In Re Nancy Vasquez and Bolivar Building and Contracting, LLC v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-26-00044-CV

                                   COURT OF APPEALS

                       THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                          CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG


                        IN RE NANCY VASQUEZ AND
                  BOLIVAR BUILDING AND CONTRACTING, LLC


                      ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS


                               MEMORANDUM OPINION

         Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Peña and West
                 Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña1

        By petition for writ of mandamus, relators Nancy Vasquez and Bolivar Building and

Contracting, LLC (BBC) assert that the trial court 2 abused its discretion by granting a


        1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not

required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R.
47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).
          2 This original proceeding arises from trial court cause number 2021-DCL-05478 in the 357th

District Court of Cameron County, Texas, and the respondent is the Honorable Israel Ramon, sitting by
assignment. See id. R. 52.2. By memorandum opinions issued this same date, we have denied two petitions
for writs of mandamus arising from this same trial court cause number. See In re Bolivar, No. 13-26-00188-
motion for leave to add third-party defendants which was “filed nearly five years into

litigation and just months before trial, where the addition of new parties would cause

unreasonable delay, prejudice the relators, and involve parties who are not indispensable

to the resolution of the case.” We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus.

                                       I.      BACKGROUND

       Based on the live pleadings, Vasquez and BBC filed suit against Randall Bolivar

and Bolivar Business Conglomerate, LLC on grounds that Vasquez was the sole owner

and member of BBC and its assets. She alleged that Bolivar incorporated BBC in 2006

but did not make capital contributions or operate the company and in 2007, she, Bolivar,

and two others executed an operating agreement stating that she was the only party to

make capital contributions and that she owned 100% of BBC. Vasquez alleged that after

Bolivar was convicted of murder in 2009, he signed a letter resigning from the company.

She asserted that Bolivar thereafter claimed ownership of BBC and all its assets by virtue

of fraudulent documents. She sought declaratory relief, recission, and the imposition of a

purchase money resulting trust, and she alleged causes of action including fraud, slander

to title, and trespass to try title. Bolivar filed an answer to relators’ lawsuit including

counterclaims for breach of fiduciary duty, self-dealing, fraud, theft, and wrongful

conversion. Bolivar claimed he owned BBC and that he never signed the operating

agreement or the resignation letter.

       On November 17, 2025, Bolivar filed a “Motion for Leave to File Third[-]Party

Petition” against various “third[-]party defendants.” At that time, trial was set for March 23,



CV, 2026 WL _____, at *_ (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. _, 2026, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.);
In re Bolivar, No. 13-26-00233-CV, 2026 WL _____, at *_ (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. _,
2026, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).


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2026. Bolivar sought to add Emilia Vasquez, who is Nancy’s mother; Ramiro Vasquez,

who is Nancy’s father; Jacqueline “Jackie” Vasquez, who is Nancy’s sister; and Javier

Perez, who is Jackie’s boyfriend. 3 Bolivar alleged that, “Through discovery and a diligent

investigation,” he had “obtained documents and information linking the third[-]party

defendants to the criminal, fraudulent, and malicious conduct of Vasquez.” He asserted

that “[t]he third[-]party defendants have fraudulently signed documents purporting to be

members and/or officers of the Company as well as engaged in activities not authorized

by Bolivar.” Regarding each of these potential parties, Bolivar alleged that:

    •   Emilia: signed the operating agreement as a member of BBC knowing that it was

        fraudulent, yet Vasquez’s testimony and discovery responses stated that Emilia

        was not a member of BBC;

    •   Ramiro: signed the operating agreement as a member of BBC knowing that it was

        fraudulent, yet Vasquez’s testimony and discovery responses stated that Ramiro

        was not a member of BBC, and as per Vasquez’s deposition, signed transfers of

        lien and a release of lien as president of BBC in 2011 and 2012;

    •   Jackie: requested a line of credit from Matt’s Cash and Carry on behalf of BBC “at

        some unknown time prior to this suit,” engaged in a building project in the name of

        BBC, submitted a fraudulent transfer of lien on real property owned by BBC in

        2022, filed a notice of protest to the appraisal district in 2023, and attempted to

        make a change to the BBC in 2025; and




        3 Bolivar also sought leave to file a third-party petition against a corporation, JAD Construction

Group; however, the trial court denied that request.


