Jason Kelsey v. Maria M. Rocha

NUMBER 13-24-00261-CV

                              COURT OF APPEALS

                    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                       CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG


JASON KELSEY,                                                                    Appellant,

                                              v.

MARIA M. ROCHA,                                                                  Appellee.


               ON APPEAL FROM THE 92ND DISTRICT COURT
                     OF HIDALGO COUNTY, TEXAS


                             MEMORANDUM OPINION

                   Before Justices Silva, Peña, and Fonseca
                    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva

       Pro se appellant Jason Kelsey appeals the trial court’s order denying his petition

for bill of review, raising multiple issues in his brief. Because resolution of his first issue

is dispositive, we affirm.
                                   I.     BACKGROUND

A.      Agreed Divorce Decree

        On March 11, 2019, appellee Maria M. Rocha filed for divorce against Kelsey. The

petition stated that “[t]he parties were married on or about August 1, 2014[,] and ceased

to live together as spouses on or about January 17, 2019.” The petition further stated the

parties have one son together, born on March 13, 2018. Rocha claimed that the parties

might agree on the division of their property and requested that the trial court approve

their anticipated agreement. According to the record, Kelsey was served with the petition

for divorce via certified mail while incarcerated on March 25, 2019. Kelsey later signed an

agreed final divorce decree during his incarceration in front of a notary on August 20,

2019.

        The agreed final divorce decree reflects that the divorce court conducted a hearing

regarding the parties’ agreement on September 10, 2019. Rocha appeared in person with

counsel and Kelsey appeared pro se. After swearing in the parties, the court found that

the agreement regarding the parties’ marital estate is a just and right division “having due

regard for the rights of each party and the child of the marriage.” Rocha was awarded, as

her sole and separate property, “ALL OF [KELSEY’S] RIGHT, TITLE AND INTEREST TO

ANY REAL ESTATE, ROYALTY AND MINERAL INTEREST LOCATED IN MCMULLEN

COUNTY, TEXAS,” including eleven specifically-identified tracts. Rocha was also

awarded “100% of the business known as J & M South Texas Trucking, LLC together with

all personal and real property owned by said business.” Kelsey was awarded, among

other things, all individual retirement accounts, employee pensions, annuities, and life

insurance benefits in his name, as well as 401(k) plan, any profit-sharing plan, accrued

                                             2
unpaid bonuses, and any “other benefits existing by reason of [Kelsey]’s past, present, or

future employment.” The decree directed Rocha to pay “100% of any business debt of J

& M South Texas Trucking, LLC” but stated “[t]his debt does not include any IRS debts

owed by [Kelsey].” The parties also agreed that Kelsey would be responsible to pay for

all debt incurred under his name and pay taxes from the date of their marriage through

December 31, 2018, including any penalties or interest. Kelsey agreed to execute and

deliver to Rocha a Warranty Deed. The decree also stated that it served as muniment of

title to transfer ownership of the property awarded to Rocha.

       The decree also contained an acknowledgement by the parties that, prior to

signing the decree, they had

       [r]ead this Final Decree of Divorce fully and completely, have had the
       opportunity to ask any questions regarding the same, and fully understand
       that the contents of this Final Decree of Divorce constitute a full and
       complete resolution of this case. [Rocha] and [Kelsey] acknowledge that
       they have voluntarily affixed their signatures to this Final Decree of Divorce,
       believing this agreement to be a just an right division of the martial debt and
       assets, and state that they have not signed by virtue of any coercion, any
       duress, or any agreement other than those specifically set forth in this Final
       Decree of Divorce.

On September 10, 2019, the divorce court signed the agreed decree which also included

the signatures of both Kelsey and Rocha.

B.     Petition for Bill of Review

       On May 19, 2023, approximately forty-four months after the agreed final decree of

divorce was signed by the court, Kelsey filed an original petition for bill of review claiming

that Rocha and her attorney “concealed [his] known separate property as community

property.” Kelsea argued “Rocha received 100 [percent] community property, which was

unconscionable and disproportionable” and therefore he had a meritorious claim. He

                                              3
further alleged that Rocha misrepresented to the divorce court that a marriage existed

when in fact he was threatened with financial ruin and loss of his property if he did not

agree to the division of the martial estate as set forth in the divorce decree. Kelsey

additionally asserted that Rocha told him she would continue her relationship with him

after the divorce. Kelsey further claimed Rocha did not properly transfer the properties

after their divorce. Kelsey stated he had been incarcerated and that Rocha had “full

durable Power of Attorney [for him] prior and at [the] time of suit.” He further alleged that

