Don Jackson Constriction, Inc. v. Rockport-Fulton Independent School District

NUMBER 13-24-00171-CV

                           COURT OF APPEALS

                  THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                    CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG


DON JACKSON CONSTRUCTION,
INC.,                                                                    Appellant,

                                         v.

ROCKPORT-FULTON
INDEPENDENT SCHOOL
DISTRICT,                                                                 Appellee.


             ON APPEAL FROM THE 36TH DISTRICT COURT
                   OF ARANSAS COUNTY, TEXAS


                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

                 Before Justices Silva, Cron, and Fonseca
                 Memorandum Opinion by Justice Fonseca

      This accelerated interlocutory appeal arises from payment disputes regarding

various construction entities, including appellant Don Jackson Construction, Inc. (Don

Jackson), for repair work completed to fix damage caused by Hurricane Harvey. Don

Jackson argues that the trial court improperly granted appellee Rockport-Fulton
Independent School District’s (RFISD)1 motion for summary judgment and improperly

denied its own summary judgment motion based on wrongly finding RFISD had

governmental immunity. RFISD urges that the trial court’s decision be upheld and that its

governmental immunity was not waived under Texas Local Government Code Chapter

271 or Texas Education Code Section 44.031. We conclude that the trial court did not err

in finding that RFISD maintained its immunity because there was no evidence before the

trial court that the RFISD school board voted to approve any contract authorizing the

Regional Pool Alliance (RPA) to act on its behalf. We therefore affirm.

                                      I.      BACKGROUND

       The RPA is a distinct intergovernmental unit that was created to help governmental

entities perform a variety of services. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 791.011, .013, .025. The

RPA was created by the “Interlocal Agreement,” which authorized the RPA to perform a

variety of functions, including providing “property or other loss coverage.” The RPA

functioned by its member governmental units pooling resources together “to finance,

spread, and mitigate their risk of liability or casualty.” The agreement stated that it did not

“create a self insurance pool” but was instead “an agreement to cooperate in the

performance of governmental functions.” The agreement further stated that the RPA

could neither sue nor be sued and provided for the potential addition of further members.

The agreement also authorized the RPA as needed to “employ personnel and

independent contractors” and “[third] parties whose services are necessary to complete

the governmental functions contemplated herein.”

       The parties dispute whether RFISD joined as a member of the RPA. The only

evidence in the record in this matter shows that the RPA was created by the “Interlocal


       1 RFISD was initially known as Aransas County Independent School District.


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Agreement” but does not show any affirmative action by RFISD adopting the agreement

or approving any other contract related to the RPA. Regardless, the record does show

the RPA hired Don Jackson as a general contractor to perform repairs throughout

Aransas County at a variety of buildings, including RFISD property, and signed several

contracts with Don Jackson that included different RFISD buildings within the scope of

work. After performing work, Don Jackson claimed the RPA failed to pay for completed

labor.

         Don Jackson initially sought relief against RFISD and the RPA in an arbitration

with the American Arbitration Association. RFISD filed a plea to the jurisdiction seeking

dismissal pursuant to governmental immunity. After the arbitration panel denied the plea

to the jurisdiction and the claims were resolved in Don Jackson’s favor, RFISD filed suit

against Don Jackson seeking a declaratory judgment that it maintained its governmental

immunity under Chapter 271 from breach of contract claims. Relatedly, RFISD argued it

was also immune to Don Jackson’s quantum meruit, promissory estoppel, and

respondeat superior claims. RFISD filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the

arbitration panel lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine immunity, that the trial

court should find RFISD immune because it did not execute a contract directly with Don

Jackson, and that the RPA lacked authority to execute a contract on RFISD’s behalf.

RFISD further noted that Don Jackson settled its claims with the RPA for $1.1 million.

         Don Jackson responded to RFISD’s motion by reasserting the relationship

between RFISD and the RPA, and emphasizing that the RPA was authorized by the

Interlocal Agreement to contract on RFISD’s behalf. Don Jackson argued that the

contracts between itself and the RPA fulfill the requirements of Chapter 271 and that each

was executed on behalf of RFISD. Don Jackson highlighted the many times RFISD was


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referred to as a “member” of the RPA, and it noted the RPA’s actions indicating it was

acting as RFISD’s agent without RFISD objecting.

