Susan E. Harriman v. Leslie Hyman and Pulman, Cappuccio & Pullen, LLP

In the
                   Court of Appeals
           Second Appellate District of Texas
                    at Fort Worth
                 ___________________________
                      No. 02-25-00328-CV
                 ___________________________

                SUSAN E. HARRIMAN, Appellant

                                 V.

LESLIE HYMAN AND PULMAN, CAPPUCCIO & PULLEN, LLP, Appellees



              On Appeal from the 96th District Court
                     Tarrant County, Texas
                 Trial Court No. 096-352085-24


            Before Sudderth, C.J.; Wallach and Walker, JJ.
              Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Susan Harriman filed this lawsuit against Leslie Hyman and Pullman,

Cappuccio & Pullen, LLP (collectively Hyman Appellees) alleging that the Hyman

Appellees failed to properly represent her in a defamation lawsuit in 2017. The Hyman

Appellees filed no-evidence and traditional summary judgment motions claiming that

Harriman provided no evidence that their actions proximately caused any injury to her

and that the legal malpractice claim is time barred, and the trial court rendered summary

judgment granting the motions.        Because Harriman failed to produce sufficient

evidence to defeat the Hyman Appellees’ no-evidence motion, we will affirm. See Tex.

R. App. P. 47.1.

                           I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      As relevant to the alleged legal malpractice suit subject to this appeal, the Hyman

Appellees previously represented Harriman in a lawsuit to pursue defamation-based

claims against Palmaz Scientific, Inc., Julio Palmaz, M.D., and certain individuals

(collectively, the Palmaz Defendants) and to defend her against the Palmaz Defendants’

counterclaims in Dallas County (the Underlying Lawsuit). During the course of that

representation, Hyman participated in a hearing to unseal court records (the Boyle files1)

in Bexar County (2017 hearing).


      1
        We note that Harriman claims that she was given a copy of the Boyle files by a
“fellow whistleblower,” that her expert in the Underlying Lawsuit gained a copy of the
file prior to the 2017 hearing, and that the expert shared his “report and supporting
documents” with Hyman. According to Harriman, when Hyman reviewed these

                                            2
      During the 2017 hearing, Hyman argued that the sealed Boyle files were relevant

to her representation of Harriman in the Underlying Lawsuit because Dr. Julio Palmaz

was a party to both cases. Hyman also argued that Harriman was not an original party

to the Bexar County case and thus did not have prior notice of the hearing on the final

permanent sealing order—and that, even if she’d had notice, the filing of the Underlying

Lawsuit constituted changed circumstances that permitted Harriman to move to unseal

the records.

      Another party—the trustee of Palma Scientific Litigation Trust, an entity created

from the bankruptcy of Palmaz Scientific, Inc.—joined in Harriman’s motion to unseal

the Boyle files. The trustee was likewise not an original party to the Bexar County

lawsuit and did not have notice of the hearing on the final permanent sealing order.

      Palmaz opposed the motion to unseal the record and argued at the hearing that

the Boyle files should remain sealed because the documents impacted “third parties” as

well and should remain classified and confidential.2 Palmaz also claimed that the

motion to unseal the Boyle files was nothing more than Harriman’s attempt to


documents and discovered there was a sealing order, she refused to use Harriman’s
copy of the Boyle file. Hyman advised Harriman that a motion to unseal the file was
necessary. In her petition, Harriman alleges that she opposed Hyman’s filing of the
motion to unseal but she also acknowledges that she was aware of the motion and the
2017 hearing to unseal.
      2
       There was an extended discussion from Palmaz about the purported lack of
notice of the 2017 hearing to all impacted parties, but this argument was abandoned
during the hearing.


                                           3
circumvent discovery in the Underlying Lawsuit.3 Palmaz alleged that discovery was

stayed in the Underlying Lawsuit and accused Harriman of refusing to sit for a

deposition, respond to disclosure responses, or produce witness statements. According

to Palmaz’s attorney, Harriman had been subpoenaed to appear at the motion to unseal

hearing but had filed a motion to quash the subpoena the night before the hearing.4

      In addition to Harriman’s alleged discovery avoidance, Palmaz argued that

because Harriman had notice of the original hearing on the final permanent sealing

order, she was “barred” from attempting to unseal the Boyle files. In support of this

assertion, Palmaz attempted to introduce an e-mail—purportedly sent from an account

belonging to Harriman—with the subject line “Palma[z] court case.” Both Hyman and

the trustee’s attorney objected to the e-mail on hearsay and authenticity grounds.

