Executive Workspace–abc–preston Road, LLC A/K/A Executive Workspace–preston Road, LLC; Executive Workspace, LLC; Executive Workspace–preston Trail, LLC; Executive Workspace-Hillcrest, LLC; Executive Workspace-Abc-Tollway, LLC; And Executive Workspacefrisco Station, LLC v. Reserve Capital–preston Grove Spe, LLC
Docket 25-0074
Court of record · Indexed in NoticeRegistry archive · AI-enriched for research
- Filed
- Jurisdiction
- Texas
- Court
- Texas Supreme Court
- Type
- Lead Opinion
- Case type
- Civil
- Disposition
- Denied
- Docket
- 25-0074
Petition for review from the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas, with a motion for rehearing denied by the Supreme Court of Texas.
Summary
Justice Young filed a short opinion respecting the Court’s denial of rehearing in a petition for review concerning the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA). He explains that the Court has rarely authoritatively construed TUFTA and that many lower and federal courts have had to make independent interpretations. Justice Young concluded this particular case is a poor vehicle to resolve the broader statutory question—whether terminating a contract right to future payments can be a fraudulent transfer—because the record is highly fact-specific. For those reasons the Court denied rehearing and declined to take the case for further guidance on TUFTA.
Issues Decided
- Whether the termination of a contractual right to future payments may constitute a fraudulent transfer of an asset under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA).
- Whether this particular case is an appropriate vehicle for the Texas Supreme Court to resolve broad questions about TUFTA's scope.
Court's Reasoning
Justice Young noted that the Court has seldom construed TUFTA and many federal and lower-state courts have filled the gap. He observed the record in this case is fact-intensive and thus unlikely to produce guidance applicable across many TUFTA disputes. Because the case would not materially advance the State's broader TUFTA jurisprudence, the Court appropriately denied rehearing and elected not to grant review.
Authorities Cited
- Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA), Chapter 24, Business & Commerce CodeBus. & Com. Code Ch. 24
- Janvey v. GMAG, LLC592 S.W.3d 125 (Tex. 2019)
- Janvey v. Golf Channel, Inc.487 S.W.3d 560 (Tex. 2016)
Parties
- Petitioner
- Executive Workspace–ABC–Preston Road, LLC a/k/a Executive Workspace–Preston Road, LLC; Executive Workspace, LLC; Executive Workspace–Preston Trail, LLC; Executive Workspace–Hillcrest, LLC; Executive Workspace–ABC–Tollway, LLC; Executive Workspace–Frisco Station, LLC
- Respondent
- Reserve Capital–Preston Grove SPE, LLC
- Judge
- Justice Evan A. Young
Key Dates
- Opinion filed
- 2026-04-10
What You Should Do Next
- 1
Consider alternative appellate options
Parties may evaluate whether any procedural path remains in the state courts or whether factual development could produce a better vehicle for Texas Supreme Court review in a future case.
- 2
Assess case-specific remedies
The parties should consult counsel to determine remaining remedies or enforcement options based on the court of appeals' decision and the existing record.
- 3
Monitor for cases raising broad TUFTA questions
Litigants and counsel interested in definitive guidance should watch for other TUFTA cases with cleaner records that the Texas Supreme Court might take to clarify the law.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What did the Texas Supreme Court decide?
- The Court denied rehearing and declined to take the case to issue a broad ruling about TUFTA because the record is highly fact-specific and unlikely to provide generally useful guidance.
- What issue was at the center of the dispute?
- The main question was whether ending a contractual right to future payments can be treated as a fraudulent transfer of an asset under TUFTA.
- Who is affected by this decision?
- The immediate parties are the listed petitioners and respondent, and more broadly, lower courts and litigants seeking authoritative Texas Supreme Court guidance on TUFTA may be affected because this denial leaves some uncertainty.
- Can the parties seek further review?
- The opinion records denial of rehearing by the Texas Supreme Court; further federal review would not apply because this is a state-court decision and no additional state supreme-court review is available.
The above suggestions and answers are AI-generated for informational purposes only. They may contain errors. NoticeRegistry assumes no responsibility for their accuracy. Consult a qualified attorney before relying on them.
Full Filing Text
Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 25-0074
══════════
Executive Workspace–ABC–Preston Road, LLC a/k/a Executive
Workspace–Preston Road, LLC; Executive Workspace, LLC;
Executive Workspace–Preston Trail, LLC; Executive Workspace–
Hillcrest, LLC; Executive Workspace–ABC–Tollway, LLC; and
Executive Workspace–Frisco Station, LLC,
Petitioners,
v.
Reserve Capital–Preston Grove SPE, LLC,
Respondent
═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════
Statement of JUSTICE YOUNG respecting the denial of the motion
for rehearing.
This Court has had fewer opportunities to authoritatively construe
the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act than one might expect. By
my count, only eleven of our opinions even mention that important statute,
which is commonly called “TUFTA” and is codified as Chapter 24 of the
Business and Commerce Code. By contrast, the Fifth Circuit has resolved
scores of TUFTA cases, and about twenty since we last did so in 2019.
Unsurprisingly, when this Court has substantively addressed TUFTA, it
has often been by way of certified questions from the Fifth Circuit. See,
e.g., Janvey v. GMAG, LLC, 592 S.W.3d 125 (Tex. 2019); Janvey v. Golf
Channel, Inc., 487 S.W.3d 560 (Tex. 2016).
Given that this state law seems to arise so much more often in
federal court, it is understandable that the Fifth Circuit sometimes finds it
beneficial to solicit authoritative guidance rather than to continually make
Erie guesses that may turn out to be wrong. The lack of more frequent
TUFTA precedents from this Court has often left lower state courts and
federal courts applying Texas law to chart their own course.
This case underscores just how overdue our guidance in construing
TUFTA has become. The court of appeals below, in resolving the questions
presented, largely relied on federal Erie guesses and a patchwork of Texas
court-of-appeals decisions. And the litigants in this Court were left to rely
on decisions from courts across the country to make their arguments.
On the other hand, despite the seven-year gap, it is reasonable to
expect the Court to adhere to its usual practice of granting review only if
doing so will advance the ball not just for a particular case but for the
State’s jurisprudence as a whole. I do not suggest that taking this case
could offer nothing for the larger TUFTA jurisprudence. But because it
arises from a distinctive and highly fact-intensive record, this case may not
generate much broadly applicable guidance even if we address the issue it
presents: whether the termination of a contractual right to future payments
may constitute the fraudulent “transfer” of an “asset” under TUFTA. This
case is therefore less than an ideal vehicle for us to resolve the statutory
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questions presented, and so it is perhaps not surprising that the Court
denied this petition and now elects not to grant the motion for rehearing.
TUFTA cases that will be of clear jurisprudential import do exist,
of course. I hope that litigants will bring them to this Court to help us
develop this area of law, which is unquestionably important to our
State’s jurisprudence. When they do, I also hope and expect the Court
to be quite receptive to granting review.
Evan A. Young
Justice
OPINION FILED: April 10, 2026
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