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Matter of Pascal W. v. Carlos M.-J.

Docket Docket No. O-05047/22|Appeal No. 6413|Case No. 2025-02470|

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FamilyAffirmed
Filed
Jurisdiction
New York
Court
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
Type
Opinion
Case type
Family
Disposition
Affirmed
Citation
2026 NY Slip Op 02384
Docket numbers
Docket NoO-05047/22Appeal No6413Case No2025-02470

Appeal from a Family Court order after a fact-finding hearing that determined respondent committed a family offense and issued a six-month order of protection

Summary

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a Family Court order finding that appellant Carlos M.-J. committed a family offense amounting to second-degree harassment by intentionally bumping into the petitioner, Pascal W. The court upheld the Family Court's credibility findings and sustained the six-month suspended judgment and corresponding six-month order of protection. The appeal was not moot despite the protection order's expiration because the underlying finding can have future legal consequences. The court concluded the evidence met the fair preponderance standard and the protection order was a proper exercise of discretion.

Issues Decided

  • Whether the Family Court correctly found by a fair preponderance of the evidence that respondent committed a family offense constituting second-degree harassment by intentionally bumping the petitioner.
  • Whether the appeal was moot due to the expiration of the order of protection.
  • Whether the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in issuing a six-month order of protection following the finding of a family offense.

Court's Reasoning

The court relied on the testimony of petitioner's witness that respondent moved toward and shoved the petitioner, which satisfied the fair preponderance standard for a family offense under the Family Court Act and Penal Law § 240.26(1). The Appellate Division deferred to the Family Court's credibility determinations, finding no basis to disturb them. The court held the appeal was not moot because the finding itself can produce harmful future legal consequences, and concluded a six-month order of protection was a reasonable exercise of discretion under the Family Court Act.

Authorities Cited

  • Family Court Act § 812
  • Penal Law § 240.26(1)
  • Matter of Veronica P. v Radcliff A.24 NY3d 668 (2015)
  • Matter of Edward B. v Elizabeth T.156 AD3d 423 (1st Dept 2017)
  • Matter of R.H. v M.C.H.239 AD3d 577 (1st Dept 2025)
  • Family Court Act § 842(a)
  • Matter of Miriam M. v Warren M.51 AD3d 581 (1st Dept 2008)

Parties

Respondent
Pascal W.
Appellant
Carlos M.-J.
Judge
Jacob K. Maeroff (Referee, Family Court)
Judge
Renwick (P.J.)
Judge
Friedman
Judge
Gesmer
Judge
Pitt-Burke
Judge
Hagler
Attorney
Lewis Calderon (Law Office of Lewis S. Calderon, counsel for appellant)

Key Dates

Decision date (Appellate Division)
2026-04-21
Family Court order entered
2025-04-08

What You Should Do Next

  1. 1

    Consult appellate counsel about further review

    If the appellant wishes to continue challenging the finding, they should promptly consult counsel to evaluate grounds for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals and calculate filing deadlines.

  2. 2

    Request clarification or relief if necessary

    If either party believes aspects of the order (such as scope or enforcement) require modification, they should seek appropriate relief in Family Court or follow procedures for post-judgment motions.

  3. 3

    Document and prepare evidence for future proceedings

    Because the finding can affect future legal matters, both parties should preserve records and consider obtaining legal advice about consequences, sealing, or expungement options where available.

Frequently Asked Questions

What did the court decide?
The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court's finding that the appellant committed second-degree harassment by intentionally bumping the petitioner and upheld a six-month suspended judgment and six-month order of protection.
Who is affected by this decision?
The ruling affects the appellant (Carlos M.-J.), who remains found to have committed a family offense, and the petitioner (Pascal W.), whose request for protection was upheld.
Why wasn’t the appeal considered moot even though the protection order expired?
The court explained that the underlying finding of a family offense can cause harmful future legal consequences, so the appeal over that finding is not rendered moot by expiration of the protective order.
Can the appellant appeal this decision further?
The decision may be eligible for further review by a higher court (e.g., the Court of Appeals) subject to applicable rules and deadlines; the appellant should consult counsel about whether and how to seek further review.

The above suggestions and answers are AI-generated for informational purposes only. They may contain errors. NoticeRegistry assumes no responsibility for their accuracy. Consult a qualified attorney before relying on them.

Full Filing Text
Matter of Pascal W. v Carlos M.-J. - 2026 NY Slip Op 02384

Matter of Pascal W. v Carlos M.-J.

2026 NY Slip Op 02384

April 21, 2026

Appellate Division, First Department

In the Matter of Pascal W., Respondent,

v

Carlos M.-J., Appellant.

Decided and Entered: April 21, 2026

Docket No. O-05047/22|Appeal No. 6413|Case No. 2025-02470|

Before: Renwick, P.J., Friedman, Gesmer, Pitt-Burke, Hagler, JJ.

Law Office of Lewis S. Calderon, Jamaica (Lewis Calderon of counsel), for appellant.

Order, Family Court, New York County (Jacob K. Maeroff, Ref.), entered on or about April 8, 2025, which, after a fact-finding hearing, determined that respondent committed a family offense act that would constitute harassment in the second degree, suspended judgment for six months, and issued an order of protection to be in effect during the six-month period, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The expiration of the order of protection by its own terms did not render this appeal moot, as the order finding that respondent committed a family offense can "prompt severely deleterious future legal rulings against" him (
Matter of Veronica P. v Radcliff A.,
24 NY3d 668, 671-672 [2015]).

Nevertheless, a fair preponderance of the evidence supports the finding that respondent committed a family offense by performing an act that constitutes second-degree harassment by intentionally bumping into petitioner for no legitimate purpose (Family Court Act § 812; Penal Law § 240.26[1];
see Matter of

Edward B. v Elizabeth T.,
156 AD3d 423, 424 [1st Dept 2017]). Petitioner's witness testified that as the parties passed each other on the sidewalk, respondent moved towards petitioner, bumped into him, and "kind of shove[d] him . . . to the left." The court's credibility determination that respondent was less credible than petitioner and the witness is entitled to great deference and there is no basis to disturb it (
see

Matter of R.H. v M.C.H
., 239 AD3d 577, 578 [1st Dept 2025]).

Family Court providently exercised its discretion in issuing a six-month order of protection upon finding that respondent committed a family offense (Family Court Act § 842[a];
see Matter of Miriam M. v Warren M.
, 51 AD3d 581, 582 [1st Dept 2008]).

We have considered respondent's remaining contentions and find them unavailing.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: April 21, 2026