In the Estate of Kara Gale Murphy Watson v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed April 9, 2026




                                      In The


        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                   __________

                              No. 11-25-00137-CV
                                  __________

      IN THE ESTATE OF KARA GALE MURPHY WATSON,
                       DECEASED


                      On Appeal from the 42nd District Court
                            Callahan County, Texas
                          Trial Court Cause No. 22605


                      MEMORANDUM OPINION
       This is an appeal of the trial court’s order admitting a will to probate as a
muniment of title. In the proceedings below, James Michael Watson objected to the
probate of his mother Kara’s will, alleging that his sister, Appellee, Mary Gale
Watson Matulka, was in default for failing to offer the will to probate within the
four-year time period prescribed by the Estates Code. TEX. ESTATES CODE ANN.
§ 256.003(a) (West 2020). Following a bench trial, wherein the trial court found
that Mary Gale was not in default, the trial court admitted the will to probate as a
muniment of title. See id. § 257.001.
      In a single issue, Appellant, Consuelo “Connie” Rivas (Connie), acting
individually and as the independent executor of James Michael’s estate, contends
that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that
Mary Gale exercised reasonable diligence in admitting the will to probate and was
not in default for failing to offer the will to probate during the four-year statutory
period immediately following Kara’s death. We affirm.
                         I. Factual and Procedural History
      Kara Gale Murphy Watson (Kara) died on April 11, 2014, after being involved
in a head-on collision with a tractor trailer. At that time, Kara was survived by:
      (a) her husband, James Robert Watson (James);
      (b) their three adult children;
              (1) James Michael Watson (James Michael);
              (2) Mary Gale Watson Matulka (Mary Gale), Appellee; and
              (3) Rebecca Amy Watson McCoy (Rebecca Amy);
      (c) and other individuals relevant to this matter,
              (1) Judith Muriel Sidenblad Watson (Judith), James Michael’s wife;
                 and
              (2) Consuelo “Connie” Rivas (Connie)- James Michael’s caretaker and
                 sole beneficiary and executor of his estate.
      Approximately nine years later, on November 2, 2023, Mary Gale filed an
application to probate Kara’s will as a muniment of title. Kara’s will named Mary
Gale as the executor. Under the terms of the will, Kara left her 240-acre farm to her
three children to be shared equally. The will contained the following additional
provisions:
      James “shall live in the farm home the rest of his life if he wishes”;

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      Judith “can live in her trailer” on the property “for the rest of her life, if
      something should happen” to James Michael;
      “[s]ince [James Michael] and [Rebecca Amy] do not have children, at their
      death, their portion of the estate will revert to [Mary Gale]”;and
      “[n]o portion of the farm may be sold during their lifetime, except to each
      other by agreement.”
By the time Mary Gale filed the application to probate Kara’s will, James, Judith,
and Rebecca Amy had passed away.
      On November 22, 2023, James Michael filed an original answer, pleading a
general denial and asserting that Mary Gale was in default for having filed for
probate more than four years after Kara’s death. James Michael died nearly one year
later, on December 24, 2024, and the suit proceeded with Connie, acting individually
and as executor of James Michael’s estate.
      On April 24, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on Mary Gale’s application
to probate Kara’s will. Mary Gale’s husband, Gerald Matulka, was the first of three
witnesses to testify. Gerald stated that he and Mary Gale had maintained the
property at issue and paid taxes on it since Kara’s passing. According to Gerald,
after Kara died in 2014, James came to live with them, due to his macular
degeneration and resulting blindness. Eventually, James was placed in a nursing
home, and he died in 2015. In 2016, Gerald lost his job. When Gerald found
temporary employment in 2017, it took him out-of-state and away from Mary Gale
and their grandchildren, who were also residing with them at the time. In December
2017, when the job ended, Gerald was unemployed until he accepted a job in
Massachusetts in April 2018. Gerald testified that throughout this period, Mary Gale
turned to alcohol and eventually needed a liver transplant.
      During cross-examination, Gerald testified that he moved Mary Gale to
Massachusetts to be with him in 2018, and that in 2021, they purchased a six-acre