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   •   Perez: executed a notarized instrument in 2010 purporting to be a transfer of lien

       where he was identified as a managing partner of BBC.

Bolivar alleged that the foregoing acts “abetted, aided, and/or assisted Vasquez in

furtherance of her breach of fiduciary duty with self[-]dealing and/or fraudulent conduct.”

He stated that these individuals were liable to him “for all or part of the breach of fiduciary

duty with [self-dealing], fraud by forgery, and/or fraud by nondisclosure for particular

liability by assisting and encouraging the same.” Bolivar thus argued that they were

“indispensable parties.”

       Bolivar explained that he did not file his third-party petition within thirty days after

filing his original answer “because the extent of the third parties’ liabilities did not become

apparent until after a diligent investigation.” In this regard, Bolivar alleged that a temporary

restraining order and injunction, “Vasquez’s dilatory, evasive, and/or resistive tactics in

the discovery process,” and his failure to timely receive Vasquez’s fourth amended

petition hampered his ability to file the third-party petition earlier. Bolivar argued that

“[f]iling the third[-]party petition will not cause a delay and will not inconvenience the

parties because discovery has not been completed, and the matter is not set for trial for

more than [thirty] days.”

       The trial court held a pretrial hearing on December 10, 2025, wherein the parties

presented argument regarding Bolivar’s motion. At the hearing, the trial court referenced

the current trial setting, and stated that:

       We have a trial setting already that—I don’t know if you-all agreed, but I set
       it at the time that I—that I could. And if we—if I grant you leave and you add
       all these parties that you want to add that you already added without leave,
       you know, this is not going to allow them time to do discovery and this case
       is going to be reset to the fall. Because I’m not gonna—I’m not gonna—if I
       grant a motion for leave and add these parties, then, you know, they’re


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       going to have to do discovery and it’s unfair to them to bring them in and
       then you have to serve them again and then they’re going to have 20 days
       to respond, Monday next after 20 days and all that. That’s going to take us
       to almost February and, then, this case set for March. That’s not going to
       give them time to do discovery. Because as parties that you brought in as
       third-party defendants, they’re entitled to discovery and depositions and all
       that as to why they’re being brought in. So, that’s—that’s one concern that
       I don’t know if you-all have or not, but it would definitely move the trial.

       ....

       Once we get everybody served, and I’m hoping that it’s going to be in the
       next 30 days, maybe, once we get everybody, I’m going to enter a
       scheduling order. I’m going to expedite the proceeding in this case. I am
       going to allow—I’m going to have to vacate the setting for March 23rd.
       That’s canceled. That’s vacated. And, then, once I have all the parties in,
       then I’m going to have a very clear scheduling order on deadlines for
       discovery, deadlines for summary judgments and motions. And, then, once
       I clear all that, I’ll be able to give you a trial setting.

The trial court stated that he found that these individuals were “indispensable

parties . . . based on the actions that they took in support of the—of the plaintiff’s case.”

The trial court further vacated a subsequent setting to hear various motions based on its

ruling because “there’s people that are out that haven’t been served.” Following the

hearing, on January 7, 2026, the trial court signed an order granting Bolivar’s motion for

leave as to Emilia, Ramiro, Jackie, and Perez.

       This original proceeding ensued. We ordered the real parties in interest, Bolivar

and Bolivar Business Conglomerate, LLC, and any others whose interests might be

affected by the relief sought, to file a response to the petition for writ of mandamus. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 52.2, 52.4, 52.8. The Court received a response from Bolivar and a

response from Anna I. Aguilar “d/b/a Bolivar Building and Contracting, LLC, a sole

proprietorship.” Relators filed a reply to Bolivar’s response.




