Travers v. Briarcliff Manor Invs., LLC
Docket 2022-02942
Court of record · Indexed in NoticeRegistry archive · AI-enriched for research
- Filed
- Jurisdiction
- New York
- Court
- Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
- Type
- Opinion
- Case type
- Civil
- Disposition
- Reversed
- Citation
- 2026 NY Slip Op 02689
- Docket
- 2022-02942
Appeal from an order granting summary judgment dismissing third-party causes of action for contractual indemnification in a personal injury action
Summary
The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment that had dismissed third-party claims for contractual indemnification asserted by the project owner and general contractor against Gabriel Steel Erectors. The underlying lawsuit arises from a 2018 workplace fall of an ironworker employed by Gabriel. The court found that the indemnity clause obligating Gabriel to indemnify for losses “to the fullest extent permitted by law” could permit partial indemnification and that triable issues exist about whether Gabriel had primary responsibility for the worker's safety. Thus the indemnification claims cannot be decided as a matter of law.
Issues Decided
- Whether the third-party defendant's contractual indemnity clause can obligate it to indemnify the owner and general contractor for claims arising from the injured worker's fall
- Whether triable issues of fact exist as to whether the third-party defendant assumed primary responsibility for worker safety
- Whether General Obligations Law § 5-322.1 bars enforcement of an indemnity clause that purports to indemnify for the indemnitee's own negligence
Court's Reasoning
The court looked to the specific contract language and surrounding facts, holding that indemnity must be clearly shown by the agreement. The clause requiring indemnification “to the fullest extent permitted by law” does not violate General Obligations Law § 5-322.1 because it permits only partial indemnification for the indemnitor's share of fault. Factual disputes about who had primary responsibility for safety (worker testimony that instructions came only from Gabriel and Gabriel's foreman's safety checks) preclude dismissal on summary judgment.
Authorities Cited
- George v Marshalls of MA, Inc.61 AD3d 925
- Hooper Assoc. v AGS Computers74 NY2d 487
- Brooks v Judlau Contr., Inc.11 NY3d 204
Parties
- Plaintiff
- Wayne Travers
- Plaintiff
- Spouse of Wayne Travers
- Defendant
- Briarcliff Manor Investments, LLC
- Defendant
- Andron Construction Corp.
- Third-party Plaintiff
- Andron Construction Corp.
- Third-party Plaintiff
- SHI-III Briarcliff REIT, LLC
- Third-party Defendant
- Gabriel Steel Erectors, Inc.
- Judge
- Francesca E. Connolly, J.P.
Key Dates
- Decision date
- 2026-04-29
- Trial court order dated
- 2022-03-16
- Index filing year
- 2018-01-01
What You Should Do Next
- 1
Prepare for further proceedings on indemnification
Parties should gather and preserve evidence about who controlled site safety and who gave work instructions, since factual disputes preclude summary judgment.
- 2
Consider targeted discovery
Request documents and depositions focused on safety policies, supervision, and the contract chain to establish the extent of Gabriel's responsibility.
- 3
Evaluate appellate options (if applicable)
If any party wishes to pursue further review, consult counsel about seeking leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals and calendar the applicable deadlines.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What did the court decide?
- The appellate court reversed the trial court and held that the indemnification claims against Gabriel cannot be dismissed on summary judgment because the contract language and facts raise disputed issues.
- Who is affected by this decision?
- The owner (SHI-III Briarcliff REIT), the general contractor (Andron), Gabriel Steel Erectors, and the injured worker's lawsuit are affected because the indemnity claims remain in the case.
- What happens next in the case?
- The third-party indemnification claims return to the trial court for further proceedings; disputed facts about safety responsibility must be resolved, possibly at trial.
- Does the law allow indemnification for another party's negligence?
- Yes, but New York law bars clauses that fully indemnify a party for its own negligence. A clause promising indemnification “to the fullest extent permitted by law” can allow partial indemnification for the indemnitor's share of fault.
- Can this decision be appealed further?
- Yes, the party unhappy with the Appellate Division's reversal could seek leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, subject to applicable rules and deadlines.
The above suggestions and answers are AI-generated for informational purposes only. They may contain errors. NoticeRegistry assumes no responsibility for their accuracy. Consult a qualified attorney before relying on them.
