Penn v. Rochester Rev Holdings, LLC
Docket 196 CA 25-00721
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- Filed
- Jurisdiction
- New York
- Court
- Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
- Type
- Opinion
- Case type
- Civil
- Disposition
- Reversed
- Citation
- 2026 NY Slip Op 02540
- Docket
- 196 CA 25-00721
Appeal from an order granting defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and on its counterclaims in an action pursuant to RPAPL articles 6 and 15.
Summary
The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a Supreme Court order that had granted defendant Rochester Rev Holdings summary judgment in a dispute over ownership of real property under New York Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) articles 6 and 15. The court held that defendant failed to meet its initial burden for summary judgment because its own submissions (including a lease with a purchase option and an affidavit indicating knowledge that plaintiff was a tenant) created triable issues of fact about plaintiff's title claims and defendant's counterclaims. The case was sent back with the complaint reinstated for further proceedings.
Issues Decided
- Whether defendant met its prima facie burden on summary judgment in a quiet-title action under RPAPL article 15 by showing it holds title or that plaintiff's title claim is without merit.
- Whether defendant's knowledge of plaintiff's possession (as a tenant with a purported purchase option) constitutes constructive notice that affects defendant's title claim.
- Whether defendant's own submissions raised triable issues of fact precluding summary judgment.
Court's Reasoning
To obtain summary judgment in a quiet-title action, the movant must make a prima facie showing that it holds title or that the opposing title claim lacks merit. Defendant submitted a lease with a purported purchase option and an affirmation indicating it knew plaintiff was a tenant before recording the warranty deed, which can provide constructive notice of plaintiff's asserted rights. Those submissions created triable issues of fact about the competing ownership claims, so summary judgment was improper and must be denied.
Authorities Cited
- Corriette v Mele244 AD3d 679 (2d Dept 2025)
- Raines v Moran57 NYS2d 800 (Sup Ct, Ontario County 1945), affd 270 App Div 979 (4th Dept 1946)
- Alvarez v Prospect Hosp.68 NY2d 320 (1986)
- Ulrich v Estate of Zdunkiewicz8 AD3d 1014 (4th Dept 2004)
Parties
- Plaintiff
- James Penn
- Plaintiff-Appellant
- James Penn
- Defendant
- Rochester Rev Holdings, LLC
- Defendant-Respondent
- Rochester Rev Holdings, LLC
- Judge
- Vincent M. Dinolfo
- Judge
- Curran, J.P.
- Judge
- Montour
- Judge
- Smith
- Judge
- Ogden
- Judge
- Delconte
Key Dates
- Appellate decision date
- 2026-04-24
- Supreme Court order date
- 2025-04-17
What You Should Do Next
- 1
Prepare for further proceedings in Supreme Court
Both parties should review outstanding factual issues, complete discovery on possession and title-related documents, and prepare for motion practice or trial on the reinstated complaint and counterclaims.
- 2
Evaluate evidence of possession and notice
Plaintiff should assemble leases, notices, and other proof of possession and any purchase-option communications; defendant should be ready to explain what it knew before recording the deed.
- 3
Consult appellate counsel about further review
A party unhappy with this outcome should consult counsel regarding the feasibility and timeline for seeking leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What did the appellate court decide?
- The appellate court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant and reinstated the plaintiff's complaint, finding factual disputes that require further proceedings.
- Who is affected by this decision?
- The immediate parties, plaintiff James Penn and defendant Rochester Rev Holdings, are affected because the quiet-title claim will proceed; any subsequent purchaser or tenant asserting similar rights may be guided by the court's discussion of constructive notice.
- Why was summary judgment denied?
- Because defendant's own evidence — a lease with a purchase option and an affirmation showing knowledge that plaintiff was a tenant — created triable issues of fact about ownership and constructive notice, so defendant did not make the required prima facie showing.
- What happens next in the case?
- The complaint is reinstated and the case returns to the trial court for further proceedings, such as discovery and possibly a trial to resolve the disputed facts.
- Can this decision be appealed?
- Yes; the losing party at the Appellate Division could seek leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, subject to the Court's rules and acceptance.
The above suggestions and answers are AI-generated for informational purposes only. They may contain errors. NoticeRegistry assumes no responsibility for their accuracy. Consult a qualified attorney before relying on them.
Full Filing Text
Penn v Rochester Rev Holdings, LLC - 2026 NY Slip Op 02540 Penn v Rochester Rev Holdings, LLC 2026 NY Slip Op 02540 April 24, 2026 Appellate Division, Fourth Department JAMES PENN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v ROCHESTER REV HOLDINGS, LLC, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department Decided on April 24, 2026 196 CA 25-00721 Present: Curran, J.P., Montour, Smith, Ogden, And Delconte, JJ. WOODS OVIATT GILMAN LLP, ROCHESTER (ROBERT D. HOOKS OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT. UNDERBERG & KESSLER LLP, ROCHESTER (DAVID M. TANG OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Vincent M. Dinolfo, J.), entered April 17, 2025, in an action pursuant to RPAPL articles 6 and 15. The order granted the motion of defendant for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and on its counterclaims. It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs, the motion is denied, and the complaint is reinstated. Memorandum: In this action involving the parties' competing claims to ownership of real property pursuant to RPAPL article 15, plaintiff appeals from an order that granted defendant's motion seeking, inter alia, summary judgment dismissing the complaint and on its counterclaims. We reverse. "To obtain summary judgment in an action to quiet title pursuant to RPAPL article 15, the movant must establish, prima facie, that it holds title, or that the nonmovant's title claim is without merit" ( Corriette v Mele , 244 AD3d 679, 682 [2d Dept 2025] [internal quotation marks omitted]). "[A] purchaser is charged with knowledge of the exact rights claimed by all persons in possession" ( Raines v Moran , 57 NYS2d 800, 807 [Sup Ct, Ontario County 1945], affd 270 App Div 979 [4th Dept 1946]; see Phelan v Brady , 119 NY 587, 591 [1890]). Indeed, a purchaser is charged with "constructive notice of all the interests , rights and equities which [a tenant] may have in the property in question by reason of the fact that [such tenant] was in actual possession of the property at the time that conveyances thereof were accepted by [the purchaser]" ( Raines , 57 NYS2d at 807 [emphasis added]; see Ward v Ward , 52 AD3d 919, 920 [3d Dept 2008]). Here, defendant, which asserts that it acquired title to the property in question pursuant to a warranty deed, failed to meet its initial burden on its motion. Defendant submitted, inter alia, a lease agreement between plaintiff and a prior owner of the property—which contains a purported purchase option—as well as the affirmation of defendant's managing member, in which he made averments indicating that he knew plaintiff was a tenant prior to recording the warranty deed. Because defendant's own submissions raise triable issues of fact regarding each of plaintiff's causes of action and each of defendant's counterclaims, we conclude that Supreme Court erred in granting defendant's motion ( see generally Ulrich v Estate of Zdunkiewicz , 8 AD3d 1014, 1015 [4th Dept 2004]). "Failure to make such prima facie showing requires a denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers" ( Alvarez v Prospect Hosp. , 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). Entered: April 24, 2026 Ann Dillon Flynn