People v. Machado-Garcia
Docket 182 KA 23-00328
Court of record · Indexed in NoticeRegistry archive · AI-enriched for research
- Filed
- Jurisdiction
- New York
- Court
- Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
- Type
- Opinion
- Case type
- Criminal Appeal
- Disposition
- Affirmed
- Citation
- 2026 NY Slip Op 02532
- Docket
- 182 KA 23-00328
Appeal from a judgment convicting defendant after a jury trial in Monroe County Supreme Court
Summary
The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed defendant Carlos Machado-Garcia’s convictions following a jury trial for multiple theft-related offenses, including two counts each of third-degree criminal possession of stolen property and third-degree burglary, plus attempted grand larceny and fourth-degree grand larceny. The court held the verdicts were supported by evidence (including exclusive possession of a stolen vehicle and conflicting statements to police), denied a severance request because the separate incidents were similar and properly joined, rejected ineffective assistance claims as strategy disagreements or unpreserved, and found the sentence not unduly harsh.
Issues Decided
- Whether the guilty verdicts for criminal possession of stolen property and related theft offenses were against the weight of the evidence
- Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant's motion to sever counts arising from separate incidents
- Whether defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel
- Whether the sentence imposed was unduly harsh or severe
Court's Reasoning
The court concluded the evidence permitted the jury to infer knowledge that the vehicle was stolen based on the defendant being the sole occupant of the car late at night, conflicting statements about ownership, and inability to identify the owner. Counts from four separate but similar incidents were properly joined because the offenses were alike and the jury could segregate evidence for each incident. Allegations of ineffective assistance were either unpreserved with respect to sentencing on a separate indictment or amounted to disagreements with trial strategy and thus did not meet the standard for relief. The sentence did not amount to excessiveness.
Authorities Cited
- People v Danielson9 NY3d 342 (2007)
- People v Cintron95 NY2d 329 (2000)
- CPL 200.20
Parties
- Appellant
- Carlos Machado-Garcia
- Respondent
- The People of the State of New York
- Judge
- Victoria M. Argento
- Judge
- Ann Dillon Flynn
Key Dates
- Decision date
- 2026-04-24
- Judgment rendered
- 2022-12-22
What You Should Do Next
- 1
Consider seeking leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals
If defendant wishes to continue appellate review, counsel should evaluate timeliness and grounds for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals and prepare an application if appropriate.
- 2
Evaluate post-conviction remedies
Defense should review whether any unpreserved claims or new evidence could support a collateral attack or motion to vacate the conviction.
- 3
Review sentencing issues on related indictment
Because some sentencing concerns related to a separate indictment, counsel should assess preservation and potential challenges specific to that judgment.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What did the court decide?
- The appellate court affirmed the convictions and sentence, finding the evidence supported the jury's verdicts and that trial procedures and counsel performance did not warrant reversal.
- Who is affected by this decision?
- Defendant Carlos Machado-Garcia is affected because his convictions and sentence were upheld; the People’s convictions remain in place.
- What happens next for the defendant?
- Because the Appellate Division affirmed, the defendant may consider seeking leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, if eligible, or pursue post-conviction relief where applicable.
- Why didn't the court sever the charges from separate incidents?
- The court found the offenses were similar and properly joined, and the evidence for each incident was presented so the jury could consider them separately.
The above suggestions and answers are AI-generated for informational purposes only. They may contain errors. NoticeRegistry assumes no responsibility for their accuracy. Consult a qualified attorney before relying on them.
