Com. v. Steager, K.

J-A04015-26

                                   2026 PA super 67


  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                    :      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                  :           PENNSYLVANIA
                                                  :
                v.                                :
                                                  :
                                                  :
  KEVIN LEE STEAGER                               :
                                                  :
                       Appellant                  :      No. 1103 MDA 2025

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 18, 2024
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0005125-2018


BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and LANE, J.

OPINION BY PANELLA, P.J.E.:                                    FILED: APRIL 7, 2026

       Kevin Lee Steager appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in

the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County after he pled guilty to

involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (“IDSI”), aggravated indecent assault

of a child, aggravated indecent assault of a complainant less than 16 years of

age, indecent assault, unlawful contact with a minor, and corruption of

minors.1     Additionally,    appellate        counsel     seeks   to   withdraw   from

representation pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). After careful review,

we affirm Steager’s judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s petition to

withdraw.


____________________________________________


1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3123(a)(7), 3125(b), 3125(a)(8), 3126(a)(8), 6318(a)(1),

and 6301(a)(1), respectively.
J-A04015-26


       We glean the following from the certified record. Steager sexually

abused his biological daughter (“Victim”) over a 5-year period when she was

approximately 12 to 17 years old. On June 12, 2023, following an oral and

written colloquy, Steager entered a counseled2 guilty plea to the above

offenses in exchange for the imposition of a minimum standard-range

guideline sentence between 48 and 66 months’ incarceration on the count of

IDSI with all other sentences of incarceration to be served concurrently. See

Plea Negotiation, 6/12/23; N.T. Guilty Plea, 6/12/23, at 2-3.3 The parties also

agreed that the court retained the discretion to impose consecutive sentences

of probation. See N.T. Guilty Plea, 6/12/23, at 3. During his plea colloquy,

Steager acknowledged that due to the nature of the offenses to which he was

pleading guilty, he would be required to comply with the Sexual Offender

Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”),4 under which he would be a

lifetime registrant. See id. at 6-7. The court accepted Steager’s plea and

deferred sentencing pending the completion of a report by the Sexual

Offender’s Assessment Board (“SOAB”).


____________________________________________


2 Steager was represented by Elizabeth K. H. Pasqualini, Esq. (“plea counsel”).


3 The mandatory minimum sentencing     provision set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9718(a)(1) was inapplicable to Steager’s IDSI conviction because the
underlying criminal conduct occurred between January 2009 and December
2014, during which section 9718(a)(1) was deemed unconstitutional following
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), and Commonwealth v.
Wolfe, 140 A.3d 651 (Pa. 2016).

4 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9791-9799.42.


                                           -2-
J-A04015-26


      On January 18, 2024, the court imposed an aggregate sentence of 4½

to 9 years of incarceration and 4 years of probation. Following an SVP hearing

on July 24, 2025, the court entered an order classifying Steager as an SVP

pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9795.3. Steager did not file a post-sentence

motion, and on August 4, 2025, the court permitted plea counsel to withdraw

from representation.

      On August 12, 2025, Spencer H.C. Bradley, Esq. (“counsel”) entered his

appearance on Steager’s behalf and filed a notice of appeal. On August 19,

2025, the court ordered Steager to file a concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On September 8,

2025, counsel filed a notice of his intention to withdraw from representation

pursuant to PA.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4). On September 12, 2025, the trial court filed

a statement in lieu of filing an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). Steager

has not filed a response.

      Prior to reviewing the merits of Steager’s appeal, we must first

determine whether counsel has complied with the requirements set forth in

Anders and its progeny.

      To withdraw [from representation] pursuant to Anders, counsel
      must:

         1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after
         making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel
         has determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2)
         furnish a copy of the Anders brief to the appellant; and 3)
         advise the appellant that he or she has the right to retain
         private counsel or raise additional arguments that the
         appellant deems worthy of the court’s attention.