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property. Gerald explained that he worked as an electrical engineer. Gerald
confirmed that he had served as an executor twice before, for the wills of a married
couple that were his close friends. However, his appointment was set aside in one
case, and he was removed as executor in the other. Gerald testified that a lawyer
had prepared the application to probate each will on his behalf in those cases. Gerald
was repeatedly questioned regarding the reason he did not timely probate Kara’s
will. He provided responses that distinguished probate proceedings for his two
friends from the instant case, namely: the estates of the friends for whom he had
previously filed applications involved “hotly contested issues,” and he had filed
those applications with the assistance of a lawyer. He testified that, in the instant
case, “[e]veryone was following the will,” and it was Mary Gale, not he, who was
named the executor of the will. He also testified that he was unaware that there was
a legal time limit to probate a will.
      Mary Gale also testified to the circumstances that followed Kara’s death,
stating that she had been tasked with providing full-time care for her newly-
widowed, sick father, James, while also acting as the primary caregiver for her
grandchildren. Mary Gale testified that after James passed and amidst her husband’s
bouts of unemployment, she began abusing alcohol and was dealing with health
issues.
      On cross-examination, Mary Gale was questioned about a prior sworn
statement she made, wherein she testified:
             In light of these events, it never registered with me that I needed
      to prioritize the probate of my mother’s will. Her will clearly and
      obviously reflects what she wanted to happen to her property. I simply
      assumed that is the way it would be, and I was too occupied with these
      other personal trials and responsibilities to confirm whether I was right
      or wrong. As soon as I learned that the will needed to be admitted to
      probate to give effect to my mother’s wishes, I sought counsel and
      immediately applied to have the will probated.

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Mary Gale maintained that she did not know that the will needed to be probated, was
never informed of the necessity, and had she known, she would have acted
accordingly.
       Mary Gale testified that until she received a demand letter from James
Michael in 2023, asserting a claim to one-half of the property at issue, all interested
parties under the will had acted under the assumption that the property had already
passed in accordance with the will’s express terms. At that time, however, James
Michael instead sought to have Connie inherit a portion of the property at his
passing. Within thirty days of receipt of James Michael’s letter, Mary Gale retained
counsel and filed the application for probate.
       At the outset of Connie’s testimony, she explained the nature of her
relationship with James Michael. She testified that James Michael hired her to care
for his ailing wife, Judith, in 2016, and that Connie began caring for James Michael
in 2018 until his death.
       Connie testified that Rebecca Amy died intestate in 2021. When Mary Gale
and James Michael sought to settle Rebecca Amy’s estate, an attorney discovered
that Kara’s will was never probated and “that is when [James Michael] found out
that legally he was 50 percent owner of the property and Mary Gale was 50 percent
owner of the property.” It is unclear from Connie’s testimony whether the need to
probate the will was ever communicated to Mary Gale during these discussions.
James Michael executed an affidavit of heirship prepared by the attorney so James
Michael and Mary Gale “could sell Rebecca’s property . . . together”; in the
affidavit, James Michael swore that the only property belonging to Rebecca Amy
was her residence at the time of her death, and he made no mention of the property
at issue.1 Connie testified that Mary Gale and James Michael had executed a hunting

       Connie testified that both Mary Gale and James Michael executed affidavits of heirship, but only
       1

James Michael’s affidavit appears in the record.
                                                  5
lease for the property in 2021, and no taxes had been paid on the property since. She
further testified that she was the sole beneficiary of James Michael’s estate under his
will.
        At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ordered Kara’s will admitted
to probate. The trial court subsequently issued findings of fact and conclusions of
law that included the following findings:
        11. More than four (4) years elapsed between the [Kara’s] death and the
        date that the [w]ill was offered for probate by Mary [Gale];
        12. Mary [Gale] exercised reasonable diligence in admitting the [w]ill
        to probate.

