Webb Consolidated Independent School District v. Robert Marshall and Amy Marshall

Supreme Court of Texas
                           ══════════
                            No. 24-0339
                           ══════════

         Webb Consolidated Independent School District,
                              Petitioner,

                                   v.

                Robert Marshall and Amy Marshall,
                             Respondents

   ═══════════════════════════════════════
               On Petition for Review from the
       Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas
   ═══════════════════════════════════════

                      Argued October 8, 2025

      JUSTICE LEHRMANN delivered the opinion of the Court.

     JUSTICE HAWKINS filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice
Young and Justice Sullivan joined.

      The Texas Education Code recognizes that school-board members
acting in their official capacities have “an inherent right of access to
information, documents, and records maintained by the [school]
district.” TEX. EDUC. CODE § 11.1512(c). The Code provides those board
members with the opportunity to sue for injunctive relief when the
district does not provide them with requested information and to recover
attorney’s fees if they “prevail[]” in such a suit. Id. § 11.1512(c-2). In
this case, two school-board members sued Webb Consolidated
Independent School District under Section 11.1512 and obtained a
temporary injunction ordering the District to produce some of the
requested information and documents. Before the case proceeded to
trial, however, the members’ terms on the board expired. The primary
issue here is whether the board members nevertheless prevailed under
the statute by obtaining injunctive relief, thereby entitling them to
recover attorney’s fees.
      We hold that they did.      Although a party generally does not
“prevail” for fee purposes by obtaining a temporary injunction, the trial
court’s order effectively granted the board members the final relief
Section 11.1512 authorizes: an injunction requiring the District to
timely produce requested information to which the members have an
inherent right of access. Additionally, we hold that the board members
were not required to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing
suit because Section 11.1512(c-2) creates an exception to the general
exhaustion requirement.     We therefore affirm the court of appeals’
judgment.

                            I. Background

      Robert and Amy Marshall were members of the board of trustees
of Webb Consolidated Independent School District. On May 16, 2020,
the Marshalls requested information from the District regarding agenda




                                    2
items for an upcoming board meeting.1         The following month, the
Marshalls sued the District for injunctive relief under Texas Education




      1  In the May 16 request, quoted below, the Marshalls sought
information and documents regarding six items:
      1. Who is the architect for projects [sic] and why is he not
         signing certificates for payment AIA Document G702-1992?
      2. Agenda item #7. Discussion regarding 2020-2021 District
         Calendar and Master Schedule.
            A. Where are the Wind Tech Training Classes?
      3. Agenda Item #12. Discussion and Possible action to approve
         _______ as Construction Management Consultants for
         building Elementary School to increase enrollment.
            A. Is the board planning on building a new Elementary
               School?
            B. Where is this school going to be built?
            C. How is building a new school going to increase
               enrollment?
      4. Agenda Item #13. Presentation by Financial advisor to
         discuss a Cash Defeasance scenario.
            A. Who is the Financial advisor you are referring to?
            B. What is the Cash Defeasance scenario?
      5. Agenda Item #15. Discussion and possible action to accept
         the recommendation of the Superintendent to hire the
         following Classroom Teachers for 2020-2021. Secondary
         Teacher, Elementary Teacher, and Middle School Teacher.
            A. We would like to know who you are recommending?
            B. What are their credentials?
            C. How much experience do they have as an educator?
            D. Are their certifications current with all state
               requirements?
            E. Do they have emergency permit or a standard
               certification?




                                   3
Code Section 11.1512(c-2), alleging that the District had failed to turn
over the information. The Marshalls also sought an award of costs and
attorney’s fees. See id. § 11.1512(c-2) (“A member who prevails in a suit
under this subsection is entitled to recover court costs and reasonable
attorney’s fees.”).
       On September 15, 2020, the trial court issued a “Temporary
Injunction Order” finding, among other things, that the Marshalls “have
made . . . a proper request pursuant to” Section 11.1512, that “harm is
imminent because [the Marshalls] will be unable to properly address the
issues before the Board,” and that injunctive relief “is specifically
authorized by” Section 11.1512(c-2). The court ordered the District to
       produce to the [Marshalls] the following documents and
       information pertaining to the May 19, 2020 Board Meeting:
       1. Information and documentation regarding the
          contractor’s application for payment as to [five specific
          construction] projects[;]
          ....
       2. Construction Management Consultants for building
          Elementary School;
       3. Certification information on the           Superintendent
          recommended Classroom Teachers;
       4. Extension of Administrator(s) Term Contracts
          including [the] Superintendent . . . i.e. 2019 evaluation.