Full Filing Text
People v Machado-Garcia - 2026 NY Slip Op 02532 People v Machado-Garcia 2026 NY Slip Op 02532 April 24, 2026 Appellate Division, Fourth Department THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, v CARLOS MACHADO-GARCIA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department Decided on April 24, 2026 182 KA 23-00328 Present: Curran, J.P., Montour, Smith, Ogden, And Delconte, JJ. SARAH S. HOLT, CONFLICT DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (FABIENNE N. SANTACROCE OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. BRIAN P. GREEN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (RYAN ASHE OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Victoria M. Argento, J.), rendered December 22, 2022. The judgment convicted defendant upon a jury verdict of criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree (two counts), burglary in the third degree (two counts), attempted grand larceny in the third degree and grand larceny in the fourth degree. It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him after a jury trial of two counts of criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree (Penal Law § 165.50), two counts of burglary in the third degree (§ 140.20), one count of attempted grand larceny in the third degree (§§ 110.00, 155.35 [2]), and one count of grand larceny in the fourth degree (§ 155.30 [1]). Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime of criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree as charged to the jury ( see People v Danielson , 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), we reject defendant's contention that the verdict with respect to that crime as charged in the first count of the indictment is against the weight of the evidence ( see generally People v Bleakley , 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). "Knowledge that property is stolen can be established through circumstantial evidence such as by evidence of recent exclusive possession, defendant's conduct[,] or contradictory statements from which guilt may be inferred" ( People v Cintron , 95 NY2d 329, 332 [2000] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Waterford , 124 AD3d 1246, 1246-1247 [4th Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 972 [2015]; see also People v Brown , 174 AD3d 1329, 1332 [4th Dept 2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 979 [2019]). Here, the record establishes, inter alia, that defendant was found to be the sole occupant of the subject stolen vehicle parked in front of a business after midnight. When confronted by police, defendant provided conflicting statements as to the vehicle's purported owner and was unable to provide contact information for that person. In light of the testimony at trial, we conclude that the jury was entitled to infer that defendant knowingly possessed a stolen vehicle ( see generally People v Ohse , 114 AD3d 1285, 1286 [4th Dept 2014], lv denied 23 NY3d 1041 [2014]). Contrary to defendant's further contention, Supreme Court properly denied his motion to sever the counts of the indictment based on the separate incidents to which they pertained because he failed to show " 'good cause for severance' " ( People v Rios , 107 AD3d 1379, 1380 [4th Dept 2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1158 [2014]; see CPL 200.20 [3]). The indictment charged defendant with counts arising from four separate theft-related incidents where defendant was alleged to be using a different stolen vehicle on each occasion. The offenses were each " 'the same or similar' and thus were properly joinable [pursuant to CPL 200.20 (2) (c)]" ( People v Cabrera , 188 AD2d 1062, 1063 [4th Dept 1992]; see People v Brown , 172 AD3d 437, 437-438 [1st Dept 2019], lv denied 33 NY3d 1067 [2019]; People v Smart [appeal No. 2], 224 AD2d 999, 999-1000 [4th Dept 1996], lv denied 88 NY2d 854 [1996]). The evidence concerning each incident "was presented separately and was readily capable of being segregated in the minds of the jury," and defendant failed to establish that there was "a substantial likelihood that the jury would be unable to [separately consider the evidence]" ( Rios , 107 AD3d at 1380). Indeed, "the fact that defendant was acquitted of [certain] charges 'indicates that the jury was able to consider the proof concerning each count separately' " ( id. ; see People v Smith , 147 AD3d 1527, 1528 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1087 [2017]; People v Barber-Montemayor , 138 AD3d 1455, 1457 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 926 [2016]). As defendant correctly concedes, he failed to preserve his alternative contention that the court provided the jury with an insufficient limiting instruction regarding the jury's duty to consider each of the counts of the indictment separately ( see generally People v Hymes , 174 AD3d 1295, 1299 [4th Dept 2019], affd 34 NY3d 1178 [2020]). We likewise reject defendant's contention that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Initially, defendant's contention that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing is not properly before us on this appeal. Defendant was sentenced on two indictments, i.e., the instant indictment and a subsequent indictment related to charges arising from conduct that occurred while the charges on the instant indictment were pending. These circumstances triggered the consecutive sentencing regime provided by Penal Law § 70.25 (2-b). Defendant contends that defense counsel was ineffective at sentencing by failing to provide sufficient mitigating circumstances in favor of concurrent sentences as contemplated by that statute. Defendant's contention, however, relates to his judgment of conviction on the second indictment, not the instant indictment ( see People v Dunbar , 183 AD3d 1263, 1264 [4th Dept 2020], lv denied 35 NY3d 1044 [2020]). We conclude that defendant's remaining contentions regarding the alleged ineffectiveness of counsel represent "simple disagreement[s] with [trial] strategies, tactics or the scope of possible cross-examination" that do not constitute ineffective assistance ( People v Mastin , 232 AD3d 1268, 1269 [4th Dept 2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 1053 [2024]; see People v Austen , 197 AD3d 861, 861-862 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 1095 [2021]; People v Case , 197 AD3d 985, 988 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 1160 [2022]; People v Lozada , 164 AD3d 1626, 1628 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1174 [2019]). Finally, we reject defendant's contention that his sentence is unduly harsh and severe. Entered: April 24, 2026 Ann Dillon Flynn