In Re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., D/B/A "Chase Bank" v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-25-00681-CV

                                   COURT OF APPEALS

                       THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                          CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG


        IN RE JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. D/B/A CHASE BANK


                      ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS


                               MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Peña and Fonseca
                 Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña1

        By petition for writ of mandamus, relator JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. d/b/a Chase

Bank (Chase) asserts that the trial court 2 abused its discretion by issuing a sanction and

contempt order against Chase because: (1) the court lacked personal jurisdiction over


         1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not

required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R.
47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).
         2 This original proceeding arises from trial court cause number 2020-DCL-05416-I in the 445th

District Court of Cameron County, Texas, and the respondent is the Honorable Gloria Rincones. See id. R.
52.2.
Chase; (2) the order lacked legal authorization and violated a statutory cap; and (3) the

order was based on Chase’s alleged failure to comply with an invalid subpoena. We

conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus in part and deny it in part.

                                   I.     BACKGROUND

       The underlying lawsuit involves the ownership of two trusts. In their “Third

Amended Petition,” Stacy Layne Zahorsky individually and as guardian for Beth Ann

Walters, and Tracy Lynn Schanbacher filed suit against Annette Pearson, Betty Bruce,

Tammy LaFawn Schanbacher, Burrell L. Walters III, and Douglas F. Walters seeking a

declaratory judgment regarding the ownership of the Walters 1995 Children’s Trust

(Children’s Trust), and the Burrell L. Walters Jr. Family Trust (Family Trust). On April 18,

2023, Stacy and Tracy issued a “Notice of Intention to Take Deposition by Written

Questions” to Chase along with a subpoena duces tecum requesting it to produce “A

COMPLETE COPY of all financial records including signature cards, account

applications, records regarding beneficiary designations and statements” for the

Children’s Trust under two separate bank account numbers. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 176, 200,

205; TEX. FIN. CODE § 59.006 (governing the discovery of customer records from financial

institutions). Chase thereafter produced some but not all the requested records.

       On August 10, 2023, several parties filed a motion for the appointment of a

successor trustee for the Children’s Trust. According to the motion, Tammy had served

as its trustee but failed to comply with her duties of disclosure and committed a breach of

trust. The parties requested the trial court to appoint Matthew Badders as successor

trustee. By its August 28, 2023 order, the trial court removed Tammy as trustee of the

Children’s Trust and appointed Badders as successor trustee. Badders accepted the


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appointment. On July 22, 2024, several of the trust beneficiaries requested Badders’s

assistance in obtaining information for them, including information that Chase failed to

provide in response to the subpoena at issue.

       On July 23, 2024, Badders’s counsel sent a letter to Chase asserting that it had

“failed to fully comply” with the trial court’s August 28, 2023 order appointing Badders as

successor trustee because, although Chase had added Badders as a trustee on the

account and issued him a checkbook for the account, “[c]orrespondence continues to be

delivered to the now-removed prior trustee,” and “[m]ore importantly, [Chase] refuses to

acknowledge valid negotiable instruments drawn on the account.” Badders asserted that

the consequence of this refusal “nearly resulted in a lapse of a decades-old life insurance

policy in the amount of $750,000.” The letter stated that:

       Officers of [Chase] are unable to provide any information beyond mention
       of a “litigation hold” on the account, with no explanation as to what that is,
       what it means for your account holder (our client, the Trustee)[,] why it is
       still there, or how to remove it. Instead, the most recent response from your
       officer at the branch on 1000 Basse Rd, San Antonio, Texas, was to the
       effect of “we don’t have to comply with Court orders because we are not a
       party in that case[.]” If that truly is your organization’s position on the matter,
       please confirm, because we can easily make [Chase] a party to the case.
       Then, your legal counsel will have the opportunity to explain to [the trial
       court] your theory on why you are not subject to [the court’s] jurisdiction. We
       expect [the court] will disagree.

               Instead, we would like a written response within thirty (30) days of
       this correspondence as to your position on the matter. Is our client or is our
       client not validly authorized on the account? If not, what must be done in
       your opinion (reserving the right to disagree if it conflicts with Texas law) to
       obtain valid authorization? What is a “litigation hold” and how may it be
       removed so that the Trustee can close its accounts and discontinue doing
       business with you?