      Don Jackson also filed its own motion for summary judgment reasserting the same

arguments regarding the RPA acting as RFISD’s agent. Don Jackson also asserted that

the arbitration panel had already previously found RFISD’s immunity was waived. It

attached an affidavit from its vice president indicating that Don Jackson had entered into

the contracts with the RPA, who, in turn, entered into the contracts for the benefit of

RFISD. The affidavit also contained testimony that Don Jackson worked closely with

RFISD during the construction, including via direct telephone and email communication

and weekly meetings to discuss the status of each project. It also attached performance

and payment bonds that Don Jackson executed listing RFISD as a co-owner of the

properties with the RPA. Don Jackson further attached a letter from the RPA to the various

insurers which referred to RFISD as a participating member and to the lack of payment

for damage to RFISD properties.

      RFISD responded to Don Jackson’s summary judgment motion by reasserting that

the RPA was the only party to any contract with Don Jackson and that the RPA contracted

with Don Jackson for its own benefit. It asserted that any incidental benefit to RFISD did

not waive its immunity. Don Jackson replied that this Court’s prior decision in Regional

Pool Alliance v. NorthStar Recovery Services, No. 13-21-00045-CV, 2022 WL 1412362,

at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg May 5, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.), indicated

RFISD was a member of the RPA and that the RPA acted pursuant to the Interlocal

Agreement. It continued to assert that the waiver of immunity only required a contract to

be executed on behalf of an entity.

      On April 2, 2024, the trial court signed an order granting RFISD’s summary


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judgment motion and denying Don Jackson’s motion. In doing so, the trial court found

that RFISD retained its governmental immunity from the claims asserted in arbitration and

was enjoined from further pursuing the claims. This appeal followed.

                                      II.    ANALYSIS

       Don Jackson argues RFISD’s immunity was waived under Chapter 271 because

the RPA was RFISD’s agent when it contracted with Don Jackson.

A.     Appeal from Arbitration

       Arbitration awards are typically conclusive, and we indulge every reasonable

presumption to uphold these awards. See Xtria L.L.C. v. Int’l Ins. All., 286 S.W.3d 583,

591 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, pet. denied). Generally, even mistakes of law or fact

“will not justify vacating an arbitrator’s award.” Id. However, “[b]ecause immunity bears

on the trial court’s jurisdiction to stay or compel arbitration, and to enforce an arbitration

award in a judgment against a local government, a court must decide whether

governmental immunity is waived.” S.A. River Auth. v. Aus. Bridge & Road, L.P., 601

S.W.3d 616, 626 (Tex. 2020). Arbitrators cannot confer jurisdiction on a trial court and

thus cannot determine governmental immunity because of the inherent subject-matter

jurisdiction questions raised. Id. at 627–28.

       Accordingly, we do not defer to the arbitration’s decision here. See id.

B.     Standard of Review

       Political subdivisions of the State, such as school districts, are generally immune

from suit unless immunity has been clearly and unambiguously waived by the legislature.

See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.034; City of Houston v. Hou. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 549

S.W.3d 566, 576 (Tex. 2018). If there are competing summary judgment motions, as here,

then “each party bears the burden of establishing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter


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of law.” Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners Ass’n, 556 S.W.3d 274, 278 (Tex. 2018)

(quoting City of Garland v. Dall. Morning News, 22 S.W.3d 351, 356 (Tex. 2000)). It is our

duty in such cases to review all legal issues presented and “render the judgment that the

trial court should have rendered.” Id. (quoting Dall. Morning News, 22 S.W.3d at 356).

Therefore, each party must show that there is no genuine issue of material fact to prevail.

Id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c)). We review an order granting summary judgment de

novo. Hillis v. McCall, 602 S.W.3d 436, 439 (Tex. 2020).

C.     Discussion

       Chapter 271 waives immunity for “[a] local governmental entity that is

authorized . . . to enter into a contract and that enters into a contract subject to this

subchapter.” TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 271.152. A “contract subject to this subchapter” is

“a written contract stating the essential terms of the agreement for providing goods or

services to the local governmental entity that is properly executed on behalf of the local

governmental entity.” Id. § 271.151(2)(A). School districts are authorized to enter

interlocal contracts. See TEX. EDUC. CODE § 44.031(a)(4). Independent school districts

such as RFISD enter contracts via their board of trustees or they can delegate authority

to their superintendent to enter contracts. See id. § 11.1511(c)(4).

       It is undisputed that the contracts at issue are in writing and contain the essential

terms of the agreements. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 271.151(2)(A). Instead, the parties

dispute whether such contracts were properly executed on behalf of RFISD. See id. Don

Jackson contends that, despite RFISD not being a party to the contracts, the contracts

were executed on its behalf because RFISD was a member of the RPA and the RPA was

authorized by the Interlocal Agreement to act on behalf of its members. See TEX. EDUC.