       6. Agenda Item 17. Discussion and possible action regarding
          the extension of Administrator(s) Term Contracts.
              A. Why are we extending the Superintendent Heriberto
                 Gonzalez [contract] without his evaluation in the last
                 15 months?



                                      4
The order concluded by requiring the District to produce the information
within twenty days of the order’s execution. The District did not appeal
the order.
       Amy Marshall’s term on the board expired in November 2020.
The following month, the Marshalls amended their petition to seek
injunctive relief regarding the District’s alleged failure to comply with
five additional requests for documents and information that Robert
Marshall had made in 2019 and 2020 in his capacity as a board member.
They later filed a supplemental petition to add claims related to four
other requests from 2019.
       Meanwhile,      the    Marshalls     were     pursuing     a    separate
administrative proceeding against the District stemming from the
board’s vote to censure them at a September 2019 board meeting. One
of the claims asserted in that proceeding was that the Marshalls had
requested documents supporting their censure on multiple occasions
and that the District violated Section 11.1512 by failing to provide them.
In May 2021, the Commissioner of Education dismissed that claim for
lack of jurisdiction.2       The Marshalls did not seek review of the
Commissioner’s decision but instead added the claim to their pending
suit as part of the above-referenced supplemental petition.3



       2  The Commissioner specifically determined that (1) the Marshalls
“failed to exhaust this issue” because they did not include it in their grievance
against the District and (2) their pleadings affirmatively negated the claim by
asserting that the District had no documents supporting their censure.
       3 The Marshalls filed their supplemental petition in April 2021, after

the administrative law judge issued a proposal for decision in the
administrative proceeding but before the Commissioner issued a final decision.



                                       5
      The Marshalls then filed a motion to compel, complaining about
the District’s responses to numerous discovery requests. The District
filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment,
arguing that (1) the Marshalls failed to exhaust their administrative
remedies, (2) Amy Marshall’s claims were moot because she was no
longer a school-board member, and (3) the District had already provided
the Marshalls with all responsive documents that it maintained.4 The
trial court denied the District’s motions, and the District appealed that
order. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(8) (authorizing an
interlocutory appeal of an order that grants or denies a plea to the
jurisdiction by a governmental unit).
      The same day the District filed its notice of appeal, the trial court
signed an order granting the Marshalls’ motion to compel. The appeal
stayed all further proceedings in the trial court pending its resolution.
Id. § 51.014(b).
      While the appeal was pending, Robert Marshall’s term on the
board expired, and the District therefore urged the court of appeals to
dismiss the suit as moot. The District also continued to argue that the
Marshalls’ failure to exhaust their administrative remedies deprived the
courts of jurisdiction. The court of appeals agreed that any outstanding
requests for information and pending requests for injunctive relief were
moot because the Marshalls were no longer board members and thus no
longer had a statutory right to the requested information. 690 S.W.3d



      4 The District also moved for no-evidence summary judgment on the

ground that there was no evidence the Marshalls were not provided the
requested documents.



                                    6
698, 704 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023). However, the court of appeals
concluded that the Marshalls’ request for attorney’s fees and court costs
“presents an issue that is separate from the request for information.”
Id. The court further held that the claim for attorney’s fees remained
live because the Marshalls “prevailed,” at least in part, by obtaining the
temporary injunction before their terms expired. Id. at 704–05.

                     II. Prevailing-Party Status

      As noted, a school-board member acting in an official capacity has
“an inherent right of access to information, documents, and records
maintained by the [school] district.” TEX. EDUC. CODE § 11.1512(c). For
that reason, a board member may request such information from the
district without filing a public information request. Id. If the district
fails to timely deliver the requested information, the board member may
seek “appropriate injunctive relief” and, if he “prevails,” may recover
court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.           Id. § 11.1512(c-2).
Specifically, the statute provides:
      If a district does not provide the requested information to
      a member of the board of trustees in the time required
      under Subsection (c-1), the member may bring suit against
      the district for appropriate injunctive relief. A member
      who prevails in a suit under this subsection is entitled to
      recover court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees. . . .
Id.
      It is undisputed that the Marshalls can obtain no further
substantive relief under Section 11.1512(c-2) because they are no longer
school-board members. In that sense, their pending claims have become
moot. See Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 162 (Tex.
2012) (“A case becomes moot if, since the time of filing, there has ceased