             Second, and equally important, the parties to the case (including your
       account holder, the Trustee) have requested the records identified on this
       enclosure through a validly-served Subpoena Duces Tecum on April 18,


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      2023. We received only a partial response. It is partial to the extent the
      following records are missing without explanation:

             (1)    Chase Account [] records from 08/01/2013–12/31/2013

             (2)    Chase Account [] records from 03/27/2014–06/25/2014

             (3)    Chase Account [] records from 11/29/2014–12/31/2014

             (4)    Chase Account [] records from 02/28/2015–05/31/2016

      We understand that financial institutions have document retention policies;
      however, the production gaps do not appear consistent with a document
      retention policy. If we are able to obtain these records, or confirmation from
      Chase that these records do not exist or never existed, then court
      involvement on this point will not be necessary.

      Chase did not respond to Badders’s letter or otherwise address the foregoing

matters. Accordingly, on August 27, 2024, Badders filed a “Motion to Direct [Chase] to

Release Trust Assets and Issue Citation to Show Cause.” This motion requested the trial

court to order Chase “to cooperate with [the trial court’s] prior orders, cooperate with

previous discovery, and release assets of the Trust.” This motion recounted, inter alia,

that Chase had placed a “litigation hold” on the account and had refused to honor

Badders’ payment for the life insurance policy, and that Chase had failed to produce the

Children’s Trust records as requested. The motion sought to compel Chase to produce

the missing financial records and to release all funds belonging to the Children’s Trust.

Badders further sought to sanction Chase in the amount of $6,700 for fees incurred in

filing the motion, and to sanction Chase in the amount of $750,000 for contempt of court.

      On February 12, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on Badders’s motion. Chase

asserts that notice of the hearing was served on its registered agent; however, “due to an

internal miscommunication from the recipient of the notice, Chase’s attorneys were

unaware of the hearing and did not attend.” On February 14, 2025, the trial court granted

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Badders’s motion and issued an “Order Directing [Chase] to Release Trust Assets and

Order Granting Sanctions.” The order states that the trial court appointed Badders as

successor trustee; that Badders presented a certified copy of the appointment order to

Chase; and that Chase had “failed to fully comply with the [appointment] Order, because

[it] has refused to release” certain assets of the trust to Badders, causing substantial harm

and risk of harm. The February 14 order recited that the clerk had issued citation to Chase

on January 8, 2025; Chase was served with citation on January 16, 2025; and Chase was

“in contempt of Court for its failure to fully comply with the [appointment] Order and its

failure to appear and answer duly-issued and properly served citation.”

          The February 14 order further stated that on April 18, 2023, Chase was served

with a subpoena duces tecum pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 176; that Chase

failed to fully comply with the subpoena; and that the parties made reasonable efforts to

confer with Chase, yet Chase failed to fully comply with the discovery requests which

constituted “a bad faith abuse of the discovery process and a refusal to comply with the

[appointment] Order.” The order recited that Badders had incurred reasonable and

necessary attorney’s fees and costs in connection with the discovery in the amount of

$6,700. The order found that Chase was properly served with notice of the hearing but

failed to appear or respond and had defaulted and failed to show good cause. The order

required Chase to: (1) produce the discovery at issue; (2) deliver the funds in a specified

account and any other funds in its possession in the name of the Children’s Trust to

Badders; (3) pay $6,700 to Badders as sanctions under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure

215.2(b) and 215.3; and (4) pay $750,000 to Badders “as a sanction [for] its contempt of

court.”


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        On December 29, 2025, Chase filed this petition for writ of mandamus. Chase also

filed an emergency motion for temporary relief seeking to stay the trial court’s February

14, 2025 sanction order and any further proceedings against it. We granted Chase’s

emergency motion, and we ordered all proceedings against Chase stayed pending the

resolution of this original proceeding or further order of the Court. See TEX. R. APP. P

52.10. We requested the real parties in interest to file a response to the petition for writ of

mandamus. See id. R. 52.2, 52.4, 52.8. Badders filed a response in support of the trial

court’s order. 3

                                            II.     MANDAMUS

        Mandamus relief is an extraordinary remedy available only when (1) the trial court

clearly abused its discretion, and (2) the party seeking relief lacks an adequate remedy

on appeal. In re Ill. Nat’l Ins., 685 S.W.3d 826, 834 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding); In re

Liberty Cnty. Mut. Ins., 679 S.W.3d 170, 174 (Tex. 2023) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).

