell Realty Corp.179 AD3d 629 (1st Dept 2020)
- Wade v Giacobbe176 AD3d 641 (1st Dept 2019), lv dismissed 35 NY3d 937 (2020)
Parties
- Plaintiff
- MIC General Insurance Corporation
- Defendant
- Kathryn Eckart
- Defendant
- George Eckart
- Defendant
- Patricia Pacheco-Sanchez
- Attorney
- Michael J. Mernin (Hagelin Spencer LLC) for appellant
- Attorney
- Ross S. Friscia (Horn Appellate Group, P.C.) for respondent
- Judge
- Gerald Lebovits (Supreme Court, N.Y. County)
Key Dates
- Decision date
- 2026-05-05
- Order vacating prior judgment entered
- 2024-08-06
- Order denying leave to renew entered
- 2025-04-11
- Original summary judgment order
- 2024-01-09
What You Should Do Next
- 1
Prepare for fact development
The insurer and defendant should gather and preserve evidence about residency, occupancy, ownership, and visitation patterns at the property to address the disputed meanings of "residence" and "household."
- 2
Consider dispositive-motion strategy
Counsel may evaluate whether a targeted motion on narrower, well-supported factual or legal issues is appropriate after record development rather than another broad summary-judgment attempt now.
- 3
Assess appellate options
If the insurer believes there are appealable legal errors still available, consult appellate counsel promptly to determine whether to seek leave to appeal or other postjudgment relief.
- 4
Coordinate with personal-injury case counsel
Parties should coordinate scheduling and discovery with counsel in the underlying personal-injury action so coverage and liability issues can be resolved efficiently.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What did the court decide?
- The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision to vacate a prior summary-judgment ruling for the insurer and to deny the insurer summary judgment because there are factual disputes about whether the insurance policy covered the property and people involved.
- Who is affected by this decision?
- MIC General Insurance Corporation (the insurer) and defendant Kathryn Eckart are directly affected; the underlying personal-injury claimant is also affected because coverage is now unresolved and must be decided at trial or further proceedings.
- What happens next in the case?
- Because summary judgment was denied, the coverage questions remain for further litigation or trial where factual evidence will be developed to determine whether the policy covers the loss.
- Why did the court find for the defendant?
- Because the insurance policy did not clearly define key terms like "residence" and "household," reasonable factual disputes exist about coverage, and ambiguities are interpreted against the insurer.
- Can the insurer appeal again?
- The insurer could seek further appellate review only if there are preserved, appealable issues left; however, this decision affirms the trial court rulings, so further appeal would require a basis beyond what the court already decided.
The above suggestions and answers are AI-generated for informational purposes only. They may contain errors. NoticeRegistry assumes no responsibility for their accuracy. Consult a qualified attorney before relying on them.
Full Filing Text
MIC Gen. Ins. Corp. v Eckart - 2026 NY Slip Op 02785 MIC Gen. Ins. Corp. v Eckart 2026 NY Slip Op 02785 May 5, 2026 Appellate Division, First Department MIC General Insurance Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v Kathryn Eckart et al., Defendants-Respondents. Decided and Entered: May 05, 2026 Index No. 651028/22|Appeal No. 6541-6542|Case No. 2024-05767 2025-02802| Before: Manzanet-Daniels, J.P., Kapnick, Rodriguez, Pitt-Burke, O'neill Levy, JJ. Hagelin Spencer LLC, Buffalo (Michael J. Mernin of counsel), for appellant. Horn Appellate Group, P.C., Brooklyn (Ross S. Friscia of counsel), for Patricia Pacheco-Sanchez, respondent. Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Gerald Lebovits, J.), entered August 6, 2024, which granted defendant Kathryn Eckart's motion pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate the court's January 9, 2024 order granting plaintiff summary judgment and, upon vacatur, denied summary judgment to plaintiff, unanimously affirmed, with costs. Order, same court and Justice, entered April 11, 2025, which denied plaintiff's motion for leave to renew and reargue the motion to vacate, unanimously affirmed, with costs. The court providently exercised its discretion in granting defendant Kathryn Eckart's motion to vacate ( see CPLR 5015[a][1]; Toos v Leggiadro Intl., Inc. , 114 AD3d 559, 561 [1st Dept 2014]). Kathryn Eckart made the requisite showing of a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense to the action ( see Alliance for Progress, Inc. v Blondell Realty Corp. , 179 AD3d 629, 629 [1st Dept 2020]). Although the underlying order was based on the merits in addition to the movant's default, Kathryn Eckart moved both for reargument pursuant to CPLR 2221(d) and for vacatur pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1). The court, while electing to analyze the motion under the latter statute, also expressly stated that it "reconsider[ed] whether the terms 'residence premises' and 'household' are ambiguous," which it had the "inherent power" to do ( Rostant v Twersky , 79 AD3d 456, 456 [1st Dept 2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]). As to the merits, issues of fact exist concerning the meaning of various terms of the subject policy, including whether the property was Kathryn Eckart's "residence" as the term is used in the policy, and whether Kathryn and her husband George Eckart were part of the same "household." The terms of insurance policies are interpreted in a manner that "affords a fair meaning to all of the language employed by the parties in the contract and leaves no provision without force and effect"( Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 98 NY2d 208, 221-222 [2002] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and ambiguities in the policy must be construed against the insurer ( see Westview Assoc. v Guaranty Natl. Ins. Co. , 95 NY2d 334, 340 [2000]). Here, the policy contemplates coverage for the Tanners Neck Lane property, where the underlying incident took place, and lists only Kathryn Eckart as the Named Insured. While the policy extends coverage to Kathryn Eckart and her spouse (George Eckart) if they are a resident of the same "household," the policy does not define the term "household." The policy likewise does not sufficiently define "reside" or "residence" such that it can be determined, on this record, that Kathrn Eckart, who lived elsewhere but owned the property and visited periodically, was not a "resident" for purposes of coverage ( see e.g. Dean v Tower Ins. Co. of N.Y. , 19 NY3d 704, 709 [2012]). The court providently exercised its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for leave to renew and reargue its motion for summary judgment ( see Wade v Giacobbe , 176 AD3d 641, 641 [1st Dept 2019], lv dismissed 35 NY3d 937 [2020]). The affidavit of Kathryn Eckart submitted in the underlying personal injury action did not change the outcome insofar as that affidavit did not resolve the policy's noted ambiguities. THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT. ENTERED: May 5, 2026