Robert Berleth and Berleth & Associates, PLLC v. Susan Celeste Northcutt

Opinion filed April 9, 2026




                                     In The


        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                  ___________

                              No. 11-26-00020-CV
                                  ___________

  ROBERT BERLETH AND BERLETH & ASSOCIATES, PLLC,
                    Appellants
                                        V.
               SUSAN CELESTE NORTHCOTT, Appellee


                     On Appeal from the 266th District Court
                              Erath County, Texas
                      Trial Court Cause No. 25CVDC-00193


                      MEMORANDUM OPINION
       This appeal arises from the trial court’s denial of Appellants’ plea to the
jurisdiction and motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 91a of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a. We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
       On August 1, 2025, Appellee, Susan Celeste Northcott, filed suit against
Appellants, Robert Berleth and Berleth & Associates, PLLC (Berleth), alleging that
Berleth, a court-appointed receiver in a case involving her ex-husband in Tarrant
County, clouded title to her personal property in Erath County. Susan sought
declaratory and injunctive relief in her original petition. Berleth filed a general
denial, a plea to the jurisdiction, and a motion to dismiss under Rule 91a. Following
a hearing, the trial court denied Berleth’s plea and motion, and Berleth filed a notice
of appeal.
      When this appeal was docketed, we notified Berleth that the orders being
appealed did not appear to be final or otherwise appealable, which affected our
jurisdiction. We requested the parties to file responses and informed them that the
appeal was subject to dismissal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a).
      Berleth asserts that he constitutes a “governmental unit” as contemplated by
Section 51.014(a)(8) and is entitled to an interlocutory appeal under that statute
because he is a court-appointed receiver in the 352nd District Court. See TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8) (West Supp. 2025). Susan responds that
Berleth’s status as a court-appointed receiver “[does] not convert [Berleth]—though
an officer of the court—into ‘this state’ or ‘one of the several agencies of government
that collectively constitute the government of this state,” nor does it qualify Berleth
as “any other institution, agency, or organ of government the status and authority of
which are derived from the Constitution of Texas or from laws passed by the
legislature under the constitution.” See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 101.001(3)(A), (D)
(West 2019).
      Unless specifically authorized by statute, appeals may be taken only from
final judgments. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 840–41
(Tex. 2007); Lehmann v. Har–Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001).
Section 51.014(a)(8) authorizes an interlocutory appeal from a trial court’s order
granting or denying a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit, as that term is


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defined in Section 101.001. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 51.014(a)(8), 101.001(3). In
relevant part, Section 101.001(3) provides that:
      “Governmental unit” means:
             (A) this state and all the several agencies of government that
      collectively constitute the government of this state, including other
      agencies bearing different designations, and all departments, bureaus,
      boards, commissions, offices, agencies, councils, and courts; [and]
              ...
             (D) any other institution, agency, or organ of government the
      status and authority of which are derived from the Constitution of Texas
      or from laws passed by the legislature under the constitution.
First, Berleth states that he is a state official because he is a receiver for the 352nd
District Court, citing to Koseoglu in support. See Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d at 843–45.
In   this   regard,   he   contends   that       because   a   court-appointed   receiver
is an “[i]nstrumentality and [o]fficer” of the trial court and “Texas courts are
agencies of the State of Texas . . . the receiver partakes of that same status.” See
CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 101.001(3)(A).
      Next, Berleth contends that he constitutes a governmental unit because a
court-appointed receiver is “an institution, agency, or organ of government,” and
their “status and authority derive from laws passed by the Legislature.” See id.
§ 101.001(3)(D). In this regard, he states that a “receiver is unquestionably an
institution of government,” and that a “receiver acts under color of law, exercises
powers that no purely private actor could wield, and administers a trust for the
benefit of the public interest in the orderly resolution of litigation.”          Citing
Section 31.002 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, he states that his “status
and authority derive[s] in their entirety from laws passed by the Legislature.” CIV.
PRAC. & REM. § 31.002 (West 2020) (relating to postjudgment collections through a
court proceeding).

