In the Matter of the Name Change of A.J.G., a Child v. the State of Texas

COURT OF APPEALS
                           EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                                EL PASO, TEXAS
                                  ————————————
                                     No. 08-26-00070-CV
                                  ————————————

                  In the Matter of the Name Change of A.J.G., a Child.


                  On Motion for Review from the 388th District Court
                                El Paso County, Texas
                           Trial Court No. 2025DCM4886


                            M E MO RA N D UM O PI NI O N

       Y.S. filed a petition seeking a name change of her minor child, A.J.G., together with a

statement of inability to pay court costs. The trial court found that she was able to pay reduced

court costs and fees of $400. Y.S. appealed from the order, which we construe as a Rule 145 motion

for review of the court’s order. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(f), (g)(1). Based on the record before us,

we conclude Y.S. provided uncontroverted evidence of her inability to pay costs, and the trial court

ordered her to pay costs without holding a hearing or receiving any evidence to support its finding

that Y.S. was able to pay reduced costs. We therefore grant the motion for review and reverse the
trial court’s order, with directions to the trial court to allow Y.S. to proceed with her petition without

paying court costs or fees.

                                               I. BACKGROUND

         A. Proceedings in the trial court

         On September 9, 2025, Y.S., representing herself, filed a petition to change the name of her

minor child, A.J.G. On the same day, Y.S. filed a Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court

Costs (the Statement) using the form approved by the Texas Supreme Court. In the Statement, she

averred that she and/or her dependents were receiving food stamps, Medicaid, and WIC benefits;1

that the total she received in public assistance was $768 per month; and that her take-home pay

was between $600 and $1,000 per month based on her employment as a “substitute teacher

monitor” for Fabens I.S.D. as well as her employment with J.M. Roofing Construction. She listed

her assets as $140 in bank accounts and a car valued at $1,500, for a total value of $1,640.2 Y.S.

listed monthly expenses totaling $2,205, which included a payment of $805 for “rent/house

payments,” with the remaining expenses for food, utilities, clothing/laundry, insurance, and

transportation costs. Y.S. declared under penalty of perjury that the information she provided in

the Statement was true and correct.

         Neither the trial court clerk nor the official court reporter challenged the Statement.

However, the trial court issued four orders setting “indigency hearings” on the Statement, with the




1
 Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) is part of the United States Department of Food and Agriculture, which provides
federal grants to states for supplemental foods, health care referrals, and nutrition education for low-income, pregnant,
breastfeeding, and non-breastfeeding postpartum women, and to infants and children up to age five who are found to
be at nutritional risk. See In re C.J.S., 383 S.W.3d 682, 693 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (citing
FNS, USDA, WIC (Aug. 30, 2012), http://fns.usda.gov/wic.).
2
  The form states that a declarant is not to include her homestead in the list of her properties, and only to include
information regarding a “second house” if applicable.


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first setting on October 6, 2025, and the last setting on December 8, 2025.3 In the interim, on

October 10, 2025, Y.S. submitted supporting documentation indicating that her two children were

on Medicaid and that she was receiving SNAP benefits.4

         On December 8, 2025, the trial court entered an “Order for Payment of Court Costs,”

stating that on the same day, “an oral evidentiary hearing was held to determine whether the

declarant, who filed a Statement of lnability to Afford Payment of Court Costs, may be able to pay

costs.” In the order, the court referenced an “interview process” with someone from the County

Attorney’s Office and additional information elicited through that process:

         Movant appeared with more recent paystubs. During the interview process with
         Mr. Joseph Veith of the County Attorneys office, it was disclosed that the Movant
         is receiving child support for her eldest child. After further discussion, an
         approximate average of her income employment is $1,240.00, child support amount
         of $368.00 monthly in cash, public benefits of $768.00 for a total of $2,376.00. It
         was also disclosed in the interview process that the Movant owns her home located
         at [] with an approximate value of $137k and own[s] a business YS Roofing, which
         the Movant alleges is not generating income.”