                                      -3-
J-A04015-26



      With respect to the third requirement of Anders, that counsel
      inform the appellant of his or her rights in light of counsel’s
      withdrawal, this Court has held that counsel must attach to their
      petition to withdraw a copy of the letter sent to their client
      advising him or her of their rights.

      Further, an Anders brief must comply with the following
      requirements:

         (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts,
         with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the
         record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal;
         (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is
         frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that
         the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the
         relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or
         statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the
         appeal is frivolous.

      If counsel’s petition and brief satisfy Anders, we will then
      undertake our own review of the appeal to determine if it is wholly
      frivolous.

Commonwealth v. Gabra, 336 A.3d 1052, 1056 (Pa. Super. 2025) (brackets

and citation omitted).

      Counsel has substantially complied with the preliminary requirements

set forth in Anders and its progeny. Counsel filed a petition to withdraw in

which he certified that he reviewed Steager’s case and determined that his

appeal is frivolous. Counsel provided proof of service of the petition on Steager

as well as a letter advising him of his rights to retain new counsel, to proceed

pro se, and to raise any additional issues he deems worthy of the court’s

attention. Although counsel failed to attach a copy of the letter to his petition

to withdraw, counsel did attach a copy of the letter to his Anders brief and


                                      -4-
J-A04015-26


included proof of service of the brief on Steager. In his brief, counsel provided

a factual summary and procedural history of the case with citations to the

record, made references to anything in the record that might arguably support

the appeal, and set forth his reasons for concluding that any appeal would be

frivolous. Because counsel has complied with the Anders requirements, we

proceed to our independent review of the record to determine whether

Steager’s appeal is wholly frivolous.

      In his Anders brief, counsel identifies potential issues challenging (1)

the validity of Steager’s guilty plea, (2) the legality of his sentence, (3) the

sufficiency of the evidence to support his SVP designation, and (4) the

discretionary aspects of his sentence. See, generally, Anders Brief, at 13-

25.

      We begin by noting that generally, “[w]hen a defendant pleads guilty,

he waives the right to challenge all but the legality of his sentence and validity

of his plea.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 346 A.3d 1251, 1255 n.5 (Pa. 2025)

(citation omitted). In his brief, counsel identifies potential issues concerning

the validity of Steager’s guilty plea as well as the legality of his sentence. First,

counsel avers that any challenge to the validity of Steager’s guilty plea has

been waived and is therefore frivolous. See Anders Brief, at 13-14. We agree.

      “A defendant wishing to challenge the voluntariness of a guilty plea on

direct appeal must either object during the plea colloquy or file a motion to

withdraw the plea within ten days of sentencing. Failure to employ either


                                        -5-
J-A04015-26


measure results in waiver.” Commonwealth v. Moore, 307 A.3d 95, 99 (Pa.

Super. 2023) (brackets and citation omitted). Where an issue is waived,

“pursuing [the] matter on direct appeal is frivolous.” Commonwealth v.

Kalichak, 943 A.2d 285, 291 (Pa. Super. 2008).

      Steager has not properly preserved a challenge to the validity of his

guilty plea because he failed to object during his plea colloquy or seek to

withdraw his plea either at the hearing or in a post-sentence motion. See

Moore, 307 A.3d at 99. Accordingly, any such challenge is waived, and we

agree with counsel’s conclusion that this issue is frivolous. See Kalichak, 943

A.2d at 291.

      Next, counsel identifies potential issues concerning the legality of

Steager’s sentence. See Anders Brief, at 15-25. “[W]hether the trial court

possesses the authority to impose a particular sentence is a matter of

legality.” Commonwealth v. Merced, 308 A.3d 1277, 1283 (Pa. Super.

2024) (citation omitted). “If no statutory authorization exists for a particular

sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to correction.” Commonwealth

v. Verma, 334 A.3d 941, 951 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citation omitted). “Our

standard of review for a challenge to the legality of a sentence is de novo, and

our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Dewald, 317 A.3d 1020,

1043 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation omitted).