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      Finally, Berleth contends that Section 51.014(a)(8) must be liberally
construed “to effectuate its protective purpose.”
      “[C]haracterizations of textual interpretations as ‘strict’, ‘liberal’, ‘narrow’,
‘broad’, and the like are not helpful when, as is usually the case, the real goal is
simply a ‘fair’ reading of the language.” Dallas Symphony Assoc., Inc. v. Reyes, 571
S.W.3d 753, 759 (Tex. 2019). “[A] fair reading of [Section 51.014] must simply
give effect to all its provisions.” Id. We believe a fair reading of the statute
forecloses Berleth’s interlocutory appeal because a court-appointed receiver does
not constitute a governmental unit as contemplated by Sections 51.014(a)(8) and
101.001(3).
      We first address Berleth’s reliance on Koseoglu. In Koseoglu, the supreme
court addressed the application of Section 51.014(a)(8) to Mark McLellan, an
employee of the Texas A&M University System and the plaintiff’s supervisor, and
held that McLellan, as a state official, could seek an interlocutory appeal from the
denial of his plea to the jurisdiction. 233 S.W.3d at 837; see CIV. PRAC. & REM.
§ 51.014(a)(8). In that case, it was undisputed that McLellan, as an employee of
Texas A&M, was a state official. Id. We have found no authority for the contention
that a court-appointed receiver constitutes a state official.
      As to his next argument, the supreme court has clarified that, for purposes of
Section 51.014(a)(8) and, in turn, Section 101.001(3), an “organ of government” is
one that “‘operates as part of a larger governmental system’ and performs a ‘uniquely
governmental’ function.” CPS Energy v. Elec. Reliability Council of Tex., 671
S.W.3d 605, 614–16 (Tex. 2023) (quoting Univ. of the Incarnate Word v. Redus,
518 S.W.3d 905, 910–11 (Tex. 2017) (Redus I)). For example, the supreme court in
CPS Energy held that Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. (ERCOT) is an
organ of government because it “operates as part of the state’s broader electricity-


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regulation system under PURA and performs the uniquely governmental function of
utilities regulation.” Id. at 616. In Redus I, the supreme court held that a private
university that operates a state-authorized police department constituted a
governmental unit when defending suits because the legislature authorized the
university “to enforce state and local law using the same resource municipalities and
the State use to enforce law: commissioned peace officers,” and that “the function
the Legislature has authorized [the university] to perform it strongly indicate that [it]
is a governmental unit as to that function.” Redus I, 518 S.W.3d at 911 (citing TEX.
EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.212(b) (West 2020)), superseded by statute as stated in
University of the Incarnate Word v. Redus (Redus II), 602 S.W.3d 398, 411–12 (Tex.
2020) (noting that the legislature amended Section 51.212 to designate campus
police departments as law enforcement agencies and governmental bodies after suit
was filed).
      In contrast, turnover receivers do not serve the same type of public-oriented
governmental function. Instead, the authority provided by the legislature allows the
receiver appointed by the trial court to “take possession of . . . nonexempt property,
sell it, and pay the proceeds to the judgment creditor to the extent required to satisfy
the judgment.” CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 31.002(b)(3). A plain reading of the statute
restricts the receiver’s authority to satisfying the judgment in the case in which the
receiver is appointed.
      Because an interlocutory appeal is not authorized by statute and the trial
court’s orders do not constitute a final judgment in the case, we lack jurisdiction to
entertain Berleth’s appeal. See Sealy Emergency Room, L.L.C. v. Free Standing
Emergency Room Managers or Am., L.L.C., 685 S.W.3d 816, 820 (Tex. 2024)
(citing Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 200); see CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 51.014(a)(8).




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Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.




                                             W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
                                             JUSTICE


April 9, 2026
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.




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