Joann Crawford v. Buffalo Creek Properties, LLC

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN



                                       NO. 03-24-00260-CV


                                    Joann Crawford, Appellant

                                                   v.

                            Buffalo Creek Properties, LLC, Appellee


               FROM THE 335TH DISTRICT COURT OF BASTROP COUNTY
     NO. 2031-335, THE HONORABLE REVA TOWSLEE-CORBETT, JUDGE PRESIDING



                             MEMORAN D U M OPI N I ON


                Joann Crawford appeals from the trial-court judgment granting specific

performance of a contract for Crawford to sell real property. Crawford raises several issues that

are not supported by the record. We will affirm the judgment.


                                         BACKGROUND

                Because there is no reporter’s record before this Court, this recital is based on

documents in the clerk’s record, including the judgment.

                Buffalo Creek Properties, LLC, sued Crawford and Vickie Morgan 1 seeking

specific performance of a written agreement for Crawford to sell a parcel of real estate. According

to a Buy-Sell Agreement (Contract) attached to Buffalo Creek’s live petition, Crawford agreed in

writing on August 15, 2021, to sell her parcel to “Trails End Investments, LLC ‘or assigns.’” The


       1   Morgan is not a party to this appeal.
trial court found that Trails End assigned its rights under the Contract to Buffalo Creek on

August 16, 2021. The Contract required Crawford to pay the costs to obtain, deliver, and record

releases of any liens required to be released in connection with the sale. As part of the Contract,

Crawford represented “that there will be no liens, assessments, binding agreements, or other

security interests against the property that will not be satisfied out of the sales price.” Buffalo

Creek alleged that, on December 8, 2021, Crawford informed Buffalo Creek that the “deal

was off.”

               Buffalo Creek sued Crawford and Morgan and asserted that it filed a notice of

lis pendens with the Bastrop County Clerk in February 2022. The court found that Crawford

deeded the parcel to Morgan on March 17, 2022, with full knowledge that the suit had been filed

and public knowledge of the lis pendens. Crawford did not timely file an answer. Morgan

answered, seeking reimbursement for taxes that she said she paid to stave off a tax foreclosure

sale. In March 2023, Buffalo Creek filed a motion to compel Crawford and Morgan to provide

answers to interrogatories and disclosures that were due in November 2022.

               All three parties appeared at the February 28, 2024 non-jury trial. Buffalo Creek

and Morgan were represented by counsel. Crawford appeared without an attorney, as she does on

appeal. The trial court awarded judgment to Buffalo Creek, concluding that Morgan had public

knowledge of this lawsuit when she received the deeds from Crawford and, therefore, was not a

bona fide purchaser. The court found that Buffalo Creek was ready, willing, and able to purchase

the property from Crawford and had tendered performance timely.

               The trial court ordered specific performance of the Contract as modified by the

judgment. The trial court ordered Buffalo Creek to pay the agreed-upon sales price of $100,000

less amounts paid or owed for expenses incurred to effectuate the purchase, including court costs,


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attorney’s fees, compensation of a life-estate holder not expressly addressed in the Contract,

property taxes and late fees, and surveyor’s costs. The court found that Crawford’s mother had a

1/3 life estate in the parcel. The court held that, after offsets, Buffalo Creek owed Crawford

$38,197.70 and ordered Buffalo Creek to deposit that amount into the registry of the court. The

court held that Morgan could seek reimbursement for her tax payments from Buffalo Creek’s

payment to Crawford under the judgment. The court ordered Crawford and Morgan to execute

deeds conveying their interests in the parcel to Buffalo Creek.

                Crawford appealed on April 22, 2024. Only after Buffalo Creek filed its brief in

February 2025 did Crawford request and pay for a reporter’s record. After that record was filed

on March 27, 2025, Crawford submitted a reply brief that this Court’s clerk’s office received but

did not file because it lacked a signature and a certificate of compliance with rules. Buffalo Creek

filed a motion to strike the reporter’s record as untimely requested and filed; it argued that allowing

the filing of a year-late-requested record would require rebriefing. Buffalo Creek also asked that

this Court strike or disregard Crawford’s reply brief because it contained issues not raised in her

original brief or relevant to the appeal. This Court requested that Crawford file a response to the

motion to strike or disregard the reporter’s record; she did not file a response.

