Matter of Baldwin v. Peterkin
Docket 2025-03549
Court of record · Indexed in NoticeRegistry archive · AI-enriched for research
- Filed
- Jurisdiction
- New York
- Court
- Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
- Type
- Opinion
- Case type
- Family
- Disposition
- Reversed
- Citation
- 2026 NY Slip Op 02647
- Docket
- 2025-03549
Appeal from Family Court orders confirming a Support Magistrate's disposition finding the father willfully violated a child support order and committing him unless he paid a purge amount
Summary
The Appellate Division reversed a Family Court finding that the father willfully violated a child support order and vacated the related commitment order, remitting the case for a new hearing. The court concluded the father was deprived of his statutory and constitutional right to counsel because the Support Magistrate failed to secure a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver or to inquire about assigning new counsel after the father's assigned lawyer was relieved. Because the record shows the father protested lack of counsel and lacked basic understanding of proceedings, reversal was required regardless of the merits.
Issues Decided
- Whether the father was deprived of his right to counsel in a child support enforcement proceeding where incarceration was a possible consequence
- Whether any waiver of the father's right to counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
- Whether the Support Magistrate should have inquired about appointment of new counsel before proceeding and finding the father in default
Court's Reasoning
The court relied on the constitutional and statutory right to counsel when incarceration is possible and on Family Court Act § 262(a)(vi). Because the father's assigned counsel had been relieved and he repeatedly protested that he did not have an attorney, the Support Magistrate was required to conduct a searching inquiry to ensure a valid waiver or to consider assigning new counsel. The record showed no proper waiver and that the father lacked basic understanding of court procedures, so the deprivation of counsel required reversal and a new hearing regardless of the underlying merits.
Authorities Cited
- Family Court Act § 262(a)(vi)
- Matter of Sylvester v Goffe202 AD3d 970
- Matter of Tarnai v Buchbinder132 AD3d 884
Parties
- Respondent
- Kimora Baldwin
- Appellant
- Malcolm A. Peterkin
- Judge
- Connie Gonzalez
- Judge
- Serena Rosario
- Judge
- Mark C. Dillon
Key Dates
- Decision date
- 2026-04-29
- Order of disposition (Support Magistrate)
- 2024-09-04
- Support Magistrate proceeding where counsel was relieved
- 2024-07-30
- Proceeding where father protested lack of counsel
- 2024-08-28
- Family Court confirmation and commitment orders
- 2025-03-10
What You Should Do Next
- 1
Family Court: determine counsel status
The Family Court must ask the father whether he wishes to waive counsel and, if not, arrange assignment of new counsel before proceeding to a new hearing.
- 2
Father: consult or accept counsel
The father should consult with an attorney promptly to decide whether to accept appointed counsel or, if waiving counsel, be prepared to make a knowing and voluntary waiver on the record.
- 3
Mother: prepare for new hearing
The mother should be ready to present evidence at the new hearing on the violation petition, including proof of support orders and arrears.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What did the court decide?
- The appellate court reversed the finding that the father willfully violated child support and vacated the commitment order, sending the case back for a new hearing because the father lacked effective counsel.
- Who is affected by this decision?
- The father (appellant) is directly affected because his conviction for willful violation and related commitment were vacated; the mother (respondent) is affected because the enforcement hearing will be redone.
- What happens next?
- The Family Court must determine whether the father will knowingly waive counsel or assign new counsel if warranted, then hold a new hearing on the violation petition and make a new determination.
- Why did the appellate court require a new hearing?
- Because the Support Magistrate did not ensure the father knowingly waived his right to counsel or consider appointing new counsel after his lawyer was relieved, depriving him of a fundamental right.
- Can this decision be appealed further?
- Yes, parties may seek further review to the Court of Appeals, subject to the rules and deadlines for leave to appeal, though the remand requires the Family Court to conduct the new proceedings first.
