Verbridge v. Deol
Docket 229 CA 25-00007
Court of record · Indexed in NoticeRegistry archive · AI-enriched for research
- Filed
- Jurisdiction
- New York
- Court
- Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
- Type
- Opinion
- Case type
- Civil
- Disposition
- Affirmed
- Citation
- 2026 NY Slip Op 02551
- Docket
- 229 CA 25-00007
Appeal from an order granting summary judgment in a dental malpractice action and dismissing the complaint against certain defendants.
Summary
The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed Supreme Court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s dental malpractice complaint against the Deol defendants. Plaintiff sued for injuries from root canals performed by an endodontist, Dr. Taggar, who practiced at premises operated by the Deol defendants. The court concluded Taggar was an independent contractor, not an employee, and the Deol defendants neither controlled his professional work nor actually supervised him, so they are not vicariously or directly liable. Plaintiff’s opposition lacked admissible evidence to create a triable issue of fact.
Issues Decided
- Whether the Deol defendants were vicariously liable for the alleged malpractice of Dr. Taggar or whether he was an independent contractor.
- Whether the Deol defendants could be directly liable for negligent supervision absent actual exercise of supervisory control.
- Whether plaintiff presented admissible evidence creating a triable issue of fact to defeat summary judgment.
Court's Reasoning
The court applied the rule that a party who retains an independent contractor is not vicariously liable for the contractor's negligence when the principal lacks control over the manner and means of the work. The Deol defendants produced an independent-contractor agreement allocating control and compensation to Taggar and deposition testimony showing Taggar alone handled his patients and work without Deol review. Plaintiff offered only her attorney's affirmation without personal-knowledge evidence, which cannot defeat summary judgment, so no factual issue remained to bar dismissal.
Authorities Cited
- Kleeman v Rheingold81 NY2d 270 (1993)
- Dziedzic v Wirth162 AD3d 1749 (4th Dept 2018)
- Zuckerman v City of New York49 NY2d 557 (1980)
Parties
- Plaintiff
- Sandra Verbridge
- Defendant
- Harpreet Deol, D.D.S., L.L.C., doing business as Progressive Endodontics of Pittsford/Canandaigua/Geneseo
- Defendant
- Harpreet Deol, D.D.S., MMSc.
- Defendant
- Tanjit S. Taggar, D.M.D., M.S.
- Attorney
- Jarrod W. Smith (for plaintiff-appellant)
- Attorney
- Brian D. Ginsberg (for defendants-respondents)
- Judge
- James A. Vazzana (Supreme Court, Monroe County)
- Judge
- Lindley, J.P. (Appellate Division)
Key Dates
- Decision date
- 2026-04-24
- Order date (trial court)
- 2024-11-14
What You Should Do Next
- 1
Consider seeking leave to appeal to Court of Appeals
If the appellant believes the case raises a substantial question of law, consult counsel about applying for permission to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals and prepare the necessary papers within the deadline.
- 2
Review remaining claims and defendants
If plaintiff has claims against other defendants, coordinate with counsel to proceed with those claims and adjust strategy in light of the summary judgment ruling.
- 3
Preserve and develop admissible evidence
If pursuing further review, gather admissible factual evidence (witness testimony with personal knowledge, documents) that could create a triable issue on control or supervision.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What did the court decide?
- The appellate court affirmed dismissal of the malpractice claim against the Deol defendants because the endodontist was an independent contractor and they did not actually control or supervise his professional work.
- Who is affected by this decision?
- Plaintiff (Verbridge) is affected because her claim against the Deol defendants was dismissed; the decision leaves intact any claims that remain against other defendants, if any.
- Why didn't the court hold the Deol defendants liable?
- Because the written contract and testimony showed the endodontist controlled his own practice, compensated himself, and the Deol defendants did not review or direct his patient care; plaintiff offered no admissible evidence to contradict that.
- Can this decision be appealed further?
- Potentially yes, to the New York Court of Appeals, but an appeal there would require permission (leave to appeal) under the applicable rules and standards.
The above suggestions and answers are AI-generated for informational purposes only. They may contain errors. NoticeRegistry assumes no responsibility for their accuracy. Consult a qualified attorney before relying on them.