        13. Mary [Gale] showed valid excuses for failing to present the [w]ill
        for probate within four (4) years of [Kara’s] date of death, including:
              (a) Mary [Gale] did not know that the [w]ill needed to be
              probated for its terms to be given effect;

              (b) Mary [Gale] did not know that the [w]ill needed to be
              probated within four (4) years of [Kara’s] date of death;
              (c) All of the beneficiaries under the [w]ill treated [Kara’s]
              property as though it passed pursuant to the terms of the [w]ill;
              (d) When one of the beneficiaries, [James Michael], sent Mary
              [Gale] a demand letter in October 2023 asserting a claim to
              [Kara’s] property, she immediately sought to retain counsel and
              filed the application to probate the [w]ill in less than thirty (30)
              days;

              (e) During the nine years between [Kara’s] death and the
              application to probate the [w]ill, Mary [Gale] dealt with a
              number of challenging situations and personal tragedies.

The trial court concluded that Mary Gale was not in default for failing to offer the
will for probate within four years of Kara’s death and that the will was “entitled to
be admitted to probate as a muniment of title only.”

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                                II. Legal Sufficiency
      In a single issue, Connie challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence in
support of the trial court’s finding that Mary Gale exercised reasonable diligence in
admitting Kara’s will to probate.
      In analyzing a legal sufficiency challenge, we must determine whether the
evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the finding
under review. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005); In re
Estate of Allen, 407 S.W.3d 335, 338 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, no pet.). We must
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding, crediting
any favorable evidence if a reasonable factfinder could and disregarding any
contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d at
821–22, 827. We may sustain a no-evidence or legal sufficiency challenge only
when (1) the record discloses a complete absence of a vital fact, (2) the court is
barred by rules of law or evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered
to prove a vital fact, (3) the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more
than a mere scintilla, or (4) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of a
vital fact. Id. at 810. When an appellant does not challenge the trial court’s findings
of fact, the findings are binding upon both the party and the appellate court if
supported by the record. In re Estate of Richards, 703 S.W.3d 920, 931 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2024, no pet.) (citing McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694,
696 (Tex. 1986)).
      Section 256.003(a) provides, in relevant part, that “a will may not be admitted
to probate after the fourth anniversary of the testator’s death unless it is shown by
proof that the applicant for the probate of the will was not in default in failing to
present the will for probate on or before the fourth anniversary of the testator’s
death.” EST. § 256.003(a). “As used in section 256.003(a), ‘default’ means failure
to probate a will because of the absence of reasonable diligence by the party offering
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the instrument.” Matter of Estate of Masters, 659 S.W.3d 145, 151 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 2022, no pet.) (quoting Ramirez v. Galvan, No. 03-17-00101-CV, 2018 WL
454733, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 10, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.)); see Allen,
407 S.W.3d at 339. “Whether the proponent of a will is in default is normally a fact
issue.” Allen, 407 S.W.3d at 339. The applicant bears the burden to show that she
was not in default. Marshall v. Estate of Freeman, No. 03-20-00449-CV, 2022 WL
1273305, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 29, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).
      Significantly, Texas case law has been “quite liberal in permitting a will to be
offered as a muniment of title after the statute of limitations has expired upon the
showing of an excuse by the proponent for the failure to offer the will earlier.” Allen,
407 S.W.3d at 339–41. “The tendency of our courts has been from its earliest
decisions to permit wills to be filed after the four-year period, where there is any
evidence of a probative force which would excuse the failure to offer the will
sooner.” Id. at 339 (emphasis added) (quoting Armstrong v. Carter, 291 S.W. 626,
627 (Tex. App.—Waco 1927, no writ)).
      In Allen, we considered whether the applicant was in default for having failed
to present the will within four years. Id. at 336. Although we examined the language
of the predecessor to Section 253.006(a), Section 73(a) of the Texas Probate Code,
the repeal of the Texas Probate Code and its recodification in the Texas Estates Code
resulted in no substantive change. Compare id. at 339, with EST. § 256.003(a); see
EST. § 21.001(a). We observed that in probate cases, “[b]ecause the issue of whether
a proponent is in default is a question of fact rather than a question of law, the cases
must be analyzed in terms of their facts.” Allen, 407 S.W.3d at 341. In Allen, the
applicant had relied on the incorrect advice of an attorney, resulting in her belief that
probate proceedings were unnecessary and she could probate the will later if needed.
Id. There was additional evidence that the applicant was seventy-five years old and
had no education or background in legal matters. Id. Moreover, after learning of
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the necessity of probating the will, the applicant acted promptly in filing the
application. Id. We concluded that the “evidence was legally sufficient to sustain
the trial court’s conclusion that Appellee was not in default in not probating the will”
outside of the four-year requirement. Id.