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Full Filing Text
Matter of Baldwin v Peterkin - 2026 NY Slip Op 02647 Matter of Baldwin v Peterkin 2026 NY Slip Op 02647 April 29, 2026 Appellate Division, Second Department In the Matter of Kimora Baldwin, respondent, v Malcolm A. Peterkin, appellant. Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department Decided on April 29, 2026 2025-03549, 2025-03552, (Docket No. F-15894-17/24E) Mark C. Dillon, J.P. Paul Wooten Lourdes M. Ventura Lisa S. Ottley, JJ. Lewis S. Calderon, Jamaica, NY, for appellant. DECISION & ORDER In a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 4, the father appeals from (1) an order of the Family Court, Queens County (Connie Gonzalez, J.), dated March 10, 2025, and (2) an order of commitment of the same court also dated March 10, 2025. The order confirmed an order of disposition of the same court (Serena Rosario, S.M.) dated September 4, 2024, made after a hearing, finding that the father willfully violated a prior order of child support. The order of commitment, in effect, confirmed the order of disposition and committed the father to the custody of the New York City Department of Correction for a period of 60 days unless he paid a purge amount of $7,500. ORDERED that the appeal from so much of the order of commitment as committed the father to the custody of the New York City Department of Correction for a period of 60 days unless he paid the purge amount of $7,500 is dismissed as academic, without costs or disbursements, as the period of incarceration has expired ( see Matter of Nestor v Nestor , 236 AD3d 794, 794; Matter of Stein-Zimic v Zimic , 194 AD3d 823, 824); and it is further ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, the order of disposition is vacated, and the matter is remitted to the Family Court, Queens County, for a new hearing on the violation petition and a new determination thereafter in accordance herewith; and it is further, ORDERED that the order of commitment is reversed insofar as reviewed, on the law, without costs or disbursements. In March 2024, the mother commenced this proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 4, alleging that the father was in willful violation of a prior order of child support. At the initial appearance before a Support Magistrate on April 3, 2024, the father was assigned counsel. At a subsequent proceeding on July 30, 2024, the Support Magistrate relieved the father's assigned counsel upon the father's request. At the next proceeding on August 28, 2024, the father appeared without counsel and indicated that he had not been assigned a new attorney. The Support Magistrate advised the father that a hearing on the mother's violation petition was scheduled for that date and asked the father if he intended to "present a defense on [his] own, . . . not participat[e], or hir[e] an attorney." After the father gave a nonresponsive answer, the Support Magistrate stated that "the Court will proceed on the [father's] default." The father again protested that he did not have an attorney. The Support Magistrate then found that the father "is choosing not to participate in the proceedings." In an order of disposition dated September 4, 2024, the Support Magistrate found that the father willfully violated the prior order of child support. In an order dated March 10, 2025, the Family Court confirmed the order of disposition. In an order of commitment, also dated March 10, 2025, the Family Court in effect, confirmed the order of disposition and committed the father to the custody of the New York City Department of Correction for a period of 60 days unless he paid a purge amount of $7,500. The father appeals. Although the appeal from so much of the order of commitment as committed the father to the custody of the New York City Department of Correction for a period of 60 days must be dismissed as academic, the appeal from so much of the order of commitment as, in effect, confirmed the finding that the father willfully violated the child support order is not academic in light of the enduring consequences that could flow from the determination that he violated his support obligations ( see Matter of Nestor v Nestor , 236 AD3d at 795; Matter of Stein-Zimic v Zimic , 194 AD3d at 824). "An individual has a constitutional right to counsel in any proceeding in which incarceration is a possibility. Moreover, a parent has the statutory right to counsel in a proceeding in which it is alleged that he or she has willfully failed to comply with a prior child support order" ( Matter of Sylvester v Goffe , 202 AD3d 970, 972 [internal citation omitted]; see Family Ct Act § 262[a][vi]). "Although this right may be waived, the waiver must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent" ( Matter of Sylvester v Goffe , 202 AD3d at 972; see Matter of Mercado v Arzola , 212 AD3d 815, 816). The deprivation of a party's fundamental right to counsel in a custody or visitation proceeding is a denial of due process which requires reversal, regardless of the merits of the unrepresented party's position ( see Matter of Abigail M.A. [James A.] , 222 AD3d 973, 976; Matter of Tarnai v Buchbinder , 132 AD3d 884, 886). Here, the record demonstrates that the father "did not wish to proceed pro se, but was forced to do so" ( Matter of Tarnai v Buchbinder , 132 AD3d at 887 [internal quotation marks omitted]). At the proceeding on August 28, 2024, the father repeatedly protested that he did not have an attorney, and the Support Magistrate did not conduct an inquiry to determine whether the father was waiving his right to counsel or address the possibility of assigning new counsel to the father ( see Matter of Rosof v Mallory , 88 AD3d 802, 802-803). Moreover, although the Support Magistrate had previously cautioned the father against self-representation when the father's former assigned counsel was relieved, the Support Magistrate at no point conducted a sufficiently searching inquiry to ensure that the father was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waiving his right to counsel ( see Matter of Lherisson v Goffe , 198 AD3d 965, 967; Matter of Means v Miller , 175 AD3d 498, 500). The deprivation of the father's fundamental right to counsel requires reversal, without regard to the merits of his position, especially where, as here, the record demonstrates that the father did not have a basic understanding of court proceedings ( see Matter of Pugh v Pugh , 125 AD3d 663, 664). Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Family Court, Queens County, for a determination of whether the father wishes to waive his right to counsel, the assignment of new counsel if warranted, and a new hearing on the petition and a new determination thereafter ( see Matter of Tarnai v Buchbinder , 132 AD3d at 887). DILLON, J.P., WOOTEN, VENTURA and OTTLEY, JJ., concur. ENTER: Darrell M. Joseph