                                     -6-
J-A04015-26


       First, counsel concludes that any potential legality of sentence claim

Steager could raise relating to the imposition of sentences exceeding the

lawful maximum is frivolous. See Anders Brief, at 15-16. We agree.

       Steager’s convictions of IDSI, aggravated indecent assault of a child,

and unlawful contact with a minor were graded as first-degree felonies, with

each carrying a maximum sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment. See 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 1103(1). On the count of IDSI, the court imposed a sentence of

4½ to 9 years’ incarceration and concurrent sentences of 4½ to 9 years’

incarceration on each count of aggravated indecent assault of a child and

unlawful contact with a minor. Steager’s conviction for aggravated indecent

assault was graded as a second-degree felony, and as such, carried a

maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1103(2).

On this count, the court imposed a consecutive sentence of 4 years’ probation.

Steager’s corruption of minors conviction was graded as a first-degree

misdemeanor and carried a maximum penalty of 5 years’ imprisonment, see

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1104(1), and the court imposed a concurrent sentence of 2

years’ probation.5 Finally, Steager’s indecent assault conviction was graded as

a second-degree misdemeanor and carried a maximum penalty of two years’


____________________________________________


5 We note that both the sentencing order and the sentencing hearing transcript

are silent as to whether this probationary sentence is to be served
concurrently or consecutively to Steager’s other probationary sentences.
However, our review of the record reveals that this sentence of probation is
to be served concurrently with all other counts. See Sentencing Sheet,
1/18/24.

                                           -7-
J-A04015-26


imprisonment, see 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1104(2), and the court imposed a

concurrent sentence of 2 years’ probation. As counsel aptly notes, none of

Steager’s individual sentences exceed the corresponding statutory maximum

for each offense. See Anders Brief, at 16. Accordingly, we agree that any

claim concerning the legality of Steager’s sentence in this respect is frivolous.

      Next counsel concludes that any claim concerning the merger of

Steager’s sentences is likewise frivolous. See Anders Brief, at 16. We agree.

      “Whether convictions merge for sentencing purposes is a question

implicating the legality of a sentence.” Commonwealth v. Knupp, 290 A.3d

759, 777 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted). The merger doctrine, which is

codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9765, “prohibits merger unless two distinct facts

are present: (1) the crimes arise from a single criminal act; and (2) all of the

statutory elements of one of the offenses are included in the statutory

elements of the other.” Knupp, 290 A.3d at 777 (citation omitted). Where the

merger doctrine applies, “the court may sentence the defendant only on the

higher graded offense.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9765.

      When considering whether there is a single criminal act or multiple
      criminal acts, the question is not whether there was a break in the
      chain of criminal activity. The issue is whether the actor commits
      multiple criminal acts beyond that which is necessary to establish
      the bare elements of the additional crime, then the actor will be
      guilty of multiple crimes which do not merge for sentencing
      purposes.

      In determining whether two or more convictions arose from a
      single criminal act for purposes of sentencing, we must examine
      the charging documents filed by the Commonwealth.


                                      -8-
J-A04015-26


Dewald, 317 A.3d at 1043-44 (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted).

      Our review of the criminal complaint reveals that, over the 5-year period

in question, Steager was alleged to have digitally penetrated Victim’s vagina

and anus on 60 to 100 occasions and to have performed oral sex on Victim on

30 to 50 occasions when she was between the ages of 12 and 17. Steager’s

convictions were clearly the result of various instances of molestation that

consisted of separate and distinct criminal acts committed against Victim. See

Dewald, 317 A.3d at 1043. Therefore, Steager’s convictions were not based

on a single criminal act and do not merge for sentencing purposes. See 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9765. Accordingly, we agree with counsel’s conclusion that any

merger claim would be frivolous.

      Next, counsel concludes that any challenge to Steager’s SVP designation

is frivolous because the designation was supported by clear and convincing

evidence. See Anders Brief, at 18. We agree.