      Relevant here, when considering the applicant’s diligence, “only the
applicant’s conduct is relevant to determining whether she ‘was not in default.’”
Ferreira v. Butler, 575 S.W.3d 331, 337–38 (Tex. 2019). In addition to the
considerations present in Allen—i.e., an applicant’s lack of experience in legal
matters and reliance on faulty legal advice—courts have also considered an
applicant’s limited financial resources or language barriers, as well as other
extenuating factors. See Masters, 659 S.W.3d at 154 (collecting cases); see also
Matter of Estate of Hammack, No. 12-15-00246-CV, 2016 WL 1446083, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Tyler Apr. 13, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). In this regard, there must be some
evidence beyond an applicant’s claim of the ignorance of the law. See Chovanec v.
Chovanec, 881 S.W.2d 135, 137–38 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ).
      The case before us shares similarities with the facts in Chovanec. 881 S.W.2d
at 135. The procedural vehicle was different in Chovanec; there, the decedent’s
husband offered the decedent’s will for probate as a muniment of title and the
decedent’s son filed an opposition and subsequent motion for summary judgment,
which the trial court granted based on the expiration of the four-year statute of
limitations. Id. at 136. However, like here, there was a significant delay in filing
the application for probate, with the applicant in Chovanec waiting thirteen years.
Id. After being alerted of the necessity of filing the will for probate, the applicant
immediately filed the application. Id. at 137. In reversing the trial court, the court
of appeals found that there was evidence that the applicant was ignorant of the law
and did not believe probate was necessary because he had inherited the real property
at issue and believed the land was his, which the court held created a fact issue about
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his default. Id. at 137–38. The evidence in the instant case, as in Chovanec, created
a fact issue regarding default, but unlike in Chovanec, the trial court here presided
over the hearing and was appropriately positioned to resolve the matter. See id.; see
also Hammack, 2016 WL 1446083, at *4. The trial court, as the factfinder, was the
judge of Mary Gale’s credibility and was entitled to credit Mary Gale’s testimony.
Hammack, 2016 WL 1446083, at *4.
      Quoting Marshall v. Estate of Freeman, No. 03-20-00449-CV, 2022 WL
1273305 at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.), to support her
contention that the trial court’s decision should be reversed, Connie argues that “[a]
person who has custody of a will and refrains for the statutory period from presenting
it for probate for personal considerations or under the assumption that his title to
property is safe without it is in default.” The Marshall case, however, can be
distinguished. In Marshall, the executor filed an application for probate of the will
as a muniment of title forty-one years after the testator’s death. 2022 WL 1273305,
at *1. Although there was evidence that the executor did not know of the will’s
existence for about forty years, upon finding the will, he was advised by legal
counsel to probate it but inexplicably waited one year to do so. Id. at *4. The court
of appeals concluded that the executor’s “eleventh-grade education, lack of
experience acting as executor of a will, and lack of legal sophistication do not excuse
his decision not to apply for probate of the will for a year after his lawyer told him
he needed to do so.” Id. The court further distinguished its facts from those “in
which people who had assumed they did not need to probate a will did so shortly
after learning of the need to probate the will.” Id. at *5. Finding no evidence which
provides an explanation or excuse for executor’s delay for a year after being told to
file an application for probate, the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s order
and rendered judgment denying the application to admit the will to probate as
muniment of title. Id. at *6. Contrary to what Connie claims, Marshall did not turn
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on the applicant’s knowledge of the existence of a will or possession of the will, but
rather, the will was not filed for forty-one years after the decedent’s death, and even
then, the applicant delayed an additional one-year before filing after having been
advised to do so. Id.
      Unlike in Marshall, there was no evidence here that Mary Gale failed to act
on any legal advice. See id. Although Connie testified that after Rebecca passed in
2021, an attorney was hired, and “that attorney discovered that [Kara]’s will was
never probated,” Connie was only privy to communications between the attorney
and James Michael. Connie stated that Mary Gale and the attorney communicated
through e-mail, but the contents of the e-mails were not disclosed. Moreover, it
remains Mary Gale’s position that she did not learn of the necessity to probate the
will until after seeking the advice of an attorney upon receipt of James Michael’s
2023 letter claiming ownership in contravention to the will’s terms. Then, relying
on the attorney’s advice, Mary Gale promptly filed the application for probate within
thirty days. To the extent Connie additionally argues that Mary Gale failed to
promptly act on legal advice, the record does not support this contention.
      Similarly unpersuasive is Connie’s argument that there was evidence that
Mary Gale and Gerald, her husband, possessed the legal expertise to timely probate
the will because Gerald had probated two other wills during this same period.
Because “only the applicant’s conduct is relevant to determining whether she ‘was
not in default,’” Gerald’s prior experience as independent executor of his friends’
estates cannot be imparted onto Mary Gale. Ferreira, 575 S.W.3d at 337–38.
Moreover, there was no evidence that Mary Gale was in any way involved with the
probate of those wills. Having reviewed the record, Mary Gale’s “legal” experience
appears limited to obtaining a mortgage on personal out-of-state property and the
execution of a hunting lease for the property at issue.