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       We turn our attention to pending motions. Bolivar filed a “Rule 12 Motion to Show

Authority to Prosecute Original Proceeding” asserting that counsel for relators lack the

authority to prosecute this original proceeding on behalf of BBC. Bolivar’s motion is

founded on his contention that he owns BBC and Vasquez does not. That is one of the

many issues that is being litigated in the underlying lawsuit. Accordingly, we deny

Bolivar’s motion.

       Aguilar filed a motion for leave to file her response to the petition for writ of

mandamus on grounds that it was not timely filed. However, relators filed a motion to

strike Aguilar’s response to the petition on grounds that Aguilar, an individual proceeding

pro se, is prohibited from representing BBC, a corporation. As stated previously, Aguilar

filed the response in her name “d/b/a” BBC as the “sole proprietor” of that company. Legal

entities, such as a corporation or a limited liability company, may generally appear in court

only through a licensed attorney. See Kunstoplast of Am. v. Formosa Plastics Corp., USA,

937 S.W.2d 455, 456 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam); Abraham v. Hernandez, 705 S.W.3d 416,

422 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2024, no pet.). Based on the foregoing, we deny Aguilar’s

motion for leave, and we grant relators’ motion to strike her response to the petition for

writ of mandamus.

       Finally, Bolivar filed a motion to strike and deny the petition for writ of mandamus

on grounds that relators provided “fraudulent” certificates of service for their pleadings in

this case. Bolivar similarly filed a motion to strike relators’ reply to his response to the

petition on grounds that it failed to comply with the appellate rules. We have examined

and carefully considered Bolivar’s motions, and we conclude they are without merit.

Accordingly, we deny them.



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                                    II.      MANDAMUS

       Mandamus relief is an extraordinary remedy available only when (1) the trial court

clearly abused its discretion, and (2) the party seeking relief lacks an adequate remedy

on appeal. In re Ill. Nat’l Ins., 685 S.W.3d 826, 834 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding); In re

Liberty Cnty. Mut. Ins., 679 S.W.3d 170, 174 (Tex. 2023) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).

“A court abuses its discretion if no evidence supports the finding on which its ruling rests

and if the court could reasonably have reached only a contrary conclusion.” In re

AutoZoners, LLC, 694 S.W.3d 219, 223 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). We

conduct a “benefits-and-detriments analysis” to determine if the relator possesses an

adequate remedy at law. In re Auburn Creek Ltd. P’ship, 655 S.W.3d 837, 843 (Tex. 2022)

(orig. proceeding) (per curiam); see In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124,

136–37 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).

       In accordance with the above tenets, mandamus relief may be granted if the trial

court abuses its discretion in rendering a decision regarding joinder. See In re Boyaki,

587 S.W.3d 479, 483 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, orig. proceeding); In re Corcoran, 401

S.W.3d 136, 139 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, orig. proceeding); In re Arthur

Andersen, LLP, 121 S.W.3d 471, 483 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig.

proceeding [mand. denied]).

                                      III.    JOINDER

       We review a ruling on the joinder of parties for an abuse of discretion. Crawford v.

XTO Energy, Inc., 509 S.W.3d 906, 910–11 (Tex. 2017); Hibernia Energy III, LLC v. Ferae

Naturae, LLC, 668 S.W.3d 745, 757 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.). The trial court

abuses its discretion when it acts without reference to guiding rules or principles or in an



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arbitrary or unreasonable manner. In re Kay, 715 S.W.3d 747, 750 (Tex. 2025) (orig.

proceeding) (per curiam). “An error of law or erroneous application of law to fact is an

abuse of discretion.” Id.