                Two weeks after the time for response passed, this Court granted the motion to

strike the reporter’s record. This Court dismissed as moot Buffalo Creek’s motion to strike the

reply brief because Crawford never supplied a signature or certificate of compliance as requested.

Crawford filed a motion for rehearing of the order striking the reporter’s record, asserting that her

inability to pay for the reporter’s record caused her delay in requesting it, that she had technological

difficulties in preparing her brief and staying current on notices from the court, and that Buffalo




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Creek exploited her procedural disadvantage. This Court denied Crawford’s motion to reconsider

the order striking the reporter’s record.


                                             DISCUSSION

                Crawford contends that the trial court erred by ordering specific performance for

the following reasons: (1) Crawford justifiably disagreed with a proposed amendment to the

Contract, (2) the court ordered her to reimburse taxes that were the life tenant’s responsibility,

(3) the court did not grant her reimbursement from Buffalo Creek for taxes paid, (4) her pro se

status affected the fairness of the trial, (5) the trial court did not consider the validity of the Contract

due to the lack of notarization and Buffalo Creek’s name change, and (6) collusion between the

life tenant and Buffalo Creek affected her consent to the contract.

                Specific performance is a remedy for breach of contract when monetary damages

would be inadequate. White Knight Dev., LLC v. Simmons, 718 S.W.3d 203, 209 (Tex. 2025). A

party seeking specific performance must prove that it has complied with its obligations under the

contract (unless excused by the other party’s breach or repudiation) and that it was ready, willing,

and able to timely perform its obligations under the contract. DiGiuseppe v. Lawler, 269 S.W.3d

588, 593-94 (Tex. 2008). We review a trial court’s award of specific performance for abuse of

discretion. See Edwards v. Mid–Continent Off. Distribs., L.P., 252 S.W.3d 833, 836 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2008, pet. denied); see also Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tex. 2004) (noting

that appellate court will reverse trial court’s ruling on claim seeking equitable relief only if it is

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unsupported by guiding rules and principles).

                Where, as here, there is no timely-filed reporter’s record, and findings of fact and

conclusions of law are neither requested nor filed, the judgment of the trial court implies all

necessary findings of fact to sustain the judgment. See Waltenburg v. Waltenburg, 270 S.W.3d 308,

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312 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.). In other words, we must presume that the unfiled reporter’s

record supports the decisions of the trial court. See Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227, 230 (Tex.

2002). Crawford did not request a reporter’s record at or before the time for perfecting an appeal

as required. See Tex. R. App. P. 34.6(b)(1). She did not request it until after Buffalo Creek filed

its brief. While we are not to refuse to file a reporter’s record because it was not timely requested, 2

parties are required to cite to the record in their brief 3 and parties generally waive arguments that

are not raised in their initial brief. 4 In her original brief, Crawford did not cite to the as-yet-

unrequested reporter’s record and did not file an amended original brief with citations to the

reporter’s record. She did not file a reply brief compliant with relevant rules after the reporter’s

record was filed. Accordingly, we must review the issues presented in her original brief without

citations to a reporter’s record.

                The trial court ordered specific performance of the Contract. The court described

the Contract between Trails End and Crawford and noted that Trails End assigned its purchase

rights to Buffalo Creek. The court found that Buffalo Creek was at all times ready, willing, and

able to fulfill its obligations under the Contract and tendered performance by submitting the

purchase price. See DiGiuseppe, 269 S.W.3d at 593-94. We must presume that the reporter’s

record would have supported those findings as well as the findings regarding payments made to

obtain title clear from the life-estate holder and to pay off tax debts owed. See Bennett, 96 S.W.3d

at 230. Given those presumptions, we cannot say that the trial court erred by finding that Crawford

breached the contract and by ordering specific performance as it did.



        2See Tex. R. App. P. 34.6(b)(3).
        3See id. 38.1(g), (i) (requiring briefs to cite to record).
       4 See Howell v. Texas Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 143 S.W.3d 416, 439 (Tex. App.—Austin

2004, pet. denied).
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               Crawford’s issues on appeal do not show a basis for reversal.