      “[I]n cases involving sexually violent offenses, the determination of

whether a defendant is an SVP under SORNA is a component of a judgment

of sentence.” Commonwealth v. Torres, 327 A.3d 640, 645 (Pa. Super.

2024) (citation omitted). “A challenge to a trial court’s SVP designation

presents a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for which our standard

of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v.

Aumick, 297 A.3d 770, 776 (Pa. Super. 2023) (en banc) (citation omitted).


                                     -9-
J-A04015-26


“We will reverse a trial court’s determination of SVP status only if the

Commonwealth has not presented clear and convincing evidence that each

element of the statute has been satisfied.” Id. at 776-77 (citation omitted).

      The procedure for determining SVP status is statutorily mandated
      and well-defined. Under revised Subchapter H of SORNA, after a
      person has been convicted of an offense listed in 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
      9799.14, the trial court orders an assessment by the SOAB. The
      SOAB must assess all individuals convicted of sexually violent
      offenses to determine whether they should be classified as an SVP.
      When assessing whether a particular offender should be classified
      as an SVP, the board shall establish standards for evaluations and
      for evaluators conducting the assessments.

Moore, 307 A.3d at 100 (brackets and citation omitted). A SOAB assessment

      shall include, but not be limited to, an examination of the
      following:

         (1) Facts of the current offense, including:

            (i) Whether the offense involved multiple victims.

            (ii) Whether the individual exceeded the means
            necessary to achieve the offense.

            (iii) The nature of the sexual contact with the victim.

            (iv) Relationship of the individual to the victim.

            (v) Age of the victim.

            (vi) Whether the offense included a display of unusual
            cruelty by the individual during the commission of the
            crime.

            (vii) The mental capacity of the victim.

         (2) Prior offense history, including:

            (i) The individual’s prior criminal record.


                                     - 10 -
J-A04015-26


            (ii) Whether the individual completed any prior
            sentences.

            (iii) Whether the individual participated in available
            programs for sexual offenders.

         (3) Characteristics of the individual, including:

            (i) Age.

            (ii) Use of illegal drugs.

            (iii) Any mental illness, mental disability or mental
            abnormality.

            (iv) Behavioral characteristics that contribute to the
            individual’s conduct.

         (4) Factors that are supported in a sexual offender
         assessment field as criteria reasonably related to the risk of
         reoffense.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(b).

      Furthermore:

      The trial court’s inquiry at an SVP hearing is different from the
      SOAB’s assessment. Whereas the SOAB member must consider
      the fifteen factors listed in section 9799.24(b), the trial court must
      determine whether the Commonwealth has proven by clear and
      convincing evidence that the defendant is an individual who has a
      mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the
      individual likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses.

Aumick, 297 A.3d at 778-79 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

      The statute defines a “mental abnormality” as “[a] congenital or

acquired condition of a person that affects the emotional or volitional capacity

of the person in a manner that predisposes that person to the commission of

criminal sexual acts to a degree that makes the person a menace to the health


                                         - 11 -
J-A04015-26


and safety of other persons.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12. Furthermore, the

statute defines a “predatory” act as that which is “directed at a stranger or at

a person with whom a relationship has been initiated, established, maintained

or promoted, in whole or in part, in order to facilitate or support victimization.”

Id. The statute further defines a “sexually violent offense” as “[a]n offense

specified in section 9799.14 (relating to sexual offenses and tier system) as a

Tier I, Tier II or Tier III sexual offense committed on or after December 20,

2012, for which the individual was convicted.” Id.

      “Further, this Court emphasized that a trial court, in conducting an SVP

hearing, is not responsible for evaluating the veracity of the facts underlying

the expert’s testimony.” Moore, 307 A.3d at 102 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). Rather, “an expert’s opinion which is rendered to a

reasonable degree of professional certainty is itself, substantive evidence.”

Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, “[t]o the extent [an appellant] criticizes

the credibility or reliability of [an expert’s] opinion, such claims go to the

weight of the evidence presented rather than the sufficiency of the

Commonwealth’s case.” See id.