Following a discussion off the record, Hyman stipulated—for the purpose of that

hearing only—that Harriman had notice of the hearing for the final sealing order before




      The Hyman Appellees confirmed Harriman’s desire to avoid discovery in their
      3

motions for summary judgment.
      4
        There was no documentation in the record of the motion to quash the
subpoena, but we note that Harriman was not present at the hearing. Harriman’s
allegations against the Hyman Appellees stem from her alleged lack of knowledge about
the arguments made by Hyman during the 2017 hearing and her disagreement with their
representation of her during the same.


                                          4
it was entered.5 However, Hyman argued that any such notice had no impact on

Harriman’s request to unseal the Boyle files because Rule 76a6 of the Rules of Civil

Procedure permitted a party with notice to proceed on a motion to unseal when there

are changed circumstances. Hyman claimed that the Underlying Lawsuit was sufficient

to establish the “changed circumstances” required under Rule 76a.

      Ultimately, the Bexar County district court denied the motion to unseal. The

district court provided no reasoning for its decision.

      Approximately one year later, in November 2018, a mediated settlement

agreement was signed by the parties in the Underlying Lawsuit, and a joint notice of

nonsuit with prejudice was granted by the trial court on November 27, 2018.7 No

appeal was filed, and the judgment became final on December 27, 2018. See Tex. R.

App. P. 26.1.




      5
       The e-mail was not admitted as an exhibit during the 2017 hearing, and we note
that Hyman only stipulated to Harriman’s notice of the final sealing order before it was
entered, and not to the e-mail or its alleged contents specifically.
      6
       “An order sealing or unsealing court records shall not be reconsidered on
motion of any party or intervenor who had actual notice of the hearing preceding
issuance of the order, without first showing changed circumstances materially affecting
the order.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 76a(7).
      7
       According to the Hyman Appellees, Harriman signed the settlement agreement
with full knowledge that her copy of the Boyle file was not used in the preceding
negotiations.


                                            5
       Just over two years later, in March 2022, Harriman sent an e-mail to Hyman

requesting a copy of the transcript from the 2017 hearing. Hyman sent an e-mail back

to Harriman just over one month later with the subject “Transcript,” and the printout

of the e-mail reflects that an attachment titled “BOYLE V ADVANCED 12-21-

17.pdf” was also included.

       On April 19, 2024, Harriman filed the original petition in this lawsuit, alleging

professional negligence8—legal malpractice—on the part of the Hyman Appellees.

Harriman complained in her petition that Hyman’s representation during the motion

to unseal the records in Bexar County forced her into an unfavorable settlement of the

Underlying Lawsuit.      The Hyman Appellees’ answer alleged several affirmative

defenses, including that Harriman’s claims are time barred; that her damages, if any, are

unrelated to any act or omission of the Hyman Appellees; and that the Hyman

Appellees’ actions were not the proximate cause of any alleged damages suffered by

Harriman.

       The Hyman Appellees subsequently filed both traditional and no-evidence

motions for summary judgment; the trial court granted both motions, and this appeal

followed.




       8
        Harriman initially alleged a breach of contract claim as well, but filed a notice of
partial nonsuit as to that claim on July 22, 2024.


                                             6
                                    II. DISCUSSION

       When a party moves for summary judgment under both Rule 166a(c) (traditional

grounds) and Rule 166a(i) (no-evidence grounds),9 we will first review the trial court’s

judgment as to the standards of Rule 166a(i). See Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d

598, 600 (Tex. 2004). Then, if the nonmovant failed to produce more than a scintilla

of evidence under that burden, there is no need to analyze whether the appellee’s

summary-judgment proof satisfied the Rule 166a(c) burden, as it necessarily fails. Id.,

see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Xerox State & Local Sols., Inc., 663 S.W.3d 569, 576 (Tex. 2023).

Thus, we begin with Harriman’s second issue—the trial court’s grant of the Hyman

Appellees’ no-evidence motion for summary judgment.