                                      7
to exist a justiciable controversy between the parties—that is, if the
issues presented are no longer live . . . .”). Amy Marshall’s term expired
in November 2020, and Robert Marshall’s term expired in November
2022 while the District’s appeal of the order denying its plea to the
jurisdiction was pending in the court of appeals. Because the Marshalls
are no longer school-board members, they no longer have an inherent
right to the documents and information at issue. See TEX. EDUC. CODE
§ 11.1512(c). They already obtained some of that information, however,
by virtue of the temporary injunction. On that basis, the Marshalls
contend they may recover attorney’s fees as prevailing parties.
      The District responds that for a party to prevail, it must prevail
on the merits, and temporary injunctions do not resolve the merits of a
claim. Instead, temporary injunctions merely maintain the status quo
during the course of the proceedings and do not materially alter the
parties’ legal relationship. Further, the District asserts, the temporary
injunction did not provide full relief because the District had already
turned over the information in the order. Therefore, the Marshalls did
not prevail before their claims were mooted, so they cannot recover
attorney’s fees under the statute.
      The Marshalls reply that the trial court’s temporary injunction
provided them with the ultimate goal of their lawsuit—the production
of the documents they requested. In that way, the temporary injunction
did not merely maintain the status quo; it granted the Marshalls
permanent relief because it compelled the production of information and
documents.    There was no additional, substantive relief that the




                                     8
Marshalls could have received, at least regarding the information
covered by the injunction.
      The United States Supreme Court recently opined on the very
issue now before us: whether a preliminary injunction confers
prevailing-party status for attorney’s-fees purposes in an otherwise
moot case. See Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U.S. 192 (2025). In Lackey, drivers
whose licenses were suspended under a Virginia statute for failure to
pay certain fines challenged the statute’s constitutionality and obtained
a preliminary injunction enjoining the Commissioner of the Virginia
Department of Motor Vehicles from enforcing the statute. Id. at 196.
The statute was repealed while the case was pending, mooting the claim,
but the plaintiffs argued that they had prevailed by obtaining the
preliminary injunction and were therefore entitled to attorney’s fees. Id.
at 196–98. The Supreme Court rejected that argument and held that
“[a] party ‘prevails’ when a court conclusively resolves his claim by
granting enduring relief on the merits that alters the legal relationship
between the parties.” Id. at 207. The Court further explained that
“external events that render a dispute moot do not convert a temporary
order designed to preserve the status of the parties into a conclusive
adjudication of their rights.” Id. at 201.
      We agree with this analysis, which properly interprets the
statutory term “prevail.” Id. at 199–201. “For more than a century,”
Texas has followed the “American Rule” requiring parties to bear their
own attorney’s fees and precluding recovery of fees from an opposing
party unless authorized by contract or statute. Tony Gullo Motors I,
L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 310–11 (Tex. 2006) (citing Buckhannon




                                     9
Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 532 U.S.
598, 603 (2001)). As a result, our fee-shifting jurisprudence largely
tracks that of our federal counterpart. See Epps v. Fowler, 351 S.W.3d
862, 866–68 (Tex. 2011) (“[W]e find federal cases focusing on the
meaning of prevailing party instructive.”).
      Lackey properly recognizes that “prevailing party” is “a ‘legal
term of art.’” 604 U.S. at 199 (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603).
As the U.S. Supreme Court does when it construes acts of Congress, we
presume that when our Legislature “borrows terms of art in which are
accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it
presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to
each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and
the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise
instructed.” Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952). “We
presume the Legislature enacted the statute ‘with complete knowledge
of the existing law and with reference to it.’” In re Bridgestone Ams. Tire
Operations, LLC, 459 S.W.3d 565, 572 (Tex. 2015) (quoting Acker v. Tex.
Water Comm’n, 790 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1990)).
      Our previous decisions discussing the meaning of “prevailing
party” comport with the longstanding approach to this term of art. We
have explained that “to prevail means to ‘obtain actual and meaningful
relief, something that materially alters the parties’ legal relationship.’”
Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469,
485–86 (Tex. 2019) (quoting Intercontinental Grp. P’ship v. KB Home
Lone Star L.P., 295 S.W.3d 650, 652 (Tex. 2009)). Moreover, we have
stated that “[w]hether a party prevails turns on whether the party