Full Filing Text
Travers v Briarcliff Manor Invs., LLC - 2026 NY Slip Op 02689 Travers v Briarcliff Manor Invs., LLC 2026 NY Slip Op 02689 April 29, 2026 Appellate Division, Second Department Wayne Travers, et al., plaintiffs, v Briarcliff Manor Investments, LLC, defendant, Andron Construction Corp., et al., defendants third-party plaintiffs-appellants; Gabriel Steel Erectors, Inc., third-party defendant-respondent. Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department Decided on April 29, 2026 2022-02942, (Index No. 59486/18) Francesca E. Connolly, J.P. Cheryl E. Chambers Helen Voutsinas Elena Goldberg Velazquez, JJ. Katz & Rychik, P.C., New York, NY (Abe M. Rychik and Adam Kraman of counsel), for defendants third-party plaintiffs-appellants. Hodgson Russ LLP, Albany, NY (Scott C. Paton of counsel), for third-party defendant-respondent. DECISION & ORDER In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants third-party plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Lawrence H. Ecker, J.), dated March 16, 2022. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted those branches of the third-party defendant's motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the third-party causes of action for contractual indemnification. ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and those branches of the third-party defendant's motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the third-party causes of action for contractual indemnification are denied. The defendant third-party plaintiff SHI-III Briarcliff REIT, LLC, the owner of certain property located in Briarcliff Manor (hereinafter the owner), hired the defendant third-party plaintiff Andron Construction Corp. (hereinafter the general contractor) to act as the general contractor for a construction project. The general contractor, in turn, contracted with Orange County Ironworks, LLC (hereinafter OCI), to provide and install steel for the project as a subcontractor. OCI thereafter engaged the third-party defendant, Gabriel Steel Erectors, Inc. (hereinafter Gabriel), as a sub-subcontractor to install steel for the project. The contract between OCI and Gabriel required Gabriel, "[t]o the fullest extent permitted by law," to indemnify and hold harmless, among others, the owner and the general contractor, from and against claims, damages, losses, and expenses arising out of or resulting from Gabriel's negligent acts or omissions in the performance of its work under the contract. In 2018, the plaintiff Wayne Travers (hereinafter the injured plaintiff), an ironworker employed by Gabriel, allegedly was injured when he fell from an extension ladder while working on the project. Thereafter, the injured plaintiff, and his spouse suing derivatively, commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries alleging, inter alia, violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241(6), against the owner and the general contractor, among others. The owner and the general contractor commenced a third-party action against Gabriel asserting, among other things, causes of action for contractual indemnification. Subsequently, Gabriel moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the third-party causes of action for contractual indemnification. In an order dated March 16, 2022, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted those branches of Gabriel's motion. The owner and the general contractor appeal. The right to contractual indemnification depends upon the specific language of the contract ( see George v Marshalls of MA, Inc. , 61 AD3d 925, 930). The promise to indemnify should not be found unless it can be clearly implied from the language and purpose of the entire agreement and the surrounding circumstances ( see Hooper Assoc. v AGS Computers , 74 NY2d 487, 491-492). Here, the contract provided, inter alia, that Gabriel was obligated to indemnify and hold harmless, among others, the owner and the general contractor, from and against claims, damages, losses, and expenses arising out of or resulting from Gabriel's negligent acts or omissions in the performance of its work under the contract. Although the general contractor played a general supervisory role over the work of its subcontractors, triable issues of fact exist as to whether Gabriel "assumed primary responsibility for the safety of its workers," given the plaintiff's deposition testimony that he received instructions solely from Gabriel and never from anyone else on the project and the deposition testimony of Gabriel's foreman that he completed a weekly job site safety and hazard analysis every week while he was on the project ( Masciotta v Morse Diesel Intl. , 303 AD2d 309, 313). Furthermore, contrary to Gabriel's contention, General Obligations Law § 5-322.1 does not prohibit the owner and the general contractor from seeking partial indemnification from Gabriel even if the incident was caused, in part, by the negligence of the owner and the general contractor. Under General Obligations Law § 5-322.1(1), an agreement purporting to indemnify a party for damages arising out of the party's own negligence "is against public policy and is void and unenforceable" ( see Brooks v Judlau Contr., Inc. , 11 NY3d 204, 207; Feliz v Citnalta Constr. Corp. , 217 AD3d 750, 752). Nonetheless, contractual provisions providing for indemnification "to the fullest extent permitted by law" do not violate General Obligations Law § 5-322.1, as they allow for partial indemnification as to the portion of damages not caused by the indemnitee's own negligence ( see Brooks v Judlau Contr., Inc. , 11 NY3d at 210-211; Feliz v Citnalta Constr. Corp. , 217 AD3d at 752). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should not have granted those branches of Gabriel's motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the third-party causes of action for contractual indemnification. Gabriel's remaining contention is without merit. CONNOLLY, J.P., CHAMBERS, VOUTSINAS and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur. ENTER: Darrell M. Joseph