“A court abuses its discretion if no evidence supports the finding on which its ruling rests

and if the court could reasonably have reached only a contrary conclusion.” In re

AutoZoners, LLC, 694 S.W.3d 219, 223 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). We

conduct a “benefits-and-detriments analysis” to determine if the relator possesses an

adequate remedy at law. In re Auburn Creek Ltd. P’ship, 655 S.W.3d 837, 843 (Tex. 2022)

(orig. proceeding) (per curiam); see In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124,

136–37 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).




         3 Chase filed a motion to strike Badders’s response on grounds that it was untimely filed. Badders

filed a response to the motion to strike explaining the timing of its filing. After considering the motion, the
response, and the applicable law, we deny Chase’s motion to strike, and we consider Badders’s response
on the merits.

                                                      6
       As relevant to this case, contempt orders that do not involve confinement may be

reviewed by writ of mandamus. In re Long, 984 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. 1999) (orig.

proceeding) (per curiam) (on reh’g); In re Mittelsted, 661 S.W.3d 639, 647 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, orig. proceeding). Similarly, when a non-party has no right to

appeal, mandamus is appropriate. In re Monson L. Firm, LLC, 714 S.W.3d 256, 269 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2025, orig. proceeding); In re United Healthcare Ins., 652

S.W.3d 458, 461 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, orig. proceeding).

                              III.   PERSONAL JURISDICTION

       In its first issue, Chase asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by issuing

sanctions against it because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to do so. Chase argues that

it was not named and served as a party, it did not waive jurisdiction, and it did not make

a general appearance in the case. Badders asserts, in contrast, that the trial court

possessed jurisdiction over Chase because it is “undisputed” that Chase was served with

citation in connection with the motion to show cause, and further, Chase was served with

a subpoena regarding the deposition on written questions.

       “Non-party witnesses stand in a different position before the court than do parties

to the litigation, over whom the court has both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.”

In re Berry, 578 S.W.3d 173, 180 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2019, orig.

proceeding); see Haas v. George, 71 S.W.3d 904, 915 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no

pet.) (“Generally, a trial judge has control over only those parties properly before the

court.”). “To issue a valid and binding judgment or order, a court must have both subject-

matter jurisdiction over a case and personal jurisdiction over the party it purports to bind.”

In re Guardianship of Fairley, 650 S.W.3d 372, 379 (Tex. 2022). “For a trial court to have


                                              7
jurisdiction over a party, the party must be properly before the court in the pending

controversy as authorized by procedural statutes and rules.” In re Mask, 198 S.W.3d 231,

234 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, orig. proceeding). “Establishing personal jurisdiction

over a party requires citation issued and served in a manner provided for by law.”

Guardianship of Fairley, 650 S.W.3d at 380 (quotation omitted); see In re Tex. Prop. &

Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, No. 11-25-00191-CV, 2025 WL 2412844, at *6 (Tex. App.—

Eastland Aug. 21, 2025, orig. proceeding) (“Personal jurisdiction is invoked by a party’s

appearance before the court or by the proper service of process upon the party.”); In re

Suarez, 261 S.W.3d 880, 882–83 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, orig. proceeding) (“Generally,

a trial court does not have jurisdiction to enter a judgment or order against a respondent

unless the record shows proper service of citation on the respondent, or an appearance

by the respondent, or a written memorandum of waiver at the time the judgment or order

was entered.”).

       It is undisputed that Chase was duly served with a subpoena for a notice of

deposition and subpoena duces tecum. It is also uncontested that Chase’s registered

agent was served with citation and the motion to show cause before the hearing on

Badders’s motion. The record reflects that citation was issued and served in a manner

authorized by law. We therefore reject Chase’s contention that the trial court lacked

jurisdiction to issue the order or that the order was otherwise void due to lack of personal

jurisdiction. See Guardianship of Fairley, 650 S.W.3d at 380; In re Suarez, 261 S.W.3d

at 882-83; In re Mask, 198 S.W.3d at 234. Accordingly, we overrule Chase’s first issue.




