Matter of Jesus G.
Docket Docket No. D-24208/24|Appeal No. 6007|Case No. 2025-01845|
Court of record · Indexed in NoticeRegistry archive · AI-enriched for research
- Filed
- Jurisdiction
- New York
- Court
- Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
- Type
- Opinion
- Case type
- Family
- Disposition
- Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part
- Citation
- 2026 NY Slip Op 02371
- Docket numbers
- Docket NoD-24208/24Appeal No6007Case No2025-01845
Appeal from a Family Court order adjudicating a juvenile delinquent and imposing probation and restitution
Summary
The Appellate Division reviewed a Family Court disposition that adjudicated 17-year-old Jesus G. a juvenile delinquent after he admitted to taking a car and driving it a short distance before abandoning it. The court affirmed the delinquency finding and 15-month probation but vacated the $1,000 restitution award. The panel held the victim's statements were sufficient to establish replacement cost, but vacated restitution because the juvenile's written admission did not include an agreement to pay restitution and restitution was not sought in the charging document prior to disposition.
Issues Decided
- Whether the Family Court properly ordered restitution where the juvenile's admission did not include an agreement to pay restitution
- Whether the victim's sworn affirmation and victim impact statement provided sufficient evidence of the cost of replacement to support a restitution award
- Whether restitution may be awarded where the Presentment Agency did not seek restitution in the charging document or until after the admission
Court's Reasoning
The court recognized that Family Court Act § 353.6 allows restitution up to $1,500 for repair or replacement and that victim statements can support a restitution calculation. The Presentment Agency proved by a preponderance that the car was a total loss and that the $1,000 award was a fair replacement cost. But because the juvenile's admission did not include any agreement to pay restitution and restitution was not requested in the charging papers before the admission, the court concluded restitution should not have been ordered and vacated that portion of the disposition.
Authorities Cited
- Family Court Act § 353.6(1)(a)
- Matter of Joshua C.65 AD3d 971 (1st Dept 2009)
- Matter of Rashid F.300 AD2d 960 (3d Dept 2002)
Parties
- Appellant
- Jesus G.
- Presentment Agency
- Presentment Agency
- Attorney
- Dawne A. Mitchell, The Legal Aid Society (Judith Stern of counsel)
- Attorney
- Muriel Goode-Trufant, Corporation Counsel (Karin Wolfe of counsel)
- Judge
- Ronna H. Gordon-Galchus
Key Dates
- Admission date
- 2024-11-19
- Presentment Agency notice seeking restitution
- 2025-01-16
- Family Court disposition date (approximately)
- 2025-02-28
- Appellate Division decision date
- 2026-04-21
What You Should Do Next
- 1
Consult counsel about further appeal
If the Presentment Agency wants to challenge the vacatur, it should discuss with counsel whether to seek leave to appeal and the applicable deadlines.
- 2
Consider refiling restitution claim if appropriate
If permissible, the agency could consider initiating timely restitution procedures in a way that complies with admission requirements or seek restitution after a trial or new admission.
- 3
Comply with remaining disposition terms
The juvenile and probation officer should continue to follow the Family Court's probation order and other non-restitution conditions as affirmed by the court.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What did the court decide?
- The court upheld the delinquency finding and probation but vacated the $1,000 restitution award because the juvenile's admission did not include an agreement to pay restitution and restitution was not timely sought.
- Who is affected by this decision?
- The juvenile appellant, Jesus G., and the car owner whose restitution claim was vacated are directly affected; it also guides lower courts on when restitution can be imposed after an admission.
- Why was restitution vacated when the victim said the car was a total loss?
- Although the victim's statements could have supported the amount, the court found it procedurally improper to order restitution because the admission lacked an agreement to pay and the agency did not seek restitution before the admission.
- Can this decision be appealed further?
- Potentially, but further appeal would likely be to the Court of Appeals and would depend on whether there are preserved legal issues of statewide importance; consult counsel to assess grounds and deadlines.
The above suggestions and answers are AI-generated for informational purposes only. They may contain errors. NoticeRegistry assumes no responsibility for their accuracy. Consult a qualified attorney before relying on them.
