In Re Commitment of Jose Arredondo, Jr. v. .

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                     San Antonio, Texas
                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                        No. 04-25-00235-CV

                       IN RE COMMITMENT OF Jose ARREDONDO, Jr.

                    From the 451st Judicial District Court, Kendall County, Texas
                                       Trial Court No. 24-241
                            Honorable Kirsten Cohoon, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:       Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice

Sitting:          Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
                  Irene Rios, Justice
                  Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: April 8, 2026

AFFIRMED

           A jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant Jose Arredondo, Jr. is a sexually

violent predator (SVP). See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.003(a). The trial court

adjudged Arredondo as a SVP and civilly committed him for sex-offender treatment and

supervision. See id. § 841.081. Arredondo timely appealed. In one issue, Arredondo contends

the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to include in the jury charge an instruction that

expert testimony is just like any other testimony. We affirm.

           The only two witnesses to testify at trial were Arredondo and Darrel Turner, Ph.D., a

psychologist retained by the State to perform an abnormal behavioral evaluation on Arredondo.

At the jury charge conference, Arredondo requested the following instruction:
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        You have heard opinion testimony on certain technical subjects from a person
        referred to as an expert witness. Some of the testimony before you was in the form
        of opinions about certain technical subjects. Consider expert testimony just like
        any other testimony. You may accept it or reject it. You may give it as much
        weight as you think it deserves, considering the witness’ education and experience,
        the reasons for the opinion, and all the other evidence in the case.

Arredondo argued that because so much of the evidence is based on expert opinion, it is important

to let the jury know that Turner’s testimony should be considered just like any other type of

testimony. Arredondo asserted that his proposed instruction has been used in other jurisdictions,

including California. The State responded that Arredondo’s proposed instruction was a comment

on the weight of the evidence and that it was not supported by Texas law. The trial court refused

Arredondo’s proposed instruction.

        On appeal, Arredondo recognizes the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in Davidson v.

Wallingford, 32 S.W. 1030, 1033 (Tex. 1895), but he argues that Davidson is distinguishable. In

that case, the court held:

        We are of opinion that the court also erred in singling out Mrs. Bickford by name,
        and charging the jury that they were the judges of her credibility and the weight to
        be given to her testimony, although the charge was accompanied by the instruction
        that they were also the judges of the credibility of all the other witnesses. The court
        should simply have charged that the jury were the judges of the credibility of the
        witnesses and the weight of the evidence. The effect of the instruction was to lead
        the jury to believe that there was more question as to the credibility of the witness
        who was named than as to that of the other witnesses. Whether such was the fact
        or not was a matter solely for the determination of the jury, without any intimation,
        either direct or indirect, as to the opinion of the judge.

Id.

        Arredondo contends that Davidson is distinguishable because his proposed instruction did

not single out Turner by name. Arredondo fails to appreciate that only two witnesses testified at

trial, and the only expert witness was Turner. Therefore, the instruction Arredondo requested

would have effectively singled out Turner’s testimony. Instead, the jury charge in this case — in




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accordance with Davidson and the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure — instructed the jury, “[y]ou

are to make up your own minds about the facts. You are the sole judges of the credibility of the

witnesses and the weight to give their testimony but on matters of law, you must follow all of my

instructions.” See TEX. R. CIV. P. 226a, see also id. R. 277 (“The court shall not in its charge

comment directly on the weight of the evidence . . . .”); Davidson, 32 S.W. at 1033. Under

Davidson and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 226a, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

refusing Arredondo’s requested instruction. See Thota v. Young, 366 S.W.3d 678, 687 (Tex. 2012)

(“We review a trial court’s decision to submit or refuse a particular instruction [in its charge] under

an abuse of discretion standard of review.”). We overrule Arrendondo’s sole issue.

       We affirm the trial court’s order of civil commitment.



                                                   Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice




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