         Attached to the order were (1) paystubs from Fabens I.S.D. indicating that Y.S. was paid

$91.05 for the pay period from October 18, 2025 to October 31, 2025; (2) a “payroll journal” from

Fabens Pharmacy indicating that Y.S. was paid $341.54 for the pay period from “1/25 to 12/25”;

(3) a printout with the address of a business known as “YS Roofing” in Fabens, Texas; and (4) a

printout from the El Paso Central Appraisal District indicating that Y.S. owned a home at that same

address in Fabens, which had an appraised value of $137,541 in 2025. In its order, the court

determined that the fees and costs in the case totaled $619 and ordered Y.S. to pay a “reduced cost



3
  The court issued orders setting hearings for October 6, 2025, December 4, 2025, December 5, 2025, and December
8, 2025. In her notice of appeal, Y.S. stated that the initial court setting was continued as the court clerk informed her
that she needed to submit her pay stubs prior to the hearing. It is unclear why the other court settings were not reached.
4
 In 2008, Congress renamed the Food Stamp Act, and currently, the benefits delivered to participants in the program
are known as SNAP benefits (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits) rather than food stamps. See
Coleman v. State, 696 S.W.3d 148, 152 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2023, no pet.) (citing Agricultural Security
Improvement Act of May 22, 2008, Pub. L. 110-234, Title IV, § 4001, 122 Stat. 923).


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of $400.”5 The court’s order, however, did not make any reference to Y.S.’s monthly expenses or

otherwise indicate how it determined that Y.S. was able to pay that amount.

         After the trial court issued its order, Y.S. filed a “supplemental affidavit” to clarify her

current employment status, averring that she was no longer employed at J.M. Roofing, and she

attached a letter from J.M. Roofing’s president stating that her last day of employment was

September 1, 2025. Y.S. further averred that she started her employment with Fabens Pharmacy

on September 23, 2025, and she submitted a second “payroll journal” from Fabens Pharmacy

indicating that she was paid $2,242.94 for the pay period from 10/17/2025 to 12/02/2025.

         B. Proceedings in this Court

         Y.S. timely appealed, challenging the court’s order requiring her to pay reduced court costs.

See Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(g)(1–2) (authorizing declarant to challenge a trial court’s order denying a

statement of inability to pay court costs in court of appeals by filing a motion for review within

ten days after the trial court’s order is signed); Matter of Marriage of Duke & Terrell, No. 04-23-

00144-CV, 2024 WL 1292414, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 27, 2024, no pet.) (construing

party’s notice of appeal as a motion for review under Rule 145). The official court reporter of the

district court thereafter filed a letter with this Court, informing us that “no record was taken in this

case,” and that “[t]here was an interview with Mr. Veith with the County Attorney’s Office.”

According to the letter, “the information and documents were provided to Judge Gonzalez,” and

“[t]here is an order on file with details and exhibits.”

         Upon receipt of the notice of appeal, we issued an order directing the court clerk and the

court reporter to prepare and file with this Court the record of all trial court proceedings on Y.S.’s



5
  The court noted in the order that the filing fee for Y.S.’s petition was $350 and that the “fees for request for sheriffs
processing fee plus citation request which the Movant requested twice is $266.00 ($133 each time) [was] a total of
$619.00 [sic].”


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petition. In our order, we noted that the trial court’s order stated that “an oral evidentiary hearing”

took place, and we were required to have a complete record of all of the proceedings in the case

pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 145(g)(3). Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(g)(3) (“After a

motion is filed, the court of appeals must promptly send notice to the trial court clerk and the court

reporter requesting preparation of the record of all trial court proceedings on the declarant’s claim

of indigence.”). We further stated that if the records were not available, the clerk and reporter were

to indicate why such records are not available or do not exist. The court clerk timely filed the

clerk’s record, but the court reporter did not provide any additional response to our order.

                                     II. Y.S.’S ARGUMENTS

       Y.S. asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in several respects by ordering her to

pay court costs. First, she contends the court failed to hold an oral evidentiary hearing as required

by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 145, and that instead, she was questioned by the county

attorney and the “court coordinator” about her affidavit and income without the trial court present.