Rocha informed him “that divorce was the only way to protect [his] money and properties

and promised to give everything back.” Kelsey pleaded that Rocha advised him not to

hire an attorney for the divorce proceedings, that she had full control over his money and

property, that she would not allow him to access his money or properties to seek legal

assistance, and that he “was under duress prior and during suit[ and his] conduct was not

intentional or the result of negligence.” The following documents were attached to his

petition: his father’s death certificate, an affidavit of heirship, a blank Bexar County

marriage application form, a document stating the marriage license between Kelsey and

Rocha was “Not Returned for Recordation,” a document from the Texas Department of

State Health Services stating a marriage application between Kelsey and Rocha was

“NOT FOUND,” screenshots of two text messages, Rocha’s original petition for divorce,

the agreed final divorce decree, and a McMullen County Appraisal District property

description. Kelsey requested the trial court set aside the divorce decree.

       On September 27, 2023, Rocha filed a response to Kelsey’s petition for bill of

review alleging, among other things, that Kelsey lacked a meritorious defense, that he

failed to present any newly discovered evidence, and that he admitted he was negligent

                                             4
regarding the litigation proceedings. Rocha also asserted affirmative defenses. On

September 28, 2023, she filed a motion to dismiss the petition for bill of review arguing

that “[Kelsey] has not proper[l]y pled for relief and has failed to offer any proof to

substantiate his claims.”

       On November 27, 2023, Kelsey requested leave to file an amended petition for bill

of review contending that the divorce court abused its discretion by dividing the martial

estate without evidence of the value of the property. He argued that he has a meritorious

claim to a portion of the community property awarded to Rocha. Kelsey further argued

that he has “no legal remedy by post[-]judgment motion or by appeal available to avoid

the effect of the erroneous judgment because [he] has no access to money or properties.

[He] has been incarcerated since September 2017.”

       On November 29, 2023, Kelsey filed an objection to Rocha’s motion to dismiss

arguing that he did have a meritorious claim and, further, that the divorce court lacked

subject-matter jurisdiction over the proceedings because no marriage existed between

the parties. He further argued that the divorce court abused its discretion on the division

of the property because his “separate property was mischaracterized as community

property.” Lastly, he argued that Rocha failed to answer his petition for bill of review.

       On November 30, 2023, the trial court held a non-evidentiary hearing on Kelsey’s

petition for bill of review and Rocha’s motion to dismiss. At the hearing, the trial court

asked Kelsey whether he was going to hire counsel and Kelsey explained that he did not

have the money to do so. Rocha’s motion to dismiss was subsequently heard. During this

hearing, Kelsey asserted that the parties were not married in 2014, and he described a



                                              5
July 25, 2014 photograph of the parties. 1 Kelsey argued that the photograph did not

establish the parties were married because when it was taken, Rocha “had never even

stepped into my home.” After hearing arguments from both parties, the trial court took

Rocha’s motion under advisement.

      On April 30, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on Kelsey’s motion for leave to file

his amended petition for bill of review. Rocha’s counsel stated that the parties were

waiting on the trial court’s ruling on the bill of review itself. The following exchange

occurred:

      THE COURT:                     At this point[,] you don’t intend to hire an
                                     attorney?

      [Kelsey]:                      I have no access to any funds or money—

      ....

      THE COURT:                     So what I’m asking you is to, on the record, ask
                                     me for the relief that you’re requesting.

      [Kelsey]:                      Okay. Well, the relief I’m requesting is to have a
                                     warranty of deed—all the McMullen County
                                     properties that were given—my separate
                                     property, as I might add to the record, was given
                                     to [Rocha] in the community property estate.
                                     And I want to get that separate property back
                                     over into my possession, and I’m asking the
                                     Court—and I have a judgment on file that was
                                     filed a long time ago asking for all the relief in
                                     there, any and all property conveyed in the final
                                     decree of divorce . . . , including but not limited
                                     to all property listed in exhibit of that final divorce
                                     decree, including any new and oil leases and
                                     gas division orders from any of the McMullen
                                     County properties that were improperly
                                     conveyed to [Rocha].


      1 Kelsey did not ask to have the photograph admitted as evidence.


                                                6
                                     ....

                                     And, if you would have looked in the motion—or
                                     the judicial notices I . . . e-filed there, they will
                                     show that [Rocha] was, I guess you could say, I
                                     don’t know what you want to call it, but received
                                     over [$]135,000 of my funds and laundered
                                     them through I guess whatever you want to call
                                     it, through a joint bank account that I attempted
                                     to close, and then transferred the funds to an
                                     unknown account, and did this over a period of
                                     a year and a half, leaving me with an IRS bill of
                                     $27,000 and I’m unable to pay that because
                                     [Rocha] ha[s] kept all proceeds that was given
                                     to her under the fraudulent transfer of assets.