Full Filing Text
Matter of Jesus G. - 2026 NY Slip Op 02371 Matter of Jesus G. 2026 NY Slip Op 02371 April 21, 2026 Appellate Division, First Department In the Matter of Jesus G., a Person Alleged to Be a Juvenile Delinquent, Appellant. Presentment Agency Decided and Entered: April 21, 2026 Docket No. D-24208/24|Appeal No. 6007|Case No. 2025-01845| Before: Moulton, J.P., Pitt-Burke, O'neill Levy, Michael, Chan, JJ. Dawne A. Mitchell, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Judith Stern of counsel), for appellant. Muriel Goode-Trufant, Corporation Counsel, New York (Karin Wolfe of counsel), for Presentment Agency. Order of disposition, Family Court, Bronx County (Ronna H. Gordon-Galchus, J.), entered on or about February 28, 2025, which adjudicated appellant a juvenile delinquent, upon his admission that he committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crimes of criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree and unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree, placed him on probation for a period of 15 months, and ordered him to pay restitution of $1,000.00, unanimously modified, on the law, to vacate the restitution award, and otherwise affirmed, without costs. The case against appellant arises out of an incident in which an unapprehended person threatened and assaulted a car driver, who fled the car. Appellant then got into the car and drove it a few blocks before abandoning it. The car was recovered approximately one year later in inoperable condition. The driver's sworn witness affirmation and signed victim impact statement both state that he bought the car for $4,100 one month before the incident, and the car's post-recovery condition constituted a "total loss." At the time of the offense, appellant was 17 years old. Appellant seeks vacatur of the restitution order, arguing that the Family Court improperly ordered $1,000 in restitution where his admission did not include an agreement to pay restitution or an admission of property damage. He further argues that a hearing was required to determine the value of the damage incurred, that no reliable evidence established irreparability of the car or cost of repair or replacement, and that the car driver's lost wages do not form a basis for restitution under the Family Court Act. Finally, appellant argues that the Court should have considered his ability to pay the restitution award. The Family Court may order a juvenile offender to pay restitution in an amount not exceeding $1,500.00 which represents the "fair and reasonable" cost to "replace the property [or] repair the damage caused by the respondent" (Family Court Act § 353.6[1][a]). Whether restitution is warranted lies within the court's discretion ( Matter of Joshua C. , 65 AD3d 971 [1st Dept 2009]; Matter of Daytrill H. 32 AD3d 736 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 802 [2007]). Restitution may be awarded not merely for the cost of repairing damaged property but also for replacing it ( see Family Court Act § 353.6[1][a]). The Court has held in similar circumstances that misdemeanor petit larceny (Penal Law § 155.25) and possession of stolen property are sufficient to support an award of restitution ( see e.g. Matter of Daytrill H. , 32 AD3d at 736, Matter of Deandre Mc. , 124 AD3d 786, 788 [2d Dept 2015]). The car driver's affirmation and victim impact statement establish that the car was purchased for $4,100 one month before the incident and was completely damaged and not drivable upon return to its owner. A victim impact statement specifying the cost to the victim to replace the property may be sufficient to support a calculation of restitution ( see Matter of Jennifer A. , 73 AD3d 566, 567 [1st Dept 2010]). Here, appellant admitted to stealing the car, rendering the car subject to Family Court Act § 353.6(1)(a), and the Presentment Agency established that the restitution award represented the "fair and reasonable" cost of replacement by a preponderance of the evidence. (Family Court Act §§ 350.3 [1], [2], 353.6[1]). However, as appellant's admission did not include any agreement to pay restitution, we find that it should not have been ordered ( see Matter of Rashid F. , 300 AD2d 960, 962 [3d Dept 2002]). Here, no claim for restitution was made in the charging document and the Presentment Agency did not indicate that it would seek restitution at disposition until January 16, 2025, well after appellant's November 19, 2024 admission which did not include an agreement to pay restitution. Accordingly, the restitution award should be vacated. In light of our determination, we need not reach appellant's remaining arguments. THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT. ENTERED: April 21, 2026