       “Joinder rests on the concept of judicial efficiency and the policy of providing full

and adequate relief to the parties.” In re Arthur Andersen LLP, 121 S.W.3d at 483. A trial

court’s decision on joinder should be based on practical considerations regarding what is

fair and orderly. In re State Line Fireworks, Inc., 387 S.W.3d 27, 31 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2012, orig. proceeding); In re Martin, 147 S.W.3d 453, 457 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont 2004, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (pet. denied); In re Arthur Andersen

LLP, 121 S.W.3d at 483. While the trial court may consider whether the joinder will delay

trial of the cause, the trial court should consider whether the delay would be reasonable

under the circumstances of the lawsuit, bearing in mind the history of the suit, and not

simply whether a delay will occur. In re State Line Fireworks, Inc., 387 S.W.3d at 31; In

re Martin, 147 S.W.3d at 457; In re Arthur Andersen LLP, 121 S.W.3d at 483.

                                       IV.    ANALYSIS

       As stated previously, relators assert that the trial court abused its discretion by

granting Bolivar’s motion for leave to add third-party defendants. Bolivar asserts

otherwise.

A.     Waiver

       Bolivar asserts that relators have waived their complaint that the trial court abused

its discretion in granting leave because they failed to object to Bolivar’s motion. However,

at the hearing on the motion, relators strenuously opposed Bolivar’s motion and

specifically objected to the trial court granting it. Further, relators informed the trial court



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that they would seek relief from the trial court’s decision by way of an original proceeding.

We conclude relators sufficiently preserved error. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); In re

Mittelsted, 661 S.W.3d 639, 659 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, orig. proceeding)

(stating that the relator is required present its arguments to the trial court before seeking

mandamus relief).

B.     Applicable Law

       Bolivar contends that he filed his Motion for Leave to File Third[-]Party Petition

pursuant to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 37, 38, 39, 40, and 174, and section 33.004

of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, and the trial court’s ruling is supported

by all these provisions. 4 See TEX. R. CIV. P. 37, 38, 39, 40, 174; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE § 33.004. We disagree that all these provisions are applicable under the

circumstances of this case.

       First, Rule 174 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure governs the consolidation of

actions and provides:

       (a)     Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or
               fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial
               of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the
               actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning
               proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or
               delay.

       (b)     Separate Trials. The court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid
               prejudice may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim,
               counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any
               number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or
               issues.




       4 Bolivar’s motion for leave refers to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 37, 38, and 39 and section

33.004 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. At the hearing, Bolivar verbally invoked Rules 40
and 174 while presenting argument in support of his motion.


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TEX. R. CIV. P. 174. Thus, Rule 174 gives the trial court broad discretion to consolidate

cases with common issues of law or fact, but it does not require consolidation. See In re

Z. W.-M., No. 03-24-00767-CV, 2025 WL 2470828, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 28,

2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). Bolivar’s motion concerns one case only, and thus Rule 174

concerning separate actions is inapplicable.

       Second, section 33.004 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code governs

the designation of responsible third parties and provides, in relevant part:

       A defendant may seek to designate a person as a responsible third party by
       filing a motion for leave to designate that person as a responsible third party.
       The motion must be filed on or before the 60th day before the trial date
       unless the court finds good cause to allow the motion to be filed at a later
       date.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.004(a); see In re Bertrand, 602 S.W.3d 691, 696 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2020, orig. proceeding). Thus, this section allows defendants to

designate “responsible third parties,” which the code defines as persons who are “alleged

to have caused or contributed to causing in any way the harm for which recovery of

damages is sought.” Id. §§ 33.004(a), 33.011(6). Designation enables a defendant to

introduce evidence regarding a responsible third party’s fault and to have the jury

apportion responsibility to the third party even if that person has not been joined as a

party to the lawsuit. In re Dawson, 550 S.W.3d 625, 628 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding)

(per curiam) (citation modified); see Metro. Transit Auth. of Harris Cnty. v. Smith, 656

S.W.3d 867, 875–76 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.).