                               A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

       After an adequate time for discovery, the party without the burden of proof may,

without presenting evidence, move for summary judgment on the ground that no

evidence supports an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim or defense. Tex. R.

Civ. P. 166a(i). The motion must specifically state the elements for which no evidence

exists. Id.; Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009). The trial court


       9
        The Texas Supreme Court amended Rule 166a, effective March 1, 2026. See
Sup. Ct. of Tex., Final Approval of Amendments to Rule 166a of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure, Misc. Docket No. 26-9012 (Feb. 27, 2026). But the “amendments
apply only to a motion for summary judgment filed on or after March 1, 2026,” id., so
they are inapplicable here. All citations to Rule 166a reference the prior version of the
Rule, which continues to govern motions for summary judgment filed before March 1,
2026.


                                              7
must grant the motion unless the nonmovant produces summary-judgment evidence

that raises a genuine, material fact issue. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) & 1997 cmt.; B.C. v.

Steak N Shake Operations, Inc., 598 S.W.3d 256, 259 (Tex. 2020).

       A no-evidence summary judgment is essentially a pretrial directed verdict

because it requires the nonmovant to present evidence sufficient to raise a genuine,

material fact issue on each challenged element. Timpte Indus., 286 S.W.3d at 310. We

apply the same legal-sufficiency standard in reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment

as we apply in reviewing a directed verdict. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742,

750–51 (Tex. 2003).

       When reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment, we examine the entire record

in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and

resolving any doubts against the motion. Sudan v. Sudan, 199 S.W.3d 291, 292 (Tex.

2006). We review a no-evidence summary judgment for evidence that would enable

reasonable and fair-minded jurors to differ in their conclusions. Hamilton v. Wilson,

249 S.W.3d 425, 426 (Tex. 2008) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex.

2005)). We credit evidence favorable to the nonmovant if reasonable jurors could, and

we disregard evidence contrary to the nonmovant unless reasonable jurors could not.

Timpte Indus., 286 S.W.3d at 310 (citing Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582

(Tex. 2006)). If the nonmovant brings forward more than a scintilla of probative

evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact, then a no-evidence summary



                                             8
judgment is not proper. Smith v. O’Donnell, 288 S.W.3d 417, 424 (Tex. 2009); King Ranch,

118 S.W.3d at 751.

      Less than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence is so weak that it does

nothing more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of a fact. Kindred v. Con/Chem,

Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983). More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the

evidence would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach different

conclusions. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004); Merrell Dow

Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997).

                         B. APPLICABLE LAW: NEGLIGENCE

      A legal malpractice claim is based on negligence. Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d

662, 664 (Tex. 1989). To prevail on a legal malpractice claim, the plaintiff must prove

that (1) the attorney owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) the attorney breached that duty;

(3) the breach proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries; and (4) the plaintiff suffered

damages. Alexander v. Turtur & Assoc., Inc., 146 S.W.3d 113, 117 (Tex. 2004) (quoting

Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, 909 S.W.2d 494, 496 (Tex. 1995)); Parsons v. Baron, No. 02-09-

00380-CV, 2011 WL 3546617, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 11, 2011, pet.

denied) (mem. op.).

      The parties focused the majority of their arguments on the proximate cause

element.10 Because the plaintiff must prove all four elements, we likewise concentrate


      10
        We note that in Texas, the standard of care for a lawyer is one that would be
exercised by a reasonably prudent attorney. See Hall v. Rutherford, 911 S.W.2d 422, 424

                                            9
our analysis on whether Harriman provided more than a scintilla of probative evidence

that this breach proximately caused her alleged damages. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

       “Proximate cause consists of cause in fact and foreseeability.” Connaway v. Village

Farms, L.P., 200 S.W.3d 353, 356 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (citing Sw. Key

Program, Inc. v. Gil-Perez, 81 S.W.3d 269, 274 (Tex. 2002); Doe v. Boys Club of Greater Dall.,

Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 477 (Tex. 1995)); see also Avery Pharm., Inc. v. Haynes and Boone,

L.L.P., No. 2-07-317-CV, 2009 WL 279334, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 5,

2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Rodgers v. Weatherspoon, 141 S.W.3d 342, 345 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.)).         “These elements cannot be established by mere

conjecture, guess, or speculation.” Connaway, 200 S.W.3d at 356 (citing Doe, 907 S.W.2d

at 477). To establish cause in fact, the plaintiff must show that “the defendant’s acts or