CODE § 44.031(a)(4). It also contends that the fact that RFISD was listed on performance


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and payment bonds for the projects also indicates the RPA was authorized to bind RFISD.

Conversely, RFISD argues that only the school board or superintendent can validly

execute a contract on its behalf and therefore the RPA’s contracts with Don Jackson

cannot waive immunity for RFISD as it was not validly executed by either entity. See id.

§ 11.1511(c)(4).

       The Texas Supreme Court has noted that the waiver language in Section 271.152

only requires contracts be executed “on behalf of” local government entities, rather than

“by” such entities, and that this language is a legislative acknowledgement that contracts

“are not typically signed by all members of the entity’s governing authority.” El Paso Educ.

Initiative, Inc. v. Amex Props., LLC, 602 S.W.3d 521, 533 (Tex. 2020) (quoting TEX. LOC.

GOV’T CODE § 271.151(A)). However, as RFISD points out, the Supreme Court also held

a contract is only properly executed “when it is executed in accord with the statutes and

regulations prescribing that authority”; that is, “only in the manner the legislature has

authorized.” Id. at 532. RFISD contends the lack of direct action by its board or

superintendent to directly authorize a contract with Don Jackson means it does not

comport with what the legislature authorized. See id.

       As we held in several recent matters, the RPA was authorized to hire third parties

as needed for the entities on whose behalf it obtained insurance coverage. See Aransas

County v. W. Steel Co., ___S.W.3d___, 2026 WL 691884, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg Mar. 12, 2026, no pet. h.); Aransas County v. Northstar Recovery

Servs., No. 13-25-00159-CV, 2026 WL 700009, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg Mar. 12, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.); Rockport-Fulton Indep. Sch. Dist. v.

Northstar Recovery Servs., No. 13-25-00168-CV, 2026 WL 698279, at *1 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 12, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). Therefore, undisputed


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evidence showing that RFISD approved the Interlocal Agreement or otherwise appointed

the RPA to hire third parties would be sufficient to waive immunity. See W. Steel Co.,

2026 WL 691884, at *1; Northstar Recovery Servs., 2026 WL 700009, at *1; Rockport-

Fulton Indep. Sch. Dist., 2026 WL 698279, at *1.

       However, based on our review of the record before the trial court, there is no direct

evidence showing RFISD authorized the Interlocal Agreement or appointed the RPA as

its agent. The record only indicates:

       • Hurricane Harvey damaged RFISD’s buildings;

       • the RPA hired Don Jackson to repair RFISD’s buildings;

       • RFISD oversaw Don Jackson’s repairs of these buildings; and

       • documentation indicated RFISD was an owner of these buildings.

While there is circumstantial evidence that would seem to hint at the probability of RFISD

being a member of the RPA, this evidence fails to transcend mere suspicion and is “so

slight as to make any inference a guess” and thus is no evidence. See Ford Motor Co. v.

Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004). The parties acting as though RFISD were a

member of the RPA does not demonstrate RFISD’s approval of the Interlocal Agreement,

or any other agreement. Because Texas law requires that a contract be “properly

executed” on behalf of RFISD to bind it, merely creating the implication that RFISD was

a member of the RPA is not enough to waive RFISD’s immunity. See El Paso Educ.

Initiative, Inc., 602 S.W.3d at 532–33; TEX. EDUC. CODE §§ 44.031(a)(4), 11.1511(c)(4).

Consequently, Don Jackson’s presentment of the Interlocal Agreement unsigned by the

RFISD is insufficient to create a factual dispute absent evidence that RFISD voted on or

approved the agreement.




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       Likewise, the mere fact that the RFISD owned the buildings that Don Jackson

repaired and that it was involved in the construction remediation process is not evidence

that RFISD’s board approved any document authorizing the RPA to act on its behalf.

While it stretches credibility to claim that the RPA hired Don Jackson to repair RFISD’s

property for its own benefit, this Court’s job is not to sit in the role of factfinder. Instead,

we review the record as presented and render the judgment the trial court should have.

See Tarr, 556 S.W.3d at 278. Based on this record, there is no genuine dispute of material

fact as there is no evidence showing RFISD’s board or superintendent “properly

executed” any contract authorizing the RPA to act on its behalf. See id.; TEX. LOC. GOV’T

CODE § 271.151(2)(A); TEX. EDUC. CODE § 44.031(a)(4).

       We overrule Don Jackson’s sole issue.

                                     III.   CONCLUSION

       We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                  YSMAEL D. FONSECA
                                                                  Justice

Delivered and filed on the
9th day of April, 2026.




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