                                             8
                                   IV.     SANCTIONS AND CONTEMPT

           In its second issue, Chase asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by

improperly sanctioning it without legal authorization and in violation of a statutory cap,

and Chase ultimately asserts that the trial court lacked authority to sanction it as a non-

party. 4

A.         Authorization

           Chase contends that the cited bases for the sanction order do not support it. Chase

contends that the sanction order cites Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 215.2(b) and 215.3

as grounds for the sanction, yet Badders’s motion for sanctions was premised on alleged

violations of Rules 215.1(b) and (c). Chase asserts that we are limited to reviewing the

sanction order based only on the grounds referenced in Badders’s motion. Chase’s

contention is founded on the general concept that the trial court has no authority to grant

relief not requested by the parties. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 301; Cunningham v. Parkdale

Bank, 660 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tex. 1983) (“[A] party may not be granted relief in the

absence of pleadings to support that relief.”); Guillory v. Dietrich, 598 S.W.3d 284, 294

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, pet. denied); see also In re S.M.G., No. 05-22-00937-CV, 2023

WL 3963992, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 13, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.).

           Chase’s argument misconstrues the nature and breadth of Badders’s motion. In

the motion, Badders alleged that Chase failed to comply with the trial court’s August 28,

2023 order by adding him as an additional trustee rather than a replacement trustee, by

placing a litigation hold on the account, and by failing to honor the trustee’s payment for

the insurance policy. Badders also alleged that Chase “only partially complied” with the


           4 We have reorganized some of Chase’s arguments in support of its second and third issues.


                                                     9
subpoena directed to it, and it “inexplicably omitted pages of records.” In the motion,

Badders did not merely seek sanctions against Chase for violations of Rules 215.1(b) and

(c) as Chase states. Instead, Badders also explicitly sought both sanctions and contempt

against Chase and expressly invoked the trial court’s inherent authority to impose

sanctions for bad faith abuse of the judicial process. We further note that Chase’s

contention also fails to consider the trial court’s authority to hold it in contempt based on

its failure to appear at the hearing on sanctions despite being duly served with citation.

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 21.002(b). We reject Chase’s narrow construction of Badders’s

motion.

B.     Sanction Against a Non-Party

       Chase contends that neither the rules cited by the trial court nor the rules by which

Badders requested relief grant the trial court authority to sanction a non-party like Chase.

We agree with Chase. The rules do not authorize the imposition of sanctions or expenses

against a non-party. In re Tex. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 2025 WL 2412844, at *5

(“[W]e have found no authority permitting a trial court to sanction a non-attorney, non-

party.”); In re Perrilloux, No. 05-19-01584-CV, 2020 WL 2092483, at *5 (Tex. App.—

Dallas May 1, 2020, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (mem. op.) (concluding that Rule

215.2(b) applies only to parties and Rule 215.2(c), which applies to non-parties, does not

authorize the court to issue sanctions in the form of reasonable expenses and attorney’s

fees); In re Suarez, 261 S.W.3d at 883 (noting that courts may sanction counsel, who are

non-parties; however “[w]e know of no other basis for sanctioning a non-party under the

rules”); In re White, 227 S.W.3d 234, 236–37 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, orig.

proceeding [mand. denied]) (concluding that Rule 215.2(b) does not authorize the trial


                                             10
court to impose sanctions on non-party deponents); Pope v. Davidson, 849 S.W.2d 916,

920 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding) (observing that Rule

215.2(b) does not contemplate sanctions against non-parties). Accordingly, we conclude

that the trial court abused its discretion by sanctioning Chase in the amount of $6,700.

C.     Statutory Cap for Contempt Fine

       The analysis is different for the $750,000 awarded to Badders “as a sanction [for

Chase’s] contempt of court.” That is because, though non-parties may not be sanctioned

for discovery violations under the cited rules, a trial court may hold a non-party in

contempt of court. See In re Tex. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 2025 WL 2412844, at *5;

In re Suarez, 261 S.W.3d at 883; In re Prince, No. 14-06-00895-CV, 2006 WL 3589484,

at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 12, 2006, orig. proceeding) (per curiam); Jefa

Co. v. Mustang Tractor & Equip. Co., 868 S.W.2d 905, 908 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 1994, writ denied).