According to Y.S., at the close of questioning, she was “ordered to pay discounted court costs,”

but the county attorney informed her that she could make payment arrangements, or in the

alternative, the court could schedule a hearing at which she could “formally testify before the

judge.” Although Y.S. asserts that she informed the county’s attorney she wanted a hearing, no

hearing was set; instead, the trial court issued its order requiring her to pay reduced costs.

       Y.S. further maintains that she presented uncontroverted evidence of her inability to pay

costs and that the trial court “deviated from Rule 145” by requiring her to pay reduced costs, as

“no timely written contest appears in the record and the order contains no findings explaining [her]

partial ability to pay[.]” As a remedy, she requests that we reverse the trial court’s order and declare

that she is entitled to proceed without payment of costs. In the alternative, she asks us to remand




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to the trial court with directions to hold an oral evidentiary hearing and to make proper findings

pursuant to Rule 145.

          We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to follow the Rule 145

requirements prior to ordering Y.S. to pay costs and that the proper course of action is to reverse

the trial court’s order and direct the court to allow Y.S. to proceed without payment of costs or

fees, given the uncontradicted evidence in the record of her inability to pay.

           III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING PAYMENT OF COSTS

          A. Applicable law and standard of review

          Both the U.S. and Texas Constitutions make justice available to everyone, not just those

who can afford the costs associated with filing and serving a suit. See In re L.R.P., No. 08-24-

00126-CV, 2024 WL 3189669, at *1 (Tex. App.—El Paso June 26, 2024, no pet.). The Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires exceptions to the payment of filing fees and other

court costs when those costs stand as a barrier to accessing the justice system. Id. (citing Boddie v.

Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380 (1971) (“[A] cost requirement, valid on its face, may offend due

process because it operates to foreclose a particular party’s opportunity to be heard.”)).

          Texas has long recognized the right of people who are indigent to proceed without payment

of costs. Id. (citing Tex. Const. art. 1, § 13; Tex. R. Civ. P. 145; Tex. R. App. P. 20.1; Higgins v.

Randall Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 257 S.W.3d 684, 686 (Tex. 2008) (“The concept that courts should

be open to all, including those who cannot afford the costs of admission, is firmly embedded in

Texas jurisprudence.”); Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Honorable Thirteenth Court of Appeals, 934 S.W.2d

349, 353 (Tex. 1996) (“Our state Constitution and our rules of procedure recognize that our courts

must be open to all with legitimate disputes, not just those who can afford to pay the fees to get

in.”)).




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       Rule 145 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure was adopted as a procedure for litigants to

establish their inability to pay court costs. It requires a party, referred to as a “declarant,” who

cannot afford to pay costs to file a “Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs

approved by the Supreme Court or another sworn document containing the same information” and

defines a sworn statement as “one that is signed before a notary or made under penalty of perjury.”

Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(b). Rule 145 provides that the “declarant should submit with the Statement any

available evidence of the declarant’s inability to afford payment of costs.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(d).

It renders as “prima facie evidence” of the declarant’s inability to pay court costs an attachment

demonstrating that “the declarant or the declarant’s dependent receives benefits from a means-

tested government entitlement program.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(d)(1). To overcome the prima facie

force of this evidence, there must be evidence that the party is not dependent on public assistance

or that she has other funds available that would allow her to pay court costs. See Booker v.

Mahmoudi, No. 05-19-00048-CV, 2019 WL 2266667, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 24, 2019,

no pet.) (after declarant established a prima facie case that he was financially unable to pay costs,

“it was incumbent that evidence be presented that other funds [were] available to [declarant]”)

(citing Griffin Indus., Inc., 934 S.W.2d at 352)).

       A statement of inability to pay that is uncontested or uncontroverted in the trial court is

conclusive as a matter of law. See Campbell v. Wilder, 487 S.W.3d 146, 151 (Tex. 2016) (citing

Equitable Gen. Co. Ins. v. Yates, 684 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex. 1984)); see also Strickland v.

iHeartMedia, Inc., 668 S.W.3d 34, 38 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, no pet.) (citing Higgins,

257 S.W.3d at 688–89) (concluding that “[a]n uncontested affidavit of indigence entitles a

declarant to proceed without advance payment of costs”). However, the district clerk, a court

reporter, or an opposing party may file a motion in the trial court to challenge the declarant’s claim

of indigency. Tex. R. App. P. 145(e)(1). Any such motion “must contain sworn evidence -- not


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merely allegations -- either that the Statement was materially false when made or that because of

changed circumstances, it is no longer true.” Id. Alternatively, the trial court “on its own may

require the declarant to prove the inability to afford costs when evidence comes before the court

that the declarant may be able to afford costs . . . .” Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(e)(2). Rule 145 further

provides that the declarant must be given ten days’ notice of the “oral evidentiary hearing.” Tex. R.