       Rocha’s counsel informed the trial court that a final hearing on the bill of review

was previously held, and Kelsey did not file any post-judgment motions. Additionally,

Rocha’s counsel asserted that the evidence and exhibits had already been admitted and

“there[ is] nothing else for the [c]ourt to do except issue a ruling.” Her counsel also stated

that “as far as anybody committing fraudulent acts, he’s in prison” and “[t]hat’s the reason

why [Kelsey] signed off to the divorce decree, giving his wife everything.” Kelsey objected,

contending there was no marriage or common law marriage which gave the trial court

jurisdiction and that a “signature does not confirm jurisdiction.” Kelsey requested findings

of fact and conclusions of law concerning this hearing that same day. On May 7, 2024,

the trial court denied Kelsey’s motion for leave to file his amended petition for bill of review.

       On May 9, 2024, the trial court signed a judgment denying Kelsey’s petition for bill

of review and ordered that the agreed final divorce decree remains in full force and effect.

This appeal ensued.

C.     Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

       On January 9, 2025, the trial court issued the following findings of fact and

                                               7
conclusions of law, among others, in support of its ruling:

       6.     On November 30, 2023, [Kelsey], [Rocha], and her attorney
              appeared. The Court advised [Kelsey] prior to the hearing whether
              he intended to hire an attorney [sic]. [Kelsey] stated he was
              incarcerated and could not afford an attorney and that he wished to
              proceed.

              ....

       8.     The Court finds that a final divorce hearing was scheduled on
              September 10, 2019, and was proven up by [Rocha] and her
              attorney. The Court finds that [Kelsey] signed the Final Decree of
              Divorce in jail and in front of Raul Lopez, a notary public for the State
              of Texas.

       9.     The Court finds that [Kelsey] agreed to all terms of the divorce and
              the Court found that the terms of the divorce were a just and right
              division of the parties’ estate due to [Kelsey] being incarcerated and
              not scheduled for release until 2029.

       10.    The Court further finds that [Kelsey] has failed to satisfy the
              requirements for obtaining relief through a bill of review.

       11.    The Court finds that [Kelsey] has not proven, by a preponderance of
              the evidence, any of the grounds necessary for a bill of review,
              namely:

              (1)    A meritorious defense to the underlying cause of action that
                     he did not have an opportunity to present. The Court finds that
                     [Kelsey] agreed to the terms of the divorce and that [he] could
                     have hired an attorney for the underlying divorce. The Court
                     finds that [Kelsey] could have hired an attorney, but he chose
                     not to. [Kelsey] did not offer any admissible evidence to
                     sustain his meritorious defense to the underlying Final Decree
                     of Divorce.

              (2)    That [Kelsey] was prevented from offering and admitting
                     evidence of any fraud, accident[,] or wrongful act of the
                     opposing party or official mistake in the underlying divorce.
                     The Court finds that [Kelsey] did not offer any competent and
                     admissible evidence of any fraud, accident or wrongful act of
                     [Rocha] or that an official mistake was committed by the
                     Court.


                                              8
             (3)     Unmixed with any fault or negligence on [Kelsey]’s part. The
                     Court finds that in [Kelsey]’s Original Petition for Bill of Review
                     page 2, [Kelsey] stated “[he] had negligence regarding the
                     lack of litigation to the allegations in the Original Petition for
                     Divorce.” The Court finds that [Kelsey] judicially admitted that
                     he was negligent for the lack of litigation and or hiring an
                     attorney for his divorce.

             ....

      14.    The Court concludes that [Kelsey]’s Bill of Review does not meet the
             legal standard for setting aside an agreed final judgment.

      15.    The Court concludes that [Kelsey] has not demonstrated a
             meritorious defense to the underlying cause of action, nor has
             [Kelsey] shown that he was prevented from making such a defense
             by the fraud, accident or wrongful act of the opposing party or official
             mistake in the underlying divorce.

      16.    The Court concludes that [Kelsey] judicially admitted he was
             negligent in his Original Bill of Review by not hiring an attorney for
             the underlying divorce.

                    II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW

      A bill of review is an equitable proceeding filed by a party seeking to set aside a

judgment that is no longer subject to challenge by a motion for new trial or appeal. WWLC

Inv., L.P. v. Miraki, 624 S.W.3d 796, 799 (Tex. 2021) (per curiam); King Ranch, Inc. v.

Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003). To be successful, a bill of review

complainant must plead and present proof of the following elements: (1) a meritorious

claim or defense to the cause of action alleged to support the prior judgment, (2) which

the complainant was prevented from making by official mistake or by the opposing party’s

fraud, accident, or wrongful act, (3) unmixed with any fault or negligence by the

complainant. WWLC Inv., L.P., 624 S.W.3d at 799 (quoting Caldwell v. Barnes, 154

S.W.3d 93, 96 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam)).


                                              9
       “[B]ills of review exist to provide a failsafe against manifest injustice and the

wrongful deprivation of a litigant’s right to trial and appeal in extraordinary circumstances.”

Bowers v. Bowers, 510 S.W.3d 571, 577 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.). However,

courts do not readily grant bills of review “[b]ecause it is fundamentally important in the

administration of justice that some finality be accorded to judgments.” Valdez v.

Hollenbeck, 465 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2015) (quoting Alexander v. Hagedorn, 226

S.W.2d 996, 998 (Tex. 1950)).

       We review the denial of a bill of review under an abuse of discretion standard.

Gonzalez v. Tapia, 287 S.W.3d 805, 807 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2009, pet.

denied). In reviewing the denial of a bill of review, “we indulge every presumption in favor

of the trial court’s ruling and we will not disturb that ruling unless the trial court abused its

discretion.” Garza v. Att’y Gen., 166 S.W.3d 799, 808 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg 2005, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts in an unreasonable or

arbitrary manner, or without reference to guiding rules and principles. Id. When the inquiry

on the bill of review concerns questions of law, we review the trial court’s decision de

novo. Id.

       “A trial court’s findings of fact have the same force and dignity as a jury’s verdict.”

Tex. Outfitters Ltd., LLC v. Nicholson, 534 S.W.3d 65, 72 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017),

aff’d, 572 S.W.3d 647 (Tex. 2019); Sharifi v. Steen Auto., LLC, 370 S.W.3d 126, 147 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). “[W]hen a party challenges the trial court’s findings of

fact, . . . we review those findings by the same standards we use in reviewing the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury’s answers.” Garcia v. Tautenhahn, 314

S.W.3d 541, 544 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2010, no pet.). “If there is any

                                               10
evidence of a probative nature to support the trial court’s judgment, we will not set it aside,

and we may not substitute our findings of fact for those of the trial court.” Id.

“Unchallenged findings of fact are binding on the appellate court, unless the contrary is

established as a matter of law or there is no evidence to support the finding.” Sharifi, 370

S.W.3d at 147. “When . . . the appellate record contains a reporter’s record, findings of

fact on disputed issues are not conclusive and may be challenged for sufficiency of the

evidence.” Id.

       If a party with the burden of proof challenges the legal sufficiency of an adverse

finding, we must determine whether the complaining party has demonstrated on appeal

that the evidence establishes, as a matter of law, all vital facts in support of the issue.

See Barnes v. Mathis, 353 S.W.3d 760, 762–63 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam). In a “matter of

law” challenge, we “first examine the record for evidence that supports the finding, while

ignoring all evidence to the contrary.” Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241

(Tex. 2001) (per curiam). If there is no evidence to support the finding, we will examine

the entire record in order to determine whether the contrary proposition is established as

a matter of law. Id. We will sustain the issue only if the contrary proposition is conclusively

established. Id. The final test for legal sufficiency must always be whether the evidence

at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review.

City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005).

       “When a party attacks the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on

which [he] has the burden of proof, [he] must demonstrate on appeal that the adverse

finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.” Dow Chem. Co.,

46 S.W.3d at 242. We “must consider and weigh all of the evidence and can set aside a

                                              11
verdict only if the evidence is so weak or if the finding is so against the great weight and

preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust.” Id. Under either

standard, we must defer to the trial court’s factual determinations of witness credibility

and demeanor. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009).

       We review a trial court’s conclusions of law de novo. BMC Software Belg., N.V. v.

Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002). “The appellant may not challenge a trial

court’s conclusions of law for factual insufficiency; however, the reviewing court may

review the trial court’s legal conclusions drawn from the facts to determine their

correctness.” Id. “We are not bound by the trial court’s legal conclusions, but the

conclusions of law will be upheld on appeal if the judgment can be sustained on any legal

theory supported by the evidence.” Sheetz v. Slaughter, 503 S.W.3d 495, 502 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2016, no pet.). “Incorrect conclusions of law will not require reversal if the

controlling findings of fact will support a correct legal theory.” Id. “Moreover, conclusions

of law may not be reversed unless they are erroneous as a matter of law.” Id.