      At Steager’s SVP hearing, Dr. Robert Stein, a licensed psychologist and

Pennsylvania SOAB evaluator, testified for the Commonwealth as an expert in

the treatment of sexual offenders. Dr. Stein testified that based on Steager’s

course of conduct, the acts in question, and his pattern of behavior in

establishing a sexually victimizing relationship with his biological daughter and


                                      - 12 -
J-A04015-26


in maintaining that relationship with repeated acts, there was sufficient

evidence of predatory behavior. See N.T. SVP Hearing, 6/11/25, at 8. Dr Stein

further testified that Steager had a mental abnormality or personality disorder

that made him likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses and

specifically identified Steager’s diagnosis as “other specified paraphilic

disorder with the specifications being incest and nonconsent.” Id. at 9-10.

When asked to explain his finding of mental abnormality, Dr. Stein testified to

Steager’s specific diagnoses as follows:

      Paraphilic disorders are diagnosed when there is sexual deviance
      and that sexual deviance is acted upon to victimize another person
      for a sustained period.

      Here there was sexual deviance on two dimensions, one
      incestuous interest or sexual interest in his biological daughter.
      That is not normal. That is sexually deviant. And it was acted upon
      to victimize another person for a sustained period. The sustained
      period needs to be at least six months. In this case it was five
      years.

      None of these acts were consenting. They were nonconsenting by
      the child’s age. This was not a marital, romantic, or dating or other
      relationship like that. The child did not want these things to
      happen so this was nonconsent and incest.

Id. at 9. Dr. Stein testified that in conducting his evaluation, he considered

the factors set forth in section 9799.24(b) as they pertained to the issues of

mental abnormality and predatory behavior. See id. at 10-12. Dr. Stein also

testified that, although the statistical likelihood of Steager reoffending was low

according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual—Version V (“DSM-V”), in

his opinion, based upon Steager’s diagnoses and his extensive history of


                                     - 13 -
J-A04015-26


offending Victim, Steager presented a danger of reoffending with respect to

other underaged individuals and family members. See id. at 48-49. Based on

the foregoing, Dr. Stein testified that he believed, to a reasonable degree of

professional certainty, that Steager should be classified as an SVP. See id. at

13-15.

       The Commonwealth presented clear and convincing evidence that

Steager meets the criteria set forth in section 9795.3 to be classified as an

SVP. Steager pled guilty to various Tier I,6 Tier II,7 and Tier III8 sexual

offenses, and Dr. Stein’s testimony and report established his belief that, to a

reasonable degree of professional certainty, Steager has mental abnormalities

which make him likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses, and

the trial court credited Dr. Stein’s opinion concerning these findings. See

Aumick, 297 A.3d at 778-79; Moore, 307 A.3d at 102. At the hearing,

defense counsel extensively questioned Dr. Stein regarding the sufficiency of

Steager’s specific diagnosis of other specified paraphilic disorder nonconsent

and seemingly suggested that this diagnosis was insufficient to support a

finding of mental abnormality because it was not explicitly identified in the


____________________________________________


6 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14(b)(8) (classifying corruption of minors as a Tier

I offense).

7 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.14(c)(1.3), 9799.14(c)(5) (classifying      indecent
assault and unlawful contact with a minor as Tier II offenses).

8 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.14(d)(4), 9199.14(d)(7) (classifying IDSI and
aggravated indecent assault as Tier III offenses).

                                          - 14 -
J-A04015-26


DSM—V and has been criticized in peer review journals. See N.T. SVP Hearing,

6/11/25, at 18-29. However, this Court has specifically rejected such

contentions:

      Our courts have not required the prosecution to prove that a
      defendant has been diagnosed with a specific psychological or
      psychiatric disorder in evaluating SVP status. Our Supreme Court
      has held that an “argument that expert testimony on SVP status
      does not square with prevailing standards and methodology in the
      psychological and psychiatric diagnostic communities misses the
      mark” because our legislative schemes relative to sex offenders
      have not required “proof of a standard of diagnosis that is
      commonly found and/or accepted in a mental health diagnostic
      paradigm.” Commonwealth v. Conklin, 987 A.2d 1168, 1178
      (Pa. 2006) (quoting Commonwealth v. Dengler, 890 A2d 372,
      383 (Pa. 2005)).