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      Connie also briefly challenges the evidence supporting the trial court’s finding
that Mary Gale presented valid excuses for failing to present the will within four
years of Kara’s death. Although Connie does not address in her brief this finding or
the trial court’s finding that Mary Gale dealt with a series of “challenging situations
and personal tragedies” within the nine years that proceeded Kara’s death, we
summarize the extenuating circumstances below:
      • Mary Gale grieved the decedent’s death, which had been “not peaceful and
        natural but instead was the result of a terrible car/semi-tractor collision”;
      • Mary Gale provided “full-time care for her newly-widowed and legally
        blind father who could not live alone, necessitating him moving into her
        home”;
      • Mary Gale was required to make “improvements and modifications to the
        home to accommodate her father”;
      • Mary Gale arranged and provided transportation for her father’s doctor
        visits;
      • Mary Gale located alternative placement for her father after the level of
        care he required became too great for her to provide at home;
      • Mary Gale solely shouldered her father’s health decline and subsequent
        funeral arrangements;
      • Mary Gale repeatedly served as the primary caregiver for her
        grandchildren, who were initially removed from their parents’ home due
        to methamphetamine abuse and later, due to their father’s suicide;
      • Mary Gale’s responsibilities included transporting her grandchildren to
        and from school and extracurricular activities;
      • Mary Gale “[a]bsorb[ed] additional strain when her husband lost his long-
        term job in 2016 and had difficulty finding work, going unemployed for
        almost a year”;
      • Mary Gale became the sole caregiver for her grandchildren after her
        husband found employment out of state in 2017;


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         • Mary Gale fell into “a deep depression and beg[an] to abuse alcohol to
           numb the pain”;
         • Mary Gale began “[d]ealing with rapidly deteriorating health resulting in
           part from the effects of full-blown alcoholism” and was placed on a liver
           transplant list after being given a 50% chance of survival; and
         • Mary Gale underwent “intensive testing and therapy” to address her
           alcoholism.
This evidence—coupled with Mary Gale’s testimony that she was unaware of the
need to file an application to probate the will and believed it was unnecessary as all
the parties had been acting in accordance with the will—was legally sufficient to
survive a finding of default. See Allen, 407 S.W.3d at 339–41; Chovanec, 881
S.W.2d at 137–38.
         Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient to support
the trial court’s conclusion that Mary was not in default. We overrule Connie’s sole
issue.
                                III. This Court’s Ruling
         We affirm the judgment of the trial court.




                                                W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
                                                JUSTICE


April 9, 2026
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.




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