                                    10
prevails upon the court to award it something, either monetary or
equitable.” KB Home, 295 S.W.3d at 655.
      A temporary injunction typically does not confer prevailing-party
status because it does not conclusively adjudicate the legal dispute.
Rather, a temporary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy” that is
generally “intended to preserve the status quo until final judgment.”
Harley Channelview Props., LLC v. Harley Marine Gulf, LLC, 690
S.W.3d 32, 37 (Tex. 2024); see also Lackey, 604 U.S. at 200 (“‘The purpose
of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions
of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held,’ and ‘to balance the
equities as the litigation moves forward.’” (first quoting Univ. of Tex. v.
Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981); then quoting Trump v. Int’l
Refugee Assistance Project, 582 U.S. 571, 580 (2017))). To obtain a
temporary injunction, a party must show “(1) a cause of action against
the party to be enjoined; (2) a probable right to recover on that claim
after a trial on the merits; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable
injury absent the temporary injunction.”        Harley Channelview, 690
S.W.3d at 37; see also Kinney v. Barnes, 443 S.W.3d 87, 94 n.9 (Tex.
2014) (“Absent a showing of a likelihood of success on the merits, a
temporary injunction may not issue.”). But a probable right to recover
is not a right to recover, and temporary injunctions are not “tantamount
to decisions on the underlying merits.” Lackey, 604 U.S. at 200 (quoting
Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 395); see also Sw. Weather Rsch., Inc. v. Jones,
327 S.W.2d 417, 422 (Tex. 1959) (“Generally the most expeditious way
of obviating the hardship and discomforture of an unfavorable
preliminary order is to try the case on its merits and thus secure a




                                    11
hearing wherein the case may be fully developed and the courts, both
trial and appellate, may render judgments finally disposing of
controversies.”).
       The “Temporary Injunction Order” issued by the trial court in this
case constituted a temporary injunction because it took “immediate
effect, before final judgment,” and it “(1) require[d] the enjoined party to
perform; (2) [was] made effective and operate[d] while suit remain[ed]
pending; and (3) compel[led] performance based on a determination that
the opposing party’s claim ha[d] merit.”5         Harley Channelview, 690
S.W.3d at 40. Importantly, however, the order did not merely preserve
the status quo or award provisional relief; instead, it granted the
Marshalls the complete relief sought under Section 11.1512, ordering
the District to produce documents and information to which the
Marshalls claimed they were entitled.               See TEX. EDUC. CODE
§ 11.1512(c-2). And the District chose to comply with the order rather
than appeal it.      See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(4)
(authorizing an interlocutory appeal from an order that grants or
refuses a temporary injunction).
       Under the particular circumstances of this case and this statute
(Section 11.1512), the order was effectively dispositive as to the four
items identified in it. Thus, as to those four items, the reason the
Marshalls’ claims are no longer “live” is that the Marshalls have
prevailed on the merits of the claims—not that later mootness made the



       5 The order so qualified even though it did not contain other “required

safeguards for a temporary injunction,” like requiring a bond or setting a trial
date. Harley Channelview, 690 S.W.3d at 40.



                                      12
claims nonjusticiable. For all practical purposes, the claims had already
been adjudicated on their merits. When a court orders a party to turn
over requested information and the receiving party obtains knowledge
of that information, there is no putting the genie back in the bottle.
       Indeed, at least as to the categories of information in the trial
court’s order, the Marshalls “prevailed” in the only way they could have
under Section 11.1512(c-2): they obtained injunctive relief requiring
production of the information. See TEX. EDUC. CODE § 11.1512(c-2). The
statute did not authorize the Marshalls to seek or obtain any other kind
of relief.   When the trial court ordered the District to turn over
information and documents and the District did not appeal the order,
the Marshalls received “appropriate injunctive relief” and “prevail[ed]
in a suit under this subsection.”     See id.   Although the temporary
injunction was not final as a procedural matter, the Marshalls
nevertheless “prevailed” by means of the temporary injunction just as
fully as they would have prevailed by means of a final judgment covering
the information at issue. The Marshalls therefore “prevail[ed],” under
this particular statutory scheme, with respect to the information
covered by the temporary injunction. See id.
       As noted, the District contends that it gave the Marshalls
responsive documents before the temporary injunction issued, so the
order did not provide the Marshalls with any meaningful relief.
However, the trial court held a hearing on the Marshalls’ request for
injunctive relief and, after considering the evidence, at least impliedly
found otherwise in concluding that harm to the Marshalls was imminent
and ordering the District to produce the information. The District did