Civ. P. 145(f)(1).

        “At the hearing, the burden is on the declarant to prove the inability to afford costs.” Tex. R.

Civ. P. 145(f)(1); Basaldua v. Hadden, 298 S.W.3d 238, 241 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009,

no pet.) (per curiam). The test for determining a party’s inability to afford court costs is whether

“the record as a whole show[s] by a preponderance of the evidence that the applicant would be

unable to pay the costs, or a part thereof, or give security therefor, if he really wanted to and made

a good-faith effort to do so[.]” Strickland, 668 S.W.3d at 36 (citing Higgins, 257 S.W.3d at 686

(citations omitted)); see also In re C.H.C., 331 S.W.3d 426, 429 (Tex. 2011) (applying the same

“test for determining indigence” when a party seeks a free record for an appeal and to have her

appellate costs waived). However, “[t]he central inquiry under rule 145 ‘is not merely whether [the

declarant] can pay costs, but whether [he] can afford to pay costs’ and still pay for ‘basic essentials,

like housing or food.’” In re A.R.M., No. 05-17-00651-CV, 2017 WL 2962830, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Burns v. Rowe, No. 03-25-00744-CV, 2025 WL

3465956, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 3, 2025, order) (per curiam) (recognizing same). Stated

otherwise, “[t]he party is not . . . expected to secure the necessary funds by depriving himself and

his family of the necessities of life or borrowing money he cannot repay.” In re A.R.M., 2017 WL

2962830, at *2 (citing Allred v. Lowry, 597 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex. 1980) (orig. proceeding);

Goffney v. Lowry, 554 S.W.2d 157, 159–60 (Tex. 1977) (orig. proceeding); Pinchback v. Hockless,

164 S.W.2d 19, 20 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1942) (recognizing that although a person may have


                                                   8
sufficient cash on hand to pay fees, he cannot be required to pay court costs if paying them would

preclude the person from paying for “basic essentials, like housing or food”)); see also In re R.S.,

No. 05-24-00575-CV, 2024 WL 4223700, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 18, 2024, no pet.)

(recognizing same).

        At the conclusion of the hearing, the court “may order that the declarant pay the part of the

costs the declarant can afford[.]” Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(f)(3). Rule 145, however, expressly provides

that a declarant must not be ordered to pay costs unless: (1) the trial court has held “an oral

evidentiary hearing”; (2) the declarant received at least “10 days’ notice of the hearing”; and (3)

the trial court makes “detailed findings that the declarant can afford to pay costs.” Tex. R. Civ. P.

145(f)(1), (2).

        A trial court’s order determining a party’s ability to pay court costs is reviewed for an abuse

of discretion. See In re L.R.P., 2024 WL 3189669, at *2 (citing In re A.M., 557 S.W.3d 607, 608

(Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.); Strickland, 668 S.W.3d at 37); see also Campbell, 487 S.W.3d

at 151 (recognizing that it is “an abuse of discretion for any judge . . . to order costs in spite of an

uncontested affidavit of indigence”). A trial court abuses its discretion in denying a party’s request

to proceed without costs if it acts “in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner or without reference

to any guiding rules or principles.” In re L.R.P., 2024 WL 3189669, at *2 (citing Booker, 2019 WL

2266667, at *2). With respect to the resolution of factual issues, the trial court abuses its discretion

if the record establishes it “could reasonably have reached only one decision” and it fails to do so.

See Garza v. Garza, 155 S.W.3d 471, 475 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.) (citing Walker

v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839–40 (Tex. 1992)) (concluding that trial court abused its discretion

in sustaining challenge to declarant’s statement of inability to pay court costs on appeal where

declarant’s uncontroverted affidavit established that she was unable to pay court costs).