Full Filing Text
Verbridge v Deol - 2026 NY Slip Op 02551 Verbridge v Deol 2026 NY Slip Op 02551 April 24, 2026 Appellate Division, Fourth Department SANDRA VERBRIDGE, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v HARPREET DEOL, D.D.S., L.L.C., DOING BUSINESS AS PROGRESSIVE ENDODONTICS OF PITTSFORD/CANANDAIGUA/GENESEO, HARPREET DEOL, D.D.S., MMSC., INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS A DENTIST, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS, ET AL., DEFENDANT. Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department Decided on April 24, 2026 229 CA 25-00007 Present: Lindley, J.P., Curran, Ogden, Delconte, And Hannah, JJ. SMITH PARRY, P.L.L.C., JORDAN (JARROD W. SMITH OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT. HARRIS BEACH MURTHA CULLINA PLLC, PITTSFORD (BRIAN D. GINSBERG OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (James A. Vazzana, J.), entered November 14, 2024, in a dental malpractice action. The order granted the motion of defendants Harpreet Deol, D.D.S., L.L.C., doing business as Progressive Endodontics of Pittsford/Canandaigua/Geneseo, and Harpreet Deol, D.D.S., MMSc., for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint against said defendants. It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this dental malpractice action seeking damages for injuries sustained as a result of root canals and related treatment performed by defendant Tanjit S. Taggar, D.M.D., M.S., an endodontist practicing at a dental office in Canandaigua operated by defendant Harpreet Deol, D.D.S., L.L.C., doing business as Progressive Endodontics of Pittsford/Canandaigua/Geneseo, a professional limited liability company owned by defendant Harpreet Deol, D.D.S., MMSc. (collectively, Deol defendants). Following discovery, the Deol defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against them on the ground that Taggar was an independent contractor and, thus, they are not liable for his malpractice. Supreme Court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint against the Deol defendants. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm. "Generally, a party who retains an independent contractor, as distinguished from a mere employee or servant, is not [vicariously] liable for the independent contractor's negligent acts" ( Dziedzic v Wirth , 162 AD3d 1749, 1749 [4th Dept 2018] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Van Hook v Doak , 227 AD3d 1537, 1538-1539 [4th Dept 2024]; Chan v Toothsavers Dental Care , Inc. , 125 AD3d 712, 713 [2d Dept 2015]; see also Tereshchenko v Lynn , 36 AD3d 684, 686 [2d Dept 2007]). The rationale underlying the rule is that "one who employs an independent contractor has no right to control the manner in which the work is to be done and, thus, the risk of loss is more sensibly placed on the contractor" ( Kleeman v Rheingold , 81 NY2d 270, 274 [1993]; see Begley v City of New York , 111 AD3d 5, 28 [2d Dept 2013], lv denied 23 NY3d 903 [2014]). In keeping with that rationale, "[c]ontrol of the method and means by which the work is to be done . . . is the critical factor in determining whether one is an independent contractor or an employee for the purposes of [vicarious] tort liability" ( Gfeller v Russo , 45 AD3d 1301, 1302 [4th Dept 2007]; see Begley , 111 AD3d at 28). Additionally, while a principal who retains an independent contractor may be held directly liable for, inter alia, the principal's own negligence in "supervising the contractor" ( Kleeman , 81 NY2d at 274), such a claim requires that the principal actually exercised supervision over the contractor inasmuch as "the mere retention of general supervisory powers over an independent contractor cannot form a basis for the imposition of [direct] liability against the principal" ( Wendt v Bent Pyramid Prods. , LLC , 108 AD3d 1032, 1033 [4th Dept 2013] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Chainani v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y. , 87 NY2d 370, 380-381 [1995], rearg denied 87 NY2d 862 [1995]). Here, in support of their motion, the Deol defendants submitted an Independent Contractor Associate Agreement executed by Harpreet Deol, D.D.S., L.L.C., and Taggar providing, inter alia, that Taggar was "an independent contractor . . . responsible for scheduling and maintaining office hours to treat [his] patients, as [he] deem[s] appropriate," and that the Deol defendants "shall not exercise any control or direction over the professional aspects of [his] providing services, which shall be [his] sole responsibility." The agreement further provided that Taggar would retain 50% of his gross collections and was "solely responsible for payments of all federal income and self-employment taxes." The Deol defendants also submitted transcripts from the depositions of Taggar and Deol, who testified that Taggar was the only individual working in the Canandaigua dental office, that he did not discuss his patients with the Deol defendants, and that the Deol defendants did not review his work. Contrary to plaintiff's contentions, the Deol defendants thus met the initial burden on their motion with respect to both vicarious and direct liability ( see Wendt , 108 AD3d at 1033; Carlineo v Akins , 71 AD3d 1535, 1535-1536 [4th Dept 2010]; Gfeller , 45 AD3d at 1302-1303). In opposition, plaintiff submitted only the affirmation of her attorney, who had no personal knowledge of the facts, and thus failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition ( see Zuckerman v City of New York , 49 NY2d 557, 563 [1980]; Contacare , Inc. v CIBA-Geigy Corp. , 49 AD3d 1215, 1216 [4th Dept 2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 714 [2008]; cf. Santiago v Spinuzza , 48 AD3d 1257, 1258 [4th Dept 2008]). Entered: April 24, 2026 Ann Dillon Flynn