Moore, 307 A.3d at 102. Based on the foregoing, we discern no basis to

disturb Steager’s SVP designation and agree that any challenge to his SVP

designation is frivolous. Furthermore, in our review of the record, we were

unable to identify any additional issues relating to the legality of Steager’s

sentence and agree with counsel’s conclusion that any such challenge would

be frivolous.

      Finally, counsel concludes that any challenge to the discretionary

aspects of Steager’s sentence is frivolous. See Anders Brief, at 18. We agree.

      “The determination of whether discretionary aspects of sentencing may

be challenged after a guilty plea is entered depends upon the actual terms of

the plea bargain, specifically, to what degree a sentence agreement has been

reached.” Commonwealth v. Alameda, 339 A.3d 504, 511 (Pa. Super 2025)

(brackets and citation omitted). “When a defendant enters an open guilty plea,

                                    - 15 -
J-A04015-26


he may challenge the discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed.”

Commonwealth v. Davis, 341 A.3d 808, 813 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citation

omitted). However, “[w]here the plea agreement provides specific penalties,

an appeal from a discretionary sentence will not stand[.]” Alameda, 339 A.3d

at 511 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A “hybrid” plea

agreement exists where “the parties did not bargain for a specific sentence

but negotiated as to a certain aspect of the sentence” and “does not preclude

appellate review of those discretionary aspects of the sentence that were not

agreed upon in the negotiation process.” Heaster, 171 A.3d at 271 (citation

omitted).

      Furthermore, “[i]ssues challenging the discretionary aspects of a

sentence must be raised in a post-sentence motion or by presenting the claim

to the trial court during the sentencing proceedings. Absent such efforts, an

objection to a discretionary aspect of a sentence is waived.” Commonwealth

v. Perzel, 291 A.3d 38, 47 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted); see Davis,

341 A.3d at 812-13 (describing the four-part test an appellant must satisfy to

invoke this Court’s jurisdiction to review a discretionary sentencing claim).

      Steager entered a negotiated guilty plea at each count in exchange for

a concurrent minimum standard-range guideline sentence between 48 and 66

months’ incarceration. Therefore, Steager is precluded from appealing the

discretionary aspects of this part of his sentence. See Alameda, 339 A.3d at

511. Nonetheless, we acknowledge that pursuant to the plea agreement, the


                                    - 16 -
J-A04015-26


court retained the discretion to fashion Steager’s maximum sentence and

impose consecutive probationary sentences of an unspecified length. To the

extent that this portion of Steager’s sentence was the result of an open or

hybrid guilty plea, he is not precluded from challenging the discretionary

aspects. See Davis, 341 A.3d at 813 n.3; Heaster, 171 A.3d at 271.

However, Steager failed to preserve any issues relating to the discretionary

aspects of his sentence at the time of sentencing or in a post-sentence motion,

and as such, any potential challenge is waived on this basis. See Perzel, 291

A.3d at 47. Accordingly, Steager fails to invoke our jurisdiction to review a

discretionary sentencing claim, and we agree with counsel’s conclusion that

any such challenge would be frivolous. See Kalichak, 943 A.2d at 291.

      Upon reviewing the issues raised in counsel’s Anders brief and

conducting an independent review of the record, we agree with counsel’s

conclusion that Steager’s appeal is wholly frivolous. Moreover, our review has

not revealed any other nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s

petition to withdraw and affirm the judgment of sentence.




                                    - 17 -
J-A04015-26


     Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.

Judgment Entered.




Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary



Date: 04/07/2026




                                  - 18 -