                                     III.    ANALYSIS

       Kelsey argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his bill of

review. He specifically asserts that the trial court’s findings and conclusions are

insufficient and not supported by the record evidence. In contrast, Rocha argues that the

trial court did not abuse its discretion because Kelsey failed to offer any evidence of a

meritorious defense. Rocha also argues there is no evidence that fraud, accident, or any

wrongful act by Rocha, unmixed with fault or negligence by Kelsey, prevented Kelsey

from making a meritorious defense.

       In a bill of review proceeding, Kelsey must first show the existence of a meritorious

                                             12
claim or defense to the cause of action alleged in the prior proceedings. WWLC Inv., L.P.,

624 S.W.3d at 799. In relation to this element, the trial court found that Kelsey “agreed to

the terms of the divorce”; that he “could have hired an attorney, but he chose not to”; and

that he “did not offer any admissible evidence to sustain his meritorious defense to the

underlying Final Decree of Divorce.”

       In his petition, Kelsey alleged that he discovered he was never married to Rocha,

that Rocha and her attorney concealed his separate property as community property, and

that Rocha received all community property from the divorce which was unconscionable

and disproportionable. Kelsey presented no evidence to the trial court at the hearings on

his bill of review. Further, the record demonstrates that Kelsey represented himself pro

se in the underlying divorce proceeding and agreed and signed the final divorce decree

during his imprisonment in the presence of a notary. In this regard, he accepted the role

of a pro se litigant and had the burden of defending against Rocha’s claims with diligence,

the same standard as any licensed counsel. See Barrientos v. Barrientos, 675 S.W.3d

399, 404 n.2 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, pet. denied) (noting pro se litigants are held to

the same standards as licensed attorneys and are required “to be familiar with and comply

with all applicable laws and rules of procedure”).

       We hold that the trial court’s findings in relation to the first element are legally

sufficient. See Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 at 822. We further hold that the contrary evidence

does not render the findings “clearly wrong and unjust”; thus, the findings are factually

sufficient. See Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d at 242. Accordingly, we find the trial court did

not err in concluding that Kelsey “has not demonstrated a meritorious defense to the

underlying [divorce proceeding].” See WWLC Inv., L.P., 624 S.W.3d at 799.

                                            13
         Next, Kelsey must establish that he was prevented from making his meritorious

claim or defense by official mistake or by the opposing party’s fraud, accident, or wrongful

act. Id. In relation to this element, the trial court found that “[Kelsey] did not offer any

competent and admissible evidence of any fraud, accident or wrongful act of [Rocha] or

that an official mistake was committed by the Court.”

         Kelsey’s petition alleged that he was threatened by Rocha with financial ruin and

total loss of property if he did not agree to the terms of the divorce, that Rocha and her

counsel assured him that the agreement was for asset protection, and that Rocha would

continue her relationship with Kelsey. He further alleged that Rocha informed him “that

divorce was the only way to protect [his] money and properties and promised to give

everything back.” Other than the allegations in Kelsey’s petition, the record does not

contain any evidence establishing fraud, accident, or a wrongful act on behalf of Rocha

or her counsel. Neither Kelsey’s pleadings themselves, nor the allegations within them,

constitute evidence. See Yu v. Koo, 633 S.W.3d 712, 729 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no

pet.).

         Under these circumstances, we hold that the trial court’s findings in relation to the

second element are legally sufficient. See Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 at 822. We further

hold that the contrary evidence does not render the findings “clearly wrong and unjust”;

thus, the findings are factually sufficient. See Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d at 242.

Accordingly, we find the trial court did not err in concluding that Kelsey failed to “show[]

that he was prevented from making . . . a [meritorious] defense by the fraud, accident, or

wrongful act of [Rocha] or official mistake in the underlying divorce [proceeding].” See

WWLC Inv., L.P., 624 S.W.3d at 799.

                                              14
        As we have determined the trial court did not err regarding its findings and

conclusions concerning the elements above, we further hold that the trial court did not err

when it concluded that “[Kelsey]’s Bill of Review does not meet the legal standard for

setting aside an agreed final judgment.” 2 See Sheetz, 503 S.W.3d at 502. Therefore, the

trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Kelsey’s petition for bill of review.

See Gonzalez, 287 S.W.3d at 807. Kelsey’s first issue is overruled. In light of our

conclusion, we need not address his other issues. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. (“The court

of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that

addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”). 3

                                         IV.     CONCLUSION

        We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                        CLARISSA SILVA
                                                                        Justice

Delivered and filed on the
23rd day of April, 2026.




        2 Because we have concluded that the first and second elements concerning a bill of review were

supported by the record, we need not address the third element. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1; WWLC Inv., L.P.
v. Miraki, 624 S.W.3d 796, 799 (Tex. 2021) (per curiam).
        3 All pending motions are dismissed as moot.



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