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         B. Analysis

         Here, neither the district clerk nor the court reporter filed a motion with sworn evidence

contesting Y.S.’s declaration as permitted by Rule 145. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(e)(1). In addition,

although the trial court set the matter for an “indigency hearing” sua sponte, there is nothing in the

record to suggest that the trial court had any evidence before it to demonstrate that the declarant

was able to afford costs, as required by Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(e)(2). To the contrary, when the court

set the matter for hearing in December 2025, the only documents on file were: (1) Y.S.’s affidavit,

in which she swore under penalty of perjury that she was receiving public assistance and that her

monthly expenses outweighed her income; and (2) Y.S.’s supplemental evidence demonstrating

that her two children were on Medicare and that she was receiving SNAP benefits. It is unclear on

what basis the trial court decided to set the matter for hearing, as nothing in the record shows the

court had any evidence before it to suggest that Y.R. had the ability to pay costs. We further note

that the trial court did not provide Y.S. with ten days’ notice of the hearing, as required by Tex. R.

Civ. P. 145(f)(1), as the trial court’s order setting the case for an “indigency hearing” on December

8, 2025 was dated December 5, 2025.6

         More significantly, we note that despite the trial court’s express statement in its order that

it held an “oral evidentiary hearing,” there is nothing in the record to reflect that it held any such

hearing, as required by Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(f)(1), before entering its order. To the contrary, the

remainder of the court’s order, as well as the court reporter’s letter, demonstrate that no such

hearing was held. Instead, the record reflects that when Y.S. appeared for the time and place set




6
 Y.S. did not object to the lack of notice; she appeared at the designated time and place provided in the trial court’s
order setting the matter for hearing. Therefore, any error in this regard is waived. In re L.R.P., No. 08-24-00126-CV,
2024 WL 3189669, at *2 (Tex. App.—El Paso June 26, 2024, no pet.) (concluding that any error in failing to provide
party with ten-day notice was waived where the party appeared at the hearing and did not object to the proceeding).


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for the hearing, she was subjected to an “interview” by an individual from the county attorney’s

office.

          Rule 145 itself, as well as the case law interpreting the rule, make it clear that a declarant

who has filed a statement of inability to pay costs may not be required to pay costs if the Rule 145

procedural requirements have not been met; those requirements include holding an evidentiary

hearing. Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(f)(1); see also Emerson v. Holly Lake Ranch Ass’n, 603 S.W.3d 172,

174 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2020, no pet.) (recognizing that “a party who files a Statement may

not be required to pay court costs unless the trial court holds an oral evidentiary hearing, with

proper notice given to the declarant”); Strickland, 668 S.W.3d at 36 (recognizing that a party who

files a statement of inability to afford costs cannot be required to pay costs unless the requirements

of Rule 145 are satisfied). Thus, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to conduct the

required oral evidentiary hearing before finding that Y.S. was able to pay partial court costs,

thereby depriving her of her right to be heard in the matter.7 See Espinoza v. FGMS Holdings, LLC,

No. 13-25-00650-CV, 2026 WL 199369, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Jan. 26, 2026, no pet.)

(concluding that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to “hold the mandatory evidentiary

hearing on Espinoza’s statement” as required by Rule 145); Matter of D.A.M.-F., No. 08-25-00320-

CV, 2026 WL 391746, at *3 (Tex. App.—El Paso Feb. 11, 2026, no pet.) (recognizing same).

          In addition, the court’s order did not provide the requisite findings, as required by Texas

Rule of Civil Procedure 145(f)(2), detailing how it determined Y.S. was able to pay reduced costs.

While the court’s order chronicled Y.S.’s monthly income, income is only one factor in determining

her ability to pay costs. The court must also consider the party’s monthly expenses to determine if




7
 We note that the trial court also failed to hold a hearing in another recent case, and instead allowed the court clerk to
question the declarant regarding the accuracy of his affidavit and his income. Matter of D.A.M.-F., No. 08-25-00320-
CV, 2026 WL 391746, at *2 (Tex. App.—El Paso Feb. 11, 2026, no pet.).