               (1)     Crawford claims that the trial court erred by granting specific performance

despite her “justified” refusal to agree to a proposed amendment to the Contract. She does not

specify in her brief what amendment she refused to accept. She cites cases that she purports

support the proposition that any amendments to the Contract had to be in writing. However,

Crawford’s cited cases are either “hallucinated” cases or do not support the proposition that the

mere proposal of an amendment nullified the Contract. 5

               Regardless of what amendment Crawford disputes, Buffalo Creek sought specific

performance of the original Contract, and the court awarded that relief. There is no showing that

the court ordered specific performance of any amendment Buffalo Creek proposed. The Contract

called for any liens or binding agreements to be “satisfied out of the sales price.” The court

“reformed” the Contract to adjust Buffalo Creek’s payment due for the expenses of effectuating

the Contract such as courts costs, attorney’s fees, property-tax payments, and payment to the

life-estate holder. Even if Crawford’s refusal to agree to any proposed amendments was valid, that

does not require reversal of the judgment.


       5   For example, she lists In re Estate of Denman as being found at 462 S.W.3d 641 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2015, no pet.). However, that page citation is partway through a criminal case from
Arkansas, Isom v. State, 462 S.W.3d 638 (Ark. 2015). She describes Denman as involving a
dispute over the validity of a land-sale-contract amendment. The most recent Texas case with the
style In re Denman has a different cite and is a non-substantive grant of a motion to dismiss. See
No. 04-14-00111-CV, 2014 WL 4627603 (Tex. App.—San Antonio, no pet.). Another case with
that name concerned the statute of limitations for declaratory judgment actions. 362 S.W.3d 134
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet). Still another concerned the independent co-executor’s
standing to appeal and how to apply a generation-skipping tax. See 270 S.W.3d 639 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2008, pet. denied).
        One case that she cites discusses a subdivision covenant that required lease agreements to
be in writing and discussed restrictions on the modifications of covenants, but did not pertain to a
requirement that amendments to a land-sale contract be in writing. See Angelwylde HOA, Inc. v.
Fournier, No. 03-21-00269-CV, 2023 WL 2542339, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 17, 2023, pet.
denied) (mem. op.).
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                (2)     Crawford asserts that the court erred by ordering her to reimburse Buffalo

Creek for paying back taxes that were a life tenant’s responsibility. We must presume that the

record supports a finding that—regardless of the life tenant’s role in paying property taxes—

Crawford had the responsibility under the Contract to obtain a release of liens and satisfy any liens,

assessments, binding agreements or other security out of the sales price.

                Specific performance can be accompanied by monetary compensation when needed

to put the parties in the same position as if the contract had been performed. See White Knight,

718 S.W.3d at 208-10. The ordered reimbursement of the back taxes paid is consistent with

satisfying Crawford’s responsibility to satisfy any liens, assessments, binding agreements, or other

security out of the sales price.

                (3)     Crawford contends that the court erred by ordering Crawford to reimburse

Buffalo Creek for the cost of acquiring the life-estate interest. We presume that the record supports

a finding that the life-estate owner’s interest would be satisfied out of the sales price in order to

effectuate the sale.

                Crawford also asserts that an LLC cannot have a life-estate interest. But the

unification of the ownership of the life estate and the reversionary estate leads to a merger of the

interests in Buffalo Creek, extinguishing the life estate. See Steger v. Muenster Drilling Co.,

134 S.W.3d 359, 376 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) (stating test for merger of estates).

Crawford has not shown that the trial court’s judgment is erroneous.

                (4)     Crawford claims that her pro se status affected the fairness of the trial. We

must presume that the record supports a finding that her self-representation did not affect the

fairness of the trial. Crawford cites a case and a study that she asserts show that courts have




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mistreated pro se litigants but these authorities are not properly cited. 6 She does not, however,

show when or how her pro se status caused the trial court in this case to treat her improperly in a

way that probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment or probably prevented her from

properly presenting the case to this Court. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1 (describing how to preserve

error), 44.2 (describing standard for reversible error). We presume that proceedings in the trial

court are regular and correct unless the record shows otherwise. See Diamond Offshore Servs. Ltd.

v. Williams, 542 S.W.3d 539, 545 (Tex. 2018). We construe pro se filings liberally and with

patience “so as to obtain a just, fair and equitable adjudication of the parties’ rights.” Veigel

v. Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., 549 S.W.3d 193, 195 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018, no

pet.). However, pro se litigants must comply with the same rules and standards as must litigants

represented by attorneys. Mathis v. Lockwood, 166 S.W.3d 743, 745 (Tex. 2005).