       In his motion, Bolivar alleges that the designated individuals “are liable” to him “for

all or part of the breach of fiduciary duty with [self-dealing], fraud by forgery, and/or fraud

by nondisclosure for particular liability by assisting and encouraging the same.” Bolivar



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states that he filed a “motion for leave to designate third[-]party defendants

contemporaneously” with his motion. Examining the substance of Bolivar’s motion,

Bolivar is not seeking to designate responsible third parties and is instead seeking to

impose direct liability against the named individuals. Accordingly, section 33.004 is not

applicable.

       Finally, Bolivar relies on Rule 38, which allows “a defending party, as a third-party

plaintiff, [to] cause a citation and petition to be served upon a person not a party to the

action who is or may be liable to him or to the plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim

against him.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 38(a). When brought in as a third-party defendant, a third

party may assert defenses against the defendant’s claim against him and the plaintiff’s

claim against the defendant. Id. Rule 38(a) also states:

       The third-party defendant may also assert any claim against the plaintiff
       arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
       plaintiff’s claim against the third-party plaintiff. The plaintiff may assert any
       claim against the third-party defendant arising out of the transaction or
       occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff’s claim against the third-
       party plaintiff, and the third-party defendant thereupon shall assert his
       defenses and his counterclaims and cross-claims.

Id. “Rule 38(a) makes clear that if a plaintiff wishes to bring a claim against a third-party

defendant, that claim must arise out of the transaction or occurrence forming the basis of

the plaintiff’s claim against the original defendant.” Perryman v. Spartan Tex. Six Cap.

Partners, Ltd., 546 S.W.3d 110, 132 (Tex. 2018). A claim against a third-party defendant

may be brought without leave of court if filed not later than thirty days after service of the

third-party plaintiff’s original answer; otherwise, leave of court, with notice to all parties, is

required to serve the third-party petition. TEX. R. CIV. P. 38(a); Advanced Tech. Transfer




                                               11
& Intell. Prop. Grp. LLC v. Krenek, 627 S.W.3d 540, 543–44 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2021, no pet.).

       Here, again, Bolivar claims that the designated individuals are personally liable to

him for alleged tortious acts, and he does not claim that these individuals are “liable to

him or to [Vasquez and BBC] for all or part of [Vasquez’s and BBC’s] claim against him.”

See TEX. R. CIV. P. 38(a) (emphasis added). Accordingly, this rule is inapplicable.

       We turn our attention to the remaining provisions: Rules 37, 39, and 40. Rule 37

states that:

       Before a case is called for trial, additional parties necessary or proper
       parties to the suit, may be brought in, either by the plaintiff or the defendant,
       upon such terms as the court may prescribe; but not at a time nor in a
       manner to unreasonably delay the trial of the case.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 37; see Jones v. Smith, 157 S.W.3d 517, 523 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2005, pet. denied). Rule 39 provides that:

       A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in
       the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among
       those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of
       the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence
       may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that
       interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a
       substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
       obligations by reason of his claimed interest.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 39(a). The rule further provides that if such a party has not yet been joined,

“the court shall order that he be made a party.” Id. Although the rule contemplates that

certain persons “shall” be joined, there is no “precise formula for determining whether a

particular person falls within its provisions.” Cooper v. Tex. Gulf Indus., Inc., 513 S.W.2d

200, 204 (Tex. 1974); see Conrad Constr. Co., Ltd. v. Freedmen’s Town Pres. Coal., 491

S.W.3d 12, 16 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.). “Rule 39 does not require



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joinder of persons who potentially could claim an interest in the subject of the action; it

requires joinder, in certain circumstances, of persons who actually claim such an interest.”