(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, writ denied). Because expert testimony is generally
required to prove the standard of care, see Ulrickson v. Hibbs, No. 2-02-161-CV, 2003
WL 22514689, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 6, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.), it
logically follows that to show an attorney’s actions fell below that standard of care and
thereby caused the client’s injury would also require expert testimony. Such testimony
can be evidenced in an affidavit made on personal knowledge and setting forth facts
that would be admissible in evidence and may not include legal conclusions. See Hall,
911 S.W.2d at 424 (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(f); Beta Supply, Inc. v. G.E.A. Power Cooling
Sys., Inc., 748 S.W.2d 541, 542 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied);
Harbour Heights Dev., Inc. v. Seaback, 596 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 1980, no writ)). The testimony—or sworn affidavit—of a lay witness is not
competent to controvert an expert witness’s opinion. Id. The affidavit from Hyman
does not discuss the standard of care owed to Harriman and Harriman provides no
expert affidavit at all. Effectively, neither party provides proper expert evidence in this
case as to the breach of duty element. This lack of expert evidence is likewise
problematic for Harriman’s proximate cause argument.


                                             10
omissions were a substantial factor in bringing about the injury that would not

otherwise have occurred.” Avery Pharm., Inc., 2009 WL 279334, at *7. It is not enough

to show that the defendant’s negligence merely contributed to a condition that made the

plaintiff’s injury possible. Connaway, 200 S.W.3d at 356 (citing Doe, 907 S.W.2d at 477)

(emphasis added). Like cause in fact, foreseeability requires more than speculation—

the test considers whether the alleged negligent act or omission was the type that should

have been reasonably anticipated to cause the plaintiff’s injury. Id. at 357 (citing Read v.

Scott Fetzer Co., 990 S.W.2d 732, 737 (Tex. 1998); Phan Son Van v. Pena, 990 S.W.2d 751,

755 (Tex. 1999)).

                                      C. ANALYSIS

       In Harriman’s original petition, she alleged that the Hyman Appellees had

violated the duties owed to her under their lawyer-client relationship. Harriman

provided a list of the ways11 she believed that the Hyman Appellees deviated from these

duties and “fail[ed] to exercise ordinary skill and knowledge.” Harriman then claimed

that, as a direct and proximate cause of these actions, she suffered “actual damages,


       11
         The allegations included that the Hyman Appellees improperly stipulated that
Harriman had notice of the motion to seal, had failed to advise the Bexar County district
court that Harriman already had a copy of the Boyle file, had failed to prevent
Harriman’s affirmative claims in the Underlying Lawsuit from “being compromised,”
had failed to protect Harriman’s interests to allow her to pursue her claims, had failed
to keep Harriman “properly informed” and had misled her in material ways, and finally,
had done “things that required [Harriman] to spend more money on legal fees and other
expenses.” The petition also allowed for any “other particulars” that would be
established during discovery.


                                            11
special damages, incidental damages, and punitive damages, all in an amount to be

proven at trial.”

       The Hyman Appellees’ no-evidence motion for summary judgment argued that

Harriman provided no evidence that Hyman’s stipulation at the 2017 hearing

proximately caused any damages. To support this assertion, the Hyman Appellees

claimed that the lack of explanation from the Bexar County district court regarding the

denial of Harriman’s motion to unseal and the simultaneous denial of the same relief

requested by the trustee—who “undisputedly had no prior notice of the . . . motion to

seal”—indicated that the stipulation to Harriman’s notice of the final sealing order

hearing did not impact the outcome of the 2017 hearing.

       In her response to the summary judgment motions, Harriman asserted that her

damages stemmed from: (1) the failure to “introduce evidence already in [Hyman’s]

possession to show the truth of [Harriman’s] allegedly defamatory statements” in the

Underlying Lawsuit; (2) the decision not to tell the Bexar County district court that

Harriman already had a copy of the Boyle files; and (3) the stipulation to “fraudulent”

evidence during the hearing without first consulting Harriman. According to Harriman,

these failures caused her to “settle her case for millions less than she was entitled to,

release valuable affirmative claims, and incur additional attorneys’ fees.” Harriman

claimed the “unauthorized (and incorrect) stipulation [] regarding the Purported




                                           12
Email”12 and Hyman’s failure to inform the Bexar County district court that Harriman

had a copy of the Boyle files, caused the trial court to deny the motion to unseal the

Boyle files, thereby impacting the outcome of the Underlying Lawsuit.