                                    13
not provide a reporter’s record of the temporary-injunction hearing, and
we therefore presume the evidence was sufficient to support the trial
court’s findings. See In re G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d 288, 300 (Tex. 2021); see
also Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 783
(Tex. 2005) (“If the proceeding’s nature, the trial court’s order, the
party’s briefs, or other indications show that an evidentiary hearing took
place in open court, then a complaining party must present a record of
that hearing to establish harmful error.”).
      Finally, we note that our holding does not entitle the Marshalls
to recover attorney’s fees incurred throughout the pendency of the case.
On the record before us, the Marshalls “prevailed” by obtaining the
“Temporary Injunction Order” issued in September 2020, but only as to
the documents covered by that order. It follows that the only attorney’s
fees recoverable are those incurred in connection with the claim to
information that was the subject of the temporary injunction.         See
Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313 (requiring a fee claimant to segregate
recoverable and unrecoverable fees). The order was issued early in the
case, which continued for two years and involved many additional claims
and requests for information that were rendered moot by the Marshalls’
departure from the school board before the trial court granted any relief.
Accordingly, the trial court must take that into account in determining
the amount of a reasonable, recoverable fee.

           III. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

      We next address the District’s argument that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction over the action because the Marshalls were required,
and failed, to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit.



                                   14
The Legislature may expressly or impliedly grant an agency exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve disputes “within the agency’s regulatory arena.”
Clint Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Marquez, 487 S.W.3d 538, 544 (Tex. 2016).
With respect to such disputes, “[i]f [a] party files suit before exhausting
exclusive administrative remedies, the courts lack jurisdiction and must
dismiss the case.” Id. (further explaining that requiring exhaustion
“honors the Legislature’s intent that ‘the appropriate body adjudicates
the dispute’ first” (quoting Essenburg v. Dallas County, 988 S.W.2d 188,
189 (Tex. 1998))).
      In the context of “disputes that arise within the education
system,” parties are generally required to exhaust their administrative
remedies before filing suit. Id. at 545–46. “For well over one hundred
years, we have held that persons complaining about the ‘management of
the school system’ or the ‘administration of school laws’ must exhaust
their administrative remedies before courts can exercise jurisdiction.”
Id. at 546. That requirement follows from Section 7.057(a) of the Texas
Education Code, which provides that if a “person [is] aggrieved
by . . . the school laws of this state,”6 she “may appeal in writing to the
commissioner.”       TEX. EDUC. CODE § 7.057(a).    We have interpreted
Section 7.057(a) “to require a person who chooses to appeal to first seek
relief through the administrative process.” Marquez, 487 S.W.3d at 545
(emphases omitted).




      6   “‘School laws of this state’ means Title 1 and [Title 2] and rules
adopted under those titles.” TEX. EDUC. CODE § 7.057(f)(2). Section 11.1512
falls within Title 2 and is therefore a school law of this state.



                                    15
       However, the administrative-exhaustion requirement is subject
to “limited statutory exceptions.”7           Id.   We agree with the court of
appeals that Section 11.1512 creates such an exception.                 “When
construing a statute, our primary objective is to determine the
Legislature’s intent which, when possible, we discern from the plain
meaning of the words chosen.” In re Est. of Nash, 220 S.W.3d 914, 917
(Tex. 2007).     Section 11.1512(c-2) straightforwardly provides that a
school-board member “may bring suit” when the school district has
missed     its   deadline    to   turn    over      information.   TEX. EDUC.
CODE § 11.1512(c-2).        The use of the word “suit” contrasts with the
general exhaustion requirement in Section 7.057, where the Legislature
provides for an “appeal” to the Commissioner by the aggrieved party
followed by another “appeal” to the district court.8 Id. § 7.057(a), (c), (d).
Moreover, Section 11.1512 provides for “appropriate injunctive relief,”
id. § 11.1512(c-2), which the Commissioner cannot provide, see Hou.
Fed’n of Tchrs., Loc. 2415 v. Hou. Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 S.W.2d 644, 646
(Tex. 1987) (“The Commissioner of Education is not authorized to order
immediate injunctive relief.”).          Instead, the express mechanism by