Crawford, 509 S.W.3d at 913. Rule 39 was designed “to avoid questions of jurisdiction,”

and it “would be rare indeed if there were a person whose presence was so indispensable

in the sense that his absence deprives the court of jurisdiction to adjudicate between the

parties already joined.” In re Tr. A & Tr. C., 690 S.W.3d 80, 86 (Tex. 2024) (quoting

Cooper, 513 S.W.2d at 203–04). And finally, Rule 40 governs permissive joinder and

reads as follows:

       (a)    Permissive Joinder. All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if
              they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in
              respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
              series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or
              fact common to all of them will arise in the action. All persons may
              be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against
              them jointly, severally, or in the alternative any right to relief in
              respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
              series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or
              fact common to all of them will arise in the action. A plaintiff or
              defendant need not be interested in obtaining or defending against
              all the relief demanded. Judgment may be given for one or more of
              the plaintiffs according to their respective rights to relief, and against
              one or more defendants according to their respective liabilities.

       (b)    Separate Trials. The court may make such orders as will prevent a
              party from being embarrassed, delayed, or put to expense by the
              inclusion of a party against whom he asserts no claim and who
              asserts no claim against him, and may order separate trials or make
              other orders to prevent delay or prejudice.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 40; see In re Doe, 704 S.W.3d 538, 542 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding).

The plaintiff has the burden of establishing proof of each joinder element. Surgitek,

Bristol-Myers Corp. v. Abel, 997 S.W.2d 598, 602–03 (Tex. 1999); Smith v. Adair, 96

S.W.3d 700, 705 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. denied).




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C.     Discussion

       Relators assert that granting Bolivar’s motion for leave at this late stage of the case

is a clear abuse of discretion. In contrast, Bolivar contends that relators’ argument that

his motion for leave was untimely “has no basis in law or fact.” Bolivar asserts that the

trial court vacated the trial setting, a separate party had indicated it might need more time

to prepare for trial, and the presence of many unresolved and pending motions indicates

that his motion was timely filed. In this regard, Bolivar further asserts that the “fraudulent

actions of the third[-]party defendants have continued to [accrue].” He further contends

that they are indispensable parties because they were participatory actors in a “criminal

and fraudulent scheme.”

       We begin by addressing Bolivar’s claims and the trial court’s conclusion that these

parties are indispensable. Bolivar alleges that the designated individuals are personally

liable to him for tortious acts. Under established law, they are not indispensable parties.

See Swafford v. Holman, 446 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1969, writ ref’d n.r.e.)

(concluding that if a plaintiff can proceed against any one defendant separately, the other

defendants are not indispensable parties).

       We turn our attention to the timing of Bolivar’s motion. This lawsuit has been

pending since September 20, 2021. The trial of the case was set for June 20, 2022;

December 5, 2022; March 27, 2023; August 28, 2023; September 29, 2023; March 25,

2024; September 3, 2024; November 18, 2024; December 16, 2024; April 21, 2025; May

12, 2025; June 2, 2025; and March 23, 2026. Bolivar filed his motion for leave on

November 17, 2025, and the trial court vacated the March 23, 2026 trial date in connection

with granting Bolivar’s motion. It is self-evident that the trial court’s ruling delayed the trial



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of the case. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 37; Jones, 157 S.W.3d at 523. Further, bearing in mind

the history and circumstances of the lawsuit, the delay was not reasonable. See In re

State Line Fireworks, Inc., 387 S.W.3d at 31; In re Martin, 147 S.W.3d at 457; In re Arthur

Andersen LLP, 121 S.W.3d at 483. Accordingly, we sustain the sole issue presented in

this original proceeding.

                                     V.     CONCLUSION

       The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus,

Bolivar’s response, and the applicable law, is of the opinion that relators have met their

burden to obtain mandamus relief. Accordingly, we conditionally grant the petition for writ

of mandamus, and we direct the trial court to vacate its January 7, 2026 order granting

Bolivar’s motion for leave. Our writ will issue only if the trial court fails to act promptly in

accordance with this memorandum opinion.

                                                                  L. ARON PEÑA JR.
                                                                  Justice


Delivered and filed on the
23rd day of April, 2026.




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