      The Hyman Appellees, in the reply to Harriman’s response, argued that

Harriman can only speculate that the stipulation during the 2017 hearing caused the

Bexar County district court to deny the motion to unseal the Boyle files. The Bexar

County district court provided no explanation for its decision, and the other party that

participated in the hearing—who made no such stipulation regarding prior notice—was

also denied the requested access to the sealed Boyle files. Thus, we agree that Harriman

can only speculate as to the reason that the Bexar County district court denied the

motion to unseal the Boyle files. There is nothing in the petition or in the response to

the summary judgment motions to support Harriman’s hypotheses.                 Because

speculation is not sufficient to prove causation, Harriman failed to meet her summary

judgment burden. See Connaway, 200 S.W.3d at 356.

      Harriman also claims that Hyman’s refusal to use her copy of the Boyle files was

the proximate cause of an unfavorable settlement agreement—requiring her to abandon



      12
        Harriman admitted that she has not seen a copy of this e-mail, and we note that
it was not admitted as an exhibit during the 2017 hearing. Hyman claims that she chose
to stipulate to Harriman’s notice of the final sealing order to avoid a possible
continuance and to prevent Harriman from having to sit for a deposition, since that
notice was, in her opinion, immaterial to Harriman’s ability to move to unseal the Boyle
files.


                                          13
her “valuable affirmative claims during [the] settlement negotiations.”      Harriman

maintains that she would have been able to “resolve the case more favorably” had she

been able to use her copy of the Boyle files. To support this, Harriman points to

Hyman’s deposition—one page of which was attached to her summary judgment

response—where Hyman purportedly stated that, “It was very clear that the case was

not going to settle if she did not dismiss her affirmative claims.” In response, the

Hyman Appellees pointed out that “[Harriman]—by her own admission—was aware of

[the] failure [to use the Boyle files] before entering into the settlement agreement.”

(Emphasis in original).

      By definition, settlement agreements are the product of give and take between

parties. See Frew v. Hawkins, No. 3:93-CA-065 WWJ, 2007 WL 2667985, at *29 (E.D.

Tex. Sept. 5, 2007). Harriman points to nothing in the record—and provides no expert

testimony—to support her claim that a more favorable settlement would have been

reached had the copy of the Boyle file been used during the negotiations. In fact, she

points to statements that support the opposite: Hyman stated that there would not have

been a settlement at all without Harriman releasing her affirmative claims. Further,

Harriman’s response to the motions for summary judgment only provides vague,

conclusory statements about how the key element of her defamation case “could have

been readily proven with the Boyle file, which was available but not used by [the Hyman

Appellees].” She does not provide any context or evidence to support this contention.



                                          14
        Thus, the trial court correctly determined that Harriman’s claim is not supported

by a scintilla of evidence. Harriman makes sweeping negative statements about the

result of the settlement negotiations without pointing to any evidence in the record to

support her claim that if the Boyle files had been used in those discussions, the result

would have been different or more favorable. Conjecture, like speculation, is not

enough to support the element of proximate cause—and Harriman failed to provide

either direct or circumstantial evidence to support this element of her claim. See Excel

Corp. v. Apodaca, 81 S.W.3d 817, 820 (Tex. 2002) (holding cause in fact may not be

supported by conjecture, guess or speculation, but can be based on either direct or

circumstantial evidence) (citing Doe, 907 S.W.2d at 477; Havner v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc.,

825 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Tex. 1992)).

        Because Harriman failed to meet her burden to present more than a scintilla of

evidence showing that the Hyman Appellees’ actions proximately caused any of her

purported damages, we overrule her second issue. See Alexander, 146 S.W.3d at 117.

                                 III. CONCLUSION

        Having overruled Harriman’s second issue—which is dispositive of this

appeal—we affirm the trial court’s order of summary judgment. See Tex. R. App. P.

47.1.

                                                       /s/ Brian Walker
                                                       Brian Walker
                                                       Justice

Delivered: April 16, 2026

                                           15