       7 For example, a party is not required to exhaust administrative
remedies when an administrative agency acts without authority or raises
certain questions of law. Jones v. Clarksville Indep. Sch. Dist., 46 S.W.3d 467,
471 n.3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.) (collecting cases).
       8 Indeed, as the court of appeals noted, “[w]hen the Legislature refers

to a dispute being brought before the Commissioner of Education—or the
dispute is otherwise subject to the exhaustion of administrative remedies—it
has consistently used the word ‘appeal’ rather than the word ‘suit.’” 690
S.W.3d at 708 (collecting examples).



                                         16
which a party may obtain injunctive relief under Subsection (c-2) is by
filing a suit in court.
       Further, “[t]he statutory words must be determined considering
the context in which they are used, not in isolation.” Silguero v. CSL
Plasma, Inc., 579 S.W.3d 53, 59 (Tex. 2019). Section 11.1512 permits
school-board members to request information to which they have an
inherent right of access without submitting a public information
request.    TEX. EDUC. CODE § 11.1512(c).      When a board member
requests information, the school district has only twenty business days
to turn over that information. Id. § 11.1512(c-1). If the district must
delay its response because compliance would be unduly burdensome,
then it may take “a reasonable additional period of time, not to exceed
[thirty business days],” and it must “inform the [board member] of the
reason for the delay . . . and the date by which the information will be
provided.” Id. These provisions demonstrate the Legislature’s intent
for pertinent information to be placed into the hands of requesting board
members quickly.
       Yet, if board members must exhaust their administrative
remedies by appealing to the Commissioner before seeking relief under
Section 11.1512, the Commissioner has until the 240th day after the
appeal is filed to issue a decision, after which the aggrieved person may
appeal to district court. Id. § 7.057(c). The lengthy exhaustion process
is incompatible with the speedy procedure envisioned by the Legislature
for ensuring board members obtain information to which they have an




                                   17
“inherent right of access.”9 Id. § 11.1512(c). Therefore, because Section
11.1512 creates an exception to the general exhaustion requirement, the
Marshalls were not required to appeal to the Commissioner before
pursuing injunctive relief.10

                              IV. Conclusion

       As a general matter, a party does not “prevail” for attorney’s-fees
purposes by obtaining a temporary injunction during the pendency of
litigation. And when the substantive claims in a case are rendered moot
before final judgment, a corresponding claim for attorney’s fees based on
prevailing-party status is not kept alive by virtue of the prior issuance
of such an injunction. However, Section 11.1512 presents an unusual
statutory scheme, and this case presents an unusual set of
circumstances. We therefore hold that when a school-board member
obtains an injunction under Section 11.1512 ordering a school district to


       9 To be sure, delay does not by itself create an exception to the general

exhaustion requirement. Indeed, the administrative process can often be a
more efficient method of resolving disputes than litigation. See Marquez, 487
S.W.3d at 544 (“A party who obtains relief through the administrative process
avoids the expense and delay of litigation.”). But the statute here provides a
limited exception to the exhaustion requirement to facilitate prompt access to
information that a school-board member needs and that a school district has
withheld. The only way to do that, as the plain language of the statute makes
clear, is to obtain injunctive relief from the courts. See TEX. EDUC. CODE
§ 11.1512(c-2) (“[A school-board] member may bring suit against the district
for appropriate injunctive relief.”).
       10 We have also recognized a limited exception to the exhaustion
requirement in certain circumstances involving requests for temporary
injunctions. See Marquez, 487 S.W.3d at 555 (citing Hou. Fed’n of Tchrs., 730
S.W.2d at 646). Because we hold that exhaustion of administrative remedies
is not required under Section 11.1512’s plain language, we need not address
that exception.



                                      18
immediately turn over requested information and documents, the
district complies with that order, and the case becomes moot before final
judgment, the board member’s claim for attorney’s fees as a prevailing
party remains live. We also hold that a board member need not exhaust
administrative remedies by appealing to the Commissioner before filing
suit for injunctive relief under Section 11.1512. Accordingly, we affirm
the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the case to the trial court for
a determination of the Marshalls’ reasonable and recoverable attorney’s
fees.



                                        Debra H. Lehrmann
                                        Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: April 24, 2026




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