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she is able to pay court costs; failing to do so is an abuse of discretion. See In re A.M., 557 S.W.3d

at 609–10 (“By focusing exclusively on income and disregarding expenses, the trial court did not

properly consider whether [the declarant] can afford to pay costs.” (emphasis in the original)).

          Since the record before us allows for only one conclusion, i.e., that Y.S. is entitled to

proceed without payment of costs, we need not remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing

and findings.8 See In re L.R.P., 2024 WL 3189669, at *3 (declining to remand case to the trial court

for the entry of appropriate findings where the record allowed for only one finding, that the

declarant was entitled to proceed without paying court costs (citing Hollingsworth v. Walaal Corp.,

No. 05-17-00555-CV, 2017 WL 2492788, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 9, 2017, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (reversing the trial court’s order to pay costs without remand when there were no

detailed findings in order supporting its decision, and the only evidence before the court showed

that the declarant could not afford costs))); see also Matter of D.A.M.-F., 2026 WL 391746, at *2–

3 (reversing trial court’s order requiring payment of court costs, without remand, where trial court

failed to hold a hearing, but where the uncontroverted evidence established party’s inability to pay

costs).

          In sum, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to follow the requirements of

Rule 145 and by disregarding Y.S.’s sworn declaration and supporting evidence, which established


8
  Although the court’s order stated that after a “discussion,” it was determined her income totaled $2,376, this was
based on a “finding” that Y.S. was receiving child support payments monthly in the amount of $368, no evidence of
which was in the record. And although the trial court stated in its order that Y.S. owns her own home, that finding was
based on a printout provided by either the county’s attorney or the court coordinator. Even if there were competent
evidence of home ownership, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Y.S. could leverage her home to pay court
costs without infringing upon the necessities of life or borrowing money she could not repay. Garza, 155 S.W.3d at
476 (concluding that the trial court erred by requiring declarant to pay costs on appeal, where the record reflected that
her monthly living expenses exceeded her income and she did not have the ability to borrow funds to pay the court
costs, or pay back any such loan); In re A.R.M., 2017 WL 2962830, at *2 (recognizing that a party is not expected to
secure the necessary funds to pay court costs by depriving himself and his family of the necessities of life or borrowing
money he cannot repay (citing Goffney, 554 S.W.2d at159–60) (holding that a litigant seeking to appeal without paying
costs is not required to “borrow money which cannot be repaid except by depriving the litigant of the necessities of
life”)); see also In re S.V., No. 05-23-00324-CV, 2025 WL 2898007, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 10, 2025,
pet. denied) (recognizing same).


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that not only was she receiving public assistance, but that her monthly expenses exceeded her

income. See Strickland, 668 S.W.3d at 38 (trial court abused its discretion in denying declarant’s

statement of inability to pay courts costs where declarant produced evidence that she was on public

assistance, and “[a]gainst this prima facie evidence, there [was] no competent evidence in the

record” demonstrating that declarant otherwise had the ability to pay costs); In re L.R.P., 2024 WL

3189669, at *3 (trial court abused its discretion in finding that declarant was able to pay a portion

of the filing fees, where the undisputed evidence established that his expenses were more than his

income (citing Hollingsworth, 2017 WL 2492788, at *3 (recognizing that “the trial court [is] not

free to completely disregard the only evidence establishing [the declarants’] inability to pay costs

when no evidence was offered in rebuttal”))); In re S.T., 239 S.W.3d 452, 457 (Tex. App.—Waco

2007, order) (per curiam) (holding same); Sansom v. Sprinkle, 799 S.W.2d 776, 778 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 1990, no writ) (recognizing that a trial court judge “may not completely disregard the

only positive evidence he heard” in determining a party’s ability to pay court costs).

                                       IV. CONCLUSION

       We grant Y.S.’s motion for review, reverse the trial court’s order, and direct the trial court

to allow Y.S. to proceed with her petition for name change without payment of court costs or fees.


                                              LISA J. SOTO, Justice

April 22, 2026

Before Salas Mendoza, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.




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