       Chase asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by issuing a contempt fine

against it which exceeded the applicable statutory cap. Chase’s contention is founded on

the Texas Government Code which provides that: “The punishment for contempt of a

court other than a justice court or municipal court is a fine of not more than $500 or

confinement in the county jail for not more than six months, or both such a fine and

confinement in jail.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 21.002(b). This provision identifies punishments

allowed for criminal contempt; however, civil contempt orders are not limited by section

21.002(b). See In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 366 n. 9 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding); In

re Mittelsted, 661 S.W.3d at 656; see also TEX. GOV’T CODE § 21.002(e) (providing that

section 21.002 “does not affect a court’s power to confine a contemn[o]r to compel the


                                           11
contemn[o]r to obey a court order”); New Penn Fin. LLC v. Salvagio, No. 09-19-00157-

CV, 2021 WL 1306390, at *5 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Apr. 8, 2021, no pet.) (per curiam)

(mem. op.) (“A daily coercive fine is not limited by section 21.002(b), which governs

criminal contempt fines.”).

       The trial court’s order does not state whether the contempt was civil or criminal in

nature. In determining whether contempt is civil or criminal, we “examine the purpose

behind the contempt order.” In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d at 365. Civil contempt is “remedial

and coercive in nature,” and “the contemnor carries the keys to the jail cell in his or her

pocket since the confinement is conditioned on obedience with the court’s order.” Id. On

the other hand, “criminal contempt is punitive in nature—the contemnor is being punished

for some completed act which affronted the dignity and authority of the court.” Id.

(quotation omitted).

       Here, the trial court sanctioned Chase $750,000, payable to Badders, for contempt

of court. The trial court’s order was not remedial or coercive in nature, and the sanction

was not conditioned upon any future performance. Rather, the trial court’s order punishes

Chase for its completed actions. The trial court’s order was therefore criminal in nature,

rather than civil. See id. Thus, the sanction was limited by section 21.002(b). See In re

Mittelsted, 661 S.W.3d at 656; New Penn Fin. LLC, 2021 WL 1306390, at *5. Accordingly,

the trial court abused its discretion by assessing a fine for contempt against Chase in

excess of $500. See In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d at 365; In re Mittelsted, 661 S.W.3d at 648.

D.     Fine Payable to Badders

       Chase further asserts that the trial court erred by ordering the sanctions payable

to Badders. We agree. “[C]ivil damages may not be awarded to a private party as


                                            12
punishment for contempt because such damages are not a fine.” ASR 2620-2630

Fountainview, LP v. ASR 2620-2630 Fountainview GP, LLC, 582 S.W.3d 556, 566 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.); see Khan v. Valliani, 439 S.W.3d 528, 536–37

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Accordingly, the trial court abused its

discretion by ordering the sanctions payable to Badders.

E.     Summary

       In terms of sanctions and contempt, we conclude that the trial court abused its

discretion by sanctioning non-party Chase in the amount of $6,700. We determine that

the $750,000 fine assessed against Chase for contempt exceeded the $500 amount

authorized by the Texas Government Code. We further conclude that the trial court lacked

authority to order a fine payable to Badders as a private litigant. Accordingly, we sustain

Chase’s second issue in part and overrule it in part.

                                       V.   DISCOVERY

       In its third issue, Chase contends that the trial court abused its discretion by

attempting to enforce an invalid subpoena and otherwise abused its discretion regarding

the discovery at issue in this case.

A.     Validity of Subpoena

       Chase argues that the trial court abused its discretion by attempting to enforce an

invalid subpoena that was not properly before the trial court. Chase asserts that the notice

of deposition was not served ten days before the subpoena compelling production was

served. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 205.2 (“A notice to produce documents or tangible things

under Rule 205.3 must be served at least 10 days before the subpoena compelling

production is served.”). Chase’s contention fails to recognize that the subpoena at issue


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was propounded to it pursuant to Texas Finance Code section 59.006, which is the

exclusive method to obtain the compelled discovery of customer records from a financial

institution. See TEX. FIN. CODE § 59.006(a); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 30.007. This

section prevails over the rules of procedure regarding discovery. See TEX. FIN. CODE

§ 59.006(a); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 30.007; In re Tex. Dow Emps. Credit Union,

No. 13-24-00053-CV, 2024 WL 1301212, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar.

26, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op). Chase does not contend that the subpoena failed to comply

with the terms of the Texas Finance Code. We reject Chase’s contention that the

subpoena was invalid.