               Crawford also asserts that the “aggressive actions” of Buffalo Creek contributed to

an unfair trial process. While it is unclear whether Crawford presented this argument to the trial

court, we must presume that the record supports a negative finding on this assertion. The clerk’s

record shows that Buffalo Creek filed suit on February 15, 2022; Buffalo Creek sent discovery

requests in October 2022, to which responses were due in November 2022 and did not seek to

compel responses until March 2023; and trial was held in February 2024. Neither the pleadings

nor the pace of the lawsuit demonstrate undue aggression. The record before us does not support

a conclusion that Buffalo Creek conducted itself with aggression that caused reversible error as

defined in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.1.


       6   Crawford refers to “Hercenberger v. Proctor” without reporter citation for the
proposition that the right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice is required by the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution. She refers to a study titled “Underestimating the Unrepresented:
Cognitive Biases Disadvantage Pro Se Litigants in Family Law Cases.” We find no binding
authority by that name, and Crawford does not identify where the study was published.
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                (5)     Crawford contends that the court erred by not considering the validity of the

Contract due to the lack of notarization and because the LLC changed its name. However,

land-sale contracts are not required to be notarized. See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 26.01 (requiring

real-estate sales contract to be in writing and signed by party to be charged with promise; no

notarization requirement). Further, we must presume that the record supports a finding that no

relevant entity changed its name improperly and the trial court’s express finding that the

contracting entity (Trails End) assigned its right to purchase the parcel to a different entity (Buffalo

Creek) the day after Crawford signed the contract with Trails End.

                (6)     Crawford contends that her consent to the Contract was affected by

collusion between the life tenant and Buffalo Creek. We must presume that the record does not

support a finding of collusion that affected Crawford’s consent in a legally significant way. She

asserts that Buffalo Creek contacted her through another person’s texting account and used it to

send “[e]ndless, harassing text messages attempting to entice appellant with dollar symbols and

offers of personal ‘help’ with financial burdens that could be holding back the closing of business.

Offering storage space funding, help paying taxes as well as transportation [etc.] (text message

documentation is available).” Crawford argues that these assertions show fraud, but does not assert

that any of the representations or enticements were false as is required to show fraud. See Ernst

& Young, L.L.P. v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 51 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. 2001) (defining elements

of fraud). Further, the time for introducing documentation is at trial, and the record before us lacks

the asserted text-message documentation.

                We note further that Crawford’s issues would show no error even if we considered

the reporter’s record. In an abundance of caution, we have reviewed the reporter’s record and

exhibits that we struck. Viewed under the proper standard of review, the record supports the trial


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court’s judgment. 7 When faced with conflicting or disputed evidence, the trial court was best

positioned to assess credibility and weight of the evidence. 8 The record did not show the trial court

acting with bias against Crawford because she represented herself and did not show Buffalo Creek

acting with impermissible aggression. Crawford did not provide the necessary evidence of

collusion between Buffalo Creek and the life tenant or get the allegedly fraudulent text messages

admitted into evidence.


                                          CONCLUSION

               Finding no reversible error presented, we affirm the judgment.


                                               __________________________________________

                                               Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Kelly and Ellis

Affirmed

Filed: April 23, 2026




       7   Under the legal-sufficiency standard, when the appellant attacks the legal sufficiency of
an adverse finding on which she did not have the burden of proof, she must demonstrate on appeal
that there is no evidence to support the adverse finding. Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co.,
348 S.W.3d 194, 215 (Tex. 2011). Under the factual-sufficiency standard, when the appellant
attacks the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on which she did not have the burden of proof,
we consider and weigh all the evidence in the record pertinent to the finding to determine if the
credible evidence supporting the finding is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of
all the evidence, that the finding should be set aside. Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner,
505 S.W.3d 580, 615 (Tex. 2016).
         8 Under legal- and factual-sufficiency standards, the factfinder is the sole judge of the

witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. City of Keller v. Wilson,
168 S.W.3d 802, 819 (Tex. 2005) (describing legal-sufficiency review); Golden Eagle Archery,
Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003) (describing factual-sufficiency review).
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