B.       Badders’s Ability to Seek Relief

         Chase further argues that the motion for sanctions and contempt “was not properly

before the court because Badders was not a party, intervenor, or otherwise before the

trial court such that he could properly file the Trustee’s Motion.” In support of its

contention, Chase cites Hodge v. Joyce W. Lindauer Att’y, PLLC, No. 06-21-00008-CV,

2021 WL 4527902, at *4 n.10 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Oct. 5, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.),

which it asserts “reject[ed] the contention that a successor representative automatically

steps into the shoes of a prior representative without specific legal authority providing as

such.”

         Chase’s argument exemplifies one of the reasons that it was sanctioned and held

in contempt in this case: it failed to acknowledge or adhere to the trial court’s August 28,

2023 order appointing Badders as a successor trustee. Specifically, as recounted in

Badders’s July 23, 2024 letter to Chase, Chase failed to comply with the August 28, 2023

order because it did not remove the prior trustee from the accounts, delivered


                                            14
correspondence to the prior trustee rather than Badders, and refused to acknowledge

negotiable instruments drawn on the account. The trial court’s August 28, 2023 order

appointing Badders as successor trustee has not been reversed or vacated. This order is

“specific legal authority” establishing Badders’s authority to act as representative of the

trust. See id. We conclude that Badders’s motion was properly before the trial court, and

we reject Chase’ contentions otherwise.

      Chase further asserts that Badders lacked standing to compel compliance with the

subpoena because it was issued by Stacy and Tracy. In support of this contention, Chase

cites Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 176.6(d), (e), and 215.1, which refer to the “party

requesting the subpoena” and the “discovering party” as those who could file a motion to

compel or motion for sanctions. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 176.6(d), (e), 215.1. Chase also cites

authority for the proposition that the party seeking discovery bears the responsibility to

obtain a hearing on the issue. See Klein & Assocs. Pol. Rels. v. Port Arthur Indep. Sch.

Dist., 92 S.W.3d 889, 894 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, pet. denied).

      Chase cites no authority that stands for the proposition that Badders lacked the

ability or standing to seek relief regarding the discovery at issue. See TEX. R. APP. P.

38.1(i). Moreover, Chase did not present this issue in the trial court proceedings. See id.

R. 33.1. Rather, it produced documents in response to the subpoena without objection.

Further, the record indicates that the parties and beneficiaries asked Badders for

assistance with obtaining these records or confirming that they do not exist. And Chase’s

contention fails to consider that Badders motion states that he, “as trustee, has also been

unable to obtain these records.” We reject Chase’s contentions regarding the trial court’s

ability to address Badders’s motion or the subpoena at issue.


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C.     Procedure

       Finally, Chase also asserts by its third issue that it was not provided with the

opportunity to comply with a discovery order because the order for compliance and finding

of contempt were issued in the same order. Chase’s contention fails to consider that the

trial court’s order was premised, in part, on Chase’s failure to abide by the trial court’s

August 28, 2023 order appointing Badders and not merely its failure to fully respond to

the subpoena. Further, Chase was provided with the opportunity to respond to Badders’s

motion to compel the discovery at issue; however, it did not attend the trial court hearing

on that matter even though it was duly cited and served. We disagree that the trial court’s

contempt order was issued in error for this reason.

D.     Summary

       We overrule Chase’s third issue.

                                   V.      CONCLUSION

       The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus,

the response filed by Badders, and the applicable law, is of the opinion that Chase has

met its burden to obtain mandamus relief, in part. Accordingly, we lift the stay previously

imposed in this case. We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus, in part,

and direct the trial court to vacate that portion of its order requiring Chase to pay $6,700

to Badders. We further direct the trial court to vacate its award of $750,000 payable to

Badders, and to modify its order to reflect the $500 statutory maximum fine for contempt

payable to the court rather than Badders. See, e.g., In re Kozinn, No. 03-23-00748-CV,

2024 WL 2855077, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin June 6, 2024, orig. proceeding [mand.




                                            16
denied]) (mem. op.). We deny all other relief sought. Our writ will issue only if the trial

court fails to act promptly in accordance with this memorandum opinion.

                                                              L. ARON PEÑA JR.
                                                              Justice


Delivered and filed on